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BBC News
9 hours ago
- BBC News
Newcastle dealer and friend 'responsible' for student death
Two men who traded the MDMA which killed a 21-year-old student have been Pavlovic died hours after taking the Class A drug, also known as ecstasy, given to him by his friend George Harle at a house party in Newcastle in October 2020, the city's crown court Ali, who sold the MDMA, was jailed for three years and seven months while Harle was jailed for a year suspended for a year with 150 hours unpaid Pavlovic's family said they were devastated by his death while judge Tim Gittins said it had been an "avoidable tragedy" with both men bearing responsibility. Mr Pavlovic, from Halifax in West Yorkshire, had just entered the final year of a cybersecurity degree at Northumbria University when he died in the early hours of 4 October 2020, the court heard. 'Hallucinating and hot' He and friends had been socialising at his shared-flat at the Rialto building on Melbourne Street when Harle, then aged 20, arrived and offered them drugs, prosecutor Jessica Slaughter people, including Harle, took the MDMA, the court girl who took the drug said it made her feel "depressed and paranoid" and caused her to vomit, adding it was a "totally different" experience compared to when she used it before, Ms Slaughter Pavlovic quickly started acting erratically, the court heard, suffering hallucinations and friends tried to cool him down with wet towels but became increasingly concerned as he was unable to stand or talk coherently, Ms Slaughter were called and he was taken to hospital where he was pronounced dead at 07:23 BST. 'Mourn loss every day' In statements read to the court, Mr Pavlovic's parents said their son was kind, genuine and had a "wicked sense of humour".His father said they had a "Nathan-shaped hole" in their lives and after his death they shared his money out between his friends which is what he would have said his son was "super cautious" and the family would "never know" what was said to him that night to persuade him to take drugs, adding it was "so out of character".Mr Pavlovic's mother said he and his family had been "denied" the joy of many important milestones with him "because another person made a bad decision which ultimately ended our son's life".She said he had been very popular with about 300 people attending his funeral, although many of them had to do so virtually due to the coronavirus pandemic restrictions in place."We mourn his loss every minute of every day," she said. 'Wishes he'd died' In mitigation for Harle, Adrian Strong said that weekend had been one last chance for everyone to socialise before lockdown restrictions were expected to court heard Harle had since graduated as a nurse working with children and was keen to use his "negative experience" to ensure others did not take said Harle accepted both moral and legal responsibility for Mr Pavlovic's death and he would "always regret" his actions, adding: "The death of Nathan is always on his mind.""He wishes quite frankly it had been him that died that night and not [Mr Pavlovic]," Mr Strong said. Harle gave police the details of his dealer, Ali, 34, who was arrested the following day in his car and found with a haul of MDMA, cocaine, ketamine and cannabis worth up to £2,110, Ms Slaughter MDMA was found to have 96% purity, with messages on his phone showing Ali had been selling drugs since 5 September 2020, the court heard. In mitigation, John Crawford said his client had become addicted to drugs after being injured in a machete attack in 2019 and was dealing to pay off debts. 'Prime of life' Judge Tim Gittins said Mr Pavlovic was "naive" and "wholly inexperienced" in drug use, taking an amount which "would have been a fatal dose for anyone"."It is nothing short of an avoidable tragedy," the judge said, adding both Ali and Harle bore a responsibility in part for the death of the "likeable" and "much-loved young man" at the "prime of his life".The judge said Ali was prepared to sell illegal drugs in lethal quantities while Harle, as a student nurse, "should have known better" than to give his friend the illicit Gittins said the case was a "stark warning" about those who saw taking drugs as "recreational", adding: "They are nothing short of dicing with death and sometimes people lose the game".Harle, of Shield Street in Newcastle, admitted supplying MDMA while Ali, of Croydon Road, Fenham, admitted four counts of possessing drugs with an intent to supply. Follow BBC Newcastle on X, Facebook, Nextdoor and Instagram.
BreakingNews.ie
20-07-2025
- Health
- BreakingNews.ie
What kind of exercise can help improve your sleep?
