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AllAfrica
2 days ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
China's gray-zone hybrid threats against Taiwan's Pacific allies
This article was originally published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with permission. In the Indo-Pacific's intensifying great power competition, Taiwan's Pacific allies – Palau, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu—are increasingly caught in the crosshairs of China's hybrid warfare. These microstates, long diplomatically aligned with Taipei, are now contending with cyberattacks, disinformation, economic coercion and elite capture that exploit their resource limitations and geopolitical exposure. Events such as the June 2025 Taiwan-Marshall Islands security pact and revelations of Chinese organized crime in Palau underscore a broader pattern: Beijing is deploying gray-zone tactics to undermine sovereignty, fracture alliances and weaken the US-led regional order. Hybrid threats encompass a range of operations that combine cyber intrusions, manipulation of influence, economic pressure and the spread of disinformation. Unlike traditional forms of coercion, these threats function beneath the level of overt conflict, using ambiguity to reduce the likelihood of international backlash. In the Pacific Islands, these threats find fertile ground. Countries such as Palau, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu have small populations and limited state capacity. Their diplomatic recognition of Taiwan and Compact of Free Association agreements with the United States place them at the heart of regional rivalry. Beijing's toolkit now includes dual-use platforms such as fishing fleets and unmanned systems, supported by the world's third-largest coast guard. These assets enable surveillance, economic disruption and maritime intimidation. Though presented as diplomacy or development aid, many of China's recent actions reveal a deeper strategic calculus. Palau: a targeted pressure campaign Palau offers a striking example of China's hybrid operations. In March 2024, a cyberattack attributed to Chinese actors breached government systems, stole 20,000 documents, and caused $1.2 million in damages. At the same time, tourism restrictions that have been in place since 2017 reduced the share of Chinese tourists from 60% to 30%, significantly impacting Palau's GDP. Disruption strategies, including mass cancellations of hotel bookings, have further unsettled local markets. On the political side, entities associated with China have leased approximately 380,000 square meters of land near US military facilities in Palau and made illicit contributions to Palauan officials, including a $20,000 donation to former President Thomas Remengesau Jr., deemed illegal by Palau's anti-corruption prosecutor. Beijing portrays these as private business transactions, but their scale and proximity to strategic sites raise significant national security concerns. Palau's response has been firm. The government deported Chinese nationals involved in influence operations in 2024 and requested US missile systems in May 2025. Yet, significant gaps remain in digital resilience and investment transparency. Marshall Islands: strategic tug-of-war The Marshall Islands, tightly linked to the US through its compact of free association, is another prime arena for Beijing's influence efforts. Since 2020, China has poured $50 million into infrastructure projects aimed at cultivating elite support and promoting a diplomatic realignment, such as was seen in Nauru's switch in 2024. In response to mounting pressure, the Marshall Islands signed a security pact with Taiwan in June 2025. The agreement focuses on maritime domain awareness, cybersecurity and counter-disinformation efforts following cyberattacks in 2024 that targeted government systems. A newly established National Security Office now monitors maritime threats. Nonetheless, the Marshall Islands' participation in China's Pacific Summit in May 2025 illustrates the continued diplomatic contest. Tuvalu: disinformation and digital vulnerability Tuvalu's embrace of digital governance has opened new pathways for hybrid influence. In January 2025, Chinese state media circulated videos of Tuvaluans expressing support for the One China policy. While portrayed as cultural content, the campaign coincided with high-level diplomatic talks, casting doubt on its intent. Cyber threats are escalating in the Pacific. Tuvalu's digital nation initiative, involving significant investment in digital passports and blockchain technology, is vulnerable to cyberattacks, as highlighted by regional cybersecurity gaps. A 2024 cyberattack on the Pacific Islands Forum, attributed to Chinese state-sponsored actors, compromised sensitive data and required costly mitigation efforts, underscoring the risks to Tuvalu's digital ambitions. China has also outpaced Taiwan in infrastructure aid, offering $30 million since 2022 compared with Taiwan's $15 million. Despite these pressures, Tuvalu reaffirmed ties with Taipei by accrediting a new ambassador in April 2025. However, its cyber defenses remain underdeveloped. Comparative observations Despite differences in geography and political dynamics, these three countries share overlapping vulnerabilities. Each has experienced