Latest news with #Resolution1559
MTV Lebanon
04-04-2025
- Politics
- MTV Lebanon
Schenker to MTV: This Is What Ortagus Will Say, and Normalization Will Happen in Due Time!
David Schenker, former US Assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern Affairs, revealed that US Deputy Special Envoy to the Middle East Morgan Ortagus will express surprise at the efforts of the Lebanese security forces but will stress that they must do more. He added, "It is also important for the Lebanese government to tell Ortagus that Saudi Arabia and Qatar should assist with funding the salaries of the security forces to enable them to carry out their work." In an interview on MTV's It's About Time (Sar El Waet) program, Schenker explained that "the work must continue until Resolution 1559 is implemented across all of Lebanon, not just south of the Litani River. While the ceasefire has held despite the crisis, Lebanon must persist in its efforts to disarm Hezbollah." He emphasized that "peace is always beneficial, and Lebanon will gain from it, but other necessary steps must be taken before that." Schenker further noted that "Lebanon and Israel must finalize their border demarcation and resolve the Shebaa Farms issue with Syria before talks on normalization can proceed." He added: "It is clear that a confrontation will be necessary to implement the agreement, but Lebanon must seize the opportunity to build a state, rather than remaining an Iranian militia. There is a clear difference between the US and France on Lebanon, as demonstrated by France's attempt to impose an economic rescue plan without the necessary reforms."
Al Binaa
27-03-2025
- Politics
- Al Binaa
Honourable Members of Parliament: Accountability is the Path Forward With the Foreign Minister, Not Mere Debate
Since assuming office from the diplomatic corps, Foreign Minister Ambassador Youssef Raji has consistently framed his statements around a troubling equation, linking Lebanon's demand for Israel, as referred to in official Lebanese discourse, to fulfill its obligations under Resolution 1701 and the ceasefire agreement, with what he considers Lebanon's own unfulfilled commitments, namely those under Resolution 1559, which calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah. The minister's rhetoric reflects hostility toward the Resistance, which is his right as a citizen and politician. However, when such views are expressed in his capacity as a minister within a government that does not consider Hezbollah an enemy – one that, in fact, includes two Hezbollah-affiliated ministers just as it includes Raji as a representative of the Lebanese Forces, it constitutes an abuse of power. More critically, it reveals a profound ignorance of diplomatic principles, a fundamental misunderstanding of the foreign minister's role, and a failure to grasp the implications of Resolution 1701 and the ceasefire agreement. His statements also indicate a detachment from the government's ministerial statement and a misreading of the President's oath of office. As observers, analysts, and researchers, it is our responsibility to dissect and expose the shallowness and legal contradictions of the minister's statements. However, it is incumbent upon members of parliament to take decisive action. We have already stated that the minister is abusing his authority by using his official platform to express his party's hostility toward another political force that is equally represented within the government. His role as foreign minister is defined by the government's ministerial statement, not by the Lebanese Forces' political stance. Furthermore, the foreign minister's position on Lebanon's foreign policy carries significant weight, it is akin to that of the President and Prime Minister in terms of how it binds the state, even if it ranks lower in hierarchy. As the head of the diplomatic corps, his words shape Lebanon's official posture with an even greater degree of precision. When he exploits this position to settle political scores with a rival party that is also part of the government, distorting the state's position in the process, the issue goes beyond abuse of power, it becomes a disqualification for office. Such conduct jeopardises Lebanon's national interests, weakens its negotiating position, and damages its diplomatic credibility, misrepresenting the President's and Prime Minister's stances, which fundamentally diverge from the minister's rhetoric. At its core, the issue is not about acknowledging that Resolution 1559 is referenced in Resolution 1701, nor is it about debating the state's exclusive right to bear arms, these are internal Lebanese matters on which there is consensus in principle. The real debate concerns the political timing of their implementation relative to other pressing priorities. Some argue that before the state can assert exclusive control over arms, Lebanon must first recover its occupied territories, secure an end to Israeli aggression, or establish a deterrent force to prevent future attacks. Others, including the minister and his party, disagree. But what do Resolution 1701, the ceasefire agreement, the ministerial statement, and the presidential oath actually say? The core issue lies in Israel's obligations to withdraw and