Latest news with #NationalSecurityCommissiononEmergingBiotechnology
Time Magazine
3 days ago
- Business
- Time Magazine
The U.S. Can't Afford to Lose the Biotech Race with China
In this era of escalating trade tensions and geopolitical uncertainty, the U.S. cannot afford to cede another critical industry to China. Though we have long stood as the global leader in biotechnology, we are now at risk of losing that position, just as we did with semiconductors a generation ago. American innovation brought about the semiconductor revolution. For decades, we supplied the world with those innovations, too: U.S. manufacturers produced nearly 40% of all semiconductors in 1990. Today, that number is hardly over 10%. And while the Chinese chip industry has long lagged behind global leaders, China has spent billions catching up and is expected to have captured nearly 25% of the worldwide chip manufacturing market by 2030. History is about to repeat itself, this time in the biotech sector, as we write in a new report with our fellow Commissioners on the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB). The Chinese government has been heavily investing in its biotech sector for decades, and while many of the most consequential discoveries in the field were made by American scientists in American labs, we are now quickly losing ground to China in everything from the production of critical medications to the development of defense applications. The NSCEB has put forward recommendations to speed up the American biotech sector while slowing down Chinese advancement, but the successful implementation of those recommendations will require real, tangible collaboration between industry and government. Here, we highlight two critical areas for immediate action: 1. Limit the influence of adversarial capital on American biotech Too many American biotech companies, struggling to raise funding and traverse the ' valley of death '—the phase of technology development when research funding runs dry but before commercialization and profit are possible—have accepted capital from foreign investors, including Chinese entities. Once those entities hold a stake in an American business, they may influence the trajectory of product development, or even work to degrade the company's relationship with the American government. For instance, some forms of Chinese investment make companies ineligible for many government contracts. At the least, they gain insight into the state of American biotech and access to valuable intellectual property. China's recent restrictions on investment in American companies only further demonstrate the Chinese Communist Party's willingness to alter investment regulation as part of their strategy for competition. Biotech companies have a responsibility to better understand the dangers of adversarial investment. Unlike the pharmaceutical industry, biotech is relatively uncoordinated, with fewer centralized bodies dedicated to regulation or information sharing. This also means there are minimal mechanisms for a unified response to those dangers. Therefore, industry leaders must organize to take up this issue, not just for the sake of national security, but also because it's good business: protecting our biotech ecosystem's intellectual property is critical for its economic success. Government action is also essential in combatting this threat—that's why the NSCEB has recommended that Congress create the Independence Investment Fund. Managed by an expert, non-government partner, the fund would back start-ups that strengthen American national security but are struggling to attract traditional investors. It would support businesses in exactly the situation that most often leads to foreign investment, allowing up-and-coming American biotech companies to survive difficult periods in their development and successfully enter the global market. This infusion of strategically deployed federal capital into our biotech sector would make a disproportionate impact at this critical moment in the development of the industry, paving the way for private investment. 2. Create better information flow between the biotech sector and the American government, particularly the intelligence community If we believe, as we NSCEB Commissioners do, that economic security is national security, we must enhance reciprocal communication between our intelligence establishments and industry. Briefing business leaders on the risks their companies face will allow them to take action in the boardroom. To a similar end, we must manage the over-classification of intelligence that often prevents the sharing of important findings with civilian business leaders, particularly when complex geopolitical dynamics are involved. Greater collaboration will also permit our government to better understand the industries they seek to protect: access to the perspectives of biotech leadership will allow the intelligence community to recognize the most pressing issues for our government to monitor. We also must involve many more people across government with knowledge of biology and science, outside of the traditional and narrow framing of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. Without people in the room who can understand the biotech sector and its needs, we will fail to effectively navigate this increasingly important theater for U.S.-China geopolitical competition. The risks presented by adversarial capital and the siloing of information are just two opportunities for the kind of public-private collaboration that could protect our biotech industry. And importantly, like the other areas for action the NSCEB identifies in our report, they are issues we have the ability to fix before it's too late. Decades ago, we failed to preserve our position as the global leader in semiconductor manufacturing. That error required us to take extraordinarily expensive, difficult, and uncertain measures to regain what we lost. Today, as we face a similar risk with biotech, we must not make the same mistake again.
