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Asia Times
2 days ago
- Politics
- Asia Times
China's taking cues from Russia to undermine US security umbrella
This article, originally published by Pacific Forum, is republished with permission. China doesn't like extended deterrence, the longstanding US policy that commits Washington to defending not just its own territory but also its allies against aggression – including, in some cases, with nuclear weapons. That's why, as I've argued in a recent Foreign Affairs article, China has developed a sophisticated approach to undermine, negate and even defeat the policy that in popular parlance is often called the 'security umbrella.' One aspect of the Chinese approach often goes unnoticed: the fact that it is increasingly mirroring the Russian approach, partly because China has of late joined forces with Russia to counter the United States. This development requires attention because Moscow has always been more aggressive than Beijing against US extended deterrence. So, the United States can now expect a stronger challenge from China and should thus redouble its efforts to strengthen extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. There are – always have been – striking similarities between the Chinese and Russian approaches to US extended deterrence. Both China and Russia see US extended deterrence as an inseparable part of a larger problem that includes US alliances, which themselves fit in a broader effort designed to counter them. In a recent joint statement, for example, China and Russia talk about the need to strengthen 'international security and global strategic stability' and the two countries castigate US extended deterrence as one of the obstacles, among others, to that goal. Both China and Russia, as a result, are pushing back hard against US extended deterrence and doing so through integrated diplomatic, economic and military actions, while increasingly, as mentioned, working closely together. Their goal is to break extended deterrence by separating the United States from its allies. As Eric Edelman and Franklin Miller have explained, 'Russia and China will seek to stress and undermine US extended deterrence … by 'seeking to de-couple' the defense of the US homeland from defense of our allies.' Both China and Russia have developed concepts and capabilities to negate and defeat US extended deterrence. They are getting ready for conflicts that would entail that they seize and secure territory quickly (in the Indo-Pacific for China and in the Euro-Atlantic for Russia), making it difficult for the United States to respond and restore the status quo. In this regard, China and Russia appear confident that they are well-positioned to win because they think that they have greater skin in the game than the United States, as the fight would take place in 'their' neighborhood and thus, they calculate, be more strategically important to them. They also believe that geography (proximity to the battlefield) benefits them militarily and assess that they now have the capabilities to execute a military operation quickly and effectively. That's why the recent analytical literature talks about asymmetries of stakes, geographyand escalation in China's and Russia's favor. For a long time, there were also major differences between the Chinese and Russian approaches. Many of these differences, however, have either diminished, or no longer apply today because the Chinese approach has come to resemble the Russian approach, at least in three ways. First, traditionally Beijing has seen US extended deterrence as an effort to prevent China's rise and rightful return as the Middle Kingdom – whereas, to Moscow, it is a vicious attempt to crush Russia. For example, Wei Fenghe, China's former minister of national defense, said a few years ago that the United States wants to 'create conflict and confrontation, and to contain and encircle others.' By contrast, Russia's President Vladimir Putin stated last year that 'the United States … has shifted the military aspect of NATO back into the spotlight, collectively declaring their intention to inflict a strategic defeat upon us.' So, while Beijing has seen US extended deterrence as an encirclement or containment problem, Moscow has viewed it as existential. That is changing, however. Like Moscow, Beijing today is increasingly looking at US extended deterrence in existential terms, for two reasons. One is because the United States has labeled China its number one competitor and, recently, influential US voices have insisted that Washington should 'win' the competition against Beijing and defeat the Chinese Communist Party. To Chinese, that means the United States wants regime change in China. The other reason Chinese officials now consider US extended deterrence an existential problem is because they have seen the United States and its regional allies strengthen their activities. Recently, Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra and Manila have enhanced their defense work, engaged new partners, and sought to build a region-wide security architecture through new mechanisms such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, or the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States security arrangement, dubbed AUKUS. To Beijing, these moves suggest that the United States is preparing to act militarily against China. It is not surprising, then, to hear Chinese officials voice stronger concerns about US intentions. For example, Qin Gang, China's former minister of foreign affairs and former Chinese ambassador to the United States, said: 'The US