Latest news with #R&AW
The Print
19 hours ago
- Politics
- The Print
Sikkim's accession to India has 6 stories. And 3 strong-willed women
However, this—and the upcoming column—is not about the sterling accomplishments of the state, but about the narratives regarding the formation of this Himalayan land. These include Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim by Sunanda K Datta-Ray, The Sikkim Saga by Brajbir Saran Das, Sikkim: Requiem for a Himalayan Kingdom by Andrew Duff, Sikkim: Dawn of Democracy by GBS Sidhu, and Sikkim: A History of Intrigue and Alliances by Preet Mohan Singh Malik. Incidentally, all these were written by those who saw Sikkim from outside: Dutta-Ray was the editor of The Stateman and a personal friend of the Chogyals, to whom he has dedicated the book; Das was a civil servant who saw the transition, Duff was a Scotsman who followed his father's footsteps to this Shangri La and based his writings on the letters of his 'missionary aunts', who had access to the palace; Sidhu headed the operations of the R&AW (Research and Analysis Wing); Malik was a foreign service officer who was posted there in the late 1960s. In these five decades, Sikkim has indeed been a success story. In 2023-24, it overtook Goa to become the state with the highest per capita GDP in the country. In 2024-25, the per capita income was Rs 7.07 lakh, as against the all-India average of Rs 2.4 lakh. Addressing a mammoth gathering at Gangtok on 29 May via video conferencing from Bagdogra airport in Siliguri, Prime Minister Modi (his trip had to be cancelled last minute on account of inclement weather) congratulated the people of Sikkim for becoming the 'numero uno' state in the country, and expressed complete confidence in seeing Sikkim as the sports, tourism, medical education, hydropower and organic agriculture hub of the country. In 1975, Sikkim became the 22nd constituent state of the Union of India, that is Bharat. There are actually three dates in the spring of that year that bear recalling. The first of these is 16 May, which marks the passage of the 36th Constitutional Amendment. This affected a change in Article 1 Schedule, which defines India as a Union of States, and introduced Article 371 F, which grants special provisions for Sikkim. The second is 26 April, the retrospective date on which it came into effect. The third is the date of the referendum—14 April—on which an overwhelming majority chose the Democratic Republic of India over the theological feudalism exercised by the Chogyal monarchy. Another powerful narrative is Sikkim: The Wounds of History by Biraj Adhikari, a political activist from the state. This looks at how a teenager coped with learning a new national anthem and saluting a new flag during his formative years. As is often said, the historian is more powerful than god, for they can reimagine the past. An interesting point to note is that all these six narratives accept the fact of changing demographics, unrepresentative institutions, Verrier Elwin's influence on Nehru's frontier policy, feudal landholdings, the 1962 war, Sikkim's outreach to Nepal and Bhutan, and the role of three strong-willed women. These were Hope Cooke, the celebrity Gyalmo (royal consort) to the Chogyal; Kazini Elisa Maria Dorjee, the very ambitious wife of the popular leader Lhendup Dorjee, who had been snubbed by the Gyalmo; and Indira Gandhi, who had won India's most decisive war against Pakistan. All of their personalities and ambitions were inextricably connected with the transition. Let me talk briefly about each of these facts before commenting on how the different commentators have given their own perspective on them. Also read: BJP wants to emerge as a power in Sikkim. First, it must assure Article 371F will stay as is Demography is destiny First and foremost, one has to remember that for Sikkim—as for any other political entity—demography is destiny. In the later part of the nineteenth century, the monastic establishments invited the Nepali workers to farm the lands and ensure a regular supply of grains to the community of monks and nuns. The population of the Nepali householders grew, whereas the fertility rate of Bhutias and Lepchas saw a decline—so much so that even in 1947, at the time of Independence, the Nepalis were 60 per cent of the total population. Their condition is best described in the words of Tashi Tshering, the head of the Sikkim Congress in 1947. 'Sikkim is a small Indian state tucked away in a corner of the Himalayas. Its ruler Sir Tashi Namgyal, KCSI, KCIE is of Tibetan descent, and so are his personal adherents, the Kazis, who form the majority of the landlords of Sikkim. His Highness has a council consisting entirely of landlords and a secretariat, which is largely controlled by the landlords, the subject people or Eyoys (peasants) have no voice in the administration and they have long groaned under the yoke of landlordism,' he said. Even after the reforms of 1953, in which universal adult franchise was introduced, only six of the eighteen seats in the State Assembly were earmarked for those of Nepali descent. Another six were reserved for the Lepcha-Bhutia community, and the final six seats were filled by nominees from the Chogyal. It is important to note that