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Express Tribune
10 hours ago
- Politics
- Express Tribune
Winning limited war by disruption, not just destruction
On May 10, 2025, Pakistan and India announced a ceasefire bringing to an end a confrontation which militarily did not last for more than four days and nights. Such conflicts are categorised as limited wars (as opposed to a general war), in which the aim, scope, rules of engagement, intensity, duration, geographical span, etc. are scaled down. Neither side seeks decisive results and both aim to end the engagement in a position of military strength that yields a political advantage during negotiations. Therefore, a limited war is controlled, calculated and often influenced by diplomatic concerns. Within this very broad definition of a limited war, we will look in a little more detail at the 'May War' of 2025. The conflict was ignited by an attack on April 22 by Kashmiri militants in Pahalgam resulting in the deaths of 26 civilians tourists. Within hours India attributed the attack to a little known group it alleged was affiliated with Lashkar-e-Taiba, leading to heightened tensions. This may or may not have been a false flag operation by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indian equivalent of United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or Israel's Mossad, etc. Was it a coincidence that it occurred during a visit by the American vice president just as a terrorist attack on Sikhs, allegedly carried out by Kashmiri militants, occurred during former US president Bill Clinton's visit in 2000? It reminds me of a quote attributed to Ian Fleming's James Bond novel, Goldfinger: "Once is happenstance, twice is coincidence, three times is enemy action". In her autobiography, Clinton's foreign secretary Madeline Albright blamed the killing on Hindu militants (for Hindu Militants read the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the militant wing of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party). Attacks by militants in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) have been occurring periodically and even if Pahalgam was not a false flag operation, in such an eventuality, India was prepared to execute a contingency that would gave it political and military gains. The instant gain was finding it an excuse to suspend the 64-year-old Indus Basin Water Treaty that had survived two wars and withstood many twists and turns. Having what they considered a political victory, the Indians now wanted to militarily 'punish' Pakistan for supporting terrorism in IHK. I have been on the Directing Staff at the National Defence University and have taught all manners of conflict strategies relevant to the scenarios in the Subcontinent, including limited wars. However, it was during the Kargil conflict that I realised that in many ways a limited war is more difficult to manage. In a general war troops are mobilised, formations and units deployed in the battle zone according to a predetermined plan, air bases placed on war footing, satellite bases activated, ships and submarines move out to sea, etc. for a no holds barred conflict. On the other hand, in a limited war mobilisation is very selective and every deployment and action has to be gauged against counteractions by the enemy. A limited war only remains limited if both sides choose to do so and if one side is reckless, the escalation ladder becomes steep. After the Pahalgam incident on April 22, Indian security forces spent two days conducting joint operations in Jammu and Kashmir, which they allege led to the death of a senior Lashkar-e-Taiba commander. They also demolished residences they claimed belonged to suspected militants. Concurrently they activated the Line of Control (LoC) with both sides exchanging artillery and small arms fire across multiple sectors. By April 28, diplomacy gained traction to limited avail with the US seemingly sitting on the fence. Finally on the night between May 6 and 7, India launched "Operation Sindoor," with missile strikes on what they claimed was terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. This is when the conflict got interesting, but to appreciate the scale and nature of the PAF response we have to go back to a similar incident in 2019 when the IAF struck what it alleged was a terrorist camp near Balakot. Operation Swift Retort, the PAF response to India's strikes showed glimpses of its prowess in the electromagnetic sphere. The counterstrike package of the PAF had a very strong component of electronic warfare that enabled their aircrafts to engage the enemy without activating their own radars thus concealing their locations. But back then, the PAF was still far from possessing the technology need to excel in multi-domain operations that encompasses real-time imagery, cyber units disabling enemy radar, drones providing surveillance and fighter jets launching precision strikes – all while being coordinated through secure, networked communications. The PAF had acquired radars from different countries and integration of those technologies of different origins was achieved by an indigenous Data Link that integrated all these systems. According to military analysts, the PAF decided to build on this capability and under a modernisation plan, the PAF established the PAF Cyber Command (PAFCC) and the PAF Space