claims it wants to 'compete to win' with China, and does not seek conflict. But in fact, the so-called 'competition' by the US is all-round containment and suppression, a zero-sum game of life and death.' Second, Beijing has been generally less aggressive than Moscow in countering US extended deterrence. Unlike Russia, which engages in overt, high-risk confrontations, as in Ukraine, China has favored incremental pressure, using 'salami-slicing' and coercion. That's partly because their tools are different. Beijing resorts predominantly to economic measures because China is an economic powerhouse, whereas Moscow employs political subversion and military force more readily because Russia is weak(er) economically but a military superpower. But here, too, that's changing. As Chinese military power is increasing, Beijing is becoming more militarily adventurist. In the South China Sea, for example, Chinese vessels have of late repeatedly collided with Filipino ships, sometimes dousing them with water cannons and injuring onboard personnel. Worryingly, a just-released RAND report finds that China is redefining hybrid warfare to include the use of nonmilitary tools for enhancing lethality. That's why Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, recently warned that 'China continues to pursue unprecedented military modernization and increasingly aggressive behavior that threatens the US homeland, our allies, and our partners.' Third, for a long time Chinese nuclear weapons did not have a major role against US extended deterrence. That's because the Chinese tradition supports a strategy of assured retaliation, and of not integrating nuclear strategy with conventional strategy, or pursuing nuclear warfighting, because of the idea that these weapons only prevent nuclear coercion and deter nuclear attack. That's why Beijing has claimed to have a 'self-defense nuclear strategy' and why it has maintained tight control over its arsenal, never delegating authority over nuclear strategy to the Chinese military. That's also why China has developed a small nuclear force and refused to engage in arms races, while pledging never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The Chinese nuclear tradition stands in contrast with the Russian nuclear tradition. Moscow has made the large nuclear arsenal it has inherited from Soviet times, which it has modernized, the cornerstone of its defense policy, even emphasizing its readiness to use tactical nuclear weapons early (and first) in a conflict. China, however, is now engaged in a rapid nuclear build-up, so change might be in the offing. Of course, China denies that its nuclear 'modernization' – Beijing insists it is not a build-up – will lead to change, either in Chinese nuclear policy or posture. But even before independent observers began shedding light on what looked like a build-up, evidence was mounting that Beijing had abandoned its traditional nuclear approach and embraced one more similar to Moscow's. Significantly, in unofficial dialogues Chinese scholars now confess that Beijing has made 'adjustments' to its nuclear approach. Just as Moscow has waved the nuclear threat during the Ukraine war, Beijing could do the same over Taiwan. This is plausible, especially given the apparent belief in Beijing that Russian nuclear weapons and threats have deterred the United States and West from direct intervention in Ukraine. China's embrace of the Russian approach to US extended deterrence is bad news for the United States because it means that Beijing will become more confrontational. This is concerning, for two reasons. First, because it adds complexity to an already heavily charged security environment: There are active wars in Europe and the Middle East. Second, because managing two increasingly combative peer (nuclear) competitors – Russia and China – forces the United States to rethink its longstanding deterrence and defense assumptions and practices, especially given that Moscow and Beijing are strengthening their cooperation and, in Moscow's case, developing new ties with another US nuclear-armed adversary: North Korea. Detailed recommendations for action by the United States are beyond the scope of this piece. Suffice to say, however, that Washington should further strengthen extended deterrence. Given the magnitude of the challenge from China – it is the only power able to supplant the United States – Washington should also urge its regional allies to do more on the defense front. The United States, of course, should remain involved in Europe to help manage the Russia threat, but it should push its European allies to contribute more, both because they can do so and because their increased actions will facilitate a greater US focus on China. In times of strategic shifts, leaders must prioritize and realign their teams. It is true in business as in international relations; the United States should do so as the China challenge is growing. David Santoro ( david@ ) is president and CEO of the Pacific Forum. Follow him on X at @DavidSantoro1
Asia Times
21-05-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
The US factor in India-Pakistan tensions: a Kautilyan perspective
