Honourable Members of Parliament: Accountability is the Path Forward With the Foreign Minister, Not Mere Debate

Al Binaa

27-03-2025

Since assuming office from the diplomatic corps, Foreign Minister Ambassador Youssef Raji has consistently framed his statements around a troubling equation, linking Lebanon's demand for Israel, as referred to in official Lebanese discourse, to fulfill its obligations under Resolution 1701 and the ceasefire agreement, with what he considers Lebanon's own unfulfilled commitments, namely those under Resolution 1559, which calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah.
The minister's rhetoric reflects hostility toward the Resistance, which is his right as a citizen and politician. However, when such views are expressed in his capacity as a minister within a government that does not consider Hezbollah an enemy – one that, in fact, includes two Hezbollah-affiliated ministers just as it includes Raji as a representative of the Lebanese Forces, it constitutes an abuse of power. More critically, it reveals a profound ignorance of diplomatic principles, a fundamental misunderstanding of the foreign minister's role, and a failure to grasp the implications of Resolution 1701 and the ceasefire agreement. His statements also indicate a detachment from the government's ministerial statement and a misreading of the President's oath of office. As observers, analysts, and researchers, it is our responsibility to dissect and expose the shallowness and legal contradictions of the minister's statements. However, it is incumbent upon members of parliament to take decisive action.
We have already stated that the minister is abusing his authority by using his official platform to express his party's hostility toward another political force that is equally represented within the government. His role as foreign minister is defined by the government's ministerial statement, not by the Lebanese Forces' political stance. Furthermore, the foreign minister's position on Lebanon's foreign policy carries significant weight, it is akin to that of the President and Prime Minister in terms of how it binds the state, even if it ranks lower in hierarchy. As the head of the diplomatic corps, his words shape Lebanon's official posture with an even greater degree of precision. When he exploits this position to settle political scores with a rival party that is also part of the government, distorting the state's position in the process, the issue goes beyond abuse of power, it becomes a disqualification for office. Such conduct jeopardises Lebanon's national interests, weakens its negotiating position, and damages its diplomatic credibility, misrepresenting the President's and Prime Minister's stances, which fundamentally diverge from the minister's rhetoric.
At its core, the issue is not about acknowledging that Resolution 1559 is referenced in Resolution 1701, nor is it about debating the state's exclusive right to bear arms, these are internal Lebanese matters on which there is consensus in principle. The real debate concerns the political timing of their implementation relative to other pressing priorities. Some argue that before the state can assert exclusive control over arms, Lebanon must first recover its occupied territories, secure an end to Israeli aggression, or establish a deterrent force to prevent future attacks. Others, including the minister and his party, disagree. But what do Resolution 1701, the ceasefire agreement, the ministerial statement, and the presidential oath actually say?
The core issue lies in Israel's obligations to withdraw and cease hostilities, and the dangerous notion of tying these obligations to Lebanon's, such as the disarmament of the Resistance. This linkage undermines the legitimacy of Lebanon's demands, which the President, Prime Minister, UNIFIL statements, and the ceasefire agreement's oversight committee all frame as violations of Resolution 1701 and the ceasefire terms by Israel. The foreign minister is not more committed than the President to the oath's principle of state sovereignty over arms, nor more devoted than the Prime Minister to implementing the ministerial statement and extending state authority over all Lebanese territory. However, the oath and ministerial statement outline a roadmap for achieving these goals – a roadmap the minister's statements completely undermine, turning them into instruments that serve Israel's occupation and violations of Lebanese sovereignty. What exactly is the roadmap that the minister is attempting to dismantle?
The presidential oath and ministerial statement do indeed present an alternative to the 'People, Army, and Resistance' triad, but not the version the minister advocates, which prioritises disarming the Resistance first, then demanding Israel's withdrawal, and finally pursuing a peace agreement and normalisation, as many of his party colleagues openly endorse. Instead, the official triad envisions a sequence: first, the Lebanese Army assumes control over the area south of the Litani River, where the state exercises exclusive authority over arms and extends full sovereignty to the international borders, requiring Israel to withdraw and cease its aggression. This follows the Resistance's prior withdrawal from the area in favour of the army. Second, once the state successfully asserts full control over all Lebanese territory between the Litani and the internationally recognised borders, a national security strategy is implemented to determine the future of the Resistance's arms, in line with the goal of exclusive state control and ensuring Lebanon's defense capabilities. This strategy, mandated by the presidential oath and adopted in the ministerial statement, is to be the outcome of a national dialogue. Third, only after the transitional stages outlined in this defense strategy are completed can the principle of exclusive state control over arms be fully realised, just as the abolition of political sectarianism is enshrined in the Constitution as a national goal but remains subject to transitional provisions. Yet, while no minister who supports abolishing sectarianism unilaterally questions the constitutionality of state institutions because sectarianism has not yet been eliminated, the foreign minister sees fit to challenge Lebanon's stance simply because Hezbollah's disarmament has not yet occurred.
Returning to Resolution 1701, there is no need for lengthy debate, the text is clear. Like Resolution 1559 and the Taif Accord, it outlines a phased approach to implementation. The first phase, outlined in Articles 1–7, establishes a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities. Lebanon's obligations in this phase include deploying its army and ensuring Hezbollah ceases fire, while Israel is required to immediately withdraw from all occupied Lebanese territory up to the Blue Line and halt all other hostile actions. Article 7 explicitly states that 'all parties must ensure that no actions violating Article 1 are taken that could undermine efforts toward a lasting solution'.
Once this initial phase is completed, the second phase begins, aimed at establishing a permanent solution, including the creation of a weapons-free zone south of the Litani. The third phase encompasses remaining unresolved issues under a long-term framework, involving UN-mediated indirect negotiations to address disputed areas, particularly the Shebaa Farms, alongside further UN proposals regarding the implementation of the Taif Accord and Resolutions 1559 and 1680.
The ceasefire agreement, built upon Resolution 1701, differs only in two aspects: first, instead of requiring immediate implementation, it granted a 60-day window for fulfilling the obligations of the cessation of hostilities, primarily Israel's withdrawal – a deadline that has long since expired. Second, whereas Resolution 1701 sequences the establishment of a weapons-free zone south of the Litani after hostilities end, the ceasefire agreement integrated this provision into the cessation process itself. These were concessions Lebanon made to facilitate Israeli compliance with Resolution 1701, compliance that Israel has nonetheless failed to deliver, while Lebanon has fulfilled all its obligations, as affirmed by the President, Prime Minister, the Lebanese Army's statements, UNIFIL reports, and the ceasefire oversight committee. The only entities disputing this are Israel and our own foreign minister, who, in theory, should be the guardian of Lebanon's diplomatic position.
With all due respect to the MPs who have voiced objections to the minister's statements, the gravity of his remarks demands a clear and public stance from the government, both politically and procedurally. It also compels parliament to take action, through formal inquiries, interrogations, and, if necessary, a motion of no confidence in the minister.