7 days ago
Have the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in Libya?
Young Libyans remove the sign of the Justice and Construction Party (JCP), affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, following rising public opposition to Islamist political factions
Over a decade after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood finds itself facing unprecedented isolation. Once poised to shape Libya's post-revolutionary future, the group has been steadily marginalised — electorally, politically, and socially.
From Exile to Political Entry
The roots of the Brotherhood in Libya trace back to the late 1940s, when members fleeing persecution in Egypt sought refuge in eastern Libya. Over the decades, the movement grew cautiously, operating in secrecy during the Gaddafi era and relying on external networks for survival.
Following the 2011 uprising, the Brotherhood seized the moment. In March 2012, it launched the Justice and Construction Party (JCP), claiming a formal separation between its religious mission and political work. However, many observers noted that the party remained under the effective influence of the Brotherhood's leadership, mirroring the Egyptian model.
Despite losing to the National Forces Alliance (NFA) in the 2012 elections, the JCP gained influence in the General National Congress (GNC) through aligned independents, positioning itself at the centre of Libya's fragile transition.
From Power to Backlash
The tide turned quickly. In the 2014 parliamentary elections, the JCP secured only around 30 seats out of 200. Rather than accepting the result, elements linked to the Brotherhood supported Operation Libya Dawn, a military campaign that seized control of Tripoli and contributed to Libya's political bifurcation.
This marked the beginning of Libya's second civil war. With competing governments emerging in the east and west, and a rise in militia influence, the Brotherhood's role became increasingly contested — and, in the eyes of many, discredited. The movement was seen not as a force for unity, but as one of several groups prioritising influence over national reconciliation.
Electoral Decline and Diminishing Influence
Subsequent elections underscored a steep decline in public support. In areas once thought to be Islamist strongholds — such as Derna, Abu Salim, and even Misrata — Brotherhood-affiliated candidates struggled to make inroads. The results reflected growing disillusionment with ideologically driven politics and the failure to deliver stability or effective governance.
Moreover, the Brotherhood's lack of service delivery infrastructure, in contrast to Islamist movements elsewhere, undermined its grassroots credibility. Unlike in Tunisia or Egypt, Libya's Brotherhood never developed significant charitable or educational wings to embed itself socially.
A Crisis of Legitimacy
By 2020, internal dissent became more visible. Members in cities like Misrata and Zawiya resigned en masse, citing frustration with the movement's political trajectory and internal rigidity.
The regional environment added further pressure. After the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the changing posture of key international players, the Libyan branch found itself increasingly isolated. With international backers shifting focus and a domestic audience growing wary, the Brotherhood faced a legitimacy crisis.
The Rebrand: 'Revival and Renewal'
In May 2021, the Brotherhood issued a public statement announcing its transformation into the Revival and Renewal Association, positioning itself as a civil society actor focused on social development and national unity.
The rebrand, however, raised more questions than it answered. While distancing itself from the transnational Brotherhood in name, the group retained its original logo and much of its ideological language. The announcement, released on Facebook under the Brotherhood's official page, retained Quranic citations and a discourse consistent with its historic messaging.
Analysts have largely viewed the shift as a tactical move rather than a strategic rethink — an attempt to shed a politically burdensome identity without engaging in real structural or ideological change.
A Pattern of Tactical Adaptation?
The Libyan Brotherhood's rebranding follows a familiar pattern observed across the region. Faced with declining support and rising scrutiny, Islamist groups have often attempted to repackage their image through cosmetic adjustments while maintaining core beliefs and goals.
In the case of Libya, the language of 'moderation', 'renewal', and 'civil engagement' echoes a broader Islamist lexicon. Terms such as 'Islamic constants', 'revival', and 'identity' remain embedded in the group's discourse, suggesting continued adherence to a political Islam framework — albeit in more subtle terms.
Critics argue that the Brotherhood's repositioning does not reflect a genuine break from its past, but rather a strategic retreat aimed at surviving a hostile political environment.
Conclusion
More than a decade since the 2011 revolution, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood has lost much of the influence it once wielded. Its political vehicle, the Justice and Construction Party, is largely sidelined. Its social base has eroded. And its rebranding efforts, while signalling adaptability, have done little to restore public trust.
For many Libyans, the Brotherhood symbolises a chapter of missed opportunities, divisive politics, and unfulfilled promises. Whether as a political party or a civil association, its challenge now is not simply to change names — but to prove that it can meaningfully contribute to a pluralistic, democratic Libya.
Until then, its legacy remains one of ambition unmet — and success, at best, incomplete.