Axios
16-04-2025
- Politics
- Axios
U.S. trails China in race to utilize biotech on the battlefield
A critical avenue of U.S.-China competition has slipped under the public's radar despite its potential outsize impacts on economies, militaries and weaponry: biotechnology. Why it matters: Better body armor, dynamic camouflage, foods synthesized in trenches, super soldiers, landmine-detecting bacteria and sabotaged materials shipped to the enemy are all promises of this field. And a new report concludes that Beijing is ascending to biotech dominance, at great risk to Washington. Driving the news: The National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology filed that report to Congress this month after two years of research and debate. Commissioners include Sen. Todd Young (R-Ind.), also a member of the intelligence committee; Eric Schmidt, the former Google CEO; and Michelle Rozo, a vice president at In-Q-Tel and former principal director for biotechnology at the Pentagon. Here's a taste of the report's many findings, recommendations and warnings: China is sprinting ahead after prioritizing biotech 20 years ago. The U.S. must course correct in three years. Washington should dedicate $15 billion minimum over the next five years to supercharge the sector. Beijing's advancements are fueled by military-civil fusion. But the U.S. "should not try to out-China China; that is a losing strategy." There is "every reason to believe" the Chinese Communist Party will "weaponize biotechnology." Drone warfare "will seem quaint" the day the People's Liberation Army debuts genetically enhanced troops. Opportunities for greater collaboration already exist, namely through NATO's innovation accelerator, DIANA. Congress should require the Defense Department to incorporate military-relevant biotech into wargaming and exercises. What they're saying: U.S. leadership should consider biotech a distinct domain of warfare, according to Young, a Marine Corps veteran. "Imagine if we could, in theater, biomanufacture shelf-stable blood, thereby seizing on that golden hour in which we need to provide emergency medical attention to warfighters who are under duress," he told Axios. "Imagine a world in which we are able to develop new energetics through biological means, with far more thrust — power — to extend the range of our existing missile systems." "That would, obviously, change all sorts of calculations of warfare." Reality check: There's a lack of stateside industrial capacity. And moving from lab to market is an expensive ordeal, a red flag for increasingly risk-averse investors. What we're watching: What makes it into the National Defense Authorization Act, a logical home for this report's suggestions. The bottom line: "Just like the Industrial Age, just like the Information Age, this is the Biotechnology Age. Most people do not know that," Paul Arcangeli, a commissioner and former House Armed Services Committee staff director, said in an interview.
Yahoo
10-04-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Opinion - America can't afford to fall behind China in the race for biotech dominance
Earlier this week, the congressionally-mandated National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology released its major report, titled 'Charting the Future of Biotechnology.' The bipartisan and bicameral commission — on which I serve as a commissioner, although the views here are solely my own — asserts in no uncertain terms that 'biotechnology represents the next transformative leap for human potential.' Biotechnology — in less than a decade and when mated with artificial intelligence — will have a transformative impact on defense, supply chains, agriculture, health and computing, all areas that will affect our national security. And yet it is China, not the U.S., that has assigned top priority to biotechnology development for two decades. China's efforts pose a direct threat to America's national security. Beijing has harnessed both its government and civilian sectors in what it terms 'military-civil fusion' to enable the People's Liberation Army to displace the U.S. military as the world's most dominant force. It has invested in gene editing, bionic robots and biomanufacturing, all of which have military applications. China has already employed biotechnology for surveillance of its own people, notably the Uyghur population. One of its scientists, initially defrocked but now back in his lab, modified the genes of babies to make them more resilient to infections. It is not a stretch from that effort to develop 'super soldiers,' a clear Chinese objective. Chinese control of critical supply chains — the nation already dominates basic health products such as pain relievers — could enable it to blackmail other countries simply by threatening to cut off supplies. China could infiltrate agricultural food chains, with devastating effects not only on America's military but on our population as a whole. And all of this could take place well within a decade, unless the U.S., which still holds the lead in basic and applied biotechnology research, develops a cohesive, integrated, public-private biotechnology strategy. To this end, the commission's report outlines 50 major recommendations that fall into six categories. Among these are a call for the U.S. to prioritize biotechnology at the national level and, as a first step, establish a National Biotechnology Coordinating Office within the Executive Office of the