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Economic Times
15 hours ago
- Business
- Economic Times
‘America's attitude to Britain was ruthless as it became global hegemon — China's ‘military-civil fusion' mirrors the US now'
What is the core of your research? When exactly did the 'military-industrial complex' emerge — and is this a purely American entity or a multinational force? Live Events Is there any one emerging technology which could completely redefine national security now? (You can now subscribe to our (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel Katherine C. Epstein is Associate Professor of History at Rutgers University-Camden. Speaking to Srijana Mitra Das , she outlines, on America's Independence Day, the rise of the US ' military-industrial complex ' — and its implications:I focus on two main issues. The first is how the two most powerful, liberal societies of the modern era — Great Britain and the United States — sought to acquire the most cutting-edge secret naval technology. Upto World War I, naval technology was the most advanced on Earth — air power was in its infancy and nuclear weapons hadn't been invented. Naval procurement presented difficult challenges though — one was the tension between the government and private sector over the control of intellectual property rights (IPRs), patents and advanced new weapons which, owing to their growing sophistication, couldn't be procured by traditional methods like in-house building in public factories. As such technology grew more complex, governments began investing in private sector research and development. This raised questions about who owned the IPRs — the contractor doing the work or the government giving subsidies? Also, these weapons were so secret, governments could assume national powers over them, forbidding exports, etc. I look at the tension here between classical liberal norms of property rights and national security interests.I also study the hegemonic transition from the Pax Britannica to the Pax Americana — this change, where the US became global hegemon over Britain, was much more contested and rivalrous than often thought. Considerable evidence shows Britain was quite unhappy — and the US, quite ruthless — about the American pursuit of power at Britain's expense. I argue the US behaviour towards Britain then anticipated Chinese behaviour towards the United States today. This is reflected in US tech imports, through pursuit and theft, which China has apparently done, and in terms of US efforts to build a navy, financial infrastructure, global telecom, etc., that rivalled Britain in much the same way China has been doing the US, the canonical description of the 'military-industrial complex' comes from President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1961 address — Eisenhower warned this system threatened many American liberties. He defined it as the conjunction of a large military establishment with a permanent arms industry. There were huge changes in military production with World War II and the early Cold War. However, drawing from Benjamin Cooling's work, my research finds the first 'military-industrial complex' in America was naval and emerged in the late 19th century, not as a response to any one war but driven by a set of forces — these included the industrialisation of warfare and technology, geopolitical rivalries between the great powers like the scramble for Africa, the starting of globalisation and so H. McNeill's book 'The Pursuit of Power' further traces the first military-industrial complex to 1880s Britain, emerging in response to a set of global forces that caused a naval buildup in peacetime. This isn't a uniquely American phenomenon — it exists worldwide, from South America to Japan, Russia, France, Germany, etc. China's 'military-civil fusion' has several parallels with the US military-industrial complex and vice-versa. Also, although the military-industrial complex looks like a well-oiled machine from outside — a hugely profitable global ring of arms manufacturers, etc. — inside, there are large tensions between militaries and contractors, the first, often a terrible customer who sees the second as sense is that war will always remain a human phenomenon and we can be sceptical of the ability of any technology to transform warfare. Of course, torpedoes, airplanes and nuclear weapons did change warfare — today, semiconductors and artificial intelligence could do this. However, I retain some reservations about moves like restricting the export of semiconductors to China — we need to ask if this could have been relevant in a lack of smart weapons and the proliferation of dumb weapons which cause huge civilian AI , from a national security view of threats posed, this technology makes populations stupider by undermining critical thinking. The American education system is in a dreadful state and AI's role in stunting intellectual development is a huge threat for a nation that needs educated and aware AI will only deepen the trend of the growing insulation of the American people from the violence done in their names — this has increased over the 20th century, reflected in fiscal terms and how the US has resorted to borrowing to pay for its wars rather than taxation, hiding conflict's true financial costs from also been an increasing move towards 'standoff weapons', like drones, where American bodies are not at risk and the US can effectively do violence to others without risking it for themselves. In that sense, AI and semiconductors — which are about improving the ability of weapons to do what muscle power once did — are more a continuation of a trend than something fundamentally expressed are personal
