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News18
3 hours ago
- Politics
- News18
Can India Sail In Both RIC With Quad Boats, Balancing US, China And Russia?
Last Updated: While Russia and China are keen to wean India away from the US, is India ready to spoil relations with America? The US is India's biggest trade partner. There are unexpected friendly noises from India's otherwise hostile and mighty neighbour's house. And a gentle invitation to do an almost impossible trapeze: resuscitate the RIC (Russia-India-China) axis. Nevermind India is still in the Quad with the US, Australia, and Japan. It started mid-July with Russian media quoting their deputy foreign minister Andrei Rudenko as saying that Moscow expects the resumption of the RIC format and is deliberating on it with Beijing and New Delhi. 'This topic appears in our negotiations with both of them. We are interested in making this format work, because these three countries are important partners, besides being the founders of BRICS," Rudenko reportedly said. Russia's foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, is also eager to restart the RIC dialogue. 'I would like to confirm our genuine interest in the earliest resumption of the work within the format of the troika — Russia, India, China — which was established many years ago on the initiative of Yevgeny Primakov (former Russian Prime Minister)," Lavrov is quoted as saying. Beijing immediately seemed to warm up to the idea. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said: 'China-Russia-India cooperation not only serves the respective interests of the three countries but also helps uphold peace, security, stability and progress in the region and the world." Should it hasten into RIC's embrace and upset its biggest trade partner and fellow democracy, America? Or should it fritter away the opportunity to forge a powerful global alliance that mellows China's hostility towards it and hedges against America's hegemony and Trump's mercurial politics? India has wisely chosen to buy time, mull, and act in its own best interest. 'This consultative format is a mechanism where the three countries come and discuss global issues and regional issues of interest to them," India's external affairs ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said at his weekly media briefing. 'As to when this particular RIC format meeting is going to be held, it is something that will be worked out among the three countries in a mutually convenient manner." Meanwhile, a SWOT (strength, weakness, opportunity, threat) analysis of reactivating the RIC must undoubtedly be on in the foreign office. Let us first examine the potential weaknesses and threats. The obvious one is whether India can balance the Quad and RIC. It is immensely tricky because, notwithstanding public utterances, the central idea of the Quad is to contain China's influence in the Indian Ocean. By being part of RIC, India will risk the most acute conflict of interest in today's geopolitics. While Russia and China are keen to wean India away from the US, is India ready to spoil relations with America? The US is India's biggest trade partner. Also, ideologically and culturally, India fits more comfortably with a liberal democracy like the US than a Communist dictatorship or a one-man rule. Besides, given China's track record of backstabbing and waiting for the right moment to strike, it is inadvisable to trust the Dragon or take it at face value. And lastly, it seems unlikely that China will stop using Pakistan and its jihad factory as a strategic tool against India. It is also fattening the worst Islamist elements in Bangladesh with money and junkets, knowing fully well they will create trouble for India. Indian agencies believe Chinese money is widely used in manufacturing so-called 'dissent' and internal security challenges for India. But there are considerable positives linked to RIC. If the three massive economies and militaries of China, India, and Russia come together, they can easily rival NATO. Recently, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte threatened India and China with sanctions if they continue to buy Russian oil, seeing no irony in the fact that the European Union bought USD 22 billion worth of Russian oil in a year and sent just USD 19 billion of aid to Ukraine. Even NATO member Turkey, by Rutte's logic, stands to be sanctioned. Also, the world's two most populous countries form a vast talent pool as well as massive domestic markets. RIC may work as a bulwark against US President Donald Trump's whimsical and disruptive policies like retaliatory tariffs and meddling uninvited in regional conflicts. The US also fears that BRICS, which has all three as its founding members, may challenge the dollar hegemony with its own currency. But ending the monopoly of the dollar may actually be good for a multipolar world. China, India, and Russia working more closely could be a massive regional stabilising force in Asia, Middle East, and Africa. Also, a India-China strategic alliance with common friend Russia in the middle may make China less bent on using Pakistan and other irritants against India. The positives might sound fanciful, but RIC is definitely worth giving a long thought. If India can convince the US and Europe that cooperation with its adversaries does not mean hostility and that its huge market and talent pool is available for mutual trade and growth, it can pull off the near-impossible. Get breaking news, in-depth analysis, and expert perspectives on everything from politics to crime and society. Stay informed with the latest India news only on News18. Download the News18 App to stay updated! view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: July 20, 2025, 10:01 IST News india Can India Sail In Both RIC With Quad Boats, Balancing US, China And Russia? 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The Diplomat
2 days ago
- Business
- The Diplomat
What Underlies High US Tariffs on Bangladesh