Command (PAFSC) in Islamabad. It also created the NASTP (National Aerospace Science & Technology Park) which has become a hub for various indigenous programs. One of the biggest advantages that the armed forces of Pakistan have over the Indians is that development, testing and manufacture of weapons and military systems is guided by the services themselves. Within a few years, and of course with much assistance from the Chinese, the PAF developed a capability which took aerial combat to a completely new level. EW was no longer just a force multiplier and coupled with AI, it became central to a new art of warfare that I call AI-Centric Cognitive Warfare where 'AI-Centric' highlights the primacy of machine intelligence and 'Cognitive Warfare' indicates the strategic aim of winning the battle. In other words, war by disruption, not just destruction Parallels can be drawn from history where dramatic and unexpected innovations changed the method of warfare. The feudal knights in armour (the heavy cavalry) who had dominated the battlefields of medieval Europe were defeated by the arrows of the English longbows which penetrated their plate armour. The advent of large cannon in late medieval period was a watershed moment that sounded the death knell of siege warfare by rendering traditional castles and city walls useless. The German Blitzkrieg in the opening stages of Second World War marked a dramatic shift from the static trench warfare of the previous World War and its core principles continue to influence military doctrine till now. Each of these breakthroughs was more than a tactical improvement — they represented a fundamental change in how wars were fought. AI-Centric Cognitive Warfare may prove to be the next such transformation, reshaping battlefields with speed, precision, and control over information itself. In future limited wars (as well as operations on a larger scale), AICCW will shift the battlefield focus from brute force to brainpower. The aim will be to deliver maximum damage quickly — not just by destroying enemy assets, but by breaking their ability to think, respond, or coordinate effectively. AI will take the lead in planning and executing operations with speed and precision. It identifies weak spots in the enemy's defences, disrupts their communication, and creates confusion in command structures — often before the first missile is even launched. Weapons of destruction like tanks, fighter aircrafts, missiles, artillery, drones, etc would still used, but their employment will be guided by AI systems that target not just hardware, but the minds and systems behind them. A limited war fought within the concept of AICCW would open with launching cyber and electronic attacks to jam radars, blind sensors, and distort battlefield awareness. This would be in tandem with strikes to overwhelm the enemy's decision-making and disrupt leadership and command structure by neutralising communication hubs, and information nodes (e.g., radio trucks, SIGINT stations), making it hard for the enemy to fight back. Having established a secure battlespace eliminate or cripple the enemies' assets identified through AI analysing enemy patterns, communication flows, and sensor emissions to target command elements. Rather than 'kill everything,' own forces will be able to focus on the neutralisation/destruction of the most critical assets. As the battle unfolds, AI will adjust the operation in real time — redirecting drones, retargeting missiles, and shifting tactics. There are indications that the Pakistan Army is also developing an AICCW capability. It has officially announced that the Corps of Signals has been elevated from a supporting arm to a combat arm. This signifies a shift in the role and responsibilities of the Corps, placing them at the forefront of military operations rather than simply providing support and is a noteworthy development in the Pakistan Army's structure and operational capabilities. I would not be surprised if our 'Silent Service', the Pakistan Navy is already well ahead in developing an AICCW capability. In a region like South Asia where tensions can spike quickly and escalation must be avoided, AICCW offers a way to achieve decisive results without a full-scale war. These AI-led limited wars could be over in days, with one side effectively paralysed before it can respond. The key is to win the cognitive battle — to confuse, deceive, and disable the enemy mentally and operationally before they can regain control. However, such fast, AI-driven warfare comes with dangers. Misjudging the enemy's red lines or failing to control escalation could turn a limited war into a larger conflict. And as machines take over more decision-making, the role of human judgment and restraint becomes more critical than ever. Author's Note: all material for this article has been gathered from open sources. Syed Ali Hamid is a retired Pakistan Army major general and a military historian. He can be contacted at syedali4955@ All facts and information are the responsibility of the writer
News18
3 days ago
- Politics
- News18
Chinese Mobile App Luring Northeast Residents To Share 'Anti-India Content', Centre Mulls Ban