in the aftermath of Independence, Sardar Patel and BN Rau, the constitutional advisor, made the case for Sikkim's accession to India. The Chogyal was, at the time, the Vice Chair of the Chamber of Princes. Patel and Rau's case was not accepted by Nehru, who, under the influence of Verrier Elwin's Frontier policy, placed this under the Ministry of External Affairs. It gave many in Sikkim and other parts of the world the impression that the status of Sikkim was different from that of the 562 states which merged with India. Even though Nehru supported land reforms elsewhere in the country, the tenants of Sikkim continued to be disempowered. In the aftermath of the 1962 war, India realised how fragile its borders were, the strategic importance of the Chumbi valley and the vulnerability of the chicken's neck—the Siliguri corridor. Meanwhile, the Chogyal's whirlwind romance with the American Hope Cooke landed him in the pages of the influential American magazine Life. Cooke was so enamoured by the media blitz that she ignored the ground reality of her husband's state (which was more of an estate), fought with the Kazini, and assumed that she, as queen, ranked higher in protocol than the democratically elected, and very powerful Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi. Also read: Sikkim's war on GLOF. Monks, shamans, and scientists are all in the fight The different narratives We will first take up Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim. In this book, dedicated to Jungkhyang—the reverential term used for the Chogyal—Dutta-Ray draws an intricate tapestry of characters. A benign, trusting monarch in the Chogyal, his glamorous wife, Hope Cooke, the partisan politician, Kazi Lhendup Dorjee, his ambitious wife, the Kazini Elisa Maria Dorjee, a flip-flopping political officer in GBS Sidhu, and a shrewd, merciless tactician in Indira Gandhi. The book also delves deeply into the historicity of the event, through the British skirmishes in the area, the Nepalese migration, the ambivalent Nehruvian years, the mounting geopolitical tensions with China, the anti-royalist protests staged outside the palace, right down to the referendum that officially sealed the fate of the 333 old Namgyal dynasty (1642-1975). Published by Vikas in 1984, its circulation was highly restricted on account of a defamation suit filed against the author and the publisher by the Kazi and Kazini. I got to see a copy of the book in Kalimpong, where I was posted during the peak of the Gorkha National Liberation Front agitation in 1986. Obviously, the version of events in this book is at total variance with what 'the flip-flopping officer', GBS Sidhu wrote in Sikkim: The Dawn of Democracy, about which we shall discuss in the next column. This is the first in a series of columns about Sikkim's accession to India. Sanjeev Chopra is a former IAS officer and Festival Director of Valley of Words. Until recently, he was director, Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration. He tweets @ChopraSanjeev. Views are personal. (Edited by Theres Sudeep)
The Hindu
6 days ago
- Politics
- The Hindu
‘India's strategy should be to make Pakistan as irrelevant as possible'
Published : May 29, 2025 18:32 IST - 16 MINS READ On May 10, the India-Pakistan ceasefire went into force after four days of cross-border hostilities. As can be expected after each conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbours, analysts from both sides are making all kinds of claims. With propaganda being one of the weapons in the arsenal of both countries, truth is often the casualty. As time progresses, claims, counterclaims, and inputs from Western sources are expected to provide a better picture of what happened during Operation Sindoor. Ramanathan Kumar, a former Pakistan analyst with India's foreign intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), spoke to Frontline to discuss this and understand what happens now between India and Pakistan. He headed the Pakistan desk of R&AW for many years and has also served as a counterterrorism specialist. Edited excerpts: Now that the ceasefire seems to be holding, what happens next between India and Pakistan? We are in a somewhat familiar situation, which Dalton and Perkovich once famously described as 'Not War, Not Peace'. We are still very much on the razor's edge—this can still go anywhere. It is, after all, just a pause in what happened between May 7 and 10. Unless the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's foreign intelligence agency] ceases all infiltration forthwith and pulls back the terrorists who are already in the Valley, there could well be another terrorist attack either in Jammu and Kashmir or elsewhere in India. If that happens, India will be compelled to respond at a time and in a manner of its choosing, as happened after the Pahalgam attack. On the other side, in the persona of the newly promoted Field Marshal Asim Munir, the Pakistan Army has an uncompromising and ideologically oriented Chief of Army Staff [COAS] who will not hesitate to retaliate in equal measure to the Indian response. So there could well be an even more serious escalation the next time around. I would agree with the well-known Pakistani