This commentary first appeared on Pacific Forum and is republished with permission. Read the original here. Following the deadly terrorist attacks in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir on April 22, Delhi and Islamabad engaged in immediate diplomatic and security measures and countermeasures. This period of heightened tension culminated in a four-day military clash that ultimately concluded with an 'understanding' between the two nations. The international community's response to these events has varied, encompassing widespread condemnation and condolences, appeals for de-escalation and restraint, and expressions of enthusiastic or cautious support for India or Pakistan. These reactions, viewed through the lens of ancient Indian strategic thought, starkly highlight the enduring primacy of political interests in the global arena, echoing the rajamandala (circle of states) theory articulated by Kautilya. Within this framework, the response of the United States—arguably occupying the position of the udasina (neutral king) in India's rajamandala —warrants scrutiny. Kautilya's seminal Arthashastra conceptualizes the intricate web of interstate relations through the rajamandala , a construct comprising 12 distinct categories of states. The defining characteristics of each state within this system are determined by a confluence of three key factors: geographical proximity, the prevailing balance of power, and the state's intentions or disposition ( bhavin ). Applying this ancient wisdom to contemporary geopolitics, the United States arguably embodies the quintessential udasina —the neutral king—within India's rajamandala . 'One outside (the sphere of) the enemy, the conqueror and the middle king, stronger than (their) constituents, capable of helping the enemy, the conqueror and the middle king when they are united or disunited and of suppressing them when they are disunited, is the neutral king.' In the context of the post-Pahalgam scenario, India assumes the role of the vijigishu (the aspiring conqueror), Pakistan its immediate ari (enemy), and China potentially fits the description of the madhyama (middle king) or parshnigraha (rear enemy), given its geographical proximity and complex relationship with both India and Pakistan. The United States, geographically distant from this immediate sphere of interaction, possesses a comprehensive national power that surpasses that of India, Pakistan, and China. Historically, Washington has strategically navigated the dynamics between these actors, often shaping their interactions in pursuit of its own national objectives. India has cultivated a strategic partnership with the US, elevating it to the status of a mitra (ally) since the turn of the century, in line with Kautilya's framework that acknowledges the significance of external allies. His enumeration of the seven elements of state power uniquely includes mitra as the final component, a resource to be tapped when internal balancing proves ineffective to achieve foreign policy objectives. The US has reciprocated this alignment, driven by considerable strategic convergences, resulting in a demonstrably strengthening bilateral relationship over the past decade. From an Indian perspective, the United States is an important strategic partner with growing alignment of interests across several domains, notably in counter-terrorism. Washington, in turn, has witnessed a growing divergence, and even outright contestation, of its interests with Pakistan, primarily due to Islamabad's enduring 'iron brother' relationship with Beijing, America's principal strategic competitor. Against this backdrop, Delhi would have likely anticipated a more robust and unequivocal response from Washington following the Pahalgam attacks, moving beyond mere condemnation and calls for restraint to a more direct attribution of blame and support for India's security concerns. Despite Washington's affirmation of 'full support' to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on May 2, its reluctance to explicitly hold Pakistan accountable for its role in fostering terrorism has been conspicuous. This contrasts with the aftermath of the 2019 Pulwama attacks, where Washington adopted a significantly more assertive stance against Pakistan, both in terms of assigning blame and acknowledging India's right to self-defence. Some analysts attribute this shift in response to the absence of a 'formally claimed responsibility' by a specific Pakistan-based terrorist group for the Pahalgam attacks, unlike Jaish-e-Mohammed's claim for Pulwama. However, statements from US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Vice President J D Vance, hinting at US support for India's right to self-defence post-Pahalgam, suggest that a lack of definitive evidence was not the primary constraint. Notwithstanding recent vacillation and flip-flops of President Trump, a growing sentiment has emerged within Washington over the past few years, suggesting that its significant bet on India has not yielded the anticipated returns in countering the dual challenges posed by Russia and China. The proliferation of intense and protracted global flashpoints and the resulting alignment of major powers on opposing sides have severely tested India's delicate balancing act. Furthermore, Washington's apparent shift in strategic focus from the Indo-Pacific towards the conflicts in Russia and the Middle East has arguably diluted the strategic convergence that once defined the US-India partnership. The strategic value derived from the bilateral relationship is evident for both New Delhi and Washington, albeit tempered by an inherent power asymmetry that renders the relationship multifaceted and complex. India, as the relatively weaker partner, is naturally circumspect in its alliance with a stronger power to avoid potential manipulation. Conversely, the US delicately balances its approach towards its ally, based on the attitude it exhibits. For Kautilya: ' The ally is permanent because of (exclusive) feelings of friendship, fickle because of (his feelings) being