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Russia rolls a geopolitical dice
Russia rolls a geopolitical dice

Express Tribune

time02-08-2025

  • Business
  • Express Tribune

Russia rolls a geopolitical dice

Listen to article Pakistan presented its first National Security Policy (NSP) in January 2022. The policy emphasised a shift to economic security and a citizen-centric approach. Former National Security Advisor Moeed Yousaf led the idea of recognising that economic security was crucial for overall national security. Seen in the context of Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan, it is hard to understand how geo-economics can precede geopolitics. Pakistan provides Afghanistan its primary transit route, serves as its largest export market and acts as its principal diplomatic emissary to the world. It's not just geo-economics but geopolitics that binds both countries in a not-so-friendly but enduring relationship. In the matter of Afghanistan, a recent geopolitical event is dominating the current discourse on Afghanistan. Russia has recently rolled a geopolitical dice that may have far-reaching regional and global implications. By according diplomatic recognition to the Taliban regime, the first by any country, the Russian dice puts on spot the very idea of international consensus led by the US not to do so. It is not just Russia but China also that is supporting the idea of developing a regional consensus in treating the Taliban not just as a military movement or a rogue regime but as a responsible political force that can be trusted with the process of state-building. Countries in the Russian and Chinese sphere of influence must already have sensed the bigger picture behind the Russian idea of the roll of this dice. With one roll of the dice, Russia has indicated that it is ready to forego all the historical animosity and grievances that have overshadowed its relationship with Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, a million Afghans were killed, a million and a half were wounded, three million sought refuge in Iran and Pakistan, and an unknown number were internally displaced — all out of a population of fewer than 20 million people. Yet both Russia and Afghanistan have decided to move beyond their historical grievances, and Russia, by recognising the Taliban's government, has laid the foundation for helping the Taliban in transitioning from a military movement to becoming an internationally recognised legitimate political force. The dice roller in this case would not do that without a specific agenda. What can be on that agenda? Russia and China, together, are throwing up a challenge to the US-led international consensus against diplomatic normalisation with the Taliban regime. The diplomatic engagement and support that both Russia and China have chosen to offer to Afghanistan stems from the rising tensions between the global north and global south and backs these two great powers' driven narrative of 'the rise of the rest against the west'. On the question of Afghanistan, China is utilising geopolitics to create the right conditions to enable its geo-economic strategies. In January 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping accepted the credentials of the Taliban's newly appointed Afghan ambassador to China. The message that China sent to the world was clear: China does not believe that Afghanistan should be excluded from the international community. Geo-economically, China doesn't want uncertainty in Afghanistan to upset its plans for Central and South Asia, and it would do everything to politically and diplomatically engage with the Taliban to ensure that the insecurity radiating out of Afghanistan does not undermine its billions of dollars of investment in its neighbouring country, Pakistan. An Afghanistan, supported politically and engaged diplomatically, will ensure that China's largest BRI project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which runs through areas near the Afghan border, is not vulnerable to strikes from Pakistani Taliban rebels. If China also recognises the Taliban government, would a broader wave of recognition follow? The diplomatic engagement and support that both Russia and China have chosen to offer to Afghanistan stems from the rising tensions with the US, which has made the possibility of normalisation of its relations with the current Taliban regime explicitly conditional. America's Afghan policy is driven by ensuring a global endorsement that the world will stay united in holding the Taliban to their commitments in key areas. Three key areas that the US wants the Taliban to deliver in are: not allowing Afghan land to be used for terrorist activities abroad and giving up violence as an instrument of power; respecting human rights; and undoing its policy of depriving women of their rights. In contrast, the diplomatic olive branch that both Russia and China have offered to the Taliban regime goes against the US-driven international commitment. Seen from the perspective of increased disengagement of the US and Western powers from Afghanistan, the Russian roll of this geopolitical dice may induce a domino effect of more and more countries joining hands with Russia and China in elevating the Taliban's status from being considered as a rogue regime to being accepted as a responsible political force. Geo-economically, Russia is planning to raise the bar of its bilateral trade with Afghanistan from the current $1 billion annual to $3 billion by the end of this year. Afghanistan acts as an important transit corridor for Russia. If Afghanistan gets its act together, it can play a significant role in enabling regional connectivity and providing access to Russian oil and wheat to the South Asian markets. In April this year, Russia, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan have already signed agreements to launch the Trans-Afghan Railway, reaffirming the strategic importance of Afghanistan in regional connectivity. Russia's actions may fundamentally reshape the global community's stance on Afghanistan. President Trump's idea of rolling a tariff dice is already being viewed with contempt by many countries in the world. India has also been put on the spot as its exports have been subjected to a 25% tariff, and the seven Indian companies that imported oil from Russia have been put under sanctions. Will this encourage India to distance itself from American relations? It is already a defence and strategic partner of Russia; will it bring a shift in its relations with China? Pakistan's current government enjoys good relations with the current American administration, and considering that Pakistan is also part of the international consensus against the Taliban regime, what will be the response of Pakistan's establishment to this Russian roll of geopolitical dice? We will have to wait and see.