People with insomnia often endure long, uncomfortable nights without rest, but new research indicates that specific forms of exercise may offer relief. A team of researchers in China reviewed 22 clinical trials involving 1,348 participants and assessed how 13 different methods impacted sleep, including seven types of exercise: yoga, Tai chi, walking or jogging, combined aerobic and strength training, strength training alone, aerobic exercise paired with therapy, and various aerobic routines. Advertisement Published in BMJ Evidence-Based Medicine, the study found that yoga was particularly effective, increasing total sleep time by nearly two hours and reducing the amount of time spent awake after falling asleep by almost an hour. This research highlights the powerful link between physical activity and sleep quality. However, it also raises an important question: how exactly does exercise prepare the body and brain for sleep – and which types of exercise are most effective in doing so? Brain 'Exercise can have a direct impact on our brain activity during sleep, including an increase in slow-wave sleep (the stage of sleep that is restorative) and increases our total sleep time,' explains Dr Greg Elder , associate director of Northumbria Sleep Research at Northumbria University. 'This means that we have better sleep for longer.' Hormones 'Exercise can also affect relevant hormones,' says Elder. 'For example, exercise can affect our melatonin levels, which is a hormone involved in sleep-wake regulation, as well as cortisol levels, which is a stress hormone.' Advertisement Mood Exercising outdoors will help boost your mood (Alamy/PA) 'Exercise is also beneficial for our mood, and mood is closely linked with sleep. Bad sleep is usually associated with mood disorders,' notes Elder. 'If we exercise outside and go for a morning run or cycle, for example, then we are typically exposed to bright, outdoor light which in itself is a good thing for our sleep.' If you are struggling with sleep, here are four types of exercises to try… 1. Aerobic exercise like cycling or running Cycling or running can help ease anxiety and improve mood (Alamy/PA) 'Aerobic exercises that increase your heart and breathing rates can make falling asleep easier by lowering your blood pressure and reducing stress,' says Dr Hana Patel, resident sleep expert at Time4Sleep . 'For example, running and cycling are perfect for tackling any anxiety that is keeping you up at night.' Luke Cousins, health and wellbeing physiologist at Nuffield Health agrees and adds: ''It's important to remember though that timings of when you workout is equally important to consider, because exercise can also cause a spike in adrenaline, which keeps your body in an alert state. Advertisement 'For maximum benefit, try to get your exercise about five to six hours before trying to sleep but no later than two hours before bed.' 2. Strength training Strength training can be beneficial (Alamy/PA) Try lifting some weights in the gym or workout using some resistance bands in the comfort of your own home. 'A mix of aerobic exercise and strength training can be beneficial, like lifting weights and using resistance bands,' says Patel. 'But remember to only do what feels comfortable and gradually increase the difficulty as you progress.' 3. Yoga Deep breathing and yoga have a plethora of benefits (Alamy/PA) Slow down and take time to stretch and breathe before bed. Advertisement 'Yoga is also great for improving mindfulness and reducing stress, helping our bodies relax and reducing tension,' says Patel. 'Deep breathing techniques can help to improve sleep quality and relax the nervous system, allowing us to properly unwind before bed.' Elder agrees and adds: 'I would suggest avoiding any activity or exercise that is likely to cause you to be mentally stressed when you go to bed because that is more likely to be an issue, because stress is very bad for our sleep.' 4. Walking Vitamin D and fresh air do wonders for the body and mind (Alamy/PA) A brisk walk in the fresh air can help lower stress and anxiety that might be keeping you up at night. 'Walking is suitable for all fitness levels and can be a huge mood booster as it helps to lower cortisol levels, something which can also impact our sleep quality and our energy levels,' says Samuel Quinn, personal training lead at Nuffield Health. 'If we're walking outdoors – and hopefully away from a screen – this can also help reduce anxiety.' Advertisement
The Diplomat
14-07-2025
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Diaspora: An Interview with Dr. Edward Anderson
