Latest news with #QuincyInstitute
Yahoo
5 days ago
- Business
- Yahoo
Opinion - Time is not on Russia's side in Ukraine
Who is winning, Ukraine or Russia? And whose prospects are better in the long run? In other words, whose side is time on? The Quincy Institute's Anatol Lieven states matter-of-factly that, 'as everyone now seems to agree, time is on Russia's side.' But is it? At one time, everyone also agreed that the Ukraine War would be over in a few weeks — an alert to the perils of groupthink. And now, as then, the reality is rather more complicated. As with everything, there are two opposing schools of thought: the optimists who think Ukraine will prevail and the pessimists who bet on Russia. The bottom-line pessimist case is based on numbers. Russia's population, economy and military-industrial complex are much bigger than Ukraine's. The numbers will therefore decide ultimate outcomes, even though Russian battlefield losses are exceptionally high and its economy has been battered by sanctions and Vladimir Putin's anti-consumerist economic policies. Expert analysts Collin Meisel and Mathew Burrows explicitly adopt this approach in a piece titled, 'Russia Can Afford to Take a Beating in Ukraine.' 'Whether Russia can maintain its ability to reconstitute and even grow its forces as its war in Ukraine progresses remains uncertain,' they write. 'More certain is its advantage over Ukraine in terms of total population, with nearly four times as many people and roughly 18.9 million males aged 20–39 relative to Ukraine's fewer than five million males of that age. Russia can lose three times as many troops as Ukraine and still suffer less in relative terms.' It is hard to argue with numbers. It is easy to argue with what they do or do not imply. After all, numbers alone are a poor predictor of victory. The U.S. should have prevailed in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, but it didn't. France should have won in Algeria and Vietnam, but it didn't. Imperial Russia should have won the Crimean War and the Russo-Japanese War, but it didn't. And the ancient Greeks and, later, Alexander of Macedon should never have defeated the Persian Empire, but they did. Clearly, there's more to the story than numbers of men, money and materiel. Leadership, morale, tactics, strategy, quality of weapons and other unquantifiable factors play an important — perhaps even decisive — role. Germany under both Kaiser Wilhelm and Hitler stupidly violated Otto von Bismarck's guiding foreign-policy principle of avoiding a two-front war. Both suffered defeat as a result. Seen in this light, a Russian victory is anything but a sure bet. And the fact that the war has dragged on for so long is perhaps evidence of the futility of relying exclusively on numbers. But can the numerically challenged Ukrainians possibly prevail? Many, especially front-line soldiers, think they can. Stefan Korshak, senior defense correspondent at the Kyiv Post, recently summarized the argument made by one such officer, Robert Brovdi. 'Russia is mobilizing about 30–32,000 soldiers a month, and [the Ukrainian Armed Forces] is killing about 20,000 soldiers a month,' he writes. 'This makes the [Ukrainians'] task easy to grasp in very clear terms: Kill or wound 10,000 to 12,000 more Russian soldiers a month. Do that, all Russian offensives collapse in short order. Keep it up, the Russian army global morale cracks. Keep it up some more, you can bring down the Russian government.' Can Ukraine pull this off? Brovdi, thinks so. He points to the Ukrainians' four drone brigades. 'The solution is mathematically simple,' he writes. 'More drone pilots, more drone brigades … Absent more drones and more operators, the alternative is to make the existing ones more efficient. By Brovdi's calculation, if the drone units in the field now increase kill rates by 15 percent across the board, by whatever means, then in four months a critical mass of Russian casualties would be reached.' Brovdi estimates that Ukraine could reach 35,000 monthly Russian casualties by August. Brovdi agrees that it's ultimately about numbers — Ukraine needs to kill more Russians than Russia can mobilize. But getting to that point isn't just about the number of soldiers or weapons Ukraine can produce. It is about the quality of the drones and the ability of Ukrainian soldiers to use them efficiently. So, who is right, the optimists or the pessimists? Assuming that Meisel, Burrows and Brovdi are correct in their analysis, we may conclude that, at a minimum, it's a tie — which, given the disparity of resources and Putin's hopeless hope of destroying Ukraine, actually translates to a minor Ukrainian victory. At a maximum, Brovdi's calculations nullify Meisel and Burrows' conclusions and portend a possible Russian collapse — or a major Ukrainian victory. Time may just be on Ukraine's side. Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as 'Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires' and 'Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.' Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