Last Updated: The mobile application -- REDNOTE -- lures users with cash and other rewards to share "anti-India content", sources said. In a new dimension of information warfare, China has reportedly resorted to plotting against India's northeastern states using a mobile application – REDNOTE – which lures users with money and other rewards to share anti-national content, intelligence sources said on Friday. The residents of several northeastern states are on the app's radar, including those belonging to Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, and Assam. Appearing to be an ordinary app from the outside, REDNOTE is filled with fake RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) documents, disputed maps of India, edited videos, and content aligned with Pakistan's agenda. The app aims to create mistrust among youth towards India with messages such as 'Delhi is far away". It also promotes the idea that being closer to China would be beneficial for the residents of the northeast. Joint Operation By Pakistan And China? According to intelligence sources, psychological operations experts from China and Pakistan are behind this app, which is being used to infiltrate the minds and society of Indians. 'China knows that Northeast India is extremely sensitive in terms of national security. That's why it's applying the same strategy it used earlier in Africa, Taiwan, and Hong Kong to create instability," sources said. Sources said that the Centre and national security agencies are aware of the application's malicious activities in India, and the Ministry of Electronics and IT has initiated the necessary procedure to ban it in the country. India had earlier banned several popular Chinese apps, such as TikTok, ShareIt, and UC Browser, due to national security reasons. First Published: May 30, 2025, 08:25 IST
The Hindu
3 days ago
- Politics
- The Hindu
‘India's strategy should be to make Pakistan as irrelevant as possible'
Published : May 29, 2025 18:32 IST - 16 MINS READ On May 10, the India-Pakistan ceasefire went into force after four days of cross-border hostilities. As can be expected after each conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbours, analysts from both sides are making all kinds of claims. With propaganda being one of the weapons in the arsenal of both countries, truth is often the casualty. As time progresses, claims, counterclaims, and inputs from Western sources are expected to provide a better picture of what happened during Operation Sindoor. Ramanathan Kumar, a former Pakistan analyst with India's foreign intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), spoke to Frontline to discuss this and understand what happens now between India and Pakistan. He headed the Pakistan desk of R&AW for many years and has also served as a counterterrorism specialist. Edited excerpts: Now that the ceasefire seems to be holding, what happens next between India and Pakistan? We are in a somewhat familiar situation, which Dalton and Perkovich once famously described as 'Not War, Not Peace'. We are still very much on the razor's edge—this can still go anywhere. It is, after all, just a pause in what happened between May 7 and 10. Unless the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's foreign intelligence agency] ceases all infiltration forthwith and pulls back the terrorists who are already in the Valley, there could well be another terrorist attack either in Jammu and Kashmir or elsewhere in India. If that happens, India will be compelled to respond at a time and in a manner of its choosing, as happened after the Pahalgam attack. On the other side, in the persona of the newly promoted Field Marshal Asim Munir, the Pakistan Army has an uncompromising and ideologically oriented Chief of Army Staff [COAS] who will not hesitate to retaliate in equal measure to the Indian response. So there could well be an even more serious escalation the next time around. I would agree with the well-known Pakistani commentator, Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy, who once said that any optimism is currently unwarranted. What happened during the military hostilities between May 7 and 10? Can we arrive at some truth between the claims and the counterclaims? First and foremost, there is a great deal of disinformation in the public domain, which has to be discounted. I don't want to repeat blow-by-blow all that has happened, but I will highlight some key points. Commercially available satellite imagery, which is a neutral umpire in these situations, shows that we were successful in conducting precision strikes on several Pakistani military installations, including Bholari Air Base, Rahim Yar Khan, Sargodha, and Nur Khan Air Base. Whereas Pakistan doesn't seem to have inflicted any noticeable damage at the sites which it claims to have attacked. On the other hand, the government of India has not released any information in the public domain about the aircraft that Pakistan claims to have downed. Hence, it is not possible to make a meaningful assessment about this. Pakistan certainly believes that it downed some aircraft, which explains the upbeat mood in the country and possibly the conferment of the rank of Field Marshal on COAS Asim Munir. From reports available in the international media, it does appear that the combination of the J-10 fighter aircraft and the PL-15 missile supplied by China to Pakistan did have a significant impact on the outcome of the conflict, especially during the initial stage on May 6-7. Going forward, the possibility of Chinese military