commentator, Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy, who once said that any optimism is currently unwarranted. What happened during the military hostilities between May 7 and 10? Can we arrive at some truth between the claims and the counterclaims? First and foremost, there is a great deal of disinformation in the public domain, which has to be discounted. I don't want to repeat blow-by-blow all that has happened, but I will highlight some key points. Commercially available satellite imagery, which is a neutral umpire in these situations, shows that we were successful in conducting precision strikes on several Pakistani military installations, including Bholari Air Base, Rahim Yar Khan, Sargodha, and Nur Khan Air Base. Whereas Pakistan doesn't seem to have inflicted any noticeable damage at the sites which it claims to have attacked. On the other hand, the government of India has not released any information in the public domain about the aircraft that Pakistan claims to have downed. Hence, it is not possible to make a meaningful assessment about this. Pakistan certainly believes that it downed some aircraft, which explains the upbeat mood in the country and possibly the conferment of the rank of Field Marshal on COAS Asim Munir. From reports available in the international media, it does appear that the combination of the J-10 fighter aircraft and the PL-15 missile supplied by China to Pakistan did have a significant impact on the outcome of the conflict, especially during the initial stage on May 6-7. Going forward, the possibility of Chinese military assistance to Pakistan in key domains such as electronic warfare, airborne warning and control systems, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance—thereby blunting our advantage in the event of a conventional conflict—will be a matter of great concern. A well-known military analyst has described this not as a two-front war, but a 'reinforced single-front' conflict, with the Pakistan front being reinforced by China. You referred to disinformation: Indian television channels were making all kinds of claims that Karachi had been bombed, pilots had been captured, Lahore had been taken, there was a coup in Pakistan.... Propaganda has always been there, but this takes it to a rather fantastic level, does it not? It sure does. Propaganda experts often say that for propaganda to be truly successful, it is best to mix a little bit of fiction with a large amount of fact rather than the other way around. I'll just leave it at that. Also Read | Asim Munir becoming Field Marshal bad for Pakistan, and regional stability: Lisa Curtis You mentioned the claims and counterclaims: they claim that they hit our airbases. The commercial satellite imagery tells a tale of the damage India inflicted. Do you think there was enough for both sides to claim victory and then arrive at this ceasefire through American help? I would agree with that fundamentally. There is enough for both sides to claim some kind of victory, and that is what made the ceasefire possible, with some nudging from the Americans, which we will talk about at greater length. What does the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty mean in the long term? Is this going to be a big issue between India and Pakistan? This is a fundamental issue. In international law, there is a well-known principle of rebus sic stantibus [things standing thus]—that if there is a fundamental change in circumstances, the parties to a treaty can call it off. We have made a point that when the Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960, there was no cross-border terrorism. Then there are the sheer environmental changes, which have drastically affected the melting of the glaciers, the population increase, so on and so forth. So there are many grounds to say that there is a fundamental change in circumstances. But we should look at the other side also. It has been said by several perceptive observers that it is an animal fear of undoing which explains a great deal of Pakistan's irrational behaviour, its inveterate hostility, and its aggressiveness. So it is a fundamental point that needs to be deeply considered. When their very existence is at stake—or at least that is the interpretation that Pakistan will put on it—will this compel them to learn salutary lessons, or will it increase the irrational behavior and their aggression? It's very difficult to arrive at a definitive conclusion. As Professor Christine Fair wrote in her book In Their Own Words:Understanding Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, the possibility of holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance sounds like an opening salvo short of declaring war. But it will likely threaten Pakistan's core interest, which is the survival of the state itself. In that situation, Pakistan will possibly be compelled to respond with whatever means it has at its disposal. People like Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and the Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT] leadership have mentioned this threat of stopping water several times as a justification for what they do. There was a famous tract published by the LeT in 2004 called 'Hum Jihad Kyun Karte Hain' [Why we pursue jihad], written by someone