This is the transcript of an interview conducted for the July episode of 'Beyond the Indus,' The Diplomat's South Asia-focused podcast. Tushar Shetty (Interviewer): We're pleased to be joined by Dr. Edward Anderson, Senior Fellow at SOAS* and Assistant Professor at Northumbria University*. His research focuses on the Indian diaspora, transnational politics, Hindutva, and Hindu nationalism, as well as British histories of migration, ethnicity, and multiculturalism. His latest book, Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Diaspora, is a fascinating deep dive into these topics, charting the origin and evolution of Hindutva in the British Indian diaspora and examining the organizational aspects of Hindutva-leaning groups. Edward, welcome to Beyond the Indus, and thank you for joining the podcast. Edward Anderson: Thank you so much. It's lovely to talk to you. Tushar Shetty: Edward, I was reading your book on Hindu nationalism and the Indian diaspora, and what I found interesting was that it begins in an unusual place—not in India or the UK, but rather in Nairobi, Kenya, where the RSS actually set up its first overseas shakha* (branch) before India was even an independent country. Could you take us through the origins of transnational Hindutva in East Africa and how it spread to the UK and internationally? Edward Anderson: You're absolutely right. Hindu nationalism outside of India first established itself through the Sangh* in East Africa, specifically in Kenya. It's worth providing some historical context to explain how this happened. While Hindutva only became politically powerful toward the end of the 20th century and into the 21st century, Hindu nationalism and Hindutva ideology have origins that go much earlier—to the early 20th century or even the late 19th century in some ways. As for why it established itself in East Africa, there had been, since the end of the 19th century and early 20th century onward, a substantial population of Indian people in East Africa. East Africa at this time was part of the British Empire—the countries I'm talking about are mainly Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. These parts of East Africa started to see growth in Indian communities, partly as a response to the British colonial state encouraging Indians to move over to work in various parts of the economy. Initially, they were brought over to help construct the Uganda Railway, bringing laborers and skilled workers from India. They were also given certain rights to set up businesses and trading rights, many of which were denied to the local African population. Some people were given positions within the colonial bureaucracy as well. From the outset, the Asian population of East Africa had a relatively privileged position in society and a segregated position as well. They kept to themselves, had their own communities, and lived in particular parts of towns—often parts that had been allocated to them by the British. They maintained quite a close connection with the homeland, with India, which was a short hop over the ocean. The east of Africa and the west of India have been connected via maritime trading routes for hundreds of years. In the mid-1940s, there's a legendary story of a fellow moving over to work in a school who was an RSS member in India. When he arrived in Kenya, he established the first shakhas*, the first branches of the RSS—the leading and most powerful Hindu nationalist organization. He set up the first shakha*, and from that point onward, it became quite popular. Many children were sent there by their parents as a place to socialize with other people from the same community and to learn about Hindu culture and Indian culture in various ways, developing a sense of cultural pride and assertiveness. From that point onward, it started to establish itself through branches of the Sangh* that were set up in other parts of the world. In the historical narrative, during the 1960s and 1970s, after the African countries I mentioned started gaining independence, they were keen to coerce, persuade, or even expel the Asian population in East Africa. Most famously and notoriously, there was Idi Amin's* expulsion of the Asians in 1972. At this point, many East African Asians moved to Britain—often they had British passports by virtue of being citizens of the British Empire—and to other places as well. This is when we start to see the real establishment of Hindu nationalist organizations in the UK, around the exact time when East African Asians were moving over in the 1960s. Tushar Shetty: That community of East African Indians has produced many interesting people who have ascended quite high in both UK and US politics. I believe Kash Patel* and Zoran Mamdani*, who is the mayor incumbent* of New York City, Priti Patel*, who was former Home Secretary in the UK—is Rishi Sunak* part of that East African Indian diaspora as well? Edward Anderson: Yes, you're absolutely right. This is a community that has produced incredibly interesting and successful people in all sorts of areas, and as you've identified, from all parts of the political spectrum as well. In the UK, Rishi Sunak*, the first non-white Prime Minister of the UK and leader of the Conservative Party, and also two subsequent Home Secretaries, Priti Patel* and then Suella Braverman*—all of these people have roots in East Africa. Tushar Shetty: This is a pretty well-educated, well-established community that also brought some Hindutva ideas to the UK. To what extent has the Indian community been receptive to what we would call Hindutva ideology, considering that political Hindutva didn't really take off in India itself until the late 1980s? What was the attraction