Latest news with #Qandil


New Straits Times
25-05-2025
- Politics
- New Straits Times
Egyptian prosecutors question journalist Rasha Qandil
CAIRO: Egyptian prosecutors released prominent journalist Rasha Qandil on bail on Sunday after questioning her for "broadcasting false information", her lawyer said. Qandil, a former presenter with BBC Arabic, was released after paying 50,000 Egyptian pounds (about €880) in bail. "The prosecutors' office accuses her of broadcasting false information inside and outside the country," lawyer Nabeh el-Ganadi told AFP. The accusations against her were based on complaints from the public about her social media posts, a report from national security officials, and an examination of her social media accounts, Ganadi added. She went of her own accord to be questioned by prosecutors and is now waiting to see if they will file charges or drop the case, the lawyer added. Qandil is the wife of opposition politician and former presidential candidate Ahmed al-Tantawi, who has been in prison for a year over irregularities in his campaign accounts from the December 2023 presidential campaign. Tantawi was questioned last month over two other cases, including allegations of "incitement to commit a terrorist act", according to his lawyer Khaled Ali. He is due to finish his jail term this month and could be released on Monday, pending the outcome of the new investigations, his lawyer added. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's administration has faced persistent criticism of its human rights record since it came to power in 2014. Since 2022, the administration has released hundreds of political prisoners, although human rights groups say many more have been detained over the same period.


The National
05-05-2025
- Business
- The National
What Trump's proposed tariffs could mean for the Arab film industry
US President Donald Trump's announcement that he has authorised a 100 per cent tariff on films made "in foreign lands' has been met with shock and confusion in the Mena film community. Countries that offer tax incentives for international productions such as the UAE, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Morocco and Tunisia would be particularly affected by the potential move. For decades, Hollywood projects have been pivotal to the development of their respective local film industries, particularly in terms of investment, infrastructure and talent development. The proposed tariffs could disrupt Hollywood projects already set to film in the region, according to Qais Qandil, the Jordanian founder of The Film Makers, an Emirati production company, which has brought international projects such as The Misfits and Beyond the Likes to the emirates in the past. Qandil tells The National: 'As a producer who has spent years bridging Hollywood and Abu Dhabi, I've seen first-hand how international collaboration strengthens the industry creatively and economically. It may complicate my immediate plans to bring more US projects to the region.' Qandil also notes that Hollywood does not solely choose to film in countries such as the UAE, Jordan and Saudi Arabia because of rebate incentives. Projects such as the Mission: Impossible series, for instance, were able to pull off certain action set pieces thanks to Abu Dhabi's regulatory and logistical capabilities, which are not found in other locations. 'A tariff such as this risks penalising US productions that choose global locations like the UAE not for cost alone, but for world-class infrastructure and cinematic value. It could discourage the very partnerships that have made modern filmmaking thrive,' says Qandil. If Hollywood projects stop filming in the Mena region, it could have a potentially harmful effect on the local creative scene. UAE film professional Kane Rodrigues worked in Abu Dhabi on Dune: Part Two, the upcoming films Now You See Me: Now You Don't and F1, as well as Dubai productions including the Jack Ryan film, which stars John Krasinski, and City of Life 2. If those projects stop coming, it could halt the development of talent from the UAE, he believes. 'As a local sound mixer, getting opportunities to be part of the sound department in major Hollywood studio films means a great deal. UAE's film industry is still evolving, and these are the only opportunities we local crew get to be involved and to grow, as we rarely have locally produced films of this scale,' says Rodrigues. But the Arab film industry at large does not solely rely on Hollywood. Egyptian filmmaker Mohammed Hefzy, founder of the influential pan-regional production company Film Clinic, believes that, apart from Hollywood co-productions, Arab films will largely be unaffected. 'In terms of Arab cinema, the effect would be minimal. There are not many Arab films screened in the US anyway, and American audiences would still see those films on streaming at no extra charge.' Trump's move could also have a ripple effect of retaliatory tariffs that could have an unintended detrimental effect on American movies, Hefzy believes. 