Latest news with #Politburo
Time of India
6 hours ago
- Politics
- Time of India
Purge, paranoia, and power: Inside China's black box - Is Xi Jinping losing control?
Beneath the surface, Xi is facing friction on multiple fronts. TL;DR: Xi Jinping still rules unchallenged, but his control now relies more on loyalty than performance. Top generals purged, including close allies, fueling questions about cracks in the military. Xi's visibility is down, and key commissions are less active - a shift or a retreat? rumours swirl, but most are speculation fueled by secrecy and wishful thinking. Public unrest and economic stress are rising, especially among youth and the middle class. No successor in sight - Xi looks set to rule indefinitely, despite mounting pressure. Driving the news In recent months, speculation about the stability of President Xi Jinping's rule has reached a fever pitch, fueled by high-profile purges in China's military, unusual absences from key international summits, and a steady churn of rumours about elite infighting. But is Xi really losing control-or is the rumour mill just a symptom of the opacity that has long defined Chinese politics? Rumours about the inner workings of the Communist Party are nothing new. As Karishma Vaswani of Bloomberg notes, 'Hearsay about the inner workings of the Politburo has a long tradition of being wholly inaccurate.' Speculation surged after Xi skipped the BRICS summit in Brazil - a first since taking office - and continued as over 20 senior military officers vanished or were removed from posts, including Admiral Miao Hua and Politburo member He Weidong. But experts warn: The truth is more complex than the rumours suggest. Why it matters Xi is the most powerful Chinese leader in decades. Some analysts call Xi 'president-for-life'. He controls the party, the state, and the military. If there's instability in his leadership, it would be the most significant political event in China since Mao - with ripple effects for the global economy, US-China relations, and regional stability in Asia. No clear successor: Xi's refusal to groom or name an heir creates a dangerous vacuum. A sudden health emergency could spark chaos at the top of the Communist Party. Opaque signals: Beijing watchers have turned back to 'Pekingology,' the Cold War-era practice of decoding state media, absences, and seating charts to assess political power - a sign of just how tightly controlled information has become. High stakes for Taiwan: The purges have also affected units reportedly tasked with preparing for a Taiwan invasion. That has caught the attention of US intelligence, which sees cracks in China's chain of command - or at least in its discipline. The big picture Despite the rumours, most analysts agree Xi remains firmly in charge. But his governing style appears to be shifting - subtly and strategically. 'He guides the world's second-biggest economy and its largest armed forces seemingly unchallenged,' the Economist wrote. 'Yet analysts now whisper that Mr Xi's governing style may be changing in subtle ways.' by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Get Your Personalized IQ Certificate Today Try Now Undo Delegation over domination: Xi is sending lieutenants - like Li Qiang, Cai Qi, and Ding Xuexiang - to manage critical commissions and international trips. In 2025, he skipped BRICS and sent Li instead. Decline in meetings: Some of Xi's signature commissions, including the one on economic reform, haven't publicly met since August 2024. Communiqués are shorter, suggesting fewer decisions. Purges as a strategy: Over 400,000 officials are under investigation since April 2024, according to the Economist. In the military, top brass close to Xi have been targeted - a sign he may be preemptively removing threats inside his own tightening of control, even within his base, points to a leader who's preparing to rule indefinitely - but from a more remote, less visible perch. The purges shouldn't necessarily indicate that Xi is safe, although he's certainly cemented power within his base. He will likely rule China until he 'goes to meet Marx,' as the saying goes. An Opinion in Bloomberg What they're saying Not everyone buys the coup chatter. Most seasoned observers argue Xi is not on the verge of collapse — but that doesn't mean everything is stable either. 'Despite the noise, no one has credibly explained how a leader who dominates every significant CCP organization could be toppled,' writes Michael Cunningham of the Lowy Institute. 'He will likely rule China until he 'goes to meet Marx,' as the saying goes,' Asia Society's Center for China Analysis wrote in a report. 