to these ideas and organizations? Edward Anderson: It's an interesting question. First, it's important to note that there is a kind of received wisdom that the Indian diaspora is highly predisposed toward Hindutva ideology and very sympathetic to the RSS and Narendra Modi*. This has emerged particularly from dramatic political rallies that Modi has participated in that have taken place in London, New York, Texas, Sydney, and various other parts of the world. While it's certainly the case that there is sympathy for Hindutva, there's also a very strong tradition that resists that—a strong liberal, leftist, and socialist tradition. You've already alluded to that when mentioning a few of those names earlier. There's a very diverse range of perspectives in the diaspora, and it's really important not to essentialize, not to generalize, and not to be reductive. That being said, there are certain things that the Hindu nationalist movement and organizations have done that have attempted to cater to the diaspora in certain ways. They provide people with a sense of belonging and pride—people who might be marginalized by society around them more broadly. This is quite unusual and departs significantly from Hindu nationalism in India. The whole point of Hindu nationalism in India is that it's a majoritarian ideology relating to an ostensible majority community, an overwhelming majority community depending on how it's enumerated. Whereas in the diaspora, this is an ideology that appeals to quite a small minority—in fact, a minority that is significantly smaller than the Muslim minority in Britain and the US. That dynamic is notable, particularly in the context of the war on terror and Islamophobia in the West. There's clearly a way for Hindutva and certain Hindu nationalist mobilizations and ideas to engage with that tension and politics as well. Tushar Shetty: What's interesting when I was going through your book was the organizational aspect of this. Could you give us an overview of how Hindutva-leaning groups are organized in the UK and elsewhere – what sections of the diaspora do they cater to, how are they financed, what services do they provide and what role do they play in the community? And to what extent does their messaging and culture differ from the Sangh Parivar* in India? Edward Anderson: That's a really good set of questions with a lot in it, and it's hard to give a short answer. Just like in India, Hindutva groups in the diaspora are extremely heterogeneous. There's a bewildering plethora of different groups, and it feels like there are new ones being set up every year. While some groups might function in one way and reach out to a particular demographic, others might be very different. Even the type of Hindutva that they espouse—the tone and messaging—might differ drastically. In terms of which sections of the diaspora they cater to, one answer would be 'all.' Hindutva is a majoritarian ideology and needs to create an ostensibly monolithic and unified majority community to fulfil its ambitions. In this sense, Hindutva can be all-encompassing. We often hear the term 'Dharmic religions' being used in efforts to incorporate Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs into the fold, although this can be highly contentious. On one hand, they try to cater to many people, but on the other hand, there are clearly specific focuses. I've already mentioned a notable concentration of East African Asians. Reflecting the demography of East African Asians, there's quite a striking proportion of middle and upper-caste Gujarati Hindus. Another area of focus has been younger generations, which relates to another part of your question about the roles these groups play. These groups are eager to provide a service to the diaspora, particularly second and third generations and their parents, by positioning themselves as a place where they can convey particular versions of Hindu culture, history, and spirituality to people who are dislocated from that and living in another part of the world where they're not necessarily surrounded by it. They function by having classes—language classes, for instance. There's a very pedagogical role that these groups often play. There's a wide range of them as well. I'm referring quite broadly to the Sangh*, but there are also diasporic branches of the VHP* (Vishva Hindu Parishad). The more political side is reflected in the Overseas Friends of the BJP*. There are also various student groups and charities. The other interesting thing is that in the diaspora—and this is something I discuss in relation to an idea called 'Neo-Hindutva,' which I wrote about initially about 10 years ago and pursue further in this book—Neo-Hindutva is a term I've used to explain the way Hindutva has evolved and entered into spaces well beyond the Sangh Parivar*. We see completely new groups that operate and distance themselves from both the ideology of Hindutva and the organizational structures of the Sangh Parivar*. Yet when we look at them closely, we can identify them as Hindutva in ideology, even though they're functioning more in a multicultural context. Tushar Shetty: I recall