'Some European and Asian countries would probably impose counter-tariffs on US films, which would make Hollywood suffer quite a bit,' says Hefzy. The tariff proposition's lack of particulars leaves much uncertainty, especially in the world of streaming – perhaps the most significant current distribution system for bringing Arab films to the world. The US streamer Netflix, for example, distributes and produces several Arab films each year. It's unclear whether those projects would be affected by tariffs as well, how that would be implemented, and if it would harm the growth of Arab film on the world stage. Gianluca Chakra, founder of Front Row Filmed Entertainment, has produced several Netflix original Arab films, including the 2022 Lebanese-Egyptian hit Perfect Strangers and 2025's The Sand Castle. Chakra is concerned that this could affect this business model. 'I'm wondering what would happen to co-productions or streaming originals. How would you measure the value of a so-called non-US production that is streaming in the US in order then to apply its respective tariff or tax?' Chakra wonders. While Chakra understands Trump's concern for the health of Hollywood, which has experienced a marked drop in domestic production in recent years, he doesn't think the US will be able to reverse the trend. And, as on-screen storytelling has become increasingly decentralised, Mena countries should be adding increased incentives for local productions to develop their own self-sustaining industries. 'There is a hunger for those. They're slowly eating away from major studios anyway,' Chakra says. But for filmmakers hoping to gain attention from awards bodies such as the Oscars, US distribution is pivotal. Jordanian filmmaker Razan Takash, head of film at SAE University College Dubai, is concerned that the potential tariffs could affect the ability of foreign films to reach American film festivals, some of which are Oscar qualifiers. Emerging firms such as Watermelon Pictures have made a concerted effort to bring films such as Oscar-nominee Farah Nabulsi's The Teacher to US audiences. The Palestinian-Israeli film No Other Land, too, was theatrically successful despite lacking traditional distribution, in part because of its Oscars boost. And for Arab genre filmmakers, especially those working within the horror and sci-fi spaces, the US is a more supportive market than the Mena region, according to Takash. 'My last sci-fi shorts got distributed mostly in the US, so if they are not going be taking foreign films at the same rate, then that's a big loss for me as a platform,' she adds. Amid a lack of clarity as to how the plan will be enacted and whether it will come to fruition at all, many in the Mena region's film industry are waiting to see what will happen next – and hoping for the best. 'Personally, I believe this tariff is politically driven and unlikely to hold in the long run,' says Qandil.


Rudaw Net
30-04-2025
- Politics
- Rudaw Net
Kurds amid the slow and fast rhythms of today's Middle Eastern politics
Also in Opinions Iran in the shadow of war talk Sharing development opportunities and welcoming the blessed Ramadan together Syria-SDF deal: What's really happening behind the scenes Rudaw: the strongest Kurdish voice on the global stage Trump's two-month deadline for an agreement or confrontation with Iran, the Iranian leader's hope that in the future "by divine grace" a miracle will occur and his opponents will fall, Turkey's rush to dismantle the PKK, Qandil's requests for "an appropriate opportunity" to hold a congress, or Ahmed Shara's initiatives for "rebuilding Syria" - all these express that in the current geopolitical issues of the Middle East, accelerating, speediness or moving slowly has become a strategic option. In reality, political moments are no longer the same; for some, it's too early while for others it's far too late. This duality of speed versus slowness in events exists because changes in timing might translate into changes in alliances and political balance. Yet amid all this, the pieces on the Kurdish political chessboard still move slowly. Policies of Speed and Slowness in the Superpowers' Game In today's world, the competition between global powers is somewhat tied to who can move faster or who can exercise more restraint. Trump stands above all those who are in a hurry. In reality, it's a big question how an issue like Iran's nuclear program, which has been troubling 6 US presidents for more than 25 years since 1999, can be resolved in his two-month timeline, or how the 3-year Russia-Ukraine war can be ended in a day as he had claimed. Just as ending the decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not an easy task, especially when his deadline for the release of hostages held by Hamas at the end of January this year did not succeed. Perhaps one reason for Trump's policy is