'At every stage, he's defied convention to solidify his grip.' In their twilight years, both Mao and Deng Xiaoping fragmented authority to ensure that subordinates served as counterweights to prevent any one gaining too much influence. They became oracle-like, pontificating on ideology from behind a curtain. Over time Mr Xi may come to shape such a system—one where ultimate power remains his, even in absentia. An article in the Economist Still, challenges are mounting: Retired Party elders: Like Wen Jiabao and Li Ruihuan have criticized Xi's economic policies and mishandling of US relations, according to Radio Free Asia. While they lack direct power, their discontent underscores elite unease. Red aristocrats' or princelings, including those in exile, are reportedly sharing kompromat with foreign intelligence agencies - a risky but potentially destabilizing factor. Middle-class anger is rising amid a stagnant economy, rising unemployment, and censorship over local scandals like the student suicide in Shaanxi Province that led to violent protests. PLA grumbling: While a military coup remains highly unlikely, the recent sidelining of high-ranking officers, many with ties to Xi from his Fujian days, suggests serious internal friction. Even the PLA Daily - the military's official mouthpiece - recently promoted 'collective leadership,' a not-so-subtle rebuke of Xi's longstanding 'one-man rule' mantra. Between the lines The growing perception that Xi may be centralizing too much power - even for an autocrat - could erode internal loyalty over time. 'Those chosen for their loyalty may lack experience, shy away from delivering bad news, or see opportunities for graft,' the Economist warned. Xi himself seemed to acknowledge this when he told the Politburo, 'The string of self-revolution must be tightened even further.' There is little evidence Xi has begun preparing for succession. That's a red flag for analysts who recall how leadership vacuums in China have historically led to chaos - from Lin Biao's plane crash in 1971 to post-Deng power struggles. Instead, Xi appears to be reducing personal exposure while ensuring his ideological agenda is institutionalized through rules, written directives, and tightly controlled personnel decisions. Some observers suggest this is a strategy for long-term rule: less presence, more permanence. What's next The clearest signs of real trouble for Xi would be overt - not rumours. 'If some of Xi's closest allies - Cai Qi or Ding Xuexiang - are targeted, that will be a more likely sign of trouble,' notes * Institute's* Cunningham. Right now, purged officials like He Weidong, though powerful, are not considered part of Xi's innermost circle. Their fall suggests a shakeup - not a power struggle. As Asia Society notes, Xi's refusal to name a successor is no accident. Installing one would weaken his grip and create a rival power center. Naming no one ensures everyone remains beholden to him - but also makes China's future deeply uncertain. And that uncertainty has consequences: For the economy: Xi's mix of state-led stimulus and repression of private enterprise has underperformed. Even EV giants like BYD and SAIC are over-leveraged. For foreign relations: A softer tone with Washington, especially ahead of President Donald Trump's inauguration, may reflect desperation rather than détente. For stability: As purges continue and confidence erodes, even within the elite, the line between strength and fear starts to blur. The bottom line: So, is Xi Jinping losing control? Not exactly. But he is entering a phase where maintaining control requires more energy, more surveillance, more loyalty tests-and fewer missteps. He still commands the Party, the military, and the machinery of the state. But cracks are showing. Not enough to break him, yet-but enough to make the question impossible to ignore. The emperor still rules. But he's looking over his shoulder.
Mint
9 hours ago
- Business
- Mint
China stocks pause rally as investors eye Politburo meeting, but extend weekly gains streak
China stocks dipped on Friday, pausing their rally as investors locked in gains ahead of a Politburo meeting expected to set economic policy for the rest of the year, though markets still registered a fifth straight weekly rise. ** The Shanghai Composite index fell 0.3% to 3,593.66, slipping from a 3-1/2-year high. China's blue-chip CSI300 index lost 0.5%. ** Liquor distillers dropped 2% and consumer staples slid 1.7%, leading declines onshore. Offsetting some losses, the AI sector jumped 2.2% and semiconductor sector climbed 1.9%. ** Despite the day's pullback, the Shanghai Composite index has gained 1.7% so far this week to log its fifth straight weekly gain - its longest winning streak since the start of a rally that began in February 2024. ** Beijing's latest efforts to curb excessive competition and overcapacity, and incremental signs of improving U.S.-China trade relations lifted sentiment. ** Analysts at CLSA said institutional investors' overall risk appetite has improved significantly this month, though some remain unconvinced about a structural bull run and see more sector-specific opportunities. ** Hong Kong's benchmark Hang Seng Index weakened 1.1% to 25,388.35 after closing at its highest since November 2021 on Thursday. ** The Hang Seng Tech Index led declines, losing 1.2% on the day. ** Market attention will be squarely on the Politburo meeting due later this month, given that it will likely shape economic policy for the rest of the year. ** Chinese policymakers, concerned about local growth amid an ongoing trade war with the U.S., are unlikely to offer a big gun stimulus this time until there's more clarity on what's needed, said Keiko Kondo, Schroders' head of multi-assets for Asia, who is neutral on China equities. This article was generated from an automated news agency feed without modifications to text.