cyber incidents, disinformation efforts and targeted economic pressure. From 2023 to 2025, regional hybrid threat incidents rose by an estimated 30%. What differs is the mode of engagement: Palau faces overt economic and political coercion. The Marshall Islands is caught in a high-stakes diplomatic contest. Tuvalu is increasingly exposed to digital subversion. These patterns reflect China's tailored strategy for influence projection, calibrated to exploit specific state weaknesses. Hybrid threats are not isolated disruptions. If successful, they could flip diplomatic recognition, as they did in Nauru, weakening Taiwan's international standing and emboldening further coercion. Weak cyber defenses, estimated to have cost regional governments $1.7 million in 2024 alone, leave these countries particularly exposed during crises such as natural disasters. At the strategic level, instability in the Second Island Chain could undermine US force posture and put up to $10 billion in regional military assets at risk. Australia, Japan, and New Zealand have begun to step in. They are offering, respectively, $100 million in cybersecurity support, $50 million in maritime patrols and $20 million in media capacity-building. But more integrated and locally responsive solutions are needed. The first step is enhancing cyber resilience. A $5 million initiative, modeled on the Taiwan-Marshall Islands pact, could train local personnel, protect critical infrastructure, and modernize digital security systems. Next, the Pacific Islands Forum should establish a regional hybrid threat center with a $10 million investment to coordinate intelligence, monitor influence operations, and share best practices. Additionally, transparency laws need updates. A $1 million investment review program, modeled after Palau's deportations, could require disclosures for foreign political donations and strategic land acquisitions. Civil society also needs more support. A $2 million media literacy and grant initiative could empower journalists and local NGOs to fight disinformation and expose elite capture. Finally, disaster response frameworks should include hybrid threat scenarios. A $3 million investment in training and emergency preparedness would help prevent exploitation during crises. These initiatives could be funded through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue's $50 million Indo-Pacific aid platform, ensuring sustainability and strategic alignment. China's gray-zone tactics challenge Taiwan's allies in the Pacific and threaten the Indo-Pacific's rules-based order. These hybrid strategies mix persuasion and coercion, as well as development and disruption. If ignored, they could turn small nations into battlegrounds for geopolitical rivalry. To safeguard Taiwan's alliances and regional stability, the US, Taiwan, and allies must act decisively. The solution lies not in militarization but in building resilience, promoting transparency, and empowering local communities before the line between peace and pressure blurs completely. Tang Meng Kit (mktang87@ is a Singaporean and is a freelance analyst and commentator. He graduated from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU, Singapore in 2025. By profession, Meng Kit works as an aerospace engineer and has keen interest in geopolitics and cross-straits affairs. \
AllAfrica
02-07-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
S. Korea's role in a Taiwan crisis on which North might piggyback
This article was first published by Pacific Forum. It is republished here with permission. The new president of South Korea remains cautious in articulating a position on a potential Taiwan contingency. Still, public and policy discourse within Korea has been active, often gravitating toward a stance of deliberate restraint, arguing that the North Korean threat justifies non-involvement in a different crisis. Yet this position is riddled with strategic confusion. First, it conflates strategic goals with bargaining positions. Minimizing involvement may be a negotiation tactic, but it should not define a nation's strategy. Second, it lacks coherence in managing strategic signaling – when to conceal and when to reveal intentions and capabilities. Third, it ignores the risks of strategic miscommunication: warnings meant for adversaries can inadvertently unsettle allies, and domestic political messages can embolden external challengers. Passive posturing and abstract principles will not suffice. Instead, South Korea must carefully assess the realities it would face during a contingency and map out its strategic options accordingly. This paper explores how South Korea can move from being a silent observer to a strategic enabler in the event of a Taiwan conflict, and what choices and preparations this role would entail. US planners now treat a dual-front crisis – China over Taiwan, plus North Korea on the peninsula – as a central assumption, not a remote risk. Washington's 2022 National Defense Strategy elevated 'integrated deterrence,' pressing allies to link multiple theaters. For Seoul this means moving beyond a North-Korea-only lens and preparing forces, laws, and public opinion for wider regional contingencies. Yet, substance lags behind rhetoric. A recent Korea Economic Institute study finds the allies still lack agreed-upon roles, thresholds