that he believes if things continue as they are, his country will fall behind China. As Putin appears to be in no hurry to end the Ukraine war, which is increasing costs for Europe and America, China's President Xi Jinping is also approaching issues cautiously, at a slower pace, and has said that in the current situation, he favors stability, perhaps because the time factor is currently working in his country's favor. Beijing has established three phases to gradually transform its military into a global force by 2027, 2035, and 2049. In 2024, China's third aircraft carrier - Fujian (CV-18) - began its sea trials. It has developed the DF-27 hypersonic intercontinental missile with a range of 5000-8000 km that can reach into American territory. China wants to become dominant in AI, semiconductors, quantum science, and biotechnology, as it will invest the equivalent of 23% of its GDP in technology by 2026. In space, it has surpassed Russia and wants to become America's main competitor. Trump is concerned about China's monopoly over valuable global mines, energy corridors, and supply chains increasing, so he wants to limit China's access to the Middle East, particularly Iran's cheap oil, attract significant Saudi and Gulf investment to his country, and through the Abraham Accords and reconciliation between Turkey and Israel, find more opportunities to counter Beijing. This can directly impact the Kurdish issue. In this framework, Trump's desire for a rapid withdrawal from Syria may increase Washington's pressure for an agreement between the Kurds and the new Syrian government, similar to the role the US military played in the Jolani and Kobani agreements. He may also increase his efforts to encourage Turkey to reach an agreement with the PKK. Similarly, he might support strengthening the Kurdistan Region's role in Iraq, especially as Iraq moves toward another decisive election at the end of this year. Kurds and the Pieces of Regional Politics Trump's two-month deadline for Iran, which as he says, must result in either an agreement or confrontation, is important for the Kurds. Iran's leader Ali Khamenei in his latest speech mentioned that "Imam Hassan's agreement with his opponents" was temporary. This may be to calm the ultra-conservative wing of his political system who daily speak against the Pezeshkian government's negotiation efforts, but in reality, he views political timing from an ideological-political perspective and believes that everything happening now is temporary and one day the situation will reverse. Iran uses its relationship with China and Russia as a pressure card against America, hoping that American pressures won't last long. Besides that, it aims to proceed without issues until October this year to eliminate the risk of international sanctions being reimposed. Meanwhile, Israel is concerned that Trump's "America First" policy might limit Washington's support, so it wants to take quick action regarding Iran's nuclear dossier. Although Iran has spoken about its strategic relationship with China, a gas purchase agreement with Russia, and the establishment of a new nuclear facility by Russia, it is unlikely that a businessman and politician like Trump would make a deal that doesn't bring economic benefits to his country while allowing China, Russia, or Europe to take advantage. Therefore, there is still uncertainty about the possibility of an agreement or confrontation between Tehran and Washington. If an agreement is reached, which might include opening doors for American companies to enter Tehran, it means that Iran's situation, both internally and externally, will move toward more change. This could potentially create important opportunities for the Kurds in Eastern Kurdistan (Iranian Kurdistan) and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. However, if it turns into conflict, Kurdistan will undoubtedly become part of that battleground. If a war breaks out, the Zagros Mountain range, which is an important part of Iran's military geography and surrounds Kurdish cities, will become a sensitive security field, which could translate into the government's efforts to increase military-political control in these areas. Additionally, American bases in the Kurdistan Region might again become targets for armed groups from Iraq or even Iran. Quick but fragile reconstruction of Syria and the issue of PKK disarmament Ahmed Shara, who suddenly emerged like a lightning bolt last year and toppled Assad's government, wants to close Hezbollah's transit routes on the border, although it seems difficult for him to fully succeed in this. He closed the bases and headquarters of many Palestinian groups close to the Resistance Front in Damascus and arrested some Islamic Jihad leaders. Apparently, he has incorporated most armed groups into the army, although in reality none has actually disbanded. He has moved softly with Kurds and Druze in hopes of gaining Western support, lifting Syria's