President. Additionally, the report recommends that should take several steps to help mobilize the private sector to get U.S. biotech products to scale — which, apart from the health sector, is currently not the case. For that reason, Congress should direct regulatory agencies to simplify their processes to enable companies to bring biotechnology products to market. Congress should also fund an independent investment fund to finance technology startups whose products would have a major positive effect on national security. Moreover, in order to 'maximize the benefits of biotechnology defense,' Congress should direct the Department of Defense to 'work with private companies to build facilities across the country to biomanufacturer products that are critical for [its] needs.' Biotechnology should not be the sole province of elite laboratories on the coasts. Biomanufacturing facilities can be built anywhere in the country, and could provide employment not only to those who hold advanced degrees but to employees with a wide range of skills and educational backgrounds. In order to ensure that America maintains a permanent lead over China in biotechnology, the report recommends that Congress authorize the Department of Energy to build a new 'Web of Biological Data.' Because such a web would be widely available, it would be a boon to researchers as they pursue new biotechnology developments. At the same time, Congress should review existing export policies and provide any additional authorities that are needed to ensure China cannot obtain sensitive biological data from the U.S. Little of the foregoing is feasible unless America has a biotech-literate government and public, which is not the case today. The report recommends that Congress 'direct the Office of Personnel Management to provide workforce training in biotechnology across the interagency' and also 'maximize the impact of domestic biotechnology workforce training programs.' Finally, it is important to recognize that many of our allies have also made strides in biotechnology and are willing, indeed eager, to work with the U.S. in cooperative biotech development. For example, there are indications that the British government would be interested in including biotech in the research development pillar ('Pillar 2') of the Australia-U.K.-U.S. agreement or AUKUS. Among other steps to foster international cooperation with our friends and partners, the report recommends that Congress include biotech within the scope of the State Department's International Technology Security and Innovation Fund. Ensuring America's lead in biotechnology, and thereby protecting our national security in the face of China's determination to dominate the biotech field, is very much a bipartisan objective. The commission's membership includes two Democrats, Sen. Alex Padilla (D-Calif.) and Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), and two Republicans, commission chairman Sen. Todd Young (R-Ind.) and Rep. Stephanie Bice (R-Okla.). Moreover, the White House has indicated that biotechnology is a major concern of its own. A recent executive order specifically states that 'if the U.S. wishes to maintain an effective security umbrella to defend its citizens and homeland, as well as allies and partners, it needs to have a large upstream manufacturing and goods-producing ecosystem. This includes developing new manufacturing technologies in critical sectors like bio-manufacturing.' Recent proposed federal funding cuts in research and development could run directly counter to that executive order as it relates to biotechnology and undermine any American effort to ensure long-term American leadership in this critical field. The commission's report offers concrete steps to maintain that leadership. The cost of its major recommendations totals $15 billion, spread over five years and multiple executive agencies. Relative to the entire federal budget, this sum is quite small, and should be well within Congress's ability to fund and for the executive branch to implement. Hopefully both branches of government will act quickly to implement the commission's recommendations and prevent China from dominating this critical sector. Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
The Hill
10-04-2025
- Politics
- The Hill
America can't afford to fall behind China in the race for biotech dominance
Earlier this week, the congressionally-mandated National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology released its major report, titled 'Charting the Future of Biotechnology.' The bipartisan and bicameral commission — on which I serve as a commissioner, although the views here are solely my own — asserts in no uncertain terms that 'biotechnology represents the next transformative leap for human potential.' Biotechnology — in less than a decade and when mated with artificial intelligence — will have a transformative impact on defense, supply chains, agriculture, health and computing, all areas that will affect our national security. And yet it is China, not the U.S., that has assigned top priority to biotechnology development for two decades. China's efforts pose a direct threat to America's national security. Beijing has harnessed both its government and civilian sectors in what it terms 'military-civil fusion' to enable the People's Liberation Army to displace the U.S. military as the world's most dominant force. It has invested in gene editing, bionic robots and biomanufacturing, all of which