Time of India
17 hours ago
- Business
- Time of India
‘America's attitude to Britain was ruthless as it became global hegemon — China's ‘military-civil fusion' mirrors the US now'
Katherine C. Epstein is Associate Professor of History at Rutgers University-Camden. Speaking to Srijana Mitra Das , she outlines, on America's Independence Day, the rise of the US ' military-industrial complex ' — and its implications: What is the core of your research? I focus on two main issues. The first is how the two most powerful, liberal societies of the modern era — Great Britain and the United States — sought to acquire the most cutting-edge secret naval technology. Upto World War I, naval technology was the most advanced on Earth — air power was in its infancy and nuclear weapons hadn't been invented. Naval procurement presented difficult challenges though — one was the tension between the government and private sector over the control of intellectual property rights (IPRs), patents and advanced new weapons which, owing to their growing sophistication, couldn't be procured by traditional methods like in-house building in public factories. As such technology grew more complex, governments began investing in private sector research and development. This raised questions about who owned the IPRs — the contractor doing the work or the government giving subsidies? Also, these weapons were so secret, governments could assume national powers over them, forbidding exports, etc. I look at the tension here between classical liberal norms of property rights and national security interests. I also study the hegemonic transition from the Pax Britannica to the Pax Americana — this change, where the US became global hegemon over Britain, was much more contested and rivalrous than often thought. Considerable evidence shows Britain was quite unhappy — and the US, quite ruthless — about the American pursuit of power at Britain's expense. I argue the US behaviour towards Britain then anticipated Chinese behaviour towards the United States today. This is reflected in US tech imports, through pursuit and theft, which China has apparently done, and in terms of US efforts to build a navy, financial infrastructure, global telecom, etc., that rivalled Britain in much the same way China has been doing now. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Bank Owned Properties For Sale In Tanggulangin (Prices May Surprise You) Foreclosed Homes | Search ads Search Now Undo When exactly did the 'military-industrial complex' emerge — and is this a purely American entity or a multinational force? For the US, the canonical description of the 'military-industrial complex' comes from President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1961 address — Eisenhower warned this system threatened many American liberties. He defined it as the conjunction of a large military establishment with a permanent arms industry. There were huge changes in military production with World War II and the early Cold War. However, drawing from Benjamin Cooling's work, my research finds the first 'military-industrial complex' in America was naval and emerged in the late 19th century, not as a response to any one war but driven by a set of forces — these included the industrialisation of warfare and technology, geopolitical rivalries between the great powers like the scramble for Africa, the starting of globalisation and so on. William H. McNeill's book 'The Pursuit of Power' further traces the first military-industrial complex to 1880s Britain, emerging in response to a set of global forces that caused a naval buildup in peacetime. This isn't a uniquely American phenomenon — it exists worldwide, from South America to Japan, Russia, France, Germany, etc. China's 'military-civil fusion' has several parallels with the US military-industrial complex and vice-versa. Also, although the military-industrial complex looks like a well-oiled machine from outside — a hugely profitable global ring of arms manufacturers, etc. — inside, there are large tensions between militaries and contractors, the first, often a terrible customer who sees the second as profiteers. Live Events Is there any one emerging technology which could completely redefine national security now? My sense is that war will always remain a human phenomenon and we can be sceptical of the ability of any technology to transform warfare. Of course, torpedoes, airplanes and nuclear weapons did change warfare — today, semiconductors and artificial intelligence could do this. However, I retain some reservations about moves like restricting the export of semiconductors to China — we need to ask if this could have been relevant in a lack of smart weapons and the proliferation of dumb weapons which cause huge civilian casualties. With AI , from a national security view of threats posed, this technology makes populations stupider by undermining critical thinking. The American education system is in a dreadful state and AI's role in stunting intellectual development is a huge threat for a nation that needs educated and aware citizens. Further, AI will only deepen the trend of the growing insulation of the American people from the violence done in their names — this has increased over the 20th century, reflected in fiscal terms and how the US has resorted to borrowing to pay for its wars rather than taxation, hiding conflict's true financial costs from Americans. There's also been an increasing move towards 'standoff weapons', like drones, where American bodies are not at risk and the US can effectively do violence to others without risking it for themselves. In that sense, AI and semiconductors — which are about improving the ability of weapons to do what muscle power once did — are more a continuation of a trend than something fundamentally new. Views expressed are personal
