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Yahoo
17-03-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
China's African port interests are expanding. Is the PLA Navy next on deck?
Chinese state-owned firms have built, financed or currently operate more than one-quarter of Africa's ports, according to a new study that has detailed the scope of Beijing's investment in the continent's port developments. Of a total of 231 ports in 32 African countries, China is invested in 78 facilities, with the heaviest concentrations in West Africa, underscoring the region's strategic importance to China's global trade ambitions, according to a report by Paul Nantulya of the National Defence University's Africa Centre for Strategic Studies. Under China's current five-year plan, which outlined a "connectivity framework" positioning Africa as a pivotal link in China's global trade network, two forces have driven the investment wave in the continent: the Belt and Road Initiative and Beijing's "go out policy" - a government initiative that provides state backing to firms to venture into overseas markets such as Africa. Do you have questions about the biggest topics and trends from around the world? Get the answers with SCMP Knowledge, our new platform of curated content with explainers, FAQs, analyses and infographics brought to you by our award-winning team. Three of the six trade corridors outlined in the Chinese plan run through Africa, landing in East Africa, Egypt and the Suez region, and Tunisia, according to the report. "This reinforces the central role that the continent plays in China's global ambitions," Nantulya said in the report published by the centre on March 10. For instance, China Harbour Engineering Company was the contractor and engineering firm for Lekki Deep Sea Port in Nigeria. The firm took a 54 per cent stake in the port which it operates under a 16-year lease, after securing financing from China Development Bank, according to the report. China gains as much as US$13 in trade revenues for every dollar invested in African ports, according to the study. Isaac Kardon, a senior fellow for the Asia programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said China's presence in Africa's ports is multifaceted - driven by access to African natural resources, especially critical minerals and hydrocarbons, while opening the continent's rapidly growing markets to Chinese products, such as tech and telecoms. At the same time, China is building a diplomatic coalition in developing countries that will provide legitimacy, votes and political support for China, Kardon said. China's drive to export capital to the commercial ports has led to concern that such facilities could be repurposed for military use. The transition of Djibouti's Doraleh Port in the Horn of Africa into China's first overseas military base in 2017 has led to speculation about similar conversions elsewhere, despite official denials. "Military access is a distant third priority, focused mainly on providing security for China's overseas interests," said Kardon, who has studied Chinese port activity in Africa. John Calabrese, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, said China's involvement in West African ports is driven primarily by economic interests - encompassing everything from financing and building to managing operations. "Its financial leverage facilitates 'resource-led diplomacy' for raw material and mineral access," Calabrese said, adding that the ports themselves serve as entry points or gateways to African markets for Chinese companies seeking export destinations. "Each new or expanded port in Africa adds to the track record of leading Chinese shipping firms like Cosco Shipping, reinforcing their status as world leaders in maritime operations," Calabrese said. Sub-Saharan geoeconomic analyst Aly-Khan Satchu stressed that in addition to financing, China has been the single biggest provider of infrastructure on the continent, including railways, roads and ports, for more than two decades. "The Chinese understood that investing in Africa's infrastructure preferably under a 'build and operate' premise provided seriously above trend returns," Satchu said. China's presence in Africa's ports has grown alongside its return on investment - the result of Beijing's outsize bet on Africa and its 1.4 billion consumers, and a conviction that the average revenue per user would improve significantly over time. Satchu was not surprised. "China, like any other country, is seeking to protect its economic interests," he said. Some of Africa's Chinese-invested ports can accommodate the country's navy vessels. Since 2000, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has made 55 port calls and conducted 19 bilateral and multilateral military exercises in Africa, according to the study. Debate over the military activity has continued on the continent which has historically been averse to foreign military intervention. Apprehension grew when it emerged that China may have explored prospects for a military base in Namibia's Walvis Bay. Namibia's press first reported on the possibility in 2015, triggering a denial from the Chinese embassy. "Given that similar denials were made when stories began circulating about a potential Chinese base in Djibouti prior to the development of Doraleh, those disavowals have failed to tamp down speculation of similar outcomes in other locations," Nantulya said. Calabrese said China's growing economic interests necessitated protection against threats such as piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and regional upheaval in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. "Although primarily commercial, these ports might be repurposed for military applications," Calabrese said. He said the move would be consistent with the PLA Navy's "two oceans" approach. "The dual-use features of some of these ports could be seen to serve as discreet, non-provocative steps toward an eventual expansion of Chinese maritime power projection," Calabrese added. Kardon, from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the Djibouti base transition showed Chinese naval forces already utilised Chinese-owned-and-operated commercial facilities in Africa. "The potential for more intensive utilisation of these dual-use facilities is clear, as is the possibility of establishment of another base, perhaps on the Gulf of Guinea where counter piracy would provide a parallel rationale to the earlier move to set up basing in the Gulf of Aden," Kardon said. However, it would likely take a major security challenge to China that exceeded the capacity of its African partners to respond for Beijing to significantly expand its military footprint on the continent, he added. This article originally appeared in the South China Morning Post (SCMP), the most authoritative voice reporting on China and Asia for more than a century. For more SCMP stories, please explore the SCMP app or visit the SCMP's Facebook and Twitter pages. Copyright © 2025 South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. All rights reserved. Copyright (c) 2025. South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. All rights reserved.