sanctions, and recovering billions of dollars of frozen Syrian assets. In his relations with the SDF, he hoped to resolve all issues within 3-4 months, while the other side believed it would take several years. Finally, they agreed to resolve their issues by the end of this year, but disagreements over implementing the Tishrin Dam agreement, Kurdish language education, and the Kurdish unity conference in Qamishlo may indicate the fragility of the agreement made between both parties. Additionally, the recent movements of the Ansar al-Sunna group, which announced in recent days that it will start punishing officials of the former regime itself, could put al-Shara's government in a difficult position, especially as Shara wants to promise the world that radical Islamic groups will not gain strength while fearing the possibility of an Alawite uprising. Both Turkey and Israel are in a hurry to improve the situation in Syria for themselves. Netanyahu considers Trump's first year as the greatest opportunity to use the Washington-Tel Aviv alignment on preventing Iran, the Abraham Accords, and redesigning Syria's new situation according to its own strategic security. Turkey is also in a hurry to resolve the integration of the SDF into the Syrian army and prevent an autonomous administration. Beyond geopolitical goals, it sees Syria's reconstruction as a golden opportunity for its economy, especially Turkey's construction sector, which accounts for 30% of the country's GDP. This could be good news for Turkey's ruling party, as many construction companies appear as its supporters. Iran, meanwhile, prays for the day when Syria's situation deteriorates and turns upside down for Turkey and Israel. In this situation, the Qamishlo conference was a late but important step for the Kurds, although it faced many internal and external obstacles. Just as three flags were raised instead of one, the diversity of different perspectives is one obstacle, and the fate of Ocalan-Turkey negotiations on PKK disarmament is another. The Kurds betting on the reemergence of Syria's civil war is a mistake; that war may eventually return, but the problem is that Kurds have little time at their disposal. Therefore, while rushing may not be good, moving too slowly might also be costly. Hoping for Israeli support for Kurds may also be a mistake, as it is unlikely that Israel would exchange the possibility of reconciliation with Turkey for costly support of the Kurds. While negotiations to end the long-standing conflict between Turkey and PKK are taking place, both sides are fighting a time battle. Ankara wants the PKK to disarm and dissolve itself in the near future. Devlet Bahceli has demanded that the PKK hold its congress early next month. Erdogan, while facing obstacles with the Istanbul mayor and CHP, wants to resolve the PKK issue as soon as possible to use it as an important political achievement domestically, not to mention that it provides commercial opportunities and economic growth for his country in Syria and Iraq. However, it seems that the PKK is not in a hurry like Ankara. Therefore, it is likely that this issue will not succeed in its current form, and if it does, it will only be superficial. So, the PKK and Turkey issue will continue until the parties feel they are winning. Another point is that, in all likelihood, the issue of PKK disarmament is not only a Turkish matter but also a major issue for Iran, as for many years the PKK's presence in the mountains has served as a barrier for Iran to prevent the establishment of anti-Iranian armed groups. Besides, any peace between the PKK and Turkey would make Iran the only Middle Eastern state that has not yet opened up on the Kurdish issue. Conclusion After more than six months since the election, the Kurdistan Regional Government has still not been formed. This is while in less than 7 months, another election will be held that could change the dynamics behind the government formation process. The fate of the government may depend on the type of expected alliances in Iraq's upcoming election, just as the previous one in 2021 turned the relationship between Kurdistan's two main parties upside down. If the KDP and PUK are not on the same alliance line, then any coalition government will face problems in the future. Additionally, regional changes and expectations regarding the outcome of Iran-US negotiations may be another influential factor in the timing of government formation. In today's Middle East, speed and slowness are no longer just measures of time, but part of geopolitical competition. Just as Kurdish geography is at the heart of competing powers' areas of influence, so too are its timelines divided between the poles of speed and slowness. Certainly, navigating this situation in a way that minimizes harm requires masterful rearrangement of political timing! Ziryan Rojhelati is director of the Rudaw Research Center. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.


