Latest news with #Russia-India-China
The Print
a day ago
- Business
- The Print
India is showing signs of trusting China again. Beijing sees a window of weakness
Meanwhile, this drip-feed rapprochement is occurring in the backdrop of increasing volley of disagreements between India and its closest strategic partner – the US. Delhi and Washington are in the midst of a significant recalibration of ties and featuring strong (as well as emotive) disagreements over trade, diplomacy (ceasefire claims), secondary sanctions on Russian energy purchases, and arms purchases. Signs of convergence include an amiable visit by External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar to China for the SCO Foreign Ministers meet, India's seeming willingness to consider the reviving of the Russia-India-China (RIC) mechanism, a government think tank (Niti Aayog) suggesting that Chinese companies could be allowed to acquire up to a 24% stake in Indian firms without prior approval, the resumption of tourism visas and direct flights, and optimistic statements relating to a practical roadmap to make progress towards resolving the boundary dispute from bilateral meets such as the WMCC in July this year as well as Defense Minister Rajnath Singh's visit to China in June. Recent weeks have seen increasing signs of growing convergence and a deepening thaw in India-China relations. This has occurred despite China's support for Pakistan during Op Sindoor, the initiation of construction on the controversial Yarlung Zangbo dam, as well as an intensification of economic coercion through new regulations on exports, including critical minerals , agricultural inputs , high-speed railways , and electronics . Hence, the deepening thaw—despite China's intensified coercive approach—appears somewhat contradictory, or at least a puzzle. Episodic warmth: But what's new? India's episodic tactical pivots towards better ties with China to enhance its bargaining position vis-à-vis the US are not new or unfamiliar. It represents a core feature of Indian multi-alignment (strategic autonomy), whereby India relies on its 'power to switch sides' to extract more beneficial approaches from both adversaries and like-minded partners. Arguably, a similar approach was at work last year when India and China reached a significant patrolling agreement at the LAC, which in turn helped signal to the US that Delhi is 'not geopolitically cornered' and 'has options'. However, the ongoing tactical pivot does have some new features that are worth noting. Moment of acute instability in India-US ties India-US ties are indeed undergoing unprecedented churn, marked by a leverage-based approach by Washington. The US pressure on India to open its key and sensitive sectors to US imports, as well as adopt extensive changes to existing non-tariff barriers, is a new and uncomfortable development. President Trump's ceaseless and frequent references to the use of leverages to enforce a ceasefire on the 10th of May continues to irritate Delhi; while delays and snags related to the supply of GE jet engines has led multiple news reports to suggest that India is or should look at alternatives – ranging from France, to Japan as well as Russia. While initially over-optimistic about a trade agreement (including the strategic implications of the same), Delhi now appears pessimistic and anxious. President Trump's references to the 'Indonesia way' as a model for the deal with India have set off alarm bells in some sections of industry and among experts. Delhi had hoped, since February this year, that providing Trump with a favorable (but still reasonable) trade deal would guarantee the restoration of warmth in India-US ties. However, recent trends (including the threat of Russia-related sanctions as well as perceived US-Pakistan ties) are souring such hopes. Finally, earlier bouts of India-China flirtations were significantly constrained by the structural realities of strategic convergence between India and the US and divergence between China and India. This structural fact, although still formidable, has weakened over the last year or two, and Delhi remains in a state of uncertainty (understandably) about Trump's China policy. China is poised to reap strategic dividends India's strategic vulnerability to China at the present moment is unprecedented as well (arguably since 1962). The vulnerability is strikingly multifaceted and leaves India with very little choice (at least in the short term) other than diplomacy, patience, and attempts to generate goodwill in Beijing. China's support for Pakistan and the potential sale of advanced fighter jets represent a strong pressure point. The above-mentioned dam construction represents yet another vulnerability, with Arunachal Pradesh CM describing it as a 'ticking time bomb'. However, the most acute and immediate vulnerability pertains to China's emerging system of economic coercion. Current opinion is not entirely stable regarding China's motivations. They range from thwarting India's rise to securing China's own strategic sectors from diffusion and potential loss of advantage. In reality, Chinese motivation is likely to be a mix and also consists of diplomatic objectives (bargaining and leverage). More economically minded officials and analysts view such measures as 'retaliation' for India's own economically discriminatory policies aimed at China since 2020 (Press Note 3) and suggest that China is merely 'hitting back' to encourage Delhi to ease restrictions on Chinese companies and investments. Regardless of exact intent, however, what is alarming is the newfound comfort Beijing has found in resorting to such economic arm-twisting. This is entirely new and lacks an established template in terms of cognition and response. Could this tactical pivot lead to outcomes that are strategic? There is a long history of India seeking tactical improvement in ties with Beijing from time to time, based on the immediate bilateral and geopolitical context. Hence, such efforts are usually met with both scepticism (regarding