common to the enemy, indifferent when not interested in either, with feelings for both when interested in the two .' From Washington's perspective, India remains a significant, albeit smaller, ally. Drawing upon Kautilya's wisdom, a stronger ally (the US) would be advised to bolster the power of an ally who aligns with the vijigishu (in this case, the US), manage the growth of an ally who shows potential to become too powerful, ensure that a weak ally remains neither excessively weak nor overly strong, prevent a fickle ally (one equally inclined towards the adversary) from defecting, support a weak ally seeking help from the conqueror and the enemy so that he doesn't turn to the enemy, and assist an ally in crisis to overcome their adversaries independently. Given Delhi's cautious approach to fully 'identifying' with US strategic objectives and its continued growth in power, Washington may be resorting to measures designed to keep India strategically tethered. Arguably, the recent strains in bilateral relations concerning the alleged plot to assassinate a US-based Sikh separatist, the evolving situation in Bangladesh, and the recent re-hyphenation of India and Pakistan with an offer to mediate on Kashmir, could be interpreted as strategic manoeuvres by the stronger ally to subtly influence a weaker ally perceived as unwilling to fully comply. While the convergence of interests between Washington and New Delhi is sufficient to sustain their partnership, it may not be comprehensive enough to entirely bridge the inherent power gap. India, committed to safeguarding its strategic autonomy, will likely continue to navigate its relationships with other major powers, including Russia, based on its own national interests. By the same logic, the US may see strategic value in maintaining a relationship with Pakistan. In the long term, India's demographic dividend, growing economic influence, advancing military capabilities, and expanding diplomatic footprint will likely serve as the enduring anchors that keep the US engaged—driven by both economic opportunities and geopolitical considerations. In conclusion, the path forward for the US-India relationship necessitates strategic maturity on both sides, particularly in appreciating the underlying principles guiding the other's strategic behavior. Washington's constructive involvement in India's domestic growth is not only beneficial for New Delhi but also serves America's broader strategic objectives in the subcontinent and the Indo-Pacific. The inherent differences in their approaches to partnerships—India's preference for strategic autonomy versus America's inclination towards alliances—will likely persist as a point of friction. However, viewed through a Kautilyan lens, this dynamic tension might be understood not as a flaw in the relationship but as a natural consequence of their respective strategic positions and objectives. Dr Kajari Kamal ( kajari@ ) is associate professor at The Takshashila Institution.
Asia Times
20-05-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
Beijing's blurred red lines and the strategy of ambiguity
Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. When Lithuania let Taiwan open a diplomatic office in Vilnius in 2021, China froze trade overnight. Goods were blocked, supply chains snarled and European firms with Lithuanian ties faced pressure. The message was clear: a red line had been crossed. But what line, exactly? Beijing never said. That is the logic of strategic ambiguity. China has dellineated four red lines that anchor its foreign polilcy: Taiwan, democracy and human rights, its political system and the right to development. But those lines are rarely clear. They shift, vanish and reappear without warning. This is not a flaw; it's a feature. And it's a strategy that demands closer attention in the Indo-Pacific. Ambiguity means keeping thresholds vague, language flexible and reactions unpredictable. It lets China adjust its stance without appearing inconsistent. More importantly, it deters others. Foreign actors must weigh the risk of crossing a line they cannot see. This is not new. The US also uses ambiguity on Taiwan. But Beijing applies the tactic more broadly. Its red lines cover sovereignty, values and development. And they come with consequences. For Beijing, ambiguity offers both offensive and defensive advantages. It allows China to recalibrate its posture in real time, applying pressure where needed while walking back without losing face. It also helps maintain internal cohesion by signaling strength to domestic audiences without committing to risky action. What makes China's ambiguity work is enforcement. It uses legal, economic, military and diplomatic tools selectively and powerfully. Legally, it relies on vague laws like the Anti-Secession Law and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. Terms like 'acts of secession' or 'interference' can stretch to fit many cases. That is the point. Newer statutes, like the Foreign Relations Law, expand the toolbox. These laws often lack precise definitions. They give Beijing maximum interpretive space to act when it wants and to refrain when it does not. Economically, it uses trade bans, customs delays and unofficial boycotts. When South Korea hosted a US missile defense system, Chinese tourists vanished and Korean businesses were hit. Australia faced barley and wine sanctions for calling for a Covid inquiry. China rarely announces these moves. The silence keeps the threat alive. Military actions follow the same pattern. The PLA conducts drills near Taiwan, enters disputed waters and flies into contested airspace. Sometimes it escalates. Other times, it retreats. The choreography is meant to keep adversaries guessing. A joint naval patrol near Japan may be paired with conciliatory diplomatic visits elsewhere. The ambiguity lets Beijing strike multiple tones at once. Diplomatically, Beijing summons ambassadors, fires off sharp rhetoric and lets loose the state media. 