The Third Eye: Envisioning India's National Security Policy
The Third Eye: Envisioning India's National Security Policy

India.com

time15-06-2025

  • Politics
  • India.com

The Third Eye: Envisioning India's National Security Policy

When Prime Minister Modi briefly addressed the nation in the wake of Operation Sindoor, on May 12, he laid down some postulates that could be deemed to be a part of the country's national security policy. Many strategic analysts had been advocating for a formal declaration of National Security Policy (NSP) little realising that the release of any of its details in public domain could benefit the opponent and also that such a policy might require revisiting because of the changes in geopolitical scenario affecting the international spectrum of friends and adversaries. Prime Minister Modi's statement that any further terror attack from Pakistan will be considered as an 'act of war' and responded to by our defence forces accordingly, certainly was an immutable part of our security doctrine that matched with India's call for 'zero tolerance towards terrorism of all kinds', made from all international platforms. We may attempt to visualise the lasting paradigms of foreign and internal policies that would constitute our NSP even when we choose not to release any such formal document. When the Cold War ended at the beginning of the 90s, countries -big and small -sensed relief from the tension that existed between the two superpowers and felt free to assert their place under the sun. It is no wonder therefore, that the post-Cold War era became an era of 'proxy wars' marked by a sudden rise in insurgencies, separatist movements and cross-border militancy- their number touching the figure of 200 according to some estimates. Meanwhile, Pakistan was given full credit by the US for the success of the anti-Soviet armed campaign- run on the war cry of Jehad- which caused the dismemberment of the USSR and ended the Cold War. What Pakistan did however, was to immediately think of replicating the success of Afghan Jehad in Kashmir and sent in the dreaded Harkat- ul -Ansar (HUA)-a mix of radical Islamic militants including elements of Taliban, to make what turned out to be a failed attempt to 'liberate' the valley. Faith-based terrorism is now a prime threat to the democratic world as a whole and it is good that both the US and Russia are against Islamic terror- the latter witnessed a terror attack on a concert hall in Moscow by ISIS-K, the competitor of Al Qaeda originating from Iraq-Syria region during the US-led 'war on terror'. The attack carried out in March 2024 by a group of four terrorists armed with automatic rifles resulted in the killing of 145 persons including many children and injuries to 500 others. Terrorism will remain a prime threat to India and our NSP rightly puts it on top of the security agenda. India's experience with Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War years was a mixed bag. India apparently tilted towards one side in the combative ideological battle of the two superpowers- between International Communism propounded by the Soviet Union and Capitalism with free market practised by the US leading the West. Post-Cold War, India has come on its own on the basis of 'mixed economy' and shown the way for geopolitically remaining aligned only with friends across the international community on the basis of a mutually beneficial relationship. That India is against all military conflicts and is committed to world peace, has been clearly stated by Prime Minister Modi as a policy approach and this should serve India well in the long term. This stand goes with a conscious effort to make India economically strong and self-sufficient in defence and it is a matter of great satisfaction that Prime Minister Modi was personally taking initiatives on both fronts. The policy of inviting foreign investment in the defence sector on the condition that technology will be shared and production in India will be encouraged, is to be treated as a part of our security mandate. Foreign policy of India favours bilateral friendships in a multipolar world order and this has enabled the country to appropriately respond to military conflicts witnessed in many parts of the world. India has to be prepared to deal with the two adversaries on its borders acting in concert against this country. India's national security policy has to reckon with the threat posed by the Sino-Pak axis- particularly in Kashmir as was evident during the post-Pahalgam military confrontation between India and Pakistan. Indo-US friendship can be sustained by the shared opposition to 'Islamic terrorism' and also by the American firm support to India against any hostile acts of China. It should be indicated by India that its active participation in the Quad needed to be reciprocated by the US in preventing any Chinese aggressiveness in the Indian Ocean. Trump administration must look upon the Pak-Afghan belt as a festering ground for Islamic terrorism and India must continue to educate the former on the situation there, Biden administration seemed to have been somewhat negligent towards this region. The US needs to be constantly reminded that Pakistan had cleverly tried to be in the good books of America while harbouring radical terrorist groups on its soil, despite the fact that Islamic radicals regarded US as their prime enemy. At the same time Pakistan had brought about a settlement between the Taliban Emirate and China. American policymakers should take notice of this. The evolution of national security policy of India should be regarded as a work in progress with continuity on some fundamental points of strategic interest of India and scope for tactical adjustments depending upon geopolitical shifts and the world's economic trends. The national security policy of India would not be complete without defining the nation's approach to safeguarding its internal security, integrity and unity. A vast diverse country like India has been vulnerable to conflicts rooted in caste, creed and region and needed a set of policies that upheld fundamental rights, freedom of citizens to visit and settle down in any part of the state and access to justice. Maintenance of law and order should be strong across the length and breadth of the country and since this was a state subject the Centre's right to take note of any gross failure of a state on that front, should be further strengthened. This has become even more important in these times when the adversary can remotely instigate internal trouble by activating its 'sleeper cells' through digital media. It is heartening to note that the Union Home Minister is already working for better coordination between the central agencies and state Police forces as part of the national security policy.