called Bin Muhammad. There were eight main justifications given for LeT's jihad against India. One was the self-defence of Muslims. The second was another country abrogating or walking out of treaties signed with Muslim countries. From the LeT's point of view, that was adequate justification for jihad. So as a country, this threat will linger over the issue of water? As a counterterrorism man, I can definitely say that in the motivational speeches of the LeT leadership to attract more recruits, along with their litany of grievances, which they seek to exploit, this water business will also be included. Just by way of background, this Indus Waters Treaty actually cannot be abrogated. It can only be replaced by another treaty, which is why the government of India has used the word 'in abeyance'. Now, it has been suggested from a reasonably high level in India that Pakistan was informed, and it was expected that since India was only targeting terrorist camps, maybe the Pakistan Army would sit this one out. Do you think that is a realistic way of looking at a possible Pakistani reaction? Knowing Pakistan's DNA, that really could not have been on the cards. Remember, we are talking of a country where if we conduct five nuclear tests, they will not rest content unless they've carried out six. To expect that there would be no retaliation from Pakistan is not being realistic. We were very clear, careful, calibrated, measured. We said our strikes were non-escalatory in nature and we had struck non-military targets. But knowing Pakistan, it could not have been expected that they would also confine their retaliation only to civilian or non-military targets. There are no equivalents of sites like Muridke and Bahawalpur on our side. So it stood to reason from a Pakistani point of view that they would strike at whatever they could, including military targets. That would set in motion an escalatory chain of events, which is exactly what happened. In Balakot in 2019, we hit one site. During Operation Sindoor, India struck at nine places. Given that terrorist groups are still active and the known posture of the government of India, how do we expect the Modi government to respond to the next terrorist attack? I can't speak on behalf of the government. But as a dispassionate observer, one can say that the government will be under pressure from sheer public expectation. We've seen a lot of jingoistic and immature posturing from both sides who think that confrontation and conflict are a substitute for finely balanced statecraft. This immature posturing, public posturing, media pressure, propaganda—these create pressure on the governments on both sides. These unrealistic expectations tend to box the government in and narrow the government's options. That is not a very happy situation for any government to be in. A certain degree of expectation management—the government will have to think of doing that to manage the expectations and keep them real, so that it retains a certain flexibility of action. That will be a key challenge going forward. One sense is that Pakistan does not have the ability to retaliate and that it will roll over. That seems to have been helped along by sections of the media and their reportage during Operation Sindoor. That is a completely unrealistic expectation to think that Pakistan will simply roll over. This is high-decibel propaganda, wishful thinking, ignorance of basic facts and ground realities. Pakistan rolling over is a very unreal possibility. If I may go back into history, in 1971, we accomplished what we had to as far as East Pakistan was concerned in spectacular fashion. But we did not widen the war to West Pakistan. Why was that? One reason was the Cold War context, the possibility of the superpowers getting involved. But apart from that, there is a very lucid passage in Mr Jairam Ramesh's book, Intertwined Lives: P.N. Haksar and Indira Gandhi, where he quotes a note written by Mr Haksar, who was the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister. Mr Haksar very clearly says that to roll over Pakistan, to finish the job, we would have to go into Pakistan as an occupying power and put boots on the ground. This would mean that we would have our garrisons in Lahore, Hyderabad, Islamabad, Karachi. This would be an absolutely nightmarish proposition, which nobody in their senses could even contemplate. If that was the situation in 1971, well before the nuclearisation of Pakistan, you can rule that out ab initio now. These are completely fantastic scenarios which have no bearing on reality. 'Pakistan has always been—it remains—obsessed with India. So our strategy should be to make Pakistan as irrelevant as possible.' You referred to nuclearisation: Pakistan's nuclear weapons are not for show. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's famous comment about eating grass and developing a nuclear weapon—there is something very intrinsic. Being a little skeptical about the limits of this sub-nuclear conflict, how much can India actually push the envelope, or do we even know how much we should push the envelope? At the end, all nuclear signalling is a matter of bluff and counter-bluff. It's all in the mind. There are many mind games at the core of it. Even the very possession of nuclear weapons is a supreme act of blackmail because they are not meant to be used. It's purely a deterrent. Coming specifically to the India-Pakistan context, if I might go back about 20 years to Operation Parakram, when we had the attack on the Indian Parliament and we amassed our troops on the border in a threatening posture. In the end, it all fizzled out. One of the things we discovered was that because of the way our army is deployed, many of our formations were stationed inland. So the mobilisation was slow, and it took a lot of time for them to reach the border. We thereafter developed what Pakistan calls 'Cold Start', although there is no such formal term that is used by us. We started shifting our forces closer to the Pakistan border so that the next time there was a similar situation, our offensive formations would be able to move into Pakistan very quickly. What did Pakistan do to counter Cold Start? They developed what are known as battlefield nuclear weapons or tactical nuclear weapons. The threat is that if you move your offensive formations into our territory to any depth, and if the existence of our state is threatened and we are under threat of physical dismemberment, we will not hesitate to use small tactical nuclear weapons. When Pakistan came up with this concept, they said, now that we have battlefield nuclear weapons, we have eliminated the space completely for any kind of conventional conflict whatsoever. You cannot now have conventional conflict in Pakistan. Conversely, from our side, there were experts and strategists who argued that despite Pakistan's nuclear threshold, there is space for conventional conflict. We've seen that logic play out in this situation. We did use conventional military means despite the fact that Pakistan brings the N-word into play all the time. From Pakistan's point of view, the effort was to close this window, and that is exactly what the Chinese assistance to them has done—to close this window of conventional military conflict as much as possible. It has been a bit of a draw. It has shown that there is still scope for some military conflict under the nuclear overhang. But it is quite possible that next time around, that window will become even smaller. On May 10, there was a Reuters report that suggested that the Nuclear Command Authority in Pakistan was going to meet. A few hours later, when the phone calls started going from Washington, DC, to Islamabad and to Delhi, there was a denial of the story. The alarm bells did start ringing in world capitals. The threshold was probably when India expanded its attacks, and maybe the Nur Khan air base that was struck was something quite serious as far as the Pakistanis were concerned. We have to factor in this nuclear threshold, the role of the Americans and other influential players. I certainly agree. This is the fundamental limitation of a strategy of overt military action against a covert proxy war, which is what is being pursued by Pakistan—the escalatory potential quickly attracts unwelcome international attention with all its attendant complications. We saw that in this case. What—72 or 96 hours—was all that it took before the rest of the world began to think, and the Americans in particular, that both sides were quickly ascending the escalatory ladder. The experts say that there are 23 steps in the escalation ladder. Clearly, they felt that the rungs were being mounted rather quickly and rather alarmingly. All this leads me to the point that precisely because of the escalatory potential and the prospect of unwelcome international attention, which we have always tried to ward off, the argument can well be made that other non-escalatory options in the covert domain may perhaps be more effective in persuading Pakistan to give up what is essentially a self-defeating exercise of pursuing a covert proxy war against us. This has progressively brought diminishing returns to Pakistan over a period of time. Pakistan's covert proxy war against us is best fought by a covert counter-proxy war, and that war really has to be one in the shadows. Also Read | When Indo-Pak tensions go high-tech, it's the people who pay the price This bilateral bogey—the Shimla agreement that was signed, which the Pakistanis say they are not going to respect, though they have never respected it to begin with. Everyone knows the reality of how Kargil ended. Everyone knows the reality of how Operation Sindoor ended. Why should we keep pretending? We should be open that there are influential players who can influence behaviour and we should factor that in any decision making. What do you think? Certainly, it has to be factored into any strategy that we pursue. I entirely agree. The issue that decision makers have to grapple with is, at what point do other players come into the equation? How long can they be held off? Can they be held off till as long as it takes for you to achieve a certain objective? Even in 1971, these questions were there as to how long the conflict can be kept going before the Americans and the Russians get involved. You're absolutely right when you say that, fundamentally, this has to be one of the key points that has to be factored into our decision-making. Turning to Pakistan internally, the