'Wolf warrior' diplomacy raises tensions without drawing clear lines. The ambiguity tests resolve and gauges reactions. This system creates the appearance of control without committing to fixed outcomes. It is designed to shape the behavior of other states by increasing the cost of uncertainty. Ambiguity is not just a deterrent. It is a method of control. By making others guess, China limits their strategic choices. By reacting selectively, it maintains deniability. This is not random. It is integrated statecraft. While other countries also shift their red lines like Russia in Ukraine, China's scope is wider. It blends politics, economics and security into one strategic system. And the lines are ideological as well as geopolitical. Western criticisms of Chinese human rights practices, support for Hong Kong protests or bans on Chinese tech firms are often framed in Beijing as red-line violations. But there is no unified threshold for what triggers a reaction. That uncertainty compels self-censorship. It discourages bold policy choices. The result is a sophisticated ecosystem of influence. One that punishes selectively, forgives tactically and always retains the upper hand by never revealing the rules. But ambiguity cuts both ways. It raises the risk of miscalculation. When others cannot see the red lines, they might cross them unintentionally. That can escalate fast. It also hurts policymaking. Without knowing what triggers Beijing, governments become risk-averse. They avoid policies that might offend, even when national interests demand them. That erodes sovereignty. For businesses, the uncertainty is chilling. A symbolic gesture such as hosting a Taiwanese official, a tweet or a t-shirt can trigger major losses. In the Indo-Pacific, ambiguity deters some but fuels arms races, hedging and alliances. States prepare for the worst because they cannot tell where the line is. It can also lead to fragmentation of alliances. US allies may not agree on how to respond to Chinese provocations if they interpret the red lines differently. That divergence can weaken collective responses and embolden further testing by Beijing. There is also a cost to China. Overuse of ambiguity can create a credibility gap. If others begin to see China's red lines as performative rather than firm, the deterrent power declines. The constant calibration can look like indecision. That opens China to counter-pressure. Taiwan arms sales are a prime example. The US sells weapons to Taiwan regularly. Sometimes Beijing reacts with fury. Other times, it shrugs. That inconsistency is the point. Washington cannot predict the cost. Lithuania faced China's full wrath over a name: the 'Taiwanese Representative Office.' Beijing did not just target Lithuania; it blocked companies with any Lithuanian ties. A minor diplomatic move turned into a global lesson. In the South China Sea, China claims 'indisputable sovereignty' but will not say exactly what that means. It builds islands, harasses ships and denies wrongdoing. The line is enforced without ever being drawn. Another example is the 2023 sanctions on US defense firms. Ostensibly triggered by arms sales, they were announced months later, during a political moment when China needed to appear strong. The delay was deliberate. In each case, ambiguity allows China to set the tempo and scope of enforcement, giving it the strategic initiative. What can others do? First, stop demanding clarity. Ambiguity is the point. Instead, prepare for scenarios. Use war games and red-team exercises to explore responses. Build back channels to avoid escalation. Second, push for regional norms. Forums like ASEAN, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ('Quad') and APEC can help set expectations. Even if China resists formal rules, informal ones shape behavior over time. Third, businesses need sharper political risk analysis. Watch laws, but also speeches, trends and public sentiment. Sometimes, a party slogan can predict more than a policy paper. Governments can also develop shared playbooks. When Beijing targets one state, coordinated support from others can raise the cost of coercion. A multilateral approach makes red lines harder to exploit. Above all, staying calm matters. Not every rhetorical flare-up signals imminent escalation. Sometimes it's performance. The key is to distinguish noise from intent. China's red lines are not lines at all. They're zones of ambiguity – sometimes visible, often not. But they are enforced with powerful tools. In the Indo-Pacific, where competition and mistrust run high, strategic ambiguity will keep shaping the landscape. The real challenge isn't just seeing the red lines. It's learning to operate smartly without ever knowing exactly where they are. Understanding the logic behind this ambiguity and crafting thoughtful, adaptive responses is essential for any nation hoping to stay stable, sovereign and strategically relevant in a world where the rules are written in pencil. Tang Meng Kit is a graduate of the MSc in International Relations program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. His research interests encompass cross-Strait relations, Taiwanese politics and policy issues, as well as aerospace technology. He currently works as an aerospace engineer.