cease hostilities, and the dangerous notion of tying these obligations to Lebanon's, such as the disarmament of the Resistance. This linkage undermines the legitimacy of Lebanon's demands, which the President, Prime Minister, UNIFIL statements, and the ceasefire agreement's oversight committee all frame as violations of Resolution 1701 and the ceasefire terms by Israel. The foreign minister is not more committed than the President to the oath's principle of state sovereignty over arms, nor more devoted than the Prime Minister to implementing the ministerial statement and extending state authority over all Lebanese territory. However, the oath and ministerial statement outline a roadmap for achieving these goals – a roadmap the minister's statements completely undermine, turning them into instruments that serve Israel's occupation and violations of Lebanese sovereignty. What exactly is the roadmap that the minister is attempting to dismantle? The presidential oath and ministerial statement do indeed present an alternative to the 'People, Army, and Resistance' triad, but not the version the minister advocates, which prioritises disarming the Resistance first, then demanding Israel's withdrawal, and finally pursuing a peace agreement and normalisation, as many of his party colleagues openly endorse. Instead, the official triad envisions a sequence: first, the Lebanese Army assumes control over the area south of the Litani River, where the state exercises exclusive authority over arms and extends full sovereignty to the international borders, requiring Israel to withdraw and cease its aggression. This follows the Resistance's prior withdrawal from the area in favour of the army. Second, once the state successfully asserts full control over all Lebanese territory between the Litani and the internationally recognised borders, a national security strategy is implemented to determine the future of the Resistance's arms, in line with the goal of exclusive state control and ensuring Lebanon's defense capabilities. This strategy, mandated by the presidential oath and adopted in the ministerial statement, is to be the outcome of a national dialogue. Third, only after the transitional stages outlined in this defense strategy are completed can the principle of exclusive state control over arms be fully realised, just as the abolition of political sectarianism is enshrined in the Constitution as a national goal but remains subject to transitional provisions. Yet, while no minister who supports abolishing sectarianism unilaterally questions the constitutionality of state institutions because sectarianism has not yet been eliminated, the foreign minister sees fit to challenge Lebanon's stance simply because Hezbollah's disarmament has not yet occurred. Returning to Resolution 1701, there is no need for lengthy debate, the text is clear. Like Resolution 1559 and the Taif Accord, it outlines a phased approach to implementation. The first phase, outlined in Articles 1–7, establishes a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. Lebanon's obligations in this phase include deploying its army and ensuring Hezbollah ceases fire, while Israel is required to immediately withdraw from all occupied Lebanese territory up to the Blue Line and halt all other hostile actions. Article 7 explicitly states that 'all parties must ensure that no actions violating Article 1 are taken that could undermine efforts toward a lasting solution'. Once this initial phase is completed, the second phase begins, aimed at establishing a permanent solution, including the creation of a weapons-free zone south of the Litani. The third phase encompasses remaining unresolved issues under a long-term framework, involving UN-mediated indirect negotiations to address disputed areas, particularly the Shebaa Farms, alongside further UN proposals regarding the implementation of the Taif Accord and Resolutions 1559 and 1680. The ceasefire agreement, built upon Resolution 1701, differs only in two aspects: first, instead of requiring immediate implementation, it granted a 60-day window for fulfilling the obligations of the cessation of hostilities, primarily Israel's withdrawal – a deadline that has long since expired. Second, whereas Resolution 1701 sequences the establishment of a weapons-free zone south of the Litani after hostilities end, the ceasefire agreement integrated this provision into the cessation process itself. These were concessions Lebanon made to facilitate Israeli compliance with Resolution 1701, compliance that Israel has nonetheless failed to deliver, while Lebanon has fulfilled all its obligations, as affirmed by the President, Prime Minister, the Lebanese Army's statements, UNIFIL reports, and the ceasefire oversight committee. The only entities disputing this are Israel and our own foreign minister, who, in theory, should be the guardian of Lebanon's diplomatic position. With all due respect to the MPs who have voiced objections to the minister's statements, the gravity of his remarks demands a clear and public stance from the government, both politically and procedurally. It also compels parliament to take action, through formal inquiries, interrogations, and, if necessary, a motion of no confidence in the minister.