have military applications. China has already employed biotechnology for surveillance of its own people, notably the Uyghur population. One of its scientists, initially defrocked but now back in his lab, modified the genes of babies to make them more resilient to infections. It is not a stretch from that effort to develop 'super soldiers,' a clear Chinese objective. Chinese control of critical supply chains — the nation already dominates basic health products such as pain relievers — could enable it to blackmail other countries simply by threatening to cut off supplies. China could infiltrate agricultural food chains, with devastating effects not only on America's military but on our population as a whole. And all of this could take place well within a decade, unless the U.S., which still holds the lead in basic and applied biotechnology research, develops a cohesive, integrated, public-private biotechnology strategy. To this end, the commission's report outlines 50 major recommendations that fall into six categories. Among these are a call for the U.S. to prioritize biotechnology at the national level and, as a first step, establish a National Biotechnology Coordinating Office within the Executive Office of the President. Additionally, the report recommends that should take several steps to help mobilize the private sector to get U.S. biotech products to scale — which, apart from the health sector, is currently not the case. For that reason, Congress should direct regulatory agencies to simplify their processes to enable companies to bring biotechnology products to market. Congress should also fund an independent investment fund to finance technology startups whose products would have a major positive effect on national security. Moreover, in order to 'maximize the benefits of biotechnology defense,' Congress should direct the Department of Defense to 'work with private companies to build facilities across the country to biomanufacturer products that are critical for [its] needs.' Biotechnology should not be the sole province of elite laboratories on the coasts. Biomanufacturing facilities can be built anywhere in the country, and could provide employment not only to those who hold advanced degrees but to employees with a wide range of skills and educational backgrounds. In order to ensure that America maintains a permanent lead over China in biotechnology, the report recommends that Congress authorize the Department of Energy to build a new 'Web of Biological Data.' Because such a web would be widely available, it would be a boon to researchers as they pursue new biotechnology developments. At the same time, Congress should review existing export policies and provide any additional authorities that are needed to ensure China cannot obtain sensitive biological data from the U.S. Little of the foregoing is feasible unless America has a biotech-literate government and public, which is not the case today. The report recommends that Congress 'direct the Office of Personnel Management to provide workforce training in biotechnology across the interagency' and also 'maximize the impact of domestic biotechnology workforce training programs.' Finally, it is important to recognize that many of our allies have also made strides in biotechnology and are willing, indeed eager, to work with the U.S. in cooperative biotech development. For example, there are indications that the British government would be interested in including biotech in the research development pillar ('Pillar 2') of the Australia-U.K.-U.S. agreement or AUKUS. Among other steps to foster international cooperation with our friends and partners, the report recommends that Congress include biotech within the scope of the State Department's International Technology Security and Innovation Fund. Ensuring America's lead in biotechnology, and thereby protecting our national security in the face of China's determination to dominate the biotech field, is very much a bipartisan objective. The commission's membership includes two Democrats, Sen. Alex Padilla (D-Calif.) and Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), and two Republicans, commission chairman Sen. Todd Young (R-Ind.) and Rep. Stephanie Bice (R-Okla.). Moreover, the White House has indicated that biotechnology is a major concern of its own. A recent executive order specifically states that 'if the U.S. wishes to maintain an effective security umbrella to defend its citizens and homeland, as well as allies and partners, it needs to have a large upstream manufacturing and goods-producing ecosystem. This includes developing new manufacturing technologies in critical sectors like bio-manufacturing.' Recent proposed federal funding cuts in research and development could run directly counter to that executive order as it relates to biotechnology and undermine any American effort to ensure long-term American leadership in this critical field. The commission's report offers concrete steps to maintain that leadership. The cost of its major recommendations totals $15 billion, spread over five years and multiple executive agencies. Relative to the entire federal budget, this sum is quite small, and should be well within Congress's ability to fund and for the executive branch to implement. Hopefully both branches of government will act quickly to implement the commission's recommendations and prevent China from dominating this critical sector. Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.