assistance to Pakistan in key domains such as electronic warfare, airborne warning and control systems, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance—thereby blunting our advantage in the event of a conventional conflict—will be a matter of great concern. A well-known military analyst has described this not as a two-front war, but a 'reinforced single-front' conflict, with the Pakistan front being reinforced by China. You referred to disinformation: Indian television channels were making all kinds of claims that Karachi had been bombed, pilots had been captured, Lahore had been taken, there was a coup in Pakistan.... Propaganda has always been there, but this takes it to a rather fantastic level, does it not? It sure does. Propaganda experts often say that for propaganda to be truly successful, it is best to mix a little bit of fiction with a large amount of fact rather than the other way around. I'll just leave it at that. Also Read | Asim Munir becoming Field Marshal bad for Pakistan, and regional stability: Lisa Curtis You mentioned the claims and counterclaims: they claim that they hit our airbases. The commercial satellite imagery tells a tale of the damage India inflicted. Do you think there was enough for both sides to claim victory and then arrive at this ceasefire through American help? I would agree with that fundamentally. There is enough for both sides to claim some kind of victory, and that is what made the ceasefire possible, with some nudging from the Americans, which we will talk about at greater length. What does the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty mean in the long term? Is this going to be a big issue between India and Pakistan? This is a fundamental issue. In international law, there is a well-known principle of rebus sic stantibus [things standing thus]—that if there is a fundamental change in circumstances, the parties to a treaty can call it off. We have made a point that when the Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960, there was no cross-border terrorism. Then there are the sheer environmental changes, which have drastically affected the melting of the glaciers, the population increase, so on and so forth. So there are many grounds to say that there is a fundamental change in circumstances. But we should look at the other side also. It has been said by several perceptive observers that it is an animal fear of undoing which explains a great deal of Pakistan's irrational behaviour, its inveterate hostility, and its aggressiveness. So it is a fundamental point that needs to be deeply considered. When their very existence is at stake—or at least that is the interpretation that Pakistan will put on it—will this compel them to learn salutary lessons, or will it increase the irrational behavior and their aggression? It's very difficult to arrive at a definitive conclusion. As Professor Christine Fair wrote in her book In Their Own Words:Understanding Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, the possibility of holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance sounds like an opening salvo short of declaring war. But it will likely threaten Pakistan's core interest, which is the survival of the state itself. In that situation, Pakistan will possibly be compelled to respond with whatever means it has at its disposal. People like Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and the Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT] leadership have mentioned this threat of stopping water several times as a justification for what they do. There was a famous tract published by the LeT in 2004 called 'Hum Jihad Kyun Karte Hain' [Why we pursue jihad], written by someone called Bin Muhammad. There were eight main justifications given for LeT's jihad against India. One was the self-defence of Muslims. The second was another country abrogating or walking out of treaties signed with Muslim countries. From the LeT's point of view, that was adequate justification for jihad. So as a country, this threat will linger over the issue of water? As a counterterrorism man, I can definitely say that in the motivational speeches of the LeT leadership to attract more recruits, along with their litany of grievances, which they seek to exploit, this water business will also be included. Just by way of background, this Indus Waters Treaty actually cannot be abrogated. It can only be replaced by another treaty, which is why the government of India has used the word 'in abeyance'. Now, it has been suggested from a reasonably high level in India that Pakistan was informed, and it was expected that since India was only targeting terrorist camps, maybe the Pakistan Army would sit this one out. Do you think that is a realistic way of looking at a possible Pakistani reaction? Knowing Pakistan's DNA, that really could not have been on the cards. Remember, we are talking of a country where if we conduct five nuclear tests, they will not rest content unless they've carried out six. To expect that there would be no retaliation from Pakistan is not being realistic. We were very clear, careful, calibrated, measured. We said our strikes were non-escalatory in nature and we had struck non-military targets. But knowing Pakistan, it could not have been expected that they would also confine their retaliation only to civilian or non-military