The Third Eye: Envisioning India's national security policy
The Third Eye: Envisioning India's national security policy

Hans India

time15-06-2025

  • Politics
  • Hans India

The Third Eye: Envisioning India's national security policy

New Delhi: When Prime Minister Modi briefly addressed the nation in the wake of Operation Sindoor, on May 12, he laid down some postulates that could be deemed to be a part of the country's national security policy. Many strategic analysts had been advocating for a formal declaration of National Security Policy (NSP) little realising that the release of any of its details in public domain could benefit the opponent and also that such a policy might require revisiting because of the changes in geopolitical scenario affecting the international spectrum of friends and adversaries. Prime Minister Modi's statement that any further terror attack from Pakistan will be considered as an 'act of war' and responded to by our defence forces accordingly, certainly was an immutable part of our security doctrine that matched with India's call for 'zero tolerance towards terrorism of all kinds', made from all international platforms. We may attempt to visualise the lasting paradigms of foreign and internal policies that would constitute our NSP even when we choose not to release any such formal document. When the Cold War ended at the beginning of the 90s, countries -big and small -sensed relief from the tension that existed between the two superpowers and felt free to assert their place under the sun. It is no wonder therefore, that the post-Cold War era became an era of 'proxy wars' marked by a sudden rise in insurgencies, separatist movements and cross-border militancy- their number touching the figure of 200 according to some estimates. Meanwhile, Pakistan was given full credit by the US for the success of the anti-Soviet armed campaign- run on the war cry of Jehad- which caused the dismemberment of the USSR and ended the Cold War. What Pakistan did however, was to immediately think of replicating the success of Afghan Jehad in Kashmir and sent in the dreaded Harkat- ul -Ansar (HUA)-a mix of radical Islamic militants including elements of Taliban, to make what turned out to be a failed attempt to 'liberate' the valley. Faith-based terrorism is now a prime threat to the democratic world as a whole and it is good that both the US and Russia are against Islamic terror- the latter witnessed a terror attack on a concert hall in Moscow by ISIS-K, the competitor of Al Qaeda originating from Iraq-Syria region during the US-led 'war on terror'. The attack carried out in March 2024 by a group of four terrorists armed with automatic rifles resulted in the killing of 145 persons including many children and injuries to 500 others. Terrorism will remain a prime threat to India and our NSP rightly puts it on top of the security agenda. India's experience with Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War years was a mixed bag. India apparently tilted towards one side in the combative ideological battle of the two superpowers- between International Communism propounded by the Soviet Union and Capitalism with free market practised by the US leading the West. Post-Cold War, India has come on its own on the basis of 'mixed economy' and shown the way for geopolitically remaining aligned only with friends across the international community on the basis of a mutually beneficial relationship. That India is against all military conflicts and is committed to world peace, has been clearly stated by Prime Minister Modi as a policy approach and this should serve India well in the long term. This stand goes with a conscious effort to make India economically strong and self-sufficient in defence and it is a matter of great satisfaction that Prime Minister Modi was personally taking initiatives on both fronts. The policy of inviting foreign investment in the defence sector on the condition that technology will be shared and production in India will be encouraged, is to be treated as a part of our security mandate. Foreign policy of India favours bilateral friendships in a multipolar world order and this has enabled the country to appropriately respond to military conflicts witnessed in many parts of the world. India has to be prepared to deal with the two adversaries on its borders acting in concert against this country. India's national security policy has to reckon with the threat posed by the Sino-Pak axis- particularly in Kashmir as was evident during the post-Pahalgam military confrontation between India and Pakistan. Indo-US friendship can be sustained by the shared opposition to 'Islamic terrorism' and also by the American firm support to India against any hostile acts of China. It should be indicated by India that its active participation in the Quad needed to be reciprocated by the US in preventing any Chinese aggressiveness in the Indian Ocean. Trump administration must look upon the Pak-Afghan belt as a festering ground for Islamic terrorism and India must continue to educate the former on the situation there, Biden administration seemed to have been somewhat negligent towards this region. The US needs to be constantly reminded that Pakistan had cleverly tried to be in the good books of America while harbouring radical terrorist groups on its soil, despite the fact that Islamic radicals regarded US as their prime enemy. At the same time Pakistan had brought about a settlement between the Taliban Emirate and China. American policymakers should take notice of this. The evolution of national security policy of India should be regarded as a work in progress with continuity on some fundamental points of strategic interest of India and scope for tactical adjustments depending upon geopolitical shifts and the world's economic trends. The national security policy of India would not be complete without defining the nation's approach to safeguarding its internal security, integrity and unity. A vast diverse country like India has been vulnerable to conflicts rooted in caste, creed and region and needed a set of policies that upheld fundamental rights, freedom of citizens to visit and settle down in any part of the state and access to justice. Maintenance of law and order should be strong across the length and breadth of the country and since this was a state subject the Centre's right to take note of any gross failure of a state on that front, should be further strengthened. This has become even more important in these times when the adversary can remotely instigate internal trouble by activating its 'sleeper cells' through digital media. It is heartening to note that the Union Home Minister is already working for better coordination between the central agencies and state Police forces as part of the national security policy. (The writer is a former Director Intelligence Bureau)

Pakistan Is Dragging Itself To End Of The Road With A Broken Security Architecture
Pakistan Is Dragging Itself To End Of The Road With A Broken Security Architecture

News18

time24-05-2025

  • Politics
  • News18

Pakistan Is Dragging Itself To End Of The Road With A Broken Security Architecture