Arab News
14-02-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon would benefit all parties
Following the ceasefire agreement that was sealed on Nov. 27 last year, Israel was supposed to withdraw from Lebanese territory by Jan. 26. The deadline was last month extended to Feb. 18. However, as we approach that date, Israel is showing no signs that it will withdraw in time. Its withdrawal is necessary for Lebanon to have any kind of stability or state-building. Israel has been successful in decapitating Hezbollah's leadership. It used advanced technology to assassinate the group's field leaders. Later, it conducted the attack on Hezbollah pagers, in which more than 3,500 top operatives were simultaneously either killed or maimed. Israel followed this attack with an intensive bombing campaign, in which it killed all commanders of the group, starting with Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. According to the ceasefire agreement, Hezbollah needs to withdraw north of the Litani River. The deal also includes the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which orders all Lebanese militias to disarm. Meanwhile, Israel was supposed to withdraw by the end of an initial 60-day period. However, it did not. The excuse that Israel presented was that it needs to clear the south of the country of all arms depots and pockets of resistance. This is why it keeps bombing parts of the south and the Bekaa Valley every now and then. What is obvious is that Israel and the new US administration do not believe in soft power or the ideas of nuance and narrative. They only believe in hard power. They believe that the only way to get rid of Hezbollah is to kill all its operatives and dry up all its sources of funding. What they do not realize is that by adopting this method they are undermining the Lebanese state. Hezbollah's military muscle can be weakened, but the idea of Hezbollah cannot be eradicated as long as there is any form of Israeli occupation or breach of Lebanese sovereignty. Hezbollah's argument, on which it bases the legitimacy for its existence, is that the Lebanese army cannot protect Lebanon from Israeli aggression. Hence, a guerrilla force is needed. If Israel wanted to act intelligently, it would withdraw before the next deadline and allow the Lebanese state to take the credit Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib If Israel wanted to act intelligently, it would withdraw before the next deadline and allow the Lebanese state to take the credit. This way, Beirut could show the Lebanese people, including Hezbollah, that the Lebanese state can repel the Israelis and protect the country from its aggression by using diplomacy. However, the Israeli leaders' arrogance, coupled with American permissiveness, is undermining the Lebanese state. Though Hezbollah is weakened militarily, its narrative is being strengthened at the expense of the Lebanese state's prestige. When the 60-day period finished, the people of the south rushed back to their homes. Israel shot 22 people dead. This was a blow to the Lebanese state. It showed that the state was unable to protect its own people. Hezbollah will not be weakened as long as its audience feel that they need protection. Israel might kill the commander and disrupt the chain of command. However, it will only be a matter of time before the group restores its chain of command and grooms new leaders. The US, which brokered the ceasefire, should show respect and empower the Lebanese state in order for the Lebanese people to trust it. If the average Lebanese, especially in the south, does not feel that the state can protect them from Israeli aggression, they will revert to Hezbollah for protection. They will send their children to be enlisted in the group. They will contribute from their hard-earned money to finance the group. However, this is not how the US has acted. During her visit to Lebanon last week, Deputy Special Middle East Envoy Morgan Ortagus thanked Israel for defeating Hezbollah. Israel had just destroyed half of the country and the US envoy, speaking at the presidential palace, thanked it. This announcement undermined the Lebanese state and exacerbated the country's internal divisions. It also reinforced the perception among Lebanese Shiites that the state cannot protect them. The Shiites feel alienated and hurt and Hezbollah is taking advantage of that. At the same time, the camp that is antagonistic to Hezbollah feels empowered. Progress MP Mark Daou said that the speaker of the parliament, who is an ally of Hezbollah, should walk the line, otherwise he should be wary of a woman's shoe (referring to Ortagus) or to a boot (probably referring to a military boot). The supporters of Hezbollah and Amal were deeply offended by his disrespectful comments toward their leadership. They accused him of being an agent for the Israelis. The US, which brokered the ceasefire, should show respect and empower the Lebanese state in order for the Lebanese people to trust it Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib This is a watershed moment for the Lebanese — a moment where the people should rally around the state and focus on institution-building and the conducting of reforms. However, the Israeli presence is creating a point of contention between the Lebanese who are happy that Hezbollah has been defeated and the supporters of the group, who feel alienated by the rest of Lebanese society. It is also a distraction from state-building and a gift for corrupt politicians to derail the progress toward reforms. The US, which has the upper hand, should have a strategic view. It should pressure Israel to withdraw, while getting enough guarantees from the Lebanese state that it will pressure Hezbollah to disarm and to morph into a political party on a par with the other parties in the country. However, the US seems to prefer hard power and a blunt approach. This approach entails the risk of internal unrest. The US should realize that the only viable alternative to Hezbollah is a strong Lebanese state that can deliver security and services to its citizens. This cannot happen as long as Israel occupies parts of Lebanon and infringes on its security. The US should pressure Israel to withdraw by the deadline of Feb. 18. • Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib is a specialist in US-Arab relations with a focus on lobbying. She is co-founder of the Research Center for Cooperation and Peace Building, a Lebanese nongovernmental organization focused on Track II.