and command relationships for a Taiwan scenario. The problem is qualitative as much as temporal: Pyongyang leans toward vertical nuclear escalation, while Beijing wields cyber, space and precision-strike tools. Managing both simultaneously therefore requires new concepts, interoperable C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities and flexible logistics networks – not just more forces. The stakes are immediate. In the Guardian Tiger simulation, Chinese strikes on Taiwan coincided with North Korean provocations, forcing US Forces Korea to split attention across two theaters – untenable under current planning. Because Korean semiconductors, batteries and shipping lanes hinge on cross-Strait stability, neutrality offers no shelter: Bloomberg Economics ranks Korea the world's second-hardest-hit economy in a blockade scenario. If Seoul is serious about being a 'Global Pivotal State,' it must treat strategic simultaneity not as an added burden but as the price of safeguarding its own prosperity and alliance credibility in an interconnected Indo-Pacific. South Korea cannot afford the illusion of neutrality in a Taiwan contingency. Seoul should adopt a phased response that ranges from diplomatic backing and intel-sharing to calibrated base access and limited deployments. It must also practice strategic signaling, blending public restraint with quiet contingency planning; Guardian Tiger I showed that displaying autonomous strike options while keeping official rhetoric muted can deter Beijing and steady partners. Finally, Seoul can make a decisive contribution short of direct combat: KEI's analysis highlights how military bases in Korea would be indispensable for base access and support for coalition ISR, air and maritime protection and logistics even without ROK troops on the front line. Building on its phased-response plan, Seoul must also prepare for the requests Washington will make if a Taiwan crisis erupts. The United States will seek broad strategic alignment across military, diplomatic, economic and informational fronts – not just battlefield aid. South Korea can meet this need by setting flexible red lines: internal thresholds that dictate when and how it will step up support, keeping Beijing uncertain while showing domestic audiences that Seoul, not Washington, controls the pace. Category Likely Request Policy Considerations Diplomatic Support Public statements and joint declarations with the UN, G7, or others Calibrate language; use backchannel messaging to manage escalation risks Intelligence and Surveillance Cooperation Enhanced trilateral intelligence sharing (ROK-US-Japan); emergency intel exchanges during crisis Requires integrated platforms and information-sharing protocols Cyber and Space Operations Joint cyber defense and offensive coordination; satellite data sharing and space asset cooperation Institutionalize coordination between cyber commands; establish a joint cyber ops center Humanitarian and Non-Combat Support Disaster relief, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO); provision of non-military supplies High public support and low legal constraints; caution needed to prevent mission creep Air and Maritime Protection Securing key air and sea lines; naval escort or air interdiction missions Emphasize a posture of protection and deterrence Base Access Forward deployment of USAF; support for carrier strike group deployment Establish conditional use principles MRO Support MRO for US military; civilian-military tech sharing pre-negotiated civilian cooperation Logistics Support Ammunition, fuel, transport, and maintenance support Develop a civilian-military logistics network; coordinate dispersed support with Japan/Philippines/Australia Redeployment of USFK Assets Redeploying ISR and missile defense assets; diversion of USAF squadrons; emergency redeployment of ground forces Assess trade-offs with North Korea deterrence posture and political constraints Forward Deployment of Strike Assets Hosting long-range strike platforms and surveillance radar Risk of Chinese retaliation; cost of infrastructure and domestic consensus in peacetime Participation in Multinational Operations Naval escort missions, mine clearing, joint fire support; limited participation in multinational operation Reduces political risk; requires legal authorization Deployment of Combat Forces Overseas deployment of Korean troops and weapon systems High political and public burden; UN resolutions or firm alliance agreements Washington's most plausible request will be access to South Korea's bases. Osan and Gunsan offer hardened runways and fuel; Busan and Jeju can move war stocks and aid at scale, signaling allied resolve and reinforcing integrated deterrence without ROK boots on the ground. Folding this demand into Seoul's phased-response playbook and flexible red lines lets Korea meet US needs while retaining political control. Hosting such operations, however, brings real risks – North Korean opportunism or Chinese retaliation – so Seoul should adopt a 'conditional access' principle, for example, barring strikes on the Chinese mainland. Clear boundaries would deter Beijing, reassure allies and keep escalation with Pyongyang in check, allowing South Korea to contribute decisively without strategic overextension. In the climactic scene of the movie 