South China Morning Post
17-03-2025
- Business
- South China Morning Post
China's African port interests are expanding. Is the PLA Navy next on deck?
Chinese state-owned firms have built, financed or currently operate more than one-quarter of Africa's ports, according to a new study that has detailed the scope of Beijing's investment in the continent's port developments. Advertisement Of a total of 231 ports in 32 African countries, China is invested in 78 facilities, with the heaviest concentrations in West Africa, underscoring the region's strategic importance to China's global trade ambitions, according to a report by Paul Nantulya of the National Defence University's Africa Centre for Strategic Studies. Under China's current five-year plan , which outlined a 'connectivity framework' positioning Africa as a pivotal link in China's global trade network, two forces have driven the investment wave in the continent: the Belt and Road Initiative and Beijing's ' go out policy ' – a government initiative that provides state backing to firms to venture into overseas markets such as Africa. Three of the six trade corridors outlined in the Chinese plan run through Africa, landing in East Africa, Egypt and the Suez region, and Tunisia, according to the report. 'This reinforces the central role that the continent plays in China's global ambitions,' Nantulya said in the report published by the centre on March 10. Advertisement
Al Jazeera
13-03-2025
- Politics
- Al Jazeera
‘People need a break': DRC conflict reignites dark memories of Congo wars
In parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), communities are gearing up for war or fleeing to safety amid the advance of M23 rebels, who captured the key eastern cities of Goma and Bukavu in recent weeks, leaving devastation in their wake. The rebel group, which the United Nations says is backed by neighbouring Rwanda, has also closed in on Walikale, a major mining hub, while Kinshasa's offer of a $5m reward for the capture of M23 leaders has not slowed the group down. While M23 marches on in North and South Kivu, Ugandan troops have intensified deployments across their border with the DRC in Ituri province, only a few hours from the rebel-held regions. The Ugandan army says it is battling the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO) – two of several dozen armed groups operating in the DRC. A recent flare-up of CODECO attacks on civilians in February saw at least 51 people killed, prompting Uganda to send additional soldiers to boost its 5,000-strong deployment inside the DRC. For political observers, the growing presence of both Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers in the DRC is an eerie replay of a painful past, one they fear could again lead to a bigger, regional war if not contained. 'We are indeed seeing a replica of the Second Congo War with the same actors but in slightly different configurations,' analyst Paul Nantulya of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies told Al Jazeera, referring to the leading roles both countries played in what's now referred to as the 1998 'Great Africa War' when Rwandan and Ugandan troops invaded the DRC. Several African countries also followed suit, backing either the DRC or the Rwandan-led side, as well as dozens of local militias on either end. The result was a humanitarian crisis that saw an estimated five million deaths; the DRC looted of mineral resources like gold; and the emergence of dozens of armed groups, including the M23. At the time, thousands across the globe protested against the atrocities in the DRC, calling for an end to the looting and killings. Today, illegal mining and smuggling from the DRC's mines – which provide 70 percent of the global supply of coltan and cobalt that powers electronics – have largely continued, as have deaths and displacements due to armed group activity. 'Appetite for political negotiations is low and international pressure and coercive measures have not had the deterrent effect they once had in previous bouts of crisis,' Nantulya added, referencing the European Union's suspension of military aid support to Rwanda, and United States sanctions on key Rwandan army officials. A history of interference The DRC has been in the throes of low-level violent conflict for more than three decades. In that time, more than six million people have been killed, and millions more displaced. A complex mix of issues is to blame, among them: grievances by Kigali that the DRC harbours anti-Rwanda rebels who fled after the Hutu genocide against the Tutsis in 1994; ethnic tensions between Congolese Tutsis and their neighbours; a grab for mineral resources in insecure eastern DRC; and corruption in the Congolese government. Rwanda's invasion of the DRC prompted both the First and Second Congo Wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003), as Kigali claimed to be pursuing Hutu genocidaires who had fled across the border. After President Paul Kagame's army took power in Rwanda in 1994, the fleeing Hutu groups amassed in refugee camps in the DRC where they launched renewed attacks on Tutsis. Uganda, where Kagame and his troops trained for years before taking power in Kigali, joined Rwanda's side in the DRC. Both countries then backed a Congolese rebel group, led by Laurent Kabila, to unseat the dictator, President Mobutu Sese Seko. Mobutu, at the time, had many regional enemies. Several countries backed Kabila by sending arms or weapons, including Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea and South Africa. However, when Kabila, upon gaining power in 1997, switched sides and ordered Rwandan and Ugandan troops out of the DRC within a day, Kigali grew vengeful. In 1998, Rwanda and Uganda invaded again, sponsoring a Tutsi militia that occupied resource-rich parts of eastern DRC. Kabila managed to rally other African nations to his side, including Namibia, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad and Angola, which had now switched sides under a new government. The UN deployed a peacekeeping force, MONUSCO. Kabila also enlisted the help of Hutu militia groups in eastern DRC, deepening ethnic tensions with Congolese Tutsis who are perceived as pro-Rwanda. Looting and rights violations The Congo wars ended in 2003, but low-intensity violence persists, leading some experts to say it was never actually over. Several reports in the aftermath, including from the UN, accused Rwanda and Uganda of targeting Hutu civilians and of looting and smuggling DRC's coffee, diamonds, timber, coltan and other resources. Relatives of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, including his younger brother Salim Saleh and Saleh's wife, Jovia Akandwanaho, were named as the operators of companies involved in trading illicit items, especially during the second war. Congolese politicians and soldiers were also implicated. 