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First Post
11 hours ago
- Politics
- First Post
Weaponing water: China's hydropower push poses grave risk to India
The construction of the dams could bring devastation not only to the Pemakoe area in Tibet but also to Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Bangladesh downstream read more On the morning of July 19, inaugurating the first phase of the Yarlung Hydropower Project, Li Qiang, a member of the all-powerful Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China and Premier (Prime Minister) of the State Council (Cabinet), stated that it was to be 'large in size, long in cycle, and far-reaching in impact.' He added it can be called the 'project of a century'. The project may not become the 'project of the century' for the electricity it could generate, but for the amount of environmental devastation it will produce. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD When I read the news the next morning, the floods in Sikkim on the night of October 4, 2023, came immediately to mind. That day, a glacial lake in North Sikkim burst without warning, unleashing a deadly torrent down the Teesta River valley. The magazine Down to Earth reported: 'The disaster, triggered by climate-driven glacial melt, left a trail of devastation and renewed alarm over the growing threat of Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOF) in the eastern Himalayas.' The environmental publication added: 'Glaciers and glacial lakes serve as one of the most important water resources for downstream communities, but over the years, the increase in the number and area of glacial lakes has also become a major threat to lives and infrastructure in downstream areas in the form of GLOF events.' How will China avoid such man-made disasters caused by mega development in the Yarlung Tsangpo basin, a far more fragile area? The Launch of the Mega Project According to Xinhua News Agency, the opening ceremony of the project on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo (YT) was held in Milin County of Nyingchi City in today's Tibet Autonomous Region. The Xinhua release said: 'At the dam site of the Milin Hydropower Station (probably near Pai Township), Li Qiang inspected the construction site and the equipment. He listened to the report on the development of hydropower projects as well as the scientific and technological research undertaken.' STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD A few days earlier, a new industrial conglomerate, the China Yajiang Group, was created in Beijing for the purpose of building the five dams. Zhang Guoqing, member of the Political Bureau and Vice-Premier of the State Council, unveiled the company's by-laws: 'From a strategic and overall perspective, it is an important measure to thoroughly implement the overall national security concept, the new energy security strategy and the Party's Tibet governance strategy in the new era,' he affirmed. From Nine to Five Hydropower Stations In December 2020, Beijing had announced that a survey would be conducted to select the route and the characteristics of the hydropower plants (HPPs) on the mighty Yarlung Tsangpo, with the diversion starting a few kilometres from Pai Township; it was then to consist of one tunnel (about 30 km long) and 9 HPPs. According to the latest Xinhua release, the project in this extremely geologically fragile area will now consist of a cascade of five run-of-the-river HPPs, with water being mostly diverted via tunnels; the design has therefore been simplified. The total investment is estimated at about $167.8 billion. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The Mega Earthquake On August 15, 1950, the Assam-Tibet Earthquake of a magnitude 8.7 on the Richter scale struck Southern Tibet as well as today's Anjaw district of Arunachal Pradesh. The Dalai Lama, who was 15 at the time, noted in his memoirs: 'It was like an artillery barrage—which is what we assumed to be the cause of both the tremors and the noise: a test of some sort being carried out by the Tibetan army… Some people reported seeing a strange red glow in the skies in the direction from which the noise came…' The area is not very far from the Great Bend (and Upper Siang) where the Yarlung Tsangpo project is to be built; in 1950, the earthquake changed the course of the river. Let us not forget that there is high seismicity across the entire region. Over the years, different avatars of the HPP project were rejected by Chinese scientists, but some very powerful politicians are pushing for it. Though the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was not represented at the opening ceremony in Pai, it will probably be involved later simply because the dams are close to the Indian border—and it involves a lot of money. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD An Old Plan A few years ago, I came across a letter addressed by the Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs to Apa Pant, the Political Officer in Sikkim. It quoted a tour report of the Secretary General, Relief Committee for Tibetans; the report dated October 1960 shows that in the 1950s, the Chinese were already planning to use the hydroelectric potential of the Brahmaputra. Apa Pant was informed: 'During the course of the talk, the Dalai Lama [probably in Mussoorie] also informed that he had reports that Chinese are planning to build high dams across Brahmaputra and Indus group of rivers in the Tibetan region. He told that, as a matter of fact, the Chinese had those schemes in view ever since they came to Tibet in 1951. He wondered how far such projects undertaken unilaterally would be in the interest of