The Hill
5 days ago
- Business
- The Hill
Time is not on Russia's side in Ukraine
Who is winning, Ukraine or Russia? And whose prospects are better in the long run? In other words, whose side is time on? The Quincy Institute's Anatol Lieven states matter-of-factly that, 'as everyone now seems to agree, time is on Russia's side.' But is it? At one time, everyone also agreed that the Ukraine War would be over in a few weeks — an alert to the perils of groupthink. And now, as then, the reality is rather more complicated. As with everything, there are two opposing schools of thought: the optimists who think Ukraine will prevail and the pessimists who bet on Russia. The bottom-line pessimist case is based on numbers. Russia's population, economy and military-industrial complex are much bigger than Ukraine's. The numbers will therefore decide ultimate outcomes, even though Russian battlefield losses are exceptionally high and its economy has been battered by sanctions and Vladimir Putin's anti-consumerist economic policies. Expert analysts Collin Meisel and Mathew Burrows explicitly adopt this approach in a piece titled, 'Russia Can Afford to Take a Beating in Ukraine.' 'Whether Russia can maintain its ability to reconstitute and even grow its forces as its war in Ukraine progresses remains uncertain,' they write. 'More certain is its advantage over Ukraine in terms of total population, with nearly four times as many people and roughly 18.9 million males aged 20–39 relative to Ukraine's fewer than five million males of that age. Russia can lose three times as many troops as Ukraine and still suffer less in relative terms.' It is hard to argue with numbers. It is easy to argue with what they do or do not imply. After all, numbers alone are a poor predictor of victory. The U.S. should have prevailed in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, but it didn't. France should have won in Algeria and Vietnam, but it didn't. Imperial Russia should have won the Crimean War and the Russo-Japanese War, but it didn't. And the ancient Greeks and, later, Alexander of Macedon should never have defeated the Persian Empire, but they did. Clearly, there's more to the story than numbers of men, money and materiel. Leadership, morale, tactics, strategy, quality of weapons and other unquantifiable factors play an important — perhaps even decisive — role. Germany under both Kaiser Wilhelm and Hitler stupidly violated Otto von Bismarck's guiding foreign-policy principle of avoiding a two-front war. Both suffered defeat as a result. Seen in this light, a Russian victory is anything but a sure bet. And the fact that the war has dragged on for so long is perhaps evidence of the futility of relying exclusively on numbers. But can the numerically challenged Ukrainians possibly prevail? Many, especially front-line soldiers, think they can. Stefan Korshak, senior defense correspondent at the Kyiv Post, recently summarized the argument made by one such officer, Robert Brovdi. 'Russia is mobilizing about 30–32,000 soldiers a month, and [the Ukrainian Armed Forces] is killing about 20,000 soldiers a month,' he writes. 'This makes the [Ukrainians'] task easy to grasp in very clear terms: Kill or wound 10,000 to 12,000 more Russian soldiers a month. Do that, all Russian offensives collapse in short order. Keep it up, the Russian army global morale cracks. Keep it up some more, you can bring down the Russian government.' Can Ukraine pull this off? Brovdi, thinks so. He points to the Ukrainians' four drone brigades. 'The solution is mathematically simple,' he writes. 'More drone pilots, more drone brigades … Absent more drones and more operators, the alternative is to make the existing ones more efficient. By Brovdi's calculation, if the drone units in the field now increase kill rates by 15 percent across the board, by whatever means, then in four months a critical mass of Russian casualties would be reached.' Brovdi estimates that Ukraine could reach 35,000 monthly Russian casualties by August. Brovdi agrees that it's ultimately about numbers — Ukraine needs to kill more Russians than Russia can mobilize. But getting to that point isn't just about the number of soldiers or weapons Ukraine can produce. It is about the quality of the drones and the ability of Ukrainian soldiers to use them efficiently. So, who is right, the optimists or the pessimists? Assuming that Meisel, Burrows and Brovdi are correct in their analysis, we may conclude that, at a minimum, it's a tie — which, given the disparity of resources and Putin's hopeless hope of destroying Ukraine, actually translates to a minor Ukrainian victory. At a maximum, Brovdi's calculations nullify Meisel and Burrows' conclusions and portend a possible Russian collapse — or a major Ukrainian victory. Time may just be on Ukraine's side. Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as 'Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires' and 'Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.'