'Battleship,' the world comes together to confront an alien threat. It presents a neat narrative: one enemy, one front, one unified response. Reality, however, is far messier. Threats are multifaceted, solidarity is never automatic, and national responses are shaped by diverging interests and internal constraints. A Taiwan contingency will be the ultimate test of such complexity. South Korea cannot reduce the Taiwan crisis to a simple 'intervene or abstain' choice. The peninsula and the strait are tied not just by proximity but by interwoven political, economic, and strategic interests, so turbulence in one will inevitably reverberate in the other. Seoul should recall that its very survival in 1950 hinged on the costly intervention of the United Nations Command – proof that international solidarity can be decisive. What the ROK-US alliance now needs is detailed internal planning: As the United States, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and the Philippines shape responses to their own interests, Seoul must shed a North Korea-only mindset. Even without combat troops, enabling allied operations through intelligence, logistics and base access can signal resolve as powerfully as direct intervention. In periods of strategic flux, commitment is measured less by force size than by reliability. Silent observation is no longer viable; strategic enabling is. Hanbyeol Sohn PhD ( serves as a professor in the Department of Strategic Studies at the Korea National Defense University (KNDU), also embracing a role as the director of the Center for Nuclear/WMD Affairs at the Research Institute for National Security Affairs (RINSA). His research areas include nuclear strategy, deterrence and the ROK-US alliance. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Korea National Defense University, the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea or any other affiliated institutions.
AllAfrica
20-06-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
US-India partnership key to re-establish Indo-Pacific deterrence
Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. The advent of the second Trump administration has had a defining impact on Washington's engagement with the rest of the world. The US-India partnership – often called a 'defining relationship of the 21st century' – stands at a critical phase with opportunities to scale amid the rapid shifts in global geopolitics, geo-economics, and the exponential growth in dual-use technologies. In the last two decades, US-India relations, particularly defense ties, have seen greater military-to-military interoperability and bigger turnover in terms of defense trade. The last one-to-one meeting between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in February produced a forward-looking joint statement that, among many other initiatives, aimed to forge a stronger defense partnership in tune with the demands of the dynamic balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. As President Donald Trump, in his second term, recalibrates the US national security and defense strategies amid new terms of engagement with allies and partners, we argue that the US-India defense partnership has a new opportunity to scale cooperation in interoperability and defense industrial synergy to forge stronger deterrent capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region. In his remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced that the United States' priority on foreign policy matters would be the reestablishment of deterrence, especially in (but not limited to) the Indo-Pacific region. It comes as no surprise that the purpose of this deterrence is countering the influence and the threat of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Hegseth stressed this administration's determination, like that of its predecessors, to remain engaged abroad, noting that the prosperity and security of Americans is linked to that of the rest of the Indo-Pacific. The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community also contends that 'Russia, China, Iran and North Korea – individually and collectively – are challenging US interests in the world by attacking or threatening others in their regions, with both asymmetric and conventional hard power tactics.' In response to this threat, the US will not, in Hegseth's telling, 'preach' to other countries about how they govern themselves, nor does it seek to encircle China or execute regime change. It instead seeks to prevent war and prevent the PRC from carrying out its plans to annex Taiwan – and to do so via 'peace through strength': President Trump has also said that Communist China will not invade Taiwan on his watch. So, our goal is to prevent war, to make the costs too high, and peace the only option. And we will do this with a strong shield of deterrence, forged together with you—America's great allies and defense partners. Together, we will show what it means to execute peace through strength. While framed as a break from a previous administration that, in his telling, allowed deterrence to lapse, in at least one respect Hegseth built on the momentum of Trump 2.0's predecessor: developing bilateral ties with India. Hegseth had his first call with Indian Minister of Defense Rajnath Singh in February, in which they stressed accelerating 'our operational