India and when the projects took shape how the Government of India would view the situation.' STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The Political Officer was further told by South Block: 'We have received no information so far about any proposal of the Chinese Government to construct dams across the Indus and the Brahmaputra before the rivers leave Tibet. The correct international practice in such matters is that building of dams, reservoirs, etc. by the upper riparian must not cause material injury to the interests of the lower riparian. Since, however, the information contained in the above extract is rather vague, we cannot make representations to the Chinese. …We do know that there is a great fall in the Brahmaputra just before it enters Indian territory. …This fall has a great potential for power and irrigation (?). It will, of course, require huge resources to make anything out of it and it will certainly take a long time.' The Deputy Secretary concluded: 'The necessity of being alert in this matter can hardly be over-emphasised.' The matter was of course quickly forgotten in Delhi, but not in Beijing. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The Area's Characteristics The main characteristic of the Pemakoe area, known as the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo, is the difference of altitude between the beginning of the Bend at Pai, located at 2,900 metres above sea level, and an altitude of 600 metres at the end, 60 km away as the crow flies, where the river enters India and becomes the Siang. This creates a hydro-potential of 60,000 megawatts, which China has decided to utilize despite the technological, environmental, and political, seemingly insurmountable difficulties. After Li Qiang announced that the construction had officially started, the secretary-general of the State Council (China's Cabinet), Wu Zhenglong, presided over the opening ceremony; he explained that the project will primarily deliver electricity for external consumption while considering Tibet's local needs. The evacuation of the power produced will certainly remain a major technical issue, though China has made a great deal of progress in this domain. According to previous plans, the project ends near Baibeng (also known as Drepung), a few kilometres north of the Indian border. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD It should be noted that the route of the diversion will run close to the Doshung-la tunnel and the new G219 which links Xinjiang to Mainland China along Tibet's southern borders; the opening of the road between Pai and Metok a couple of years ago will greatly facilitate the HPPs' construction. In the 1950s, the G219 was known as the Aksai Chin road (crossing over India's territory in Ladakh). The Lower Riparians' Major Worries For India and Bangladesh, the downstream neighbours, the environment and the high seismicity of the area are major worries. The construction of the dams could bring devastation not only to the Pemakoe area in Tibet but also to Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Bangladesh downstream. Li Qiang also spoke of the resettlement of the local population. He said: 'We must do a good job in the resettlement of immigrants [does he refer to the local tribes?] and better combine the promotion of project construction with the promotion of employment and income growth for local people. …We must build the Hydropower Project into a major landmark project in the new era.' China presently has a poor reputation in terms of population resettlement. The recent announcement of the project, which remained for years in the drawers of the Communist government in Beijing, is probably timed to give a warning to India, which recently put the Indus Water Treaty with Pakistan in abeyance, following terrorist attacks in Kashmir. Being the upper riparian state, China wants to show India who is the greatest Asian state; but even the most powerful state has no control over the changing climate. The writer is Distinguished Fellow, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence (Delhi). Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
Business Recorder
12 hours ago
- Business
- Business Recorder
China stocks pause rally ahead of next week's Politburo meeting, eye 5th weekly gain
HONG KONG: China stocks edged lower on Friday, pausing their recent rally, as investors locked in gains ahead of a key Politburo meeting, though the market remained on track for a fifth straight weekly gain. At the midday break, the Shanghai Composite index fell 0.3% to 3,593.38, after logging the highest close since January 2022 on Thursday. China's blue-chip CSI300 index lost 0.5%. Liquor distiller, consumer staples and rare earth sectors led the declines, with losses ranging from 0.9% to 1.6%. Despite the day's pullback, the Shanghai Composite index has gained 1.7% so far this week and is set to rise for the fifth straight week - its longest winning streak since the rally that began in February 2024. Beijing's latest efforts to curb excessive competition and overcapacity, and incremental signs of improving U.S.-China trade relations lifted sentiment. Analysts at CLSA said institutional investors' overall risk appetite has improved significantly this month, though some remain unconvinced about a structural bull run and see more sector-specific opportunities. Hong Kong's benchmark Hang Seng Index weakened 1.1% to 25,383.07, after hitting its highest since November 2021 on Thursday. The Hang Seng Tech Index led declines, losing 1.7% on the day. Market attention would be squarely on the Politburo meeting next week, given that it will likely shape economic policy for the rest of the year.