reading about the HSS* (Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh) in the UK, which is quite similar to the RSS, but I think you noted that they claim to just be influenced by them and not have direct links. To what extent are these Hindu advocacy groups linked to or influenced by the RSS and its affiliates – are they just Sangh Parivar* subsidiaries abroad, or do they have their own independent agenda or presence? We're seeing a wider rise of Hindu advocacy groups gaining ground in places like the US and Canada, e.g. The Hindu American Foundation* comes to mind. Are all these groups linked to the RSS, or are they just a natural consequence of diaspora mobilization, similar to other immigrant communities in the Anglosphere? Edward Anderson: This is an important question and one I try to delve into in depth in the book. The overseas equivalent or wing of the RSS in the diaspora is called the HSS*, the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh*. Originally in East Africa, it was called the Bharatiya Swayamsevak Sangh*. This group does try to occasionally distance itself from the main RSS in India. They often talk about being inspired by or having ideological commonality with the RSS without being structurally connected. That being said, if you look at the organizations side by side, it's very clear that they are deeply connected. Full-time workers of the RSS in India—Pracharaks*—are sent abroad and work in various communities outside India to facilitate coordination. The Supreme Leader, the Sarsanghchalak* of the RSS, Mohan Bhagwat*, was present in Britain in 2016 for the 50th anniversary celebrations of the HSS* in the UK. We can see RSS leaders traveling across the diaspora, so there are clearly institutional connections. That being said, these groups are vernacularized—they do evolve in slightly different directions. They're not carbon copies of what we see in India in various ways. They also rely to some extent on organic, local volunteers and dynamic local leaders who are heavily invested in what they do. So there is a degree of separateness as well, even though there are clearly institutional links. These institutional links are something that many of these groups have been quite keen to obfuscate, not least because these are registered non-profits in the US and registered charities in Britain. The connection with political organizations is something that's quite contested and has been discussed and debated in various settings over quite a long period of time. Tushar Shetty: Do you think this is substantially different from the way other communities mobilize? We have different examples of this—I'm thinking of AIPAC* in the US, which advocates for Israeli interests, even though it's not necessarily connected to Israel directly in terms of donations, and is supported by the American Jewish community. We have Sikhs in Canada and the US who have strong political networks because of community connections. Is this mobilization or growth of Hindu-focused organizations substantially different from that, or is it just following a familiar pattern? Edward Anderson: I think there are some levels of similarity and other levels of distinctiveness. I wouldn't say that you can reduce all motivations of ethnic minority communities or diasporic communities to being all the same—there is real distinctiveness there, and it's important to study different groups and individuals on their own terms. That being said, there are certainly connections and links, not just across different communities but also across time. I'm a historian, although I work on topics that go almost right up to the present day. If you look at the political identities that were being formed and long-distance activism that was being conducted by Indians in Britain in the very early 20th century—people campaigning against the British Empire, seeking independence from Britain, people considered freedom fighters, including interestingly a founding father of Hindutva, Savarkar*, who was a student in London in the very early part of the 20th century—we can see a longer theme where there are similarities across different groups. But the sorts of connections and ways of doing politics have definitely been different in different parts of the world, in the US and Canada. As you say, there's a diversity of political perspectives among South Asian diasporas. Sometimes, in the case of some Sikh and Khalistani* activists, they come up in very heated and highly contested ways with other sections of the broader South Asian diaspora. Tushar Shetty: Mobilization in any community tends to be disruptive to politics – I wonder how these groups have impacted local politics in the UK and elsewhere. Do they wield enough power to influence legislation and foreign policy, and how do other communities respond to this? We've talked about Khalistani* groups reacting to certain aspects of Hindu nationalism emanating from India, and we also saw the riots in Leicester. I'd be grateful if you could talk about that for our listeners, and if there are other instances of negative fallout or reactions to Hindu politics in the Indian