cooperation and defense industrial and technology collaboration to deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific,' along with continuing the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue and concluding the next 10-year US-India Defense Framework later in 2025. The US-India relationship has seen a number of ups and downs, and the last two decades have been crucial in shaping the current contours. The relationship has the overall support of the major political parties on both sides, and the broader strategic convergence of counteracting China's assertive rise remains broadly intact, which is the mainstay of 're-establishing deterrence.' More than any domain in which the bilateral relationship has grown, the defense sector stands out, through habits of cooperation developed at the tri-service level and the growing defense trade. Moreover, the two defense industrial conclaves envision greater synergy, with a stronger role from the private sector, by following through on initiatives such as the US-India Roadmap for Defense Industrial Cooperation. Private sector partnerships include those between: Those are examples of how Indian and American firms are coming together to co-produce the necessary goods for meeting the security challenges ahead. Recognizing the disruptive impact of new technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computing, both sides have also announced the Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance (ASIA) aimed at scaling 'industry partnerships and production in the Indo-Pacific.' During the last one-to-one meeting between President Trump and Prime Minister Modi, both sides showed intent to push ahead comprehensive cooperation through the US-India COMPACT (Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce & Technology) for the 21st century. From the Biden-era iCET (Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies) to the US-India TRUST (Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology), a whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach is envisioned to leverage technologies for partnership in multiple sectors. The integration of US-origin defense items into India's inventory in the last two decades appears significant, despite bureaucratic processes of defense sales and purchases that need fixing from both ends. From heavy-duty transport aircraft and high-end attack helicopters to complex combat vehicles, missile systems and long-endurance unmanned systems, the partnership is growing in sea, land and air-based military assets. The partnership will remain especially important for developing India's anti-submarine warfare capabilities in the Indian Ocean, along with other surveillance and reconnaissance systems for a more robust maritime domain awareness. Follow-up will becrucially required to realize the benefits of the announcements made to 'to streamline defense trade, technology exchange and maintenance, spare supplies and in-country repair and overhaul of US-provided defense systems' and to open negotiations on a reciprocal defense procurement. The Trump administration sounds bullish on the prospects of improving 'accountability and transparency through the foreign defense sales systems to ensure predictable and reliable delivery of American products to foreign partners and allies in support of US foreign policy objectives.' Therefore, it is imperative for Washington and Delhi to work harder on a better alignment of their strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region that would, in turn, help streamline their vision of co-development and co-production in defense products and heightened cooperation in 'overseas deployments of the US and Indian militaries in the Indo-Pacific, including enhanced logistics and intelligence sharing.' The US Congress-mandated Commission on the National Defense Strategy last year proposed, among other things, a US 'multi-force theater construct' to enable warfighting in simultaneous conflicts with multiple adversaries, and a pitch for an augmented use of the private sector in the US defense industrial base. Therefore, for a critical stakeholder and major defense partner like India, how Washington's 're-establishing deterrence' pans out in the next few years will be crucial, for scaling the growing bilateral defense cooperation, and in minilateral groupings, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. India and the United States likely will never be fully aligned on matters of security cooperation, as their differing responses toward Ukraine and Islamic terrorism originating from Pakistan illustrate. However, these differences of opinion should not distract them, as both face a long-term challenge from a PRC that seeks to rewrite the rules of the Indo-Pacific region so crucial to both Delhi and Washington. Furthermore, as major Indo-Pacific powers with large populations and resources, both countries are well-situated to complement one another's efforts to deter Beijing's revisionism. The early signs from the Trump administration's interactions with the Modi government are promising, and it is imperative that the momentum between them continues. Monish Tourangbam ( is a senior research consultant at the Chintan Research Foundation (CRF), New Delhi. Rob York (rob@ is director for regional affairs at Pacific Forum.