AllAfrica
3 days ago
- Politics
- AllAfrica
To change or not to change in Xi's China
In 2012, the year Xi Jinping took power, it was the 63rd anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) rule in China. It was a time of deep crisis within both the party and the country, marked by concerning precedents in the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (PCUS). In 1980, the 63rd anniversary of the CPSU's rule, the largest and deepest protest in the Soviet Empire broke out in Poland. In 1956, 24 years earlier, Soviet power was first shaken by the Budapest uprising. In 1968, 12 years later, it was Prague's turn. Both protests were bloodily suppressed. That seemed to be the destiny for Warsaw as well, but then things were more complicated. A Polish pope sat in Rome, speaking with striking workers in the Polish shipyards, but also in Washington, where a devout Catholic led the CIA. The protests weren't confined to a single city, but spread across the whole country. Poland was larger than Hungary or Czechoslovakia. The Polish government was aware of the ongoing risks and sought a way out that would strike a balance between stability and reform. In Moscow, there was also weariness with the hardline stance against the protesters who, in essence, weren't outright anti-communists but sought a more humane, free socialism. The USSR had responded to liberal pressures mainly through repression since its takeover in 1917. The approach seemed no longer practical. It hadn't stopped the cyclical political emergency upending the system. A different, more tolerant response was needed. The chaotic and disordered combination of all these factors led, a few years later, to an attempt at reform under Gorbachev. These reforms ultimately failed, evidenced by a coup attempt by hardliners, and 12 years later, the USSR came to an end. In 2012, China faced a similar predicament. For 30 years, China had experimented with a different formula from the Soviet model, gradually granting economic and personal freedoms while suppressing political liberties. The Soviets had cracked down on economic and political freedom. Practically, around the same time as Deng Xiaoping's reforms in 1980, a protest erupted in Beijing, on the wall of the central Xidan district, demanding the 'fourth modernization'—democracy. The protest was stifled but not forgotten. In 1989, it erupted again in Tiananmen Square. In 1999, ten years later, the Falun Gong crisis emerged. And in 2012, nearly a decade afterward, the country was again in trouble. The police chief of the vital city of Chongqing, a close associate of Politburo member Bo Xilai, fled to the American consulate in Chengdu with a stack of secret documents. The brother of Ling Jihua, a Politburo member and head of the office of the outgoing President Hu Jintao, also fled to the United States with a mountain of secret files. It was chaos, but more importantly, proof that the deal struck at the 2002 Congress—when President Jiang Zemin stepped down but only partially transferred power to his successor Hu Jintao—was failing. The confusion of power between the old and new leaders was reminiscent of the clash between the old guard and the sitting Politburo that led to the Tiananmen protests. The end of the USSR in 1992 had cast a heavy shadow over China. Democratic political reforms could spiral out of control, leading to the disintegration of the state, party leaders argued. In 2012, the party essentially saw only one way to restore order: concentrating power in the hands of its designated successor, Xi Jinping. Today, 13 years after that decisive turn, the country shows all the cracks of concentrated power. But politics is like that—nothing lasts forever. Chinese philosophy believes that the right policy is like rain at the right time: it shouldn't come too early or too late, and it shouldn't be too much or too little. Yes, Chinese exports are booming, and its technology is advancing rapidly. But the domestic economy is in poor health. There is deflation; the real estate market, which has been the main economic driver for over two decades, has collapsed. Bankers are considering zero interest rates to stimulate sluggish growth. This is crucial as the world battles inflation and high interest rates. The deficit in Chinese local governments and State-Owned Enterprises is ballooning, as is the debt-to-GDP ratio. But these people, who have lost so much money, don't vote and have no voice. Mid-level officials also resent pressure from above and have no room to make side money (as they could before). Young graduates cannot find jobs, and so on. All this manifests as people 'lying flat,' or tanping —letting things rot, fanglan ; it means that people do not spend or save as much out of fear of the future. Many entrepreneurs have stopped investing, and growth is driven mainly by infrastructure projects that expand internal debt, leading to increased inefficiencies and wasted resources. And so on. But