diaspora. Edward Anderson: Let me first address the Leicester tensions. What we saw in Leicester in August and September 2022 was rather unprecedented and extremely upsetting scenes of tension and violence between Hindu and Muslim communities in the city. Leicester is a city in the Midlands in the middle of the UK that saw a very large influx of Asians, particularly South Asian people, in the 1960s and 1970s. It's one of the most diverse parts of the country, with nearly 45% of people identifying in the census as Asian, nearly 20% of the city being Hindu, and nearly 25% being Muslim. It's a very multicultural city that has seen various difficulties over the years, but multiculturalism is often identified as one of the great successes of the city and has enabled it to be economically successful. Tensions between communities have been present, and this reached a head in the summer of 2022. Various triggers have been suggested for what happened, but one might have been a cricket match between India and Pakistan. Following this, tensions spilled over into violence. We saw on social media videos of people walking through parts of the city shouting 'Pakistan Murdabad*' (death to Pakistan) and chanting 'Jai Shri Ram*'—a religious chant often associated with Hindutva. Subsequently, there were retaliations, including a flag being pulled down from a Hindu temple. There was a lot of rumor spreading and social media misinformation. Certain extremist elements, including the far right, were clearly stirring things up. We have evidence suggesting that a large amount of social media interaction on this matter originated in the Indian subcontinent, with hashtags like 'Hindus under attack' being spread in tens and hundreds of thousands of tweets. The flames were clearly being fanned from various parts of the world. This was a moment of considerable tension, and a lot of work has been done subsequently to try to build bridges between communities. While I said it was unprecedented, the unprecedented nature was in its scale and visibility and the reaction to it, but there have been tensions previously. If you go back three decades to 1992, one of the most pivotal moments for Indian democracy was the demolition of the Babri Masjid* by Hindu extremists. This led to significant outbreaks of violence and many deaths between Hindus and Muslims in various parts of India. There are reports from 1992 and 1993 showing that communal tensions had also found their way to Britain and other parts of the diaspora. There were reports of attacks on both Hindu and Muslim places of worship, and suggestions that opportunistic right-wing groups were also stirring things up. These tensions have existed for quite a long time. As well as tensions, there is also a lot of solidarity and groups working together—a lot of good relationships as well. Regarding the impact on UK politics, there has definitely been a concerted effort to influence legislation and be a force of lobbying. This comes back to your previous question about AIPAC*. What we can definitely identify is a desire to replicate the kind of level of influence that certain other communities have, notably the level of influence of certain elements of the Israeli lobby. It's not just a desire to replicate or mimic that but to form alliances as well. This is explored in depth in a new book called Hostile Homelands by Azad Essa*. There's definitely an effort to do advocacy and influence members of parliament, and we've seen this happen in numerous settings. One of the most dramatic was in 2019, when the Labour Party was still being led by Jeremy Corbyn*, who has been quite critical of Modi, has been a strong advocate for Dalit* rights, and has spoken out on the Kashmir issue and human rights issues in Kashmir. This led to an enormous backlash and resistance, with an effort by the Overseas Friends of the BJP* to campaign against the Labour Party in 48 constituencies. This was quite unusual—for the Overseas Friends of the BJP* to campaign specifically on a UK election and try to ensure that someone they framed as being anti-Indian and anti-Hindu would not get into office. There's definitely a level of influence going on there. The extent to which that influence has reaped rewards is a moot point—it's hard to identify necessarily. Tushar Shetty: How is Modi utilizing the Indian diaspora to advance some of his or India's foreign policy goals? Post-2014, do you think Modi's personal popularity has changed the dynamics of the Indian diaspora's politics and contributed to the rise of Hindutva ideas? Perhaps more controversially, could Modi's popularity in the diaspora have any impact on domestic politics in India, either indirectly through media coverage or perhaps directly through campaign contributions? Edward Anderson: This is an important question, certainly one that people have discussed perhaps more than any other aspect of diasporic Hindu nationalism. What we've definitely seen is the BJP being more proactive since 2014—and before that as well—in engaging the diaspora, perhaps much more dynamically than any of their rivals. The rewards they seem to be reaping perhaps reflect