targets. There are no equivalents of sites like Muridke and Bahawalpur on our side. So it stood to reason from a Pakistani point of view that they would strike at whatever they could, including military targets. That would set in motion an escalatory chain of events, which is exactly what happened. In Balakot in 2019, we hit one site. During Operation Sindoor, India struck at nine places. Given that terrorist groups are still active and the known posture of the government of India, how do we expect the Modi government to respond to the next terrorist attack? I can't speak on behalf of the government. But as a dispassionate observer, one can say that the government will be under pressure from sheer public expectation. We've seen a lot of jingoistic and immature posturing from both sides who think that confrontation and conflict are a substitute for finely balanced statecraft. This immature posturing, public posturing, media pressure, propaganda—these create pressure on the governments on both sides. These unrealistic expectations tend to box the government in and narrow the government's options. That is not a very happy situation for any government to be in. A certain degree of expectation management—the government will have to think of doing that to manage the expectations and keep them real, so that it retains a certain flexibility of action. That will be a key challenge going forward. One sense is that Pakistan does not have the ability to retaliate and that it will roll over. That seems to have been helped along by sections of the media and their reportage during Operation Sindoor. That is a completely unrealistic expectation to think that Pakistan will simply roll over. This is high-decibel propaganda, wishful thinking, ignorance of basic facts and ground realities. Pakistan rolling over is a very unreal possibility. If I may go back into history, in 1971, we accomplished what we had to as far as East Pakistan was concerned in spectacular fashion. But we did not widen the war to West Pakistan. Why was that? One reason was the Cold War context, the possibility of the superpowers getting involved. But apart from that, there is a very lucid passage in Mr Jairam Ramesh's book, Intertwined Lives: P.N. Haksar and Indira Gandhi, where he quotes a note written by Mr Haksar, who was the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister. Mr Haksar very clearly says that to roll over Pakistan, to finish the job, we would have to go into Pakistan as an occupying power and put boots on the ground. This would mean that we would have our garrisons in Lahore, Hyderabad, Islamabad, Karachi. This would be an absolutely nightmarish proposition, which nobody in their senses could even contemplate. If that was the situation in 1971, well before the nuclearisation of Pakistan, you can rule that out ab initio now. These are completely fantastic scenarios which have no bearing on reality. 'Pakistan has always been—it remains—obsessed with India. So our strategy should be to make Pakistan as irrelevant as possible.' You referred to nuclearisation: Pakistan's nuclear weapons are not for show. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's famous comment about eating grass and developing a nuclear weapon—there is something very intrinsic. Being a little skeptical about the limits of this sub-nuclear conflict, how much can India actually push the envelope, or do we even know how much we should push the envelope? At the end, all nuclear signalling is a matter of bluff and counter-bluff. It's all in the mind. There are many mind games at the core of it. Even the very possession of nuclear weapons is a supreme act of blackmail because they are not meant to be used. It's purely a deterrent. Coming specifically to the India-Pakistan context, if I might go back about 20 years to Operation Parakram, when we had the attack on the Indian Parliament and we amassed our troops on the border in a threatening posture. In the end, it all fizzled out. One of the things we discovered was that because of the way our army is deployed, many of our formations were stationed inland. So the mobilisation was slow, and it took a lot of time for them to reach the border. We thereafter developed what Pakistan calls 'Cold Start', although there is no such formal term that is used by us. We started shifting our forces closer to the Pakistan border so that the next time there was a similar situation, our offensive formations would be able to move into Pakistan very quickly. What did Pakistan do to counter Cold Start? They developed what are known as battlefield nuclear weapons or tactical nuclear weapons. The threat is that if you move your offensive formations into our territory to any depth, and if the existence of our state is threatened and we are under threat of physical dismemberment, we will not hesitate to use small tactical nuclear weapons. When Pakistan came up with this concept, they said, now that we have battlefield nuclear weapons, we have eliminated the space completely for any kind of conventional conflict whatsoever. You cannot now have conventional conflict in Pakistan. Conversely, from our side, there were experts and strategists who argued that despite Pakistan's nuclear threshold, there is space for conventional conflict. We've seen that logic play out in this situation. We did use conventional military means despite the