does this translate into active opposition within the Central Committee—the body that could potentially remove Xi? No. Because these officials believe that to fix the problem, they'd need to remove the 'big man.' But this is a highly hazardous operation, attempted a few times with no success, and often leading to the demise of the rebels. Moreover, there's a broader calculation at play. The system is built around the emperor—if you bring him down, will the system survive? If it doesn't, the officials risk losing their posts along with the leader. As an act of self-preservation, they defend the emperor, no matter what. The middle class is in a similar situation: their homes have lost half of their value, and their savings have diminished dramatically. But half is better than nothing—especially in the event of a revolution. They still have a lot to lose, and revolutions are fought by people who have nothing to lose but their chains. During Tiananmen, people came to the square with bicycles left unlocked in the corner, and they grabbed the first one they saw on their way out—they didn't even own a bike. It was almost the same in 1999 during the anti-American protests following the Belgrade embassy bombing. They had nothing to lose, but everything to gain from a revolution. Now, many (most) have something to lose, and the gains are uncertain. Plus, there is a different international climate. For decades, the ideals of freedom and equality went hand in hand. In Budapest. Prague, Warsaw, Moscow, or people in Xidan and Tiananmen Square wanted democracy. Because all thought democracy was good. Now democracy doesn't carry much water. The US tried to export it like it was a technology, a mobile phone, to Islamic countries and got rejected. That might have instilled the virus of doubt in the West. Indeed, there is also the new neo-traditional right coming from Russia and the new anti-democratic and neo-conservative sentiments growing across the Atlantic. US President Donald Trump is not so hot on democracy, and so are many radical right leaders in Europe. The West lost the ideal of an egalitarian society with the failure of the Soviet Empire, and soon after, the light of liberalism apparently also dimmed. Western societies sought social democracy in the 1960s and 1970s, when they were affluent, had many children, and significant disparities marked the global distribution of wealth between nations. Developed countries were safely rich; developing countries were 'third world'. Now, rich countries don't have children; people have wealth expectancies lower than those of their parents. There is a sense that present affluence will be taken away, and the flow of migrants with different cultures, habits and ambitions knocking on their door and begging for money at every street corner is a practical sign that it is happening. The ideal is not democracy, or greater egalitarianism. It is merely a matter of survival, holding on to their present state. International and national environments converge. As a result, there's no active opposition in China. Therefore, Xi holds more power than ever before. Can this situation last? For how long? What could be the tipping point? These are questions for the future. But North Korea also serves as a warning: coercive governments can last longer than anticipated. Even without considering North Korea, socialist Vietnam and Cuba are still standing. China is bigger, and it has more and larger fissures, but there's no certainty about what the future holds. Still, some insistent rumors have been surfacing about Xi's fall from power. There is no indication that it is the case; quite the opposite. His name is on the news every day, a stark reminder of his clout. The party may be about to set up new government bodies. There is no indication that these bodies, of which we know little in detail, would constrain Xi in any meaningful way. Quite the opposite. They could help Xi to have a more efficient rule. These organizations could help systematize and organize procedures to make administration more efficient. They will have new leaders appointed by Xi himself, who will report directly to him. He may have thus added a new layer of loyal officials handling other party and state functions. Such bureaucratic reshuffles are always a double-edged sword: on one hand, they clarify procedures; on the other, they introduce new rigidity into an already stiff system. It's not clear how they will work out. But overall, it proves that Xi is continually refining the system—evidence of his extensive power. The reforms also demonstrate that the system requires some adjustments. Despite the official rejection of democratic reforms, some reforms are indeed necessary, and the administration doesn't work too effectively. In China, it might be time to think something bolder, but the world doesn't seem ready for it. This article originally appeared on Appia Institute and is republished with permission. Read the original here.