that. In 2014, after the election, Modi embarked upon a series of international visits—diplomatic visits, but also visits in which the diaspora featured quite heavily. The first and most striking was him filling out Madison Square Garden, a venue that usually has sports superstars and rock stars on its stage. This was a rock star-type event that the diaspora were extremely excited about in the US. In the following year, we saw a similar event with even more people—maybe 50,000 or 60,000—filling much of Wembley Stadium in west London, England's national football stadium. These were really dramatic scenes, and all of these were livestreamed back to India, which I think is crucial. What you're seeing is the diaspora being engaged with and maybe thanked for their influence and the way they can promote the BJP, Modi, and India more broadly. But what those rallies do is provide really powerful images for media back in India, both via social media—which Hindu nationalists have been very adept at using—and also via mainstream media, which has been very sympathetic to the BJP in recent years. They provide striking images that reflect popularity abroad or try to instill this idea of popularity abroad, which might be influential. The diaspora is still looked up to in many ways for their success and often enhanced levels of cultural, political, and economic capital. While the diaspora might not actually be voting—Indians who take citizenship of another country lose their Indian citizenship, as there's no dual nationality—even NRIs* (Non-Resident Indians) who still have Indian citizenship very often don't vote because it's logistically very complicated. The majority of the Indian diaspora don't vote, and unlike other countries, there's no distance voting option yet. The influence they might have in terms of PR influence or ability to influence people on the ground in India is possibly considered much greater than people who just turn up and vote. Modi has definitely been a key figure—he has inspired people, there's that charisma, assertiveness, and feeling of strength that has been conveyed. The diaspora participate in lots of aspects of that rallying around the individual. One of the early campaigns was 'Chai pe Charcha*' (discussions over tea), in which support for Modi was promoted. These took place across India but also in the diaspora. The diaspora have also been involved via the Overseas Friends of the BJP*, doing car rallies, driving around in different contexts, and even turning up for particular protests. When the BBC released its very controversial two-part Modi documentary, which was banned in India, members of the Indian diaspora went outside BBC headquarters in London and protested against that. There are lots of ways in which support for Modi has been manifested, and he is clearly an important figure. One caveat to add is that there have been surveys that push against the idea of universal support. A survey conducted by the Platform for Indian Democracy* at the end of 2023 suggested that more people of Indian origin in Britain had a negative view than a positive view of Modi and the BJP, particularly among younger generations. Yes, there is hero worship for Modi, like there is among many Indians. There's also a significant proportion of members of the Indian diaspora who would turn up when he comes overseas not to support him but to protest against him. Tushar Shetty: Before we end, I want to ask you—you're a historian, and I was reading recently Lee Kuan Yew's* autobiography, where he talked about the changing dynamics in the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia in response to the unification of the People's Republic of China. He discussed how the Malayan Communist Party* attracted many more recruits from the Chinese diaspora, not necessarily due to a flare-up of Communist ideology, but because there was a flare-up of nationalist pride. In that light, to what extent do you think the popularity of Modi and the rise of India as a global power has propelled these Hindutva ideas among the diaspora? Is this just a natural inclination toward Hindutva ideas, or is it also a response to the perceived rise of India in the global arena? Edward Anderson: I certainly wouldn't ever say anything's natural. I think there are always ways of explaining and understanding how things happen. There's not an innate predisposition to any particular sort of politics or identity. What the book discusses is the much longer picture that goes back to the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. There's a long backstory to the institutional establishment of Hindu nationalism and the ideological inculcation of Hindu nationalism among the Indian diaspora. This goes back a long time, clearly to a period long predating Modi and the 21st century saffronization of India—the 'New India' in which Hindu nationalism and Hindutva have had an impact on almost all aspects of society. But definitely, something different has happened over the last decade or so, and part of that is due to a new level of confidence. Previously, people inclined toward Hindutva might have been more reticent, maybe even