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Asia Times
25-04-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
Jet by jet, US losing Pacific air superiority over China
China is racing to shatter US air dominance in the Pacific—one stealth jet, long-range missile and cratered runway at a time. This month, a top US official stated that China is rapidly building its capacity to challenge US air superiority in the Pacific, particularly within the strategically vital First Island Chain. Testifying before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), warned that the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), with an order of battle of 2,100 fighters and over 200 H-6 bombers, is outproducing the US in fighter aircraft at a ratio of 1.2 to 1. Paparo credited China with 'high marks' for its ability to deny US air superiority along the First Island Chain, citing its fast-growing fighter fleet, advanced long-range air-to-air missiles and sweeping modernization across all warfighting domains. Holding air superiority along the First Island Chain, which stretches from Japan to the Philippines, is essential for the US to operate and support allies like Taiwan. Paparo stressed that air supremacy—total control of the air—will not be enjoyed by either side, but warned that without credible investment in long-range fires, integrated air and missile defenses, and advanced command and control systems, the US risks falling behind. 'Ceding air superiority is not an option,' he cautioned. Seth Jones and Alexander Palmer mention in a March 2024 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that while China's fighter production capacity is impressive, it is still behind the US in aircraft numbers, with the US maintaining an advantage in fifth-generation aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35 in particular. However, Jones and Palmer point out that China is closing the production gap with the US. They note China is reportedly producing 100 fifth-generation J-20 fighters annually and tripling the production of other aircraft types, such as the J-10C and J-16, suggesting a high production rate. Jones and Palmer attribute China's high fighter output to its centralized, whole-of-government approach to defense production. In terms of long-range air-to-air missiles, Tyler Rogoway mentions in a December 2023 article for The War Zone (TWZ) that China's new PL-17 is most likely a very long-range air-to-air missile with an estimated 300-kilometer range. Rogoway notes that the PL-17 may be intended against airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, other aircraft close to the target, ground-based radar or satellites. He mentions that the size of the PL-17 may restrict it to being carried externally by China's J-16 or J-20 fighters. As for China's rapid airpower growth, the US Department of Defense's (DOD) 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) states that the PLAAF and PLA Naval Aviation comprise the Indo-Pacific's largest air force, with 3,150 aircraft—1,900 of them fighters—an increase of 400 in the last three years, per Aquilino. Aquilino warns that if trends persist, China could soon overtake the US in total airpower, complementing its dominance on land and sea. Given China's looming quantitative fighter advantage, Matthew Revels mentions in an April 2023 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs article that in an invasion of Taiwan, the PLA would likely mass air assets over the self-governing island to achieve localized, tactical air superiority instead of fighting to achieve strategic air dominance. Beyond sheer fighter numbers, China's missile capabilities pose an even greater threat to US air operations in the region. Eamon Passey mentions in a December 2024 article for the American Foreign Policy Council that when it comes to conventional missiles, the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has a significant hardware advantage over the US. Passey notes China has developed an extensive array of ballistic and cruise missiles that are oftentimes more numerous and sophisticated than their US counterparts. He says that while the US invests in hypersonic weapons technology, it lags behind China in development and deployment due to high costs and the complexity of integrating those weapons into its military framework. Passey observes that China can make substantial investments in its missile capabilities mainly due to the absence of constraining arms control treaties. He also points out that the PLARF manages an autonomous, intensely focused and extensive missile program that has quickly developed to unite nuclear and conventional capabilities under a single command structure. The PLARF is critical in China's counter-intervention strategy in regional conflicts. Christopher Mihal mentions in a 2021 Military Review article that China, as of that year, has 2,200 conventional ballistic missiles and enough anti-ship missiles to attack every US surface combatant in the South China Sea, with sufficient firepower to overcome each ship's missile defenses. Further, Kelly Grieco and other writers mention in a