Al Etihad
16-03-2025
- Health
- Al Etihad
Ramadan 2025: Dubai Autism Center launches autism-friendly kit initiative
16 Mar 2025 19:51 DUBAI (ALETIHAD)In line with the objectives of the 'Year of the Community' and as part of the #RamadanInDubai' campaign, the Dubai Autism Center has announced the launch of an initiative aimed at empowering children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) to participate in social and public initiative involves the distribution of specially designed autism-friendly kits, furthering the Center's efforts to support the inclusion and empowerment of individuals with autism, particularly during significant occasions such as the Holy Month of Ramadan and Eid Al Emadi, Director General of the Dubai Autism Center, stated: "This initiative is part of our commitment to contributing to the goals of the 'Year of the Community,' as declared by President His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, to foster a cohesive and thriving society. It also aligns with our ongoing dedication to supporting families and enabling children with autism to actively engage in social and recreational activities. We recognise the challenges parents face when taking their children to public spaces, and through this autism-friendly kit, we aim to facilitate these experiences and make them more comfortable and enjoyable."Al Emadi emphasised that supporting and empowering People of Determination with autism is a collective social responsibility that requires comprehensive collaboration across all sectors. He further noted that this initiative contributes to enhancing the inclusion and empowerment of individuals with autism, in line with the National Policy for Empowering People of Determination and the 'My Community … A City for Everyone' initiative, which aims to transform Dubai into a disability-friendly Qandil, Community Outreach Coordinator at the Dubai Autism Center, highlighted that the kit serves as a valuable tool for families to help manage sensory challenges that children with autism may encounter when interacting with their surroundings. She added: "This kit is more than just a collection of tools; it is a means to promote the independence of children with autism and encourage their families to participate in social events without concerns over sensory triggers, especially given the increase in activities and family gatherings during Ramadan and Eid."Qandil also pointed out that these kits are distributed to public venues and organisations certified as Autism-Friendly, including Dubai Police stations in Al Barsha and Al Muraqqabat, Dubai Airports, Dubai Frame, Children's City, Quranic Park, Etihad Museum, Al Shindagha Museum, Al Jalila Cultural Centre for Children, Hatta Heritage Village, several libraries affiliated with the Dubai Culture & Arts Authority, Dubai Ambulance Corporation, and the Endowment and Minors' Trust Foundation - Awqaf Dubai Autism Center encourages parents interested in obtaining the kit to apply through the Center's official communication channels. The Center reaffirms its commitment to launching initiatives that enhance the quality of life for individuals with autism and foster their seamless integration into Autism-Friendly Certification Program (AFCP), a pioneering initiative in the region, was launched by the Dubai Autism Center in September 2022. Designed to recognise exemplary organisations in the public and private sectors, the programme aims to foster a more inclusive community by encouraging higher accessibility standards for individuals with Autism Center (DAC) is a non-profit organisation founded in 2001. The Center aims to provide specialised services to take care of children with autism and provide support for their families and caregivers as per Decree No. 26 of 2021 issued by the Ruler of Dubai. The DAC's services include educational, psychological and rehabilitative programmes for children with autism. The financial resources of the Dubai Autism Center come from subsidies, donations and charitable spectrum disorder is one of the most common developmental disorders, typically appearing within the first three years of a child's life and persisting throughout their life stages. Autism affects an individual's communication and social abilities, leading to their isolation from those around them. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) 2021 report, one in 36 children has ASD. This prevalence is observed to be similar in most countries worldwide. Year of Community Continue full coverage