secretive about it, less keen to show their cards. But the election of Modi since 2014 has completely changed that. There has been a renewed level of assertiveness and confidence. People are much less shy to discuss that aspect of their politics. Another big difference is that the world is so much more interconnected than it was. The experience of being a member of a diaspora in 2025 is significantly different from what it must have been like in the 1960s or 1970s. I'm not suggesting that in the 1960s or 1970s there was no connection with the subcontinent—that's obviously not the case. There was communication and interaction, but today you're instantly connected and almost constantly connected via social media and a device in your pocket to what's going on in other parts of the world. You're living a transnational life. Those levels of influence—whether it's important news stories, memes, viral YouTube videos, or the latest speech of a political leader—that's all coming to you directly, and you're participating in that directly. That's a phenomenon that has shifted in a very big way over the last decade or so, and I think that, as much as anything else, has had a big impact on the politics of the diaspora. Tushar Shetty: To those who want to read more, I would definitely recommend Edward's book, Hindu Nationalism in the Indian Diaspora. Is this available in India? Edward Anderson: Yes, it was published by Penguin and is available in India. It's published in the US by Oxford University Press and in the UK by Hurst. Tushar Shetty: Fantastic. Edward, thank you so much again for joining the podcast. Edward Anderson: Thanks, it's been great talking to you. Note: Names and terms marked with asterisks have been corrected from the original transcript based on context and standard spellings.*
Wall Street Journal
11-07-2025
- General
- Wall Street Journal
Can AI Solve the Content-Moderation Problem?
Anyone who spends time on social media knows that it's hard to avoid abusive misinformation, abusive language and offensive content. Platforms like Facebook and YouTube have content moderation systems designed to keep obnoxious material in check, but a 2021 Cato Institute survey found that just one in four users think platforms apply their standards fairly. 'Content moderation is one of the crucial issues of our day and it is essentially broken,' says Carolina Are, a researcher at the Center for Digital Citizens at Northumbria University in the U.K. One major difficulty is that different users have different ideas about what should be prohibited online. Are swear words fair game? Nudity? Violent imagery? In the Cato survey, 60% of users said they wanted social-media platforms to provide them with greater choice to pick and choose what they see and what they don't.
BBC News
29-06-2025
- Entertainment
- BBC News
Northumbria fashion student wins award after sight loss
A fashion student who temporarily lost her eyesight has gone on to win an award for her graduate collection which was inspired by Ashton, from Esh Winning in Country Durham, created "Giz A Fiver" in tribute to her working-class collection incorporated vintage sportswear, including the famous black and white stripes of Newcastle United's illness in her last two terms meant everyone around her was busily finishing their work while she "couldn't use a sewing machine", she said. "I was stuck at home and had to recover," she 23-year-old was forced to take time out of university and, at one point, thought she would never finish her pieces."I was watching all of the other girls around, who were so excited to finish their collection, and I couldn't use a sewing machine," she said. The Northumbria University student became unwell and started to experience chronic migraines in early then led to the loss of sight in her left eye and she ended up needing treatment in NHS says migraines affect six million people in the UK with more women experiencing them than treatment, Miss Ashton regained her sight and managed to finish her collection in time for Graduate Fashion Week in London earlier this month, where she was awarded "highly commended"."It was crazy," she said. "After being so ill I never expected to get to London Graduate Fashion Week with three looks."When everyone was talking about it I had to put it to the back of my mind, because the most important thing was finishing my degree." The annual fashion event showcases the creations of more than 3,000 students working in 26 different fashion disciplines at more than 95 UK and international Ashton says she sourced a lot of the materials for her collection from second hand and charity shops to make it as cost effective as possible. "I don't exactly have the biggest budget to play with so it was really important that I showed how accessible the industry could be," she University fashion programmes director Sarah Walton said it was "incredibly important" for students to lean into their background when creating their designs. "We find that some of the most successful projects that we have are about a student's cultural heritage," she said. Follow BBC North East on X, Facebook, Nextdoor and Instagram.