Asia Times
15-05-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
A Trump administration playbook for the Pacific
This article first appeared on Pacific Forum and is republished with permission. Read the original here. As secretary of state, Marco Rubio has established a clear framework for US foreign policy: Every initiative must strengthen America, secure its future and enhance its prosperity. In the Pacific Islands, Washington faces a strategic puzzle: What instruments can the US deploy that both align with the Trump administration's priorities and address the region's specific circumstances and aspirations? By examining four fields of statecraft—diplomatic, intelligence, military, and economic—a playbook that speaks to both Trump's vision and regional interests is uncovered. While many point to the unpredictability of the Trump administration's foreign policy, clear patterns now appear: China stands as the paramount global threat to US interests; the use of hard power takes precedence over soft; cost-cutting is at the forefront; and allies should share more of the burden. Diplomatically, the Trump administration has focused on recalibrating trade relationships to address deficits and foster friendlier environments for American businesses. This approach has led to a clear shift: economic and financial agencies such as the Department of Commerce are taking center stage. However, these agencies' ability to effectively negotiate and work with other countries is intrinsically tied to the functions of US diplomatic assets. Despite growing interest from Pacific nations in strengthening ties with the US, the US has failed to build a robust diplomatic presence in the region. This is an obvious blind spot in a region where personal relationships hold substantial power. Sending Commerce Department officials to key Pacific nations could both facilitate trade and ensure America's influence remains strong. Additionally, the president and Congress need to expedite the nomination and confirmation of US ambassadors to the Pacific Islands. The US Embassy in Honiara reopened in January 2023, yet the ambassador position remains vacant. In the Solomon Islands, a country where China has a diplomatic footprint at least three times the size of the US, this was an easy gap to fill, but one where the US fell short. As with the first Trump administration, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ('Quad') is a key fixture in the US' Indo-Pacific Strategy. Bolstering partnerships with Australia, India, and Japan, the US can simultaneously expand its Pacific engagement while meeting the administration's burden-sharing priority. The Quad announced a range of initiatives in 2023 aimed at addressing regional issues of mutual concern, including climate change, maritime security, and economic development. The US needs a diplomatic presence that matches the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands. Beyond diplomacy, intelligence-sharing plays a critical role in safeguarding US security interests. The Freely Associated States (FAS)—including the Marshall Islands, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia—are on the front lines of countering China's malign influence. The United States could offer enhanced support from its intelligence agencies to identify illegal behavior from the PRC and support local law enforcement. Preventing malign Chinese influence through information sharing also aligns with Pacific priorities. For instance, US surveillance of weather activity and trends can boost disaster preparedness and resiliency through investments in early warning systems, infrastructure adaptation, and technical assistance. The US could also work with partners to enhance regional maritime domain awareness. With illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing cutting into Pacific food supplies and economies, it is a vital security concern that the United States can help tackle. The US has active shiprider agreements with 12 Pacific Island countries that boost local capacity by hosting local law enforcement on US Coast Guard vessels to patrol their EEZs. Combatting IUU fishing, human trafficking, and drug smuggling, shiprider programs combat transnational security issues in the Pacific Islands with potential spillover implications for the United States. However, due to the vastness of the Pacific and lack of capacity, these programs are limited. Cost-effective methods of combatting this are as simple as reallocating assets or prepositioning cutters in the Pacific Islands. The United States may have the systems in place to work closely with the Freely Associated States, but not across the Blue Pacific. Australia and New Zealand can help fill in these gaps. The Director General of New Zealand's Security Intelligence Survey recently emphasized deepened intelligence cooperation across the region. The US should also arrange secondments for its own intelligence analysts to the Australia-funded Pacific Fusion Center, which hosts analytical thinking in the region. On the military front, the US has a long-standing role as a security provider in the Pacific Islands. Through the Compacts of Free Association, the United States maintains exclusive and extensive defense rights and responsibilities for the FAS. Recently, security arrangements with Papua New Guinea and Fiji have strengthened the United States' footprint in the region, acting as a strategic counter to China's growing presence, while supporting Pacific needs through development and enhanced disaster relief collaboration. However, the US is not the only security player on the allied side of the ledger. Australia and New Zealand are both increasingly stepping up their roles in the Pacific Islands. Recently, Australia has renewed discussions with Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu on security agreements. To avoid overlap and ensure a complementary approach, the US will need to coordinate closely with these partners—especially as Australia has secured major security agreements with Tuvalu and Nauru. US engagement with the PICs can't be discussed without looking to the elephant in the room—how the freeze of foreign aid and dismantlement of USAID has not only damaged the US' credibility as a partner after years of rebuilding, but it has also given China a perfect opportunity to increase its influence. While foreign aid is not the only economic angle to consider, it is one of the most important forms of engagement. Fortunately, disaster relief and some unexploded ordnance programs were restarted in the FAS and Papua New Guinea. Additionally, once foreign aid is turned back on, programs in the Indo-Pacific seem comparatively less likely to be subjected to the chopping block. Nevertheless, the foreign aid freeze has left policy makers wondering how the US can economically engage with the PICs in a more explicitly mutually beneficial way. This isn't just about charity—it's about investing in mutual benefits. By prioritizing areas like economic development, environmental resilience, and small-scale infrastructure, the US can deepen relationships with PICs while meeting its own strategic interests. The US can easily cooperate with allies and partners on these types of foreign aid and development finance projects as they either already have a stake or are looking to become more involved. The United States' engagement with the Pacific Islands represents a crucial opportunity to align its foreign policy goals with the region's priorities, while addressing broader strategic concerns. Despite challenges such as the freeze on foreign aid, there are several avenues through which the US can strengthen its presence and influence in the Pacific. By leveraging diplomatic channels, enhancing intelligence sharing, deepening law enforcement and coast guard cooperation, and fostering economic partnerships, the US can safeguard its security interests and counter Chinese expansion. A pragmatic, cost-effective strategy that balances US interests with the aspirations of the Pacific Islands will be essential in shaping a resilient and prosperous future for both sides. Jonah Bock (jonahbock@ is senior research assistant with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute USA, where he works on issues regarding Pacific island countries with a particular focus on the Freely Associated States. Kaitlyn Flynn (kaitlynflynn@ is an analyst intern at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute USA. She previously worked as an intern for the Office of Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands at the US Department of State.