Last Updated: From Balochistan to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan remains challenged by escalating internal insurgencies In 2021, the Pakistani government introduced its inaugural National Security Policy, asserting that 'the safety, security, dignity, and prosperity of citizens in all their manifestations will remain the ultimate purpose of Pakistan's national security (p. 6)". To many, this appeared to mark a shift—at least rhetorically—towards a more citizen-focused and comprehensive understanding of security, moving away from the historically military-centric framework. Yet, four years on, such declarations appear increasingly unfulfilled. From Balochistan to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan remains challenged by escalating internal insurgencies. The Baloch nationalist movement, in particular, has withstood decades of state repression and, in recent years, has expanded both in territorial scope and tactical capability. Concurrently, Pakistan's regional stance—especially its policy alignment with the Afghan Taliban and its enduring engagement with extremist proxies—has resulted in diplomatic isolation and increased domestic exposure to militant reprisals. Pakistan must confront a difficult truth: national security cannot be sustained on the basis of repression, strategic ambiguity, and denial. Instead, it must be re-envisioned to include justice, political reconciliation, and an honest reckoning with historical missteps. This transformation must commence with Balochistan. For decades, the Pakistani state has approached Baloch nationalism not as a legitimate political grievance requiring resolution, but as a security challenge to be forcefully suppressed. This approach has involved enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and aggressive military interventions. Consequently, a profound sense of alienation has taken root among Baloch communities, many of whom, having suffered state violence, now view the state more as a colonising force than a protective authority. It is therefore unsurprising that leading non-violent advocates for justice in the province, such as Mahrang Baloch, have personally experienced repression, with numerous family members subjected to enforced disappearances or extrajudicial killings. extended their activities beyond traditional rural strongholds, increasingly targeting economic infrastructure and security personnel across the province, and occasionally in major urban centres such as Karachi. In recent years, Baloch insurgents have repeatedly attacked Pakistani military facilities and China-backed development projects, resulting in the deaths of several Chinese nationals. This trajectory does not reflect a weakening movement; rather, it underscores the failure of the Pakistani state's militarised strategy. The Pakistan government continues to portray the insurgency as externally orchestrated, particularly by India. This narrative serves to conveniently sidestep the deeper, legitimate grievances of Baloch citizens, including political exclusion, resource extraction without local benefit, and a lack of essential public services. Notably, Balochistan—despite its substantial mineral wealth—remains among the most impoverished and underdeveloped regions in the country. It is this stark disjunction between the state's strategic priorities and the lived experiences of its people that lies at the core of Pakistan's faltering national security framework. Pakistan's prevailing security architecture has been predominantly shaped and directed by the military establishment. Its conventional orientation has remained India-centric, interpreting national security primarily through the limited perspective of external threats which do not exist in reality. This strategic outlook has fostered three deeply detrimental tendencies within the country's policymaking. First, it has resulted in the systematic securitisation of internal dissent. Movements advocating for ethnic rights, such as the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, that calls for democratic reform, and even critical