sustainability) as well as strategic wariness (towards outcomes). In other words, concerns range from the inherent futility of such efforts as well as the dangers that may emanate from 'trusting' China again. Even in the present melee, it is hard to decode which aspects of the slow-moving convergence are symbolic, tactical, and purely bilateral, and which aspects are strategic, material, and geopolitical. A certain restoration in normal ties can be seen as inevitable and mutually beneficial. However, the danger lies in India's potential acquiescence to a structural overhaul of economic ties with China, which would leave the latter in an even stronger position to apply economic pressure on India in the future for strategic objectives. India is caught in an unenviable dilemma, where the short-term pain of non-cooperation with China could be acute, but the relief of that pain through wider entry for Chinese companies could lead to long-term structural vulnerabilities. Nowhere is this more evident than in the example of greater Chinese penetration (through its companies) in the Indian agricultural and horticultural sectors. The dislocations in the Indian automobile sector due to China's export restrictions are already well-reported and discussed. Recently, Bajaj Auto warned that August (2025) may be 'zero month' for the company owing to production-halts resulting from Chinese export restrictions. Given the increasing involvement of Indian automobile companies in defence production, China's new condition of non-dual-use certification could have serious strategic implications for the future as well. Despite Delhi's structural concerns related to greater economic exchange with China, there are many immediate reasons/triggers why Delhi could still be tempted. These pertain to a worrying trend in terms of declining FDI, hopes for greater inclusion in global supply chains via China linkages, and, most importantly, hopes of persuading Beijing to reverse its economic coercive approach towards India. Hence, tactical initiatives could end up taking a life of their own, especially given China's ability to exploit India's short-term vulnerabilities to achieve greater stabilisation of its long-term goals. India's patrolling agreement in October last year serves as a key example of the same. India had then hoped for a policy based on greater 'mutual understanding' in exchange for Delhi's willingness to overlook Chinese actions at the LAC since 2020. Instead, the last year has seen even greater Chinese coercion and intransigence driven by assessments of India's weakened geopolitical position and national power. Whereas both India and China have a strong a priori reason to 'come closer' owing to Trump's 'disruption' and 'unilateralism', it is China that is in the right position to exploit the 'Trump disruption' to meet its strategic objectives vis-à-vis India while also further weakening the US-India strategic partnership. Sidharth Raimedhi is a Fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research (CSDR), a New Delhi-based think tank. He tweets @SidharthRaimed1. Views are personal. This article was first published by CSDR.
News18
2 days ago
- Business
- News18
RIC Returns: The Russia-India-China Trilateral Builds Leverage For India
By keeping the RIC option open, India signals to the West that its partnership shouldn't be taken for granted, while also strengthening the ongoing reset in relations with China The old idea of Russia-India-China (RIC) coming together as a powerful trilateral force is making a quiet return. It was once a bold vision: an idea floated over three decades ago to reshape the global order by bringing together the three largest Eurasian powers outside the Western bloc. But as talk of its revival grows louder, especially from Moscow and Beijing, it's India's measured response that stands out. The coming months will be crucial. Prime Minister Narendra Modi might attend the SCO summit in Beijing alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin is expected to visit India for the Russia-India annual summit—and India is also going to be hosting the Quad summit. The question is whether the RIC can see the light of day in the middle of all this. There are opportunities and obstacles in this time frame. While the USA-China-Russia dynamic boosts the relevance of RIC to Moscow and Beijing, the India-China equation weakens it. Ultimately, it depends on where India-US ties stand, the message India chooses to send to Trump, and also on how China behaves. It's not the first time we're hearing about the Russia-India-China (RIC) triangle. Dreamed up after the Cold War ended in the 1990s, the RIC idea was supposed to be a bold answer to a world order dominated by the West. The Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, suggested then that three rising Asian giants—Russia, India, and China—should come together to reshape the rules. But while Russia and China are once again talking up the RIC, India has been measured in its approach. However, it is coming around. India describes RIC as a consultative mechanism where the three countries 'come and discuss global issues and regional issues of interest to them". And yet, the dates are yet to be worked out. As per MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal, 'It is something that will be worked out among the three countries in a mutually convenient manner, and we will let you know as and when that happens at an appropriate time when the meeting is to take place". This is an old idea being revisited. But there was a reason why it did not take off in the past. When the RIC dialogue began in the early 2000s, Russia and India were inching close on energy and defence collaboration. Two agreements with China in 2003 and 2005 on boundary disputes stabilised India-China ties. Meanwhile, all three countries sought deep ties with the US and Europe. Russia craved a fresh relationship with America after the Soviet collapse. China was riding high on Western investment and trade. India was opening up to the world