December 2024 Stimson Center report that the PLARF is expected to play a leading role in neutralizing US airbases in Japan, Guam, and other Pacific locations, launching coordinated missile attacks to destroy US aircraft on the ground and cratering runways to make them unusable. These missile capabilities threaten the US's forward-deployed airpower, which remains highly vulnerable due to inadequate base fortifications, Greico writes. Thomas Shugart III and Timothy Walton mention in a January 2025 Hudson Institute report that in a worst-case scenario, most US aircraft losses will occur on the ground, as its Pacific airbases lack hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) and individual aircraft shelters (IAS). They mention that US operational concepts have assumed mainly that its aircraft would operate from forward airfields uncontested and that minor threats to those facilities would abate with the cessation of hostilities. They say that thinking disregards China's growing ability to strike those vulnerable facilities with missiles, aircraft and special forces. Shugart and Walton say China has enough firepower to make dispersal alone an ineffective countermeasure. These shortcomings could prove catastrophic in the event of a Chinese assault on Taiwan, where a rapid US response would be critical to deterrence and defense. Timothy Heath and other writers mention in a June 2023 RAND report that Taiwan is vulnerable to defeat in the first 90 days after an invasion, with that time being the minimum required for the US to marshal enough forces for military intervention. In contrast, Bonny Lin and other writers mention in an August 2024 CSIS report that China can sustain major combat operations against Taiwan for six months as part of a larger blockade, with PLAAF and PLARF strikes aiming to neutralize the latter's naval bases, coastal and air defense batteries and command and control with the option of unleashing more missile and air attacks should Taiwan continue to resist. Lin and others say those intensified attacks also aim to prevent Taiwan from reconstituting damaged equipment and deploying additional weapons systems. If the US doesn't act fast, the next battle for air superiority could be over before its aircraft even get off the ground.


Asia Times
01-03-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
New US missile aims to pierce China's rising air power
The US Air Force's newly unveiled AIM-260A Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM) promises to reshape aerial warfare with its extended range, advanced guidance and stealth compatibility—just as China's airpower developments escalate the fight for air superiority. Last month, The War Zone reported that the US Air Force had confirmed the authenticity of the recently released AIM-260A JATM's rendering. With a more extended range yet a similar size to the AIM-120 AMRAAM, this missile is poised to replace the latter in US military service. Included in a US Navy industry day briefing, the JATM remains highly classified, with technical and programmatic details withheld. However, it is believed to feature advanced propulsion systems, multi-mode guidance technologies and the capability to receive guidance from various sources such as ground radar and satellites. While publicly available information about the AIM-260A's range is scant, Naval News mentions that the most recent AIM-120D-3 variant was nearing the threshold range of the AIM-260A at 190 kilometers, but the latter missile likely exceeds that range. The rendering reveals a sleek design optimized for high speed and low drag. It features a notably longer rocket motor than the AIM-120, suggesting significantly enhanced range and speed capabilities. The AIM-260A is anticipated to be fitted in stealth fighters like the F-22 and F-35, as well as future stealthy drones under the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program. This development reflects the US military's response to longer-range threats, particularly from Chinese missiles. Despite active testing, the exact timeline for the AIM-260A's fielding remains unclear, and there has been no public confirmation of its operational status yet. The JATM's advanced propulsion and potentially multi-mode seeker technology highlight significant advancements in US air-to-air combat capabilities. This development follows the relatively recent unveiling of advanced Chinese air-to-air missiles. The People's Liberation Army-Air Force (PLAAF) has unveiled its J-16 fighters equipped with the PL-17 missile, a long-range beyond visual range (BVR) weapon designed to neutralize high-value aerial targets, such as airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and tankers. The PL-17, significantly larger than its predecessor, the PL-15, features a dual-pulse rocket motor, thrust-vectoring controls, and speeds exceeding Mach 4. Its guidance system integrates an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and a two-way datalink, enhancing resistance to electronic countermeasures. Additionally, China is developing hypersonic air-to-air missiles to counter US stealth bombers, such as the B-21 