journalism are frequently perceived as threats to 'national unity." The state's response has often been coercive, ranging from censorship to outright violence—as recently witnessed during the Baloch Yakjehti Committee's protest march against extrajudicial killings and ongoing state-enforced disappearances in Balochistan. This approach has only exacerbated public distrust and further eroded the cohesion of the social fabric. Second, it has normalised the deployment of terrorists as tools of regional influence. From Kashmir to Afghanistan, Pakistan has supported terrorist and extremist groups that serve its strategic objectives. While this proxy strategy may have yielded short-term gains, it has come at a significant cost, as several of these groups have turned against the state itself—most notably the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has resurged in strength in recent years. Third, this strategy has contributed to Pakistan's diplomatic isolation. Its ongoing support for, or at least tolerance of, the Afghan Taliban has estranged key allies, including the United States and the wider international community. Repeated statements by US officials accusing Pakistan of exploiting its partnership with Washington for counterterrorism purposes while simultaneously shielding such groups underscore this duplicity. Moreover, Pakistan's failure to present a coherent counter-extremism policy has rendered it an unreliable actor in global counterterrorism initiatives. Thus, Pakistan's national security doctrine has, paradoxically, undermined its own security. For Pakistan to break free from this cyclical pattern, it requires more than a mere superficial adjustment to its national security policy. A profound transformation is necessary, starting with a shift in focus from safeguarding the interests of the military establishment to prioritising the welfare of its citizens. This entails prioritising political dialogue over military repression. Additionally, it must recognise that dissent is not an act of treason, that ethnic grievances do not constitute national threats, and that lasting peace is achieved through negotiation, not eradication. This also requires rejecting the militarised approach in favour of empowering civilian institutions to lead on internal security. The intelligence and military apparatus must not serve as both judge and executioner in matters of internal dissent. Pakistan's democracy has failed to survive under the strain of a constant state of emergency and dominant military control. Moreover, it is crucial to abandon the 'good Taliban, bad Taliban" policy, which has always been driven more by strategic considerations than by moral principles. The Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan represents a model that Pakistan should avoid, as it has strengthened jihadist networks across the region. Pakistan must end its strategic ambivalence and decisively distance itself from all extremist groups. No state can achieve stability while harbouring forces fundamentally opposed to the very concept of the modern nation-state. Pakistan has options, but lacks the political will. The path to reform is very challenging. It will necessitate the military's relinquishment of control over internal policy decisions, as well as political leaders demonstrating the courage to confront uncomfortable truths. Additionally, it will require society as a whole to call for a new definition of security—one that is not merely the absence of conflict, but the presence of justice, opportunity, and dignity. For Pakistan, the stakes are immense. The choice is no longer between change and continuity, but between transformation and ongoing disintegration. The writer is an author and a columnist. His X handle is @ArunAnandLive. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views. tags : Afghan Taliban Balochistan Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa pakistan Location : Islamabad, Pakistan First Published: May 24, 2025, 08:21 IST News opinion Global Watch | Pakistan Is Dragging Itself To End Of The Road With A Broken Security Architecture