promotion of Asim Munir as Field Marshal is signalling to the people of Pakistan and to India that they have achieved a major success. Does this give Munir and his civilian proxies, the Bhutto-Zardaris and the Sharifs, far more legitimacy in Pakistan? Yes, all the evidence suggests that what happened has given a fresh lease of life to the Pakistan Army in particular. By all accounts, its popularity and that of then-General Asim Munir were at a historically low ebb because of Pakistan's own internal difficulties and crises on multiple fronts. For the time being, at least, a euphoria has been generated, rightly or wrongly, which has put the Army on a new pedestal. It has all but ensured that Field Marshal Asim Munir will be at the helm of affairs for the foreseeable future in Pakistan. It perhaps represents a setback to Imran Khan and his people, at least for the time being. From our perspective, one negative fallout is that it brings the military and the civilian leadership closer together, despite a completely lopsided relationship. Our fundamental interests are best served by not having them on the same page, or at least putting as much daylight between them as possible. That has clearly not happened—it is the other way around. Any concluding remarks on this current round of the India-Pakistan conflict? In conclusion, Pakistan has always been—it remains—obsessed with India. So our strategy should be to make Pakistan as irrelevant as possible under the circumstances so that it recedes further and further back in our rear-view mirror. This is something that we have done over the past few decades. In our quest to become a developed nation by 2047, Pakistan can become a strategic distraction. That is something we should not let happen. Amit Baruah was The Hindu's Islamabad-based Pakistan correspondent from 1997 to 2000. He is the author of Dateline Islamabad.
The Print
7 days ago
- The Print
No arguments on charges yet in extortion case against Vikash Yadav, supplementary chargesheet soon
'The judge has ordered that the investigating team files the supplementary chargesheet by 25 August. Arguments on charges cannot commence until then,' a source privy to the matter said. Arguments on charges were supposed to commence in the matter in this month's hearing at Delhi's Patiala House court. However, according to sources, the investigating team said that the probe is still underway, and the judge asked the investigating officer to file the supplementary chargesheet on or before the date of next hearing—25 August. New Delhi: A supplementary chargesheet will be filed in the 2023 kidnapping and attempted murder case against former Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) officer Vikash Yadav, the investigating officer told the court during the latest hearing on 22 May, ThePrint has learnt. Yadav has not been appearing for the case hearings, citing threat to his life through exemption pleas filed by his counsels. He has claimed that the charges against him are false and frivolous, and since the particulars of his life are in public domain along with his photographs, it has exposed a 'serious threat' to his life. The former R&AW officer is also an accused in the alleged murder-for-hire plot against Sikh separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun. While Nikhil Gupta, co-accused in this case, continues to remain behind bars in a Brooklyn prison, Yadav is wanted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The one in India against Yadav pertains to a Special Cell case against him and one Abdullah Khan on charges of extortion, kidnapping and attempt to murder. Yadav was arrested in the matter in December 2023 after the complainant alleged that he and Khan abducted and tortured him, and demanded ransom in the name of jailed gangster Lawrence Bishnoi. The first chargesheet filed in the matter, as ThePrint reported in October last year, relied heavily on the former R&AW officer's disclosure. (Edited by Mannat Chugh) Also Read: No CCTV or weapon of offence, chargesheet relies on Vikash Yadav's disclosure in 2023 extortion case
Arab News
23-05-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
Pakistan says initial probe confirms Indian involvement in school bus attack in Balochistan
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan said on Friday that its initial probe into an attack on a school bus in the Balochistan province has confirmed the involvement of 'Indian terror proxies,' promising to defeat the 'nefarious' designs. Balochistan has been the site of an insurgency for decades, though it has intensified more recently, with groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) carrying out high-profile attacks on civilians and security forces. On Wednesday, at least seven people, including six children, were killed when a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device targeted the school bus en route to an army-run school in Balochistan's Khuzdar. Speaking at a press conference alongside a Pakistani military spokesman, Interior Secretary Khurram Muhammad Agha called the Khuzdar bombing an attack on 'our values, our education and on the very fabric of our society.' 