Scroll.in
02-05-2025
- Scroll.in
Podcast: In Amrita Shah's book about the voyages of one family, a tale of migrating Indians
Across the Indian Ocean are traces of a million voyages. Starting at the dawn of civilisation, traders in Mesopotamia and India began navigating its coasts. Empires transported commodities, slaves, and – during the British Empire – indentured servants. And, at the height of Pax Britannica, a certain Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi launched his political career with a fateful voyage to South Africa. In The Other Mohan in Britain's Indian Ocean Empire, Amrita Shah investigates the voyages of one of Gandhi's contemporaries: her great-grandfather, Mohanlal Killavala. In this episode of Past Imperfect, Shah explains how Indian Ocean travels left an indelible mark not only on her family, but also upon so many broader aspects of India and the Indian diaspora. She presents us with an account of the diaspora which is sometimes surprising, and sometimes unsettling. Shah began her research many years ago with a handful of family stories. Her great-grandfather, an educated and Anglicised Gujarati from Bombay, had migrated to South Africa. Here, he joined Gandhi's satyagraha activities before returning to Bombay and living out the rest of his life in India. But Shah knew that there were layers of this story that remained unexplored. Killavala left Bombay after marrying a Gujarati woman – yet he married again on his travels, and this union led to the birth of Shah's grandmother in South Africa. Who was Killavala's second wife? Where did they meet? How did all of this change her family's story? Looking for answers, Shah plumbs Gujarat's centuries-long association with the sea. The Killavala family settled in Surat while it was the dazzling epicenter of Mughal oceanic commerce, a place where merchants from across Europe, the Middle East, and East Africa mingled, haggled, and became extraordinarily rich. Appropriately enough, the Killavalas lived in the Surat precinct of Nanavat, which means 'dealing with money'. Surat's fortunes declined sharply as the Mughal Empire disintegrated. The Killavalas joined thousands of other Gujaratis in migrating to a new hub of global trade: Bombay. Bombay's imperial connections facilitated even lengthier migrations of Gujaratis to unfamiliar places like Mauritius, Durban, and Cape Town. As an educated man fond of wearing western suits and eating English porridge, Mohanlal Killavala stood apart from most of these migrants, who were escaping desperate poverty. So why did he go? Shah looks for answers in archives in Mauritius and across South Africa but encounters new questions. Learning that her great-grandmother was from Mauritius, she wonders whether she might have been Creole, of part-African descent. Many Gujarati merchants on the island married Creole women, and some of them even took these wives back to Gujarat. Another lingering question involves Killavala's participation in Gandhi's satyagraha against the 1906 Registration Act, where the government of Transvaal, in an attempt to stymie Indian immigration, forced all Indian settlers to carry identity passes. By this time, Killavala seemed to have established himself as a respectable member of the Indian community in Natal. He worked for a white lawyer, served as an interpreter of Indian languages at the courts, and had a wife and young daughter in tow. What convinced him to travel to another territory and court arrest? An archival find in Pretoria adds a new twist. Here, Shah discovers that Killavala might have been a 'permit agent,' someone involved in both legal and illegal immigration networks between India and South Africa. Then, like now, illegal immigration was a hot-button political issue, adding fuel to the fire of white antipathy towards Indian settlers. For Shah, the archival find provides possible answers to so many of her questions. Perhaps Killavala set out for South Africa through a professional network for facilitating illegal immigration. And perhaps he joined Gandhi's satyagraha for the purpose of acquiring passes – valuable sheets of paper that could smooth the way for new migrants. Shah never finds definitive answers. But along the way, she paints a vivid portrait of a diaspora, demonstrating how travel abroad both reinforced prejudices and weakened racial boundaries. Traveling through contemporary Mauritius and South Africa, she encounters so many reminders of India – and some now slightly less faint traces of her own ancestors. Dinyar Patel is an assistant professor of history at the SP Jain Institute of Management and Researchin Mumbai. His award-winning biography of Dadabhai Naoroji, Naoroji: Pioneer of Indian Nationalism, was published by Harvard University Press in May 2020.