'Natural resource exploitation became increasingly attractive, not only because it enabled these groups to finance their war efforts but also because, for a large number of political/military leaders, it was a source of personal enrichment. Natural resources thus gradually became a driving force behind the war,' one UN report read. It also accused 'foreign buyers willing to handle these goods', including traders in the DRC and multiple countries. In 2005, Anvil, an Australian-Canadian mining company, was accused of providing logistics to the Congolese army that helped it violently suppress a small uprising in southern DRC. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) found Kampala guilty of 'violating international law' in 2022 and ordered Uganda to pay $325m to the DRC for losses and damages during the wars. Kampala has begun instalment payments and is expected to complete them by 2027. Although the DRC also sued Rwanda, the ICJ could not rule in that case because Rwanda did not recognise its jurisdiction. In the most recent legal battle in 2023, the DRC again sued Rwanda at the East African Court of Justice in Arusha, Tanzania, arguing that by backing M23 rebels, it violated Kinshasa's territorial integrity against international law. That case is still ongoing. Rwanda has repeatedly denied supporting M23. 'DRC needs a break' Countries that took part in the Congo wars are once again in the DRC. And again, a Congolese politician is marching on Kinshasa, this time Corneille Nangaa, leader of the rebel Congo River Alliance (AFC). A one-time elections commissioner, Nangaa fell out with Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi and then allied with M23 in December 2023. He now leads the AFC-M23 coalition. However, Accra-based analyst Kambale Musuvali of the Center for Congo Research, told Al Jazeera that interference from DRC's closest neighbours never stopped. 'When we say Uganda and Rwanda are in the Congo again, it is from the perspective that they left and they are returning,' Musavuli, who is Congolese, told Al Jazeera. In reality, the two governments had continuously maintained a hold on the situation in the DRC, he said. Across the continent, it's fairly clear where most parties stand in this iteration of the conflict: Rwanda's support for M23 is documented by the UN, which says about 3,000 Rwandan troops are currently supporting the rebels. Burundi, under President Evariste Ndayishimiye – who has frosty relations with Kagame – deployed at least 10,000 troops to support the DRC army. South African troops lead the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the DRC and have been fighting the M23 alongside Malawian and Tanzanian soldiers since January. Angola and Kenya are leading two separate peace negotiations, while Chad is considering a request from Kinshasa to deploy troops. Uganda, though, appears to be the wild card. The country was last year implicated by the UN of providing support to M23 by allowing its territory to be used for launching attacks, and areas the Ugandan army currently occupies in the DRC are so close to M23-held areas that analysts believe there could be some collusion. But Kampala denies any connections with M23. 'Uganda is the big elephant in the room,' analyst Nantulya said. Kampala, he added, is playing an ambiguous balancing act, working to secure a part of the DRC, while committing to not standing in M23's way on the other hand. DRC's resources also remain a focal point in this conflict. So far, M23 has taken over vast expanses of North and South Kivu, which is home to massive gold and cobalt deposits. There's speculation that the DRC's gold has been funding the armed group, which has surprised analysts with its high-grade weaponry and telecommunications systems. The UN estimates that M23 earns about $800,000 monthly from illegal gold sales. Ending the protracted crisis would involve a large-scale effort by African countries to get both sides to negotiate, analysts say, but also to put pressure on the DRC government itself to fix its internal affairs: Tshisekedi suffers a legitimacy crisis as Congolese popularly rejected elections that brought him into a second term. Weaknesses and ingrained corruption in the country's military may have helped Congolese defences to falter as M23 advanced. And feelings of marginalisation are still heavy in Congolese-Tutsi communities, worsening tensions. Kinshasa's recent calls for a national dialogue, in addition to peace talks led by regional parties, are important steps, Musavuli said. So is the recent visit by International Criminal Court prosecutor, Karim Khan, who pledged to prosecute all sides accused of rights violations in the conflict, including indiscriminate killings and sexual abuse of civilians, he added. 'I usually get asked, 'What about the Rwandan government? What about the Ugandan government?' But nobody is talking about the [Congolese] people,' Musavuli said. 'We're saying that the people of the Congo have to be alive so that they can rebuild the country for the benefit of the African continent. That's why DRC needs a break. Not just for themselves, but for the entire African continent.'