'Initial findings confirm that this attack is in continuity of a broader pattern of violence sponsored by India through Fitna Al-Hindustan (FAH) operating under the tutelage and the patronage of the Indian intelligence agency R&AW,' he said, without offering any proof to link New Delhi to Wednesday's assault. The Indian administration has distanced itself from the Khuzdar school bus bombing, attributing such acts of violence to Pakistan's 'internal failures.' The FAH comprises several separatist groups and independently operating cells who have been operating in the insurgency-hit southwestern Pakistani province, according to the Pakistani officials. These cells, after having suffered immense casualties in past few years, have now resorted to hitting 'soft targets.' 'The terror proxies of Hindustan [India] have been tasked to accentuate their heinous attacks of terrorism in Balochistan and elsewhere, sabotage development in the region, incite fear among the population and derail the journey of peace and development in an attempt to repeat their playbook of 1971 [a reference to the fall of Dhaka],' he said. During the presser, Pakistani military spokesman Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry detailed various incidents of violence that he said were carried out by India-backed groups. 'Very recently the media international media has seen self-given confessions and acknowledgements of multiple surrendered terrorists of this Fitna Al-Hindustan who told that how Hindustan is funding, planning and carrying out terrorist acts in Balochistan,' he noted. Relations between Pakistan and India touched a new low last month, when gunmen killed 26 people in Indian-administered Kashmir in an attack India blamed on Pakistan. Islamabad denies complicity and Lt Gen Chaudhry said New Delhi had still not provided any evidence to back up its accusation. A day earlier, Pakistan's top diplomat at the United Nations (UN) said they would raise the school bus attack at the UN and present evidence of Indian involvement to the international community. 'This was a heinous terrorist act directed against children, against students, [which is] totally unacceptable and condemnable,' Ambassador Asim Iftikhar Ahmad told Arab News in an interview. Interior Secretary Agha said Pakistan and its people, particularly those in Balochistan, reject such 'nefarious designs' and Islamabad had the capacity and will to dismantle these networks and to bring the perpetrators and their handlers to justice. 'I assure you that the state in collaboration with the provincial governments and the state apparatus will defeat them,' he said. 'These Indian sponsored terrorists have no place in Pakistan. We have the wherewithal and the commitment to bring an end to this violence. Our resolved is firm and our response will be decisive.' Pakistan and India have a history of bitter relations and frequently accuse each other of fomenting militancy in the other's territory. Both countries have fought three wars, two of them over Kashmir.
India.com
23-05-2025
- Entertainment
- India.com
Ayan Mukerji Reveals Surprising Reason Behind Directing War 2
Mumbai: Director Ayan Mukerji opened up about his inspiration for directing the sequel to the blockbuster film 'War'. The first instalment of the movie was directed by Siddharth Anand. The Yash Raj Films recently released the much-awaited teaser of 'War 2' starring Hrithik Roshan and Jr. NTR in the lead roles on Tuesday. Taking to his Instagram handle, director Ayan Mukerji described War 2 as a movie with "powerful" and "dramatic" story. "While our movie has so much to offer our audiences with its big-screen spectacle energy, today I want to draw attention to what inspires me most about War 2. That the Core of this movie is a very powerful and dramatic Story, which really surprised me the first time I heard its script, and has been extremely exciting (and challenging) for me to bring to life!," wrote Ayan. Opening up on his directorial journey of War 2, the filmmaker expressed his gratitude to the producer Aditya Chopra for guiding him and giving him an opportunity to work with the mega-star duo Hrithik Roshan and Jr NTR. "Since this is actually the first time I'm saying anything officially about directing War 2, I just want to put out some love for the amazing team I have had the privilege of collaborating with on this movie," wrote Ayan Mukerji. He continued, "The Absolutely Amazing Leadership of Mr Aditya Chopra - from whom I have learnt so much over the last two years - And who gave me this incredible opportunity to collaborate with the once-in-a-lifetime duo of - Mr. Hrithik Roshan and NTR !" The makers recently released the teaser for the film. The teaser shows Hrithik reprising his character of Kabir. It starts with a voiceover stating he had been keeping an eye on Hrithik Roshan's character, Kabir, for a while. 'Meri nazar kabse tujh pe hai best soldier..R&AW ka best agent tu tha ab tu mujhe nahi janta.. Get ready for War'. The voice referred to Kabir as "India's best soldier" and "R&AW's best agent," but said he is no longer that. Kiara Advani makes a stunning appearance in a bikini, and the teaser shows a romantic chemistry between Hrithik and her. It ends on a dramatic clash between Hrithik and Jr NTR. The movie is slated to release in theatres on August 15.
