4 days ago
Al-Sudani, the Coordination Framework, and the PMF: Navigating between allies and pressure
Shafaq News
The raid on Baghdad's Karkh Agriculture Directorate—an operation that left casualties and sparked public outcry—forced a decisive moment for Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. Acknowledging 'gaps in command and control' within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), he dismissed the commanders of Brigades 45 and 46 of Kataib Hezbollah and pledged accountability for all those involved.
The step revived the most sensitive question facing his government: can Baghdad reassert the state's monopoly on the use of force without rupturing its compact with the Coordination Framework that sustains his premiership—or igniting a confrontation with powerful factions and their regional backers amid measured but rising Western pressure?
Mandate, Law, and Post-October 7 Climate
Formed in 2014 after Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's jihad kifāʾī fatwa against ISIS—a situation where armed struggle becomes a collective obligation—the PMF became a formal state body under the 2016 law, though that framework left key organizational and command details vague. Subsequent attempts to refine or amend the law now collide with a harsher regional and international context shaped by the Gaza war, the Israel–Iran confrontation, and debates over non-state arms—as seen most vividly in Lebanon.
Al-Sudani has anchored his position in Najaf's language: weapons should be confined to the state and law applied uniformly, 'not to target any party or person.' But turning principle into enforceable architecture—especially given that some formations maintain autonomous chains of command—remains the unresolved core.
Inside the Shiite Coordination Framework
Security expert Sarmad al-Bayati called the government's response to the Karkh incident 'firm and responsible,' arguing that the public statement 'spoke plainly when some expected silence,' and that compliance with the commander-in-chief's decisions is now a test of respect for state authority.
From within the Coordination Framework, Wisdom Movement (Al-Hikma) figure Fahd al-Jubouri stresses that the prime minister's move 'is not a crisis with the PMF as an institution,' describing it as an internal, regulatory decision consistent with the PMF's status as a state body.
Opposition politician Mithal al-Alusi offers the counter-view: that what appears as intra-Framework debate is in fact 'a distribution of roles under a unified leadership.'
In his reading, al-Sudani seeks to convince Washington he is serious about curbing 'rogue weapons' while protecting his governing coalition; the United States and Britain, he says, still view part of the arsenal as Iranian-aligned and will not accept its entrenchment.
Political analyst A'ed al-Hilali, for his part, frames the prime minister's stance as a function of the very equation that brought him to power: 'direct confrontation with the PMF would risk the government's survival; calibrated enforcement is the only viable lane.'
That logic explains the dual track now visible. On one side, disciplinary signals where lines are crossed; on the other, institutional reassurance to the broader PMF that the government is not seeking dissolution. It also explains the Framework's effort to keep visible unity—what several insiders call a 'division of roles' rather than a split—while containing any factional rivalries that could spill into the security arena ahead of elections.
The Regional Echo and Iranian Equities
Reports around a call between State of Law Coalition head Nouri al-Maliki and Ali Akbar Velayati, senior adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—reflecting shared concern over US and Israeli efforts to disarm the PMF after moves targeting Hezbollah—underline Tehran's stake in preserving armed deterrence. Within this frame, Iran's consistent public line is that the PMF is an Iraqi sovereign file. In practice, Iraqi actors close to Tehran read any structural downgrading of PMF power as part of a broader regional attempt to roll back Iran-aligned capabilities from Lebanon to Iraq.
All eyes now turn to the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani's visit to Baghdad.
Calibrated Western Pressure—So Far
Western messaging has been cautious but clearer in recent weeks. US statements opposing a PMF law that would 'entrench' Iran-linked armed groups have flagged consequences for the bilateral security partnership if amendments harden de facto autonomy. Similarly, British Ambassador Irfan Siddiq has said the PMF's wartime role is no longer needed at its former scale, adding to the tension.
Think-tank voices—citing the risk of codifying parallel chains of command—have urged Washington to couple assistance with measurable security-sector reforms and, where necessary, targeted sanctions.
For al-Sudani, this creates an outer boundary: the government must demonstrate movement on command-and-control, force integration, and accountability—or risk punitive measures that could impact leaders, financing, and elements of cooperation with Iraqi security forces. The Karkh decisions were read in this light as both internal discipline and external signaling.
What Changed After Karkh—and What Did Not
The prime minister's dismissal of the two brigade commanders matters for three reasons:
-Command signal: It reasserts the commander-in-chief's authority over named formations and sets a precedent for action when red lines are crossed.
-Coalition management: It shows the Coordination Framework that the government is policing the margins, not the institution, avoiding an existential clash—exactly the balance al-Jubouri described.
-External message: It answers Western scrutiny with a visible enforcement act, without committing to a dismantlement track that the Framework and allied factions would resist.
What did not change is equally important. No governing bloc has embraced outright disarmament; the near-term debate is about hierarchy, movement, and missions—not abolishing the PMF. As al-Hilali notes, the PMF is a 'political-security complex' with social bases, parliamentary weight, and cross-border ties; any misstep risks both security turbulence and coalition fracture.
The Draft-Law Dilemma
Amending the 2016 PMF Authority Law could, in theory, clarify subordination to the Joint Operations Command, restrict external liaison, rationalize budgets, and define disciplinary pathways. In practice, experts warn that a poorly drawn amendment could formalize autonomy rather than end it. That is why the file keeps slipping toward the next government. As Ihsan al-Shammari argues, al-Sudani may want to move, but without a coordinated political decision inside the Framework and executable security steps, his room is limited—especially in the government's final months and under the shadow of regional escalation since October 7.
Scenarios: How al-Sudani and the Framework May Proceed
-Tighten without rupture (most likely in the near term)
Incremental command measures after visible breaches; limited rotations and internal audits; more rigorous movement orders and mission approvals; quiet retirements of hard-to-control field figures. The PMF remains institutionally intact; the state's writ is asserted episodically rather than comprehensively.
-Negotiated restructuring (possible if post-election math permits)
A broader bargain re-links pay, logistics, and promotions to performance under joint command; sensitive units are redeployed into roles with less independent kinetic latitude; external liaison is politically quarantined. This track needs a stronger parliamentary center and a green light from key Framework brokers.
-Confrontation and coercion (low probability, high risk)
Triggered by a major security incident, external strike, or a legislative shock; would invite rapid Western punitive steps and risk intra-Shiite fissures. Most Framework actors appear intent on avoiding this path before elections.
The Political Price of Equilibrium
Al-Sudani's strategy is to translate Najaf's principle—state monopoly on force—into enforceable practice without detonating the coalition architecture that sustains him. That requires three parallel messages: to the Framework, that the PMF is not being targeted as an institution; to Western partners, that the government is policing command lines and is responsive to red lines on external linkage; and to the public, that rule-of-law actions are not selective.
The danger is stasis disguised as balance. If enforcement remains episodic and the legal framework remains ambiguous, a 'parallel power' can persist—formally nested in the state yet operationally independent. As al-Shammari cautions, the politics of delay keep the file alive but unresolved.
Whether this balance holds will depend on events as much as intentions; a single major incident could quickly tilt the equation toward confrontation or deeper accommodation.
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.