Gulf Insider
24-05-2025
- Business
- Gulf Insider
Iran Tells US "Time To Decide" During 5th Round Of Nuclear Talks In Rome
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Trump's Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff are leading a fifth round of nuclear talks which kicked off Friday in Rome, through Omani mediators. FM Araghchi said on X just ahead of the talks starting that it is 'time to decide' – in post late Thursday. 'Zero nuclear weapons = we DO have a deal. Zero enrichment = we do NOT have a deal,' the Iranian top diplomat stated. The US administration has of late been pushing a demand of no enrichment, but Tehran has rebuked this as a non-starter, saying it sees the issue as a right of national sovereignty. Araghchi had also written, 'Figuring out the path to a deal is not rocket science.' Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei has said from Rome, 'This round of talks is especially sensitive… we need to see what issues will be raised by the other party … and based on that, we will proceed with our positions.' This strongly suggests the Iranian side could be ready to quit the talks if Washington keeps insisting on its red line. Secretary of State Marco Rubio earlier this week admitted that getting Tehran to where the US wants it to be on the issue 'will not be easy'. However, on Thursday White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt was more optimistic, and described that Trump believes negotiations with Iran are 'moving in the right direction.' CNN reviews of where things stand, and what Iran is open to conceding: Speaking Thursday, Araghchi said Iran was open to enhanced monitoring by international inspectors but would not relinquish its right to pursue nuclear energy, including uranium enrichment. Washington is offering to wind back crippling economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for de-nuclearization. The US had previously sent mixed signals about whether Iran would be allowed to enrich uranium, but in recent weeks it has hardened its stance, insisting that no enrichment will be permitted. On Tuesday, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called the US demands that Iranian enrichment be taken down to zero 'excessive and outrageous,' according to state media. He further expressed doubts that current nuclear talks with the Trump administration will actually lead anywhere. 'I don't think nuclear talks with the U.S. will bring results. I don't know what will happen,' Khamenei said. He further called on Washington to cease making over-the-top demands in nuclear talks. Insisting on 'zero enrichment' during talks with Iran is a recipe for that's EXACTLY why hawks like John Bolton & Mike Pompeo have embraced this demand: because it will lead to American people are sick of endless wars. So let's hope Trump listens to them. — Quincy Institute (@QuincyInst) May 22, 2025 Tehran officials have of late also called the Trump administration's stance 'contradictory' – after President Trump attempted overtures, sprinkled with direct threats, in his Iran-related rhetoric while in the Gulf last week. It should be very clear by the weekend whether the Rome talks lead to any breakthrough. It could all depend on if the American delegation actually softens its stance on zero enrichment. Source Zero Hedge
South China Morning Post
06-05-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Trump urged to take slow and steady approach to North Korea to end nuclear stalemate
The US should adopt a pragmatic approach towards North Korea , taking a 'slow and paced' tack on denuclearisation and engaging regional stakeholders such as China, according to a US think tank. Advertisement The proposal by researchers at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft coincides with reports that the administration of US President Donald Trump is consulting experts on reviving talks with Pyongyang During his first term, Trump held a series of historic talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on the issue. The first summit in Singapore in 2018 resulted in a joint statement with vague commitments to denuclearisation while a second in Hanoi, Vietnam, a year later ended abruptly without a deal, suggesting disagreements over sanctions relief and the scope of North Korea's nuclear disarmament. 01:34 North Korea launches new hypersonic missile test ahead of Trump's return to White House North Korea launches new hypersonic missile test ahead of Trump's return to White House Months later Trump met Kim at the heavily fortified demilitarised zone between North and South Korea and the two agreed to restart negotiations, but Pyongyang continued to advance its nuclear and missile programmes.