Asia Times
12-05-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
Time to develop US industrial strategy
This article was originally published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with permission. The 21st century global economy is increasingly shaped by two defining pillars of national power: financial dominance and industrial capacity. On the one hand, the United States maintains an enduring edge in global finance, with the US dollar still entrenched as the world's reserve currency and American capital markets unrivaled in scale and liquidity. On the other, China has emerged as the world's manufacturing powerhouse, anchoring global supply chains and asserting influence through its industrial footprint. As economic competition intensifies between Washington and Beijing, the US must recognize that preserving its strategic edge requires more than just financial leverage. It demands an ambitious and coherent industrial strategy. In recent years, US policymakers have responded to China's industrial rise with a series of reactive measures: tariffs, export controls and investment restrictions. While these tools may address short-term imbalances or national security risks, they do little to resolve the foundational challenges eroding America's manufacturing base. Without tackling these core issues – a shrinking skilled workforce, outdated infrastructure, and brittle supply chains – America's efforts to restore production and reduce dependency on China will falter. Moreover, these temporary policy instruments signal inconsistency. From Beijing's perspective, a coherent and sustained US industrial strategy poses a greater long-term challenge than ad hoc trade barriers. China has long anticipated an American pivot toward rebuilding domestic capabilities, which is why it has redoubled efforts to internationalize the renminbi (RMB) and invest in technology self-sufficiency through programs like 'Made in China 2025' and the dual circulation strategy. The landscape of high-tech manufacturing illustrates the complexity of this rivalry. Taiwanese-owned factories play an outsized role in this arena, particularly in sectors such as semiconductors and electronics. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), for example, produces over 90% of the world's most advanced chips and has long operated major fabrication plants in mainland China. However, geopolitical tensions and supply chain disruptions have spurred a geographic recalibration. In March, TSMC announced it intended to boost its US investments to $165 billion. Similarly, other Taiwanese firms like Foxconn have begun diversifying away from the mainland China, exploring sites in Southeast Asia and North America. This migration is driven not only by strategic hedging, but by rising concerns over operational risk. Beijing's increasingly assertive stance toward Taiwan – underscored by military drills, trade coercion and political pressure – has fueled public resentment in Taiwan and hardened resolve there to chart an independent economic path. For Taiwanese firms, this volatile political environment adds yet another layer of complexity to already fraught supply chain decisions. It also sharpens the urgency for Washington to work more closely with Taipei and other democratic partners to ensure the stability and resilience of high-tech industries. These shifts also carry implications for US industrial policy. Facilitating the relocation and expansion of trusted foreign manufacturers requires proactive support – from tax incentives and streamlined permitting to workforce training and secure energy supplies. If the US succeeds in anchoring key players like TSMC and Foxconn within its industrial ecosystem, it will not only reduce strategic vulnerabilities but also catalyze domestic innovation and regional development. In Arizona, for instance, state-level coordination with federal programs has been critical in advancing TSMC's investments. Similar efforts are underway in Ohio, New York, and Texas to attract semiconductor and battery manufacturers. Local governments must be empowered with tools like workforce development grants and infrastructure bonds to prepare regions for high-tech industries. Regional partnerships with universities and technical colleges should also be expanded to create talent pipelines aligned with industry needs. Internationally, the US should deepen industrial cooperation with regional allies. In East Asia, trilateral dialogues with Japan and South Korea can align standards and incentives for semiconductor resilience. In Southeast Asia, American firms can partner with Taiwanese manufacturers relocating to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand – offering technical assistance and financing to build regional clusters of excellence. Mexico, as part of the USMCA framework, offers proximity and preferential trade treatment that could be leveraged to expand nearshoring strategies. Additional policy recommendations include: Create a national industrial council: Modeled after the National Security Council, this body would coordinate policy across federal agencies and align public and private investment in strategic sectors. Modeled after the National Security Council, this body would coordinate policy across federal agencies and align public and private investment in strategic sectors. Establish a regional resilience fund: This fund would offer