Dhaka's trade deficit with the US is smaller than that of Vietnam. Yet it has been slapped with a higher tariff rate. On July 8, the U.S. imposed a revised 35 percent tariff on Bangladeshi goods. 'Please understand that the 35% tariff is far less than what is needed to eliminate the Trade Deficit disparity we have with your Country,' Trump wrote in a letter to Muhammad Yunus, chief advisor of Bangladesh's interim government. Earlier in April, the U.S. had imposed a 37 percent tariff, increasing it from 15 percent. To understand the implications and politics of tariffs, a comparative look at Bangladesh's business competitors is essential. Bangladesh exports around $8 billion worth of goods to the United States — the highest volume to a single country. Over $6 billion of that consists of garments, meaning the industry would be heavily impacted. Vietnam is Bangladesh's key competitor, and the United States has offered them a reduced tariff rate of 20 percent. Finance Advisor Salehuddin Ahmed noted that Bangladesh's trade deficit with the U.S. is only about $5 billion, while that of Vietnam's with the U.S. stands at $125 billion. 'Even so, the U.S. has agreed to offer Vietnam some concessions,' he said. Bangladesh has a 'much smaller deficit,' he pointed out, adding that 'there is no justification for imposing such a high tariff on us. We will continue to negotiate.' Clearly, politics are at play. This is evident from the statement of Power and Energy Adviser Fouzul Kabir Khan. 'Not just tariffs, there have been discussions on non-tariff barriers as well. They [the U.S.] are prioritising their national security… A framework is being worked out in this regard, and the matter is under discussion', he said. According to business leaders and economists in Dhaka, Bangladesh's China dependency and U.S. strategic interests in Bangladesh drove Washington's tariff decision regarding Bangladesh. With the rise of China, the Indo-Pacific has become a center of global conflict. This prompted the U.S. and other major regional powers to reform the Quad in 2017. During his visit to Bangladesh in 2020, Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun formally invited Bangladesh to join the grouping. 'The U.S. sees Bangladesh as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific region,' he said. The Burma Act of 2021, which authorizes the 'Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development activities in Burma and the surrounding region to support democracy activists, humanitarian assistance, and reconciliation efforts,' also reflects the strategic interest of the U.S. in Bangladesh. The U.S. is keen on sending humanitarian assistance to Arakan in Myanmar. In April, the United Nations requested Bangladesh to facilitate a 'humanitarian corridor' to the conflict-ridden Rakhine State in Myanmar. Although the Bangladeshi government initially agreed to support the initiative, it was ultimately unable to proceed due to divergent opinions among political parties and the military. The U.S. also has long been pushing Bangladesh to sign two agreements — the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). American officials describe these agreements as 'foundational agreements' to modernize the Bangladesh military by 2030. In the run-up to the 2024 general elections in Bangladesh, the then Foreign Minister A K Abdul Momen ruled out the possibility of signing these agreements. In 2024, Prime Minister Hasina said that the U.S. wanted to establish an airbase in Bangladesh. Bangladesh's repeated refusal to sign these agreements and democratic backsliding under the former Hasina regime seemed to have prompted the U.S. to take a series of actions against Bangladesh. These included imposition of sanctions on its Rapid Action Battalion in 2021, exclusion from the 2020 Democracy Summit, and the announcement of a visa policy targeting individuals in the Hasina government, who were deemed to be undermining the democratic process. Although the 2024 election was widely perceived as rigged, the U.S. ultimately refrained from enforcing the visa policy, reportedly due to diplomatic intervention by India. China, which has been pushing Bangladesh to join its Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative for some years now, has stepped up engagement with the Yunus government. It has accelerated people-to-people connections by allowing Bangladeshis to avail health services in China, providing scholarships to Bangladeshis, and inviting politicians and educationists to China. Beijing is also eager to fund the Teesta river project, which India has opposed. China's expanding footprint in Bangladesh is of concern to the U.S. Thus, it appears that the United States is using the tariff issue to pressure Bangladesh against embracing China too closely. But Bangladesh remains heavily dependent on China, which is its largest trading partner. In the fiscal year 2022-23, Bangladesh imported nearly $23 billion worth of goods from China, accounting for over 33 percent of its total imports and firmly establishing China as its primary source of imports. These imports include refined fuel, capital machinery, electrical equipment, cotton, synthetic fibers used in garment production, fabrics, raw materials for plastics, iron and steel, fertilizers, chemicals, and other essential inputs for various industrial sectors. Bangladesh is caught between two competing powers. The country's economy is deeply intertwined with both the United States and China. Besides, its export basket is heavily dependent on a single commodity—readymade garments. This overreliance leaves Bangladesh vulnerable to external pressures and shifting geopolitical dynamics. To navigate this complex landscape, Bangladesh will need to make some hard strategic choices to diversify its export markets and expand exports beyond the garment industry into other value-added sectors. Importantly, it will need to pursue balanced and proactive diplomatic negotiations to safeguard its economic interests.