Raider. These weapons, reportedly capable of reaching Mach 9, leverage solid-fuel pulse engines and extreme heat resistance, allowing unpredictable flight paths. China's missile strategy aligns with its broader anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) doctrine, aiming to push US and allied forces farther from its coastline. The BVR revolution in fighter combat has shifted engagements from close-range dogfights to long-range, sensor-driven confrontations, with fighters using stealth, electronic warfare (EW), and active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar to detect and engage adversaries from standoff distances, often before detection, says Samuel Leiter in a March 2023 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) paper. Leiter mentions that this shift reduces attrition and maintains an advantage, emphasizing the critical need for enhanced capabilities in modern aerial warfare. He points out that simulations show that US and Japanese forces with superior aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 consistently perform those of China in engagements despite numerical disadvantages. However, China may already have countermeasures for the AIM-260A and similar missiles. In June 2024, Asian Military Review mentions that China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) are deploying sophisticated EW platforms like the Y-9DZ and J-16D. These platforms, equipped with advanced jamming pods and electronic support measures (ESM), are designed to disrupt enemy missile guidance systems and radar operations. China's innovation in EW aims to neutralize BVR threats and maintain air superiority in contested regions, reflecting a shift towards dominating the electronic spectrum to counter advanced missile technologies. As to how US and Chinese stealth fighters compare, Brent Eastwood mentions in a 1945 article this month that while China's J-20 features radar-evading features, advanced avionics, and long-range strike capabilities, its stealth is considered inferior to US fifth-generation jets such as the F-22 and F-35. However, Abraham Abrams mentions in a November 2024 article for Aviation Geek Club that the J-20's combat radius, nearly double that of the F-22 and F-35, allows for extended operational reach, crucial for Pacific theater engagements. Abrams notes that the J-20's advanced stealth design and high-thrust WS-15 engines enhance its speed, maneuverability and non-afterburner supersonic flight capabilities. With its large internal fuel capacity and sophisticated avionics, Abrams says the J-20's features provide superior endurance and operational flexibility. Discussing how US F-22s and F-35s could be used in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, Kris Osborne mentions in a September 2022 article for The National Interest (TNI) that the deployment of F-22 and F-35 fighter jets could be crucial in countering a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan, ensuring air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. F-22s flying from Kadena Air Base in Japan, the F-35B's vertical take-off and landing capabilities enabling operations from austere Pacific island airbases, and the F-35C's carrier-launch versatility would significantly bolster US and allied air power. Despite that technological advantage, US fighter readiness levels leave much to be desired. Last month, Air & Space Forces Magazine reported that in 2024, F-22 readiness levels fell from 52% to 40.19%, while that of the F-35A held steady at 51.4%. The ratings of older fighters, such as the F-15E and D, increased to 33% from 55%, respectively, to 52.9% and 63.7% as the oldest, worst-performing aircraft were retired. The F-15EX fleet, with just eight aircraft, had an 83.13% rating. Further, David Deptula mentions in a May 2024 Forbes article that the US Air Force faces a critical fighter aircraft gap, exacerbated by recent cuts to F-35 purchases, which undermines its ability to counter China's growing military power in the Pacific. In line with those cuts to F-35 purchases, the program was placed under US Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) scrutiny as it faces serious questions over its USD 2 trillion price tag, upgrade delays, software issues, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and maintenance and logistics problems. Deptula points out that the US struggles to maintain air superiority with 55 fighter squadrons compared to 134 during Operation Desert Storm. He stresses that China's production of approximately 100 J-20 fighters annually, far exceeding the US F-22 fleet fixed at 187 units, further widens this gap, posing a significant threat to Taiwan. Given those figures, General David Allvin mentioned in a February 2024 Air & Space Forces Magazine article that it would be cost-prohibitive for the US to build enough aircraft to maintain air superiority for days and weeks. While Allvin says the US in the Pacific should not resign itself to operating in mutually denied airspace as seen in the Russo-Ukrainian War, he calls for further development of affordable, off-the-shelf, unmanned aircraft to bolster numbers.