South China Morning Post
13-06-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
South China Sea needs US-China ‘security talks mechanism' to prevent conflict: think tank
China and the US should consider setting up a 'security dialogue mechanism' on the South China Sea to help prevent conflict in the contested waterway, a noted independent Chinese think tank has suggested. According to analysts at the Beijing-based Grandview Institution, US-China aerial and maritime interactions in the South China Sea have been marked by confrontational, complex and unpredictable dynamics. However, competition in the strategic waterway was still 'manageable', though it was likely to be prolonged 'structurally', they said in a report published on Thursday. The report, titled 'Competition and Risk Reduction on the South China Sea – Views from China and the United States', was prepared in collaboration with the Pacific Forum, a Hawaii-based foreign policy research institute. Both China and the United States recognised the risk of inadvertent escalation and had developed several crisis management tools, according to the executive summary of the report. 'However, implementation remains inconsistent,' it said. Liu Xiaobo and Sophie Wushuang Yi, both researchers with Grandview, called on both sides to consider 'institutionalised' dialogue mechanisms focused on the regional security architecture, maritime legal order and law enforcement norms, and crisis response protocols. Liu and Yi co-wrote one of the three papers making up the report. Jeffrey Ordaniel, a non-resident adjunct senior fellow and director of maritime programmes at the Pacific Forum, authored another, while the third was by Thomas Shattuck, another Pacific Forum non-resident fellow.
AllAfrica
13-06-2025
- Business
- AllAfrica
UK's strategic defense posture still includes East of Suez roles
Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. The launch of the United Kingdom's Strategic Defence Review has finally set down a clear direction for the UK's strategic posture for at least a parliament, perhaps longer. The most instrumental element in the paper is the decision to focus on the Euro-Atlantic as the priority region. This was already understood, but there have been at least two decades of the UK flirting with an East of Suez strategy. This included development of a robust defense attaché network in Southeast Asia, the long courtship of China – and then India – for growth, and the resurgence of UK military assets to the region in the name of defending maritime sea lanes and a 'free and open' Indo-Pacific. While it's true that this SDR was written by externals, led by Lord George Robertson, Dr. Fiona Hill, CMG, and General Sir Richard Barrons, the Labour government has already stamped its seal of approval by accepting all 62 recommendations. So what exactly does it say about the UK's 'Indo-Pacific strategy?' Well, the document is a realization that the US 'Pivot' to the Indo-Pacific region is here to stay. This was made clear after the Biden administration re-released an Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022 to put its stamp on the Trump strategy of 2019. Both strategies began with the starting point that the United States as an 'Indo-Pacific power' or 'Indo-Pacific nation.' While resources and political attention have – at times – remained stubbornly centered around the Middle East and CENTCOM and with Europe and EUCOM, the arrival of Elbridge Colby (a one-time Pacific Forum 'young leader') on the strategic scene in the United States has for now crowned the Indo-Pacific Pivot as the United States' priority region. The rise of China in this region, and the shift of political, military, and economic weight from Europe to Asia has cemented this shift. Colby's ratification as undersecretary of defense for policy has also added an explicit message to the Europeans: The dribbling of small amounts of assets to the Indo-Pacific is unnecessary; the United States would infinitely prefer that European powers – France, Germany and the UK – focus on the Euro-Atlantic and deal with Russia. The SDR wisely accommodates this resource imperative, while still providing a place for UK interests and support to the US and its allies in the region. If one looks at the number of times 'Indo-Pacific' is mentioned in the document (17), it is notable that this is down from a high of 32 mentions in the 2021 Integrated Review. Still, it is still better than the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 or the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, documents which mentioned 'Asia' five times and two times respectively. The 2025 SDR states that NATO-first does not mean NATO-only, putting the list of priorities as Euro-Atlantic, Middle East, and Indo-Pacific in that order. It states that 'the Indo-Pacific is strategically important to the UK as a global economic and political powerhouse and arena of increasing geopolitical tension.' It notes the strong partnerships the UK has in the region – ASEAN, Australia, Brunei, Japan, India, Indonesia, Nepal, New Zealand and Pakistan come in for special mention – and, of course, China. The SDR's position on China is probably closest to that of the UK Ministry of Defence and –sadly – does not reflect broader opinion across government in Whitehall. China is a 'sophisticated and persistent threat,' which behaves aggressively in the South China Sea and has escalated tensions in the Taiwan Strait. It notes the fact that China has supported Russia in its invasion of Ukraine and that the US-China relationship will be a 'key factor' in global security. It also notes the threats provided by Beijing's military build-up, nuclear modernization and technological and cyber capabilities and recommends the maintenance of UK-China military-to-military communications. Given that US-China mil-to-mil relations are extremely limited now and constantly under pressure from China over US arms sales to Taiwan, this might prove a helpful channel in time. Notably, it recognizes that most of the UK's adversaries will likely field Chinese technology – an important observation in its own right. The SDR's integrated approach toward the Indo-Pacific region is consistent with the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and consistent with the overall security interests of its closest partners, Japan and Australia, which are rapidly becoming the more important partners of choice across a number of different metrics. First, both are key partners in intelligence-sharing, both work closely with the United States to demonstrate deterrent capability in military exercises in the region and both are defense industrial partners of choice. With Japan, the UK is developing the Meteor, a joint new air-to-air missile (JNAAM) and the Global Combat Air Programme (with Italy), though this latter effort is under pressure. With Australia, there is even more by way of 'production deterrence' in the form of the AUKUS submarine and technology programs. The rotation of UK Astute-class submarines to HMAS Stiling, in Australia, planned as early as 2027 will be an immense boon to deterrence and warfighting capability. So what's missing from the SDR? Well, with respect to the authors, there are a few things: The recent murmurings of disquiet about a lack of progress in AUKUS Pillar 2 is an issue. London and Canberra now need to press upon newly arrived Trump officials their thoughts on the blockage and what can be done to expedite things at the resourcing, regulatory, and organizational level. This needs to be done at a time when the White House is shifting the US trade environment, so this will be difficult. In addition, the UK Ministry of Defence needs to think about what posture it needs to 'surge' military forces into the region in a crisis. The MOD needs to provide options and these range from inter-changeability exercises for UK assets visiting the region to developing a more mature presence in INDOPACOM – through a mid-size consulate in Honolulu run at the ambassadorial level by someone with close links to MOD. The options include joining the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience – if this has not already occurred – and supporting 'production deterrence.' It might mean co-production on long-range munitions in the wide expanse of the Pacific. And, finally, it needs to develop – alone or in tandem with the US – hubs for maintenance, repair, and operations (MRO) so that it can operate at the long-distances required by the operational environment. Dr. John Hemmings (john. @ is deputy director at the Council on Geostrategy in London and senior advisor at Pacific Forum.