The Print
2 days ago
- Business
- The Print
Critical minerals are the new oil. India can't afford to depend on China
Currently, India is heavily dependent on imports for critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements (REE). Much of this supply comes through re-export channels, which creates a third-level dependency while exposing us to potential supply shocks and strategic coercion. Mineral security is no longer just an economic concern but a national security imperative, underpinning the country's ambitions in clean energy, defence self-reliance, and advanced manufacturing. At the Summit, Modi warned against the weaponisation of critical minerals and stressed the need to work together to make supply chains secure and reliable. Other global leaders have also echoed similar concerns at the G20, Quad, and BRICS summits, and have discussed collaborating to secure and diversify critical mineral supply chains. Critical minerals have now become instruments of geopolitical bargaining and means to assert domestic autonomy and security. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's recent visit to Argentina and meeting with Chilean President, Gabriel Boric, the two legs of the lithium triangle, on the sidelines of the recently held BRICS summit in Brazil, were strategically aimed at exploring cooperation and engagement on critical minerals. The refining wall of China Globally, China holds roughly 62 per cent of lithium refining capacity, 33 per cent for nickel, 77 per cent for cobalt, 87 per cent for graphite, and 76 per cent for REEs, according to the International Energy Agency's (IEA) Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025. This underscores China's overwhelming dominance in supply chains, even though it does not host most raw material reserves. Compared to 2023, India's lithium imports from China surged by roughly 921 per cent in 2024, while graphite imports rose 85 per cent between 2022 and 2024 and Nickel imports jumped 137 per cent in 2024. Such dominance gives Beijing an asymmetric leverage over supply chains vital to clean-tech sectors and key defence applications, including advanced electronics, missile systems, and communication technologies. As a result, securing reliable access to critical minerals has become a strategic vulnerability for India's ambitions in developing a robust clean tech and defence ecosystem. The implications of this centrality are intrinsically geopolitical. Recent export restrictions by China on REE have directly affected the electric vehicle (EV) sector globally, even forcing production halts. This, in turn, undermines clean mobility targets, as REEs are essential components in EV motors. Additionally, certain elements are indispensable to India's defence sector. While China demanded invasive end-use disclosures to ensure materials aren't used for defence, despite India's compliance, it was met with a deliberate denial of access. Such wanton weaponisation of mineral supply chains, creating market distortions, is heightening global concerns over the monolithic control of upstream activities. India's multi‑vector strategy On the positive side, by following a multi-alignment approach and strengthening bilateral ties, India has diversified early-stage sourcing from countries such as Zambia, Mongolia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It has pursued technology transfer discussions with Japan; engaged internationally through platforms like the Quad Security Dialogue, Minerals Security Partnership, Critical Raw Materials Club (EU+), and the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative. Domestically, efforts have advanced through the National Critical Minerals Mission, overseas acquisitions by Khanij Bidesh India Ltd. (KABIL), extraction and recycling by Indian Rare Earths Ltd. (IREL), and inclusion of private players in exploration. However, it may not be sufficient for supply chain optimisation as the dependency on Chinese processing and refining capacities continues to exert an outsized influence, leaving India vulnerable. In light of the constantly shifting geopolitical tensions armed with resource nationalism at the core, India must consciously invest in domestic downstream capabilities and look for alternative, resilient supply chains. While China does offer cost advantages backed by decades of state investment and economies of scale, this advantage is exposing fault lines unlike before. A single‑point dependence may spark supply shocks, spikes in infrastructure costs, and stalls in critical sectors like defence and clean energy, all pivotal for an Aatmanirbhar Bharat. Also read: China has mastered the art of dumping. India must take a cue from US to fight back Strengthening mineral sovereignty While India must continue to pursue the 'China+1' sourcing strategy, mineral sovereignty demands a more strategically fortified approach, one that combines global partnerships, security-centric stockpiling agreements and more. However, it must be understood that access is not autonomy. India must now begin building its technological capabilities with a long-term vision—even if this appears financially less competitive in the short term—for strategic reasons. Strategic autonomy cannot be benchmarked solely on cost-efficiency metrics. Instead, the calculus must factor resilience, control, and long-term supply security. This calls for public-private collaboration, targeted incentives, and strengthening of Indian institutions like the National Critical Mineral Mission Outreach Forum and defence research organisations to facilitate long-term investments, research and development, and stockpiling. In essence, the cost of not strengthening domestic capacity is far greater than the dependency and vulnerability, particularly in the context of building and fortifying the defence and strategic manufacturing ecosystem. Initial investments may not