What's a National Security Strategy & why CDS Gen Chauhan feels India doesn't need one on paper
What's a National Security Strategy & why CDS Gen Chauhan feels India doesn't need one on paper

The Print

time23-05-2025

  • Politics
  • The Print

What's a National Security Strategy & why CDS Gen Chauhan feels India doesn't need one on paper

In his newly published book, 'Ready, Relevant and Resurgent: A Blueprint for the Transformation of India's Military', Gen. Chauhan writes that the absence of a document should not be mistaken for the absence of a strategy. The NSS is a comprehensive document that articulates a country's long-term vision, strategic objectives, threat perceptions and policy direction across all dimensions of national security, including military, internal, economic, cyber, energy and diplomatic domains. New Delhi: Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan has dismissed calls for a written National Security Strategy (NSS), asserting that India already has the requisite structures in place to secure itself. 'Strategic analysts and political pundits often state that India does not have a NSS. That is incorrect and a myopic understanding of the issue. What we don't have is a written document called NSS, which is published periodically by Western nations,' the CDS states in the book, which was released Thursday by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh in New Delhi. Citing examples, he writes that Israel, 'the most threatened nation on earth', has never released a formal NSS, while Pakistan issued a National Security Policy in 2022 but continues to face economic crisis, political instability and civil-military discord. 'Pakistan had the written document but lacked organisational structures, processes and policies to secure itself,' he adds. Gen. Chauhan contends that the strategic coherence behind the abrogation of Article 370 and the bifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories illustrates the presence of an existing national security framework. 'Such decisions would not have been possible without the elements, 'Policy, Processes and Organisational Structures' that constitute the National Security Strategy (NSS),' he writes. This is not the first time the CDS has questioned the utility of a written NSS. Last year as well, at a book launch in May, he had made similar remarks, stating that an NSS comprised 'policy, processes and practices', all of which India already had. 'The only thing missing is a written policy. I don't know why people insist on that,' he had said. The CDS had also argued that the absence of a written NSS had not prevented India from successfully executing strategic actions like the Balakot and Uri strikes, or the revocation of Jammu and Kashmir's special status. But just a few months later, in November, Gen. Chauhan appeared to reverse course. At an event titled 'Future Wars and the Indian Armed Forces' in New Delhi, he said a 'written (national security) document' was indeed being prepared. Also Read: India, Pakistan DGMOs agree to extend measures aimed at reducing border tensions Where does India stand While countries such as the US, China, and Russia routinely publish such documents, either in full or abridged form, India has never officially released one, despite recurring demands and several attempts. In 2021, former CDS Gen. Bipin Rawat had flagged the absence of a clearly articulated NSS as a significant shortcoming. Additionally, former Army Chief Gen. M.M. Naravane echoed this in 2022, warning that creating theatre commands without an overarching national security strategy would be ill-advised. The conversation around an NSS first gained traction in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil War, when the Kargil Review Committee led by K. Subrahmanyam called for major structural reforms to India's national security architecture. This led to the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC), Strategic Policy Group (SPG), National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS). In 2007, a draft NSS was prepared by the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) and submitted to the National Security Adviser and the Prime Minister's Office. However, it did not receive approval from the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and was never adopted. The government set up the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) under NSA Ajit Doval in 2018, comprising the three service chiefs, the defence secretary, the foreign secretary and the chief of the IDS. One of its core objectives was to formulate an NSS. Though the committee began consultations, no final document emerged. In 2019, former Northern Army Commander Lt Gen. D.S. Hooda (retd.) had submitted 'a comprehensive and exhaustive' strategy document on national security—informally known as the 'Hooda Document'—to Rahul Gandhi after the Congress party had roped in for a task force to prepare a vision paper for the country. More recently, in 2023 and 2024, the NSCS initiated inter-ministerial consultations to frame a comprehensive strategy. However, no public update or timeline has since been announced. (Edited by Tony Rai) Also Read: Rajnath calls for global supervision of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. 'Insecurity,' says Islamabad

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