fact that Pakistan brings the N-word into play all the time. From Pakistan's point of view, the effort was to close this window, and that is exactly what the Chinese assistance to them has done—to close this window of conventional military conflict as much as possible. It has been a bit of a draw. It has shown that there is still scope for some military conflict under the nuclear overhang. But it is quite possible that next time around, that window will become even smaller. On May 10, there was a Reuters report that suggested that the Nuclear Command Authority in Pakistan was going to meet. A few hours later, when the phone calls started going from Washington, DC, to Islamabad and to Delhi, there was a denial of the story. The alarm bells did start ringing in world capitals. The threshold was probably when India expanded its attacks, and maybe the Nur Khan air base that was struck was something quite serious as far as the Pakistanis were concerned. We have to factor in this nuclear threshold, the role of the Americans and other influential players. I certainly agree. This is the fundamental limitation of a strategy of overt military action against a covert proxy war, which is what is being pursued by Pakistan—the escalatory potential quickly attracts unwelcome international attention with all its attendant complications. We saw that in this case. What—72 or 96 hours—was all that it took before the rest of the world began to think, and the Americans in particular, that both sides were quickly ascending the escalatory ladder. The experts say that there are 23 steps in the escalation ladder. Clearly, they felt that the rungs were being mounted rather quickly and rather alarmingly. All this leads me to the point that precisely because of the escalatory potential and the prospect of unwelcome international attention, which we have always tried to ward off, the argument can well be made that other non-escalatory options in the covert domain may perhaps be more effective in persuading Pakistan to give up what is essentially a self-defeating exercise of pursuing a covert proxy war against us. This has progressively brought diminishing returns to Pakistan over a period of time. Pakistan's covert proxy war against us is best fought by a covert counter-proxy war, and that war really has to be one in the shadows. Also Read | When Indo-Pak tensions go high-tech, it's the people who pay the price This bilateral bogey—the Shimla agreement that was signed, which the Pakistanis say they are not going to respect, though they have never respected it to begin with. Everyone knows the reality of how Kargil ended. Everyone knows the reality of how Operation Sindoor ended. Why should we keep pretending? We should be open that there are influential players who can influence behaviour and we should factor that in any decision making. What do you think? Certainly, it has to be factored into any strategy that we pursue. I entirely agree. The issue that decision makers have to grapple with is, at what point do other players come into the equation? How long can they be held off? Can they be held off till as long as it takes for you to achieve a certain objective? Even in 1971, these questions were there as to how long the conflict can be kept going before the Americans and the Russians get involved. You're absolutely right when you say that, fundamentally, this has to be one of the key points that has to be factored into our decision-making. Turning to Pakistan internally, the promotion of Asim Munir as Field Marshal is signalling to the people of Pakistan and to India that they have achieved a major success. Does this give Munir and his civilian proxies, the Bhutto-Zardaris and the Sharifs, far more legitimacy in Pakistan? Yes, all the evidence suggests that what happened has given a fresh lease of life to the Pakistan Army in particular. By all accounts, its popularity and that of then-General Asim Munir were at a historically low ebb because of Pakistan's own internal difficulties and crises on multiple fronts. For the time being, at least, a euphoria has been generated, rightly or wrongly, which has put the Army on a new pedestal. It has all but ensured that Field Marshal Asim Munir will be at the helm of affairs for the foreseeable future in Pakistan. It perhaps represents a setback to Imran Khan and his people, at least for the time being. From our perspective, one negative fallout is that it brings the military and the civilian leadership closer together, despite a completely lopsided relationship. Our fundamental interests are best served by not having them on the same page, or at least putting as much daylight between them as possible. That has clearly not happened—it is the other way around. Any concluding remarks on this current round of the India-Pakistan conflict? In conclusion, Pakistan has always been—it remains—obsessed with India. So our strategy should be to make Pakistan as irrelevant as possible under the circumstances so that it recedes further and further back in our rear-view mirror. This is something that we have done over the past few decades. In our quest to become a developed nation by 2047, Pakistan can become a strategic distraction. That is something we should not let happen. Amit Baruah was The Hindu's Islamabad-based Pakistan correspondent from 1997 to 2000. He is the author of Dateline Islamabad.
The Print
4 days ago
- The Print
No arguments on charges yet in extortion case against Vikash Yadav, supplementary chargesheet soon
'The judge has ordered that the investigating team files the supplementary chargesheet by 25 August. Arguments on charges cannot commence until then,' a source privy to the matter said. Arguments on charges were supposed to commence in the matter in this month's hearing at Delhi's Patiala House court. However, according to sources, the investigating team said that the probe is still underway, and the judge asked the investigating officer to file the supplementary chargesheet on or before the date of next hearing—25 August. New Delhi: A supplementary chargesheet will be filed in the 2023 kidnapping and attempted murder case against former Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) officer Vikash Yadav, the investigating officer told the court during the latest hearing on 22 May, ThePrint has learnt. Yadav has not been appearing for the case hearings, citing threat to his life through exemption pleas filed by his counsels. He has claimed that the charges against him are false and frivolous, and since the particulars of his life are in public domain along with his photographs, it has exposed a 'serious threat' to his life. The former R&AW officer is also an accused in the alleged murder-for-hire plot against Sikh separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun. While Nikhil Gupta, co-accused in this case, continues to remain behind bars in a Brooklyn prison, Yadav is wanted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The one in India against Yadav pertains to a Special Cell case against him and one Abdullah Khan on charges of extortion, kidnapping and attempt to murder. Yadav was arrested in the matter in December 2023 after the complainant alleged that he and Khan abducted and tortured him, and demanded ransom in the name of jailed gangster Lawrence Bishnoi. The first chargesheet filed in the matter, as ThePrint reported in October last year, relied heavily on the former R&AW officer's disclosure. (Edited by Mannat Chugh) Also Read: No CCTV or weapon of offence, chargesheet relies on Vikash Yadav's disclosure in 2023 extortion case
Time of India
19-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Ravinder Kaushik: The Indian spy who became a Major in the Pakistan Army and was named ‘The Black Tiger' by Indira Gandhi
From acting stage to secret service The man who became Nabi Ahmed Shakir The Black Tiger End of cover A tale resurfacing in new times (You can now subscribe to our (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel The recent arrest of Jyoti Malhotra in India for allegedly spying for Pakistan has renewed attention on the world of espionage and deep-cover in Pakistan for years under a false identity, Kaushik is credited by defence circles with saving nearly 20,000 Indian lives through the intelligence he was recruited by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) at age 23. His flair for acting and public performance made him an ideal candidate for undercover work. During training, he was taught Urdu, Islamic customs, and Pakistani social norms. He studied Pakistan's geography and culture closely to prepare for his new sent Kaushik to Pakistan under the name Nabi Ahmed Shakir. All evidence of his Indian identity was erased. He studied law at Karachi University, joined the Pakistan Army, and climbed the ranks to become a Major. He married a local woman named Amanat and became a 1979 and 1983, Kaushik sent classified military information to Indian agencies. The details he provided are believed to have prevented several cross-border incidents and saved thousands of lives. Impressed by his service, then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi gave him the code name 'The Black Tiger '.Kaushik's mission ended in 1983 when his identity was exposed. According to a report in The Telegraph, Inyat Masiha—a RAW contact sent to re-establish communication with him—was caught and revealed Kaushik's true identity under interrogation. Pakistani authorities arrested Kaushik and sentenced him to death in 1985. The sentence was later reduced to life endured two years of torture in an interrogation centre in Sialkot and spent 16 more years in Mianwali Jail. In 2001, Kaushik died from pulmonary tuberculosis and heart disease in New Central Multan Jail. He was buried behind the India deals with the arrest of a Pakistani spy on its soil, Kaushik's story stands in contrast—of a man who went to the other side and served for years without public recognition. His story continues to raise questions about the silent sacrifices made in the world of intelligence, where borders blur and identities disappear.