matching grants to states and municipalities that successfully attract and retain high-tech manufacturers and build ecosystem infrastructure. This fund would offer matching grants to states and municipalities that successfully attract and retain high-tech manufacturers and build ecosystem infrastructure. Leverage Export-Import Bank of the United States and United States International Development Finance Corporation: These institutions can support overseas projects that reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains and promote reshoring through financing, insurance, and political risk coverage. These institutions can support overseas projects that reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains and promote reshoring through financing, insurance, and political risk coverage. Standardize permitting and tax incentives: A national framework for permitting and incentives would reduce red tape and create predictability for foreign and domestic investors alike. A national framework for permitting and incentives would reduce red tape and create predictability for foreign and domestic investors alike. Codify a Taiwan-US industrial compact: A bilateral framework to protect and promote Taiwanese investment in the US, facilitate joint R&D, and coordinate supply chain planning could be a diplomatic and economic win-win. For Washington, a credible industrial strategy must begin with a clear sense of national purpose: not simply to compete with China, but to rebuild a resilient, inclusive, and future-ready economy. The goal is not isolationism but strategic interdependence – reducing vulnerability while fostering trusted economic ties with allies and partners. To do this, the United States must make sustained investments in three critical areas: Workforce development: The erosion of America's industrial workforce is a long-term challenge with deep roots. Addressing it requires a generational investment in vocational training, apprenticeship programs, and STEM education. Policymakers must work with industry and labor to create pathways into advanced manufacturing, clean energy, and semiconductor production – sectors that are both strategically vital and poised for growth. Infrastructure modernization: Manufacturing competitiveness depends on the efficiency of logistics, power and digital infrastructure. The bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act was a step in the right direction, but follow-through is essential. Industrial hubs need 21st-century ports, smart grids and broadband access to compete globally. Without modern infrastructure, the productivity gains from reshoring will remain limited. Supply chain resilience: The pandemic exposed how dangerously fragile many global supply chains have become. The US must incentivize domestic production of critical inputs like rare earth elements, batteries, and pharmaceuticals. But it must also build redundancy and flexibility into its supply networks by fostering regional production alliances with trusted partners such as Japan, South Korea, Mexico, and members of the EU. Policy must be coupled with strategy. This includes: Identifying strategic sectors that merit targeted support—including semiconductors, green technologies, AI, and advanced robotics. that merit targeted support—including semiconductors, green technologies, AI, and advanced robotics. Using public-private partnerships to accelerate innovation and commercialization. to accelerate innovation and commercialization. Ensuring consistent regulatory frameworks that promote competitiveness while upholding labor and environmental standards. Importantly, the US does not need to emulate China's model of state-led capitalism. American strengths lie in decentralized innovation, private sector dynamism and democratic accountability. But the government must set the direction and provide the stability needed for industrial renewal to take root. Global allies are watching. Many share America's concerns about economic overdependence on China. A credible US industrial strategy could serve as the foundation for a broader coalition to promote economic security and democratic resilience. Ultimately, America's long-term economic influence will rest not on the power of the dollar alone, but on its ability to produce, innovate and lead by example. The world is entering an era in which economic power will increasingly shape geopolitical outcomes. If the US seeks to preserve its leadership in this new era, then rebuilding its industrial base must be treated not as an option, but as a strategic imperative. This does not require the US to mimic China's model of state-driven capitalism, but it does require clear direction and sustained investment. Otherwise, America risks remaining reliant on foreign supply chains and vulnerable to external shocks – as was made evident during the Covid-19 pandemic. The goal should not be isolationism, but strategic interdependence: building domestic strength while engaging with allies to construct a more resilient and balanced global economic order. Only with such a vision can the US maintain its influence in a world where economic power increasingly shapes geopolitical realities. Yujing Shentu PhD (yujing@ is an independent scholar and writer focused on digital politics, international political economy and US-China strategic competition. She has a background in policy analysis and economic strategy.