yield immediate commercial returns, but they will help India develop long-term technical expertise, embed resilience in our systems planning, fostering innovation ecosystems—all of which will contribute toward reducing dependency and geopolitical exposure. Policymakers must push for a mindset shift: critical mineral security should be seen as a public good. India developed its domestic oil refining capacity through early investments by both the public and private sectors, and infrastructure planning. Today, it has enabled the country to import crude oil of any grade from countries like Russia and process it independently. The same strategic approach must now be applied to critical minerals. Ultimately, India must transition from being a passive consumer in global mineral markets to an active ecosystem builder—one that can source, refine, and deploy strategic minerals while empowering emerging economies to navigate shared mineral and geopolitical challenges. Critical mineral security is no longer optional; it is national security by another name. Dr. Debajit Palit is the Centre Head and Meheli Roy Choudhury is a Research Consultant at Centre for Climate Change & Energy Transition, Chintan Research Foundation. Views are personal. (Edited by Ratan Priya)
Free Malaysia Today
2 days ago
- Politics
- Free Malaysia Today
Trump set to visit Pakistan in September
US-Pakistan relations saw a major boost when US President Donald Trump hosted Pakistan's army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir at the White House. (NDTV pic) ISLAMABAD : US President Donald Trump is expected to visit Pakistan in September, two local television news channels reported today, citing sources familiar with the matter. If confirmed, the visit would be the first by a US president since nearly two decades ago, when President George W Bush visited Pakistan in 2006. Pakistan's foreign office spokesman said he was not aware of Trump's expected visit. The two TV news channels said that Trump would also visit India after arriving in Islamabad in September. US-Pakistan relations saw a major boost when Trump hosted Pakistan's army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir at the White House last month in an unprecedented meeting. A US embassy spokesman in Islamabad told Reuters, 'We have nothing to announce,' and said that the White House could not provide confirmation on the president's schedule. Pakistan's information ministry didn't respond to a Reuters request for a comment. India is due to host the summit of the so-called Quad countries this year but dates for the meeting have not been announced yet. The Quad grouping includes the US, India, Australia and Japan and is focused on countering China's rise in the Indo-Pacific region.
India.com
2 days ago
- Politics
- India.com
Australia Hits Back At Trump's ‘Betrayal', Refuses To Commit Troops In Potential US-China-Taiwan War – Is QUAD-AUKUS Falling Apart?
New Delhi: Australia has finally spoken. It has told the United States in clear terms that Canberra will not be dragged into a war over Taiwan. Not this time. Not on uncertain promises. From Melbourne to Beijing, the shift in tone is palpable. As Prime Minister Anthony Albanese walks the diplomatic tightrope in China, his government is making it known that Australia will not send troops if tensions between the United States and China explode into war over Taiwan. No pre-commitments. No blind faith. Defence Minister Pat Conroy echoed the same. Calm, deliberate and without drama. He refused to make advance promises. Decisions, he said, would be made by Australia's elected government, not dictated by demands from Washington. Behind the scenes, frustration brews. The AUKUS pact, trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States intended to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific that is secure and stable, once hailed as a defence revolution, now stumbles. The nuclear submarines promised by the United States have not arrived. Deadlines have shifted. Commitments have blurred. Trust has thinned. This, many in Canberra believe, is not only about Taiwan but being treated as an equal partner and not a subordinate. It is about remembering history as well. Australia and the United States are both part of the Quad, a security alliance meant to counter China's rise. But now, Australia's faith in the alliance is being tested. In Beijing, PM Albanese stays cautious. He talks of peace. He speaks of stability in the region. He avoids the war talk that Washington seems eager to entertain. And he will not offer reassurances on troop deployment. Reports say the US Department of Defense has asked Australia and Japan for written guarantees. They want allies to commit to sending forces if a conflict erupts in the Indo-Pacific. One name keeps coming up is Elbridge Colby. A senior voice in Washington, overseeing the AUKUS plan, now seen as pushing too hard and too fast. But this is not the Australia of 20 years ago. Canberra today is caught in a different storm. On one side is Trump's America that is unpredictable, transactional and slapping tariffs even on allies. On the other is China, Australia's largest trading partner, economically vital and militarily dominant. Financial Times revealed that Japan too is under similar pressure. Washington is asking for promises. But leaders in Asia are hesitating. No one wants to sign up for someone else's war. Back home, Australian officials say Albanese's six-day China visit is about protecting national interest, both security and trade. It is a recalibration and a moment of realism. With Quad's future hanging in the balance, analysts whisper what officials will not say aloud – the alliance is wobbling. And if the pressure continues, it may not survive. Australia's response is less about defiance and more about dignity and less about choosing sides and more about choosing sovereignty.