Yahoo
13-03-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Are Democrats Regretting Trying To Out-Hawk Trump? (opinion)
The Democratic Party has been trying to paint negotiations as appeasement. During the 2024 elections, the Democratic platform condemned then-candidate Donald Trump's "fecklessness" on Iran and "love letters" to North Korea. When Trump argued that the U.S. should negotiate with countries like Iran and Russia over economic sanctions, Kamala Harris' campaign attacked his "weak" and "reckless foreign policy." But some Democrats seem to regret taking that line. "Being afraid to negotiate, to my mind, is the ultimate sign of weakness because it just proves that you think that if I get in a room, you're going to trick me and I'm going to do something stupid," Rep. Adam Smith (D–Wash.) said during a panel discussion Wednesday. Smith, the highest-ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, was speaking to the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, an antiwar nonprofit where I worked as a researcher in 2020 and 2021. When asked by Quincy Institute Vice President Trita Parsi whether Democrats were seen as warmongers, Smith admitted that the party "walked into that problem." The congressman argued that Democrats must "much more aggressively embrace diplomacy. I think we should have been much louder during the Biden administration." He claimed to have always believed "that the Biden administration should have directly talked to Russia," although not in a way that led to "shutting off Ukraine and leaving them completely vulnerable the way Trump just did." Smith concurred with Parsi's claim that Democrats could "reclaim the position as the party that actually promoted diplomacy, opposed stupid wars." Not all Democrats agree with Smith's criticism, of course. During confirmation hearings for Trump appointee Elbridge Colby last week, several Democratic senators doubled down on a hawkish line of attack, complaining about Trump's eagerness to talk to Russia. Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D–Ill.) put it the most bluntly: "Trump is in the middle of a capitulation, not a negotiation." At the Quincy Institute event, Smith blamed "pressure from the right and pressure from the left" for the Democrats' muddled stance. The Democratic Party is trying to balance between Republicans, who call Democrats weak in the face of adversaries, and leftists, who believe that Democrats are in bed with "neoconservative global dominance visions" and "jump all over us for anything we do," he argued. "My father used to have this expression that between two stools, you sit on the floor," Smith concluded. Smith isn't the first person to note the problem of the "defensive crouch" in Democratic foreign policy. By accepting hawks' "framing of the issues" and trying to win on those grounds, Democrats often "box themselves in to continuing policies that they have previously declared failures," journalist Daniel Larison wrote in 2021, several months before the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Rather than drumming up public support, Democrats' hawkish turn has hurt them politically. Americans disapproved of former President Joe Biden's handling of Russia and Ukraine by 22 percent in 2024, but a slim majority approved of Trump's handling of the issue by February 2025, polls showed. Trump's more hawkish proposals—taking over Gaza, Greenland, and Canada—poll very badly. A new poll released by CNN on Wednesday shows that a slim majority thinks that Trump is not "an effective world leader." It's not that Trump's foreign policy is particularly popular; it's that Democrats' hawkish approach has been particularly unpopular. Beyond criticizing the domestic politics of hawkishness, Smith acknowledged that it's "simply not possible to have that level of dominance" over the entire world that the U.S. had after World War II or the Cold War. "We're going to have to look for partnerships, alliances and a little bit more flexibility on the whole democracy, autocracy thing, in order to build that stable world that we envisioned," he said. The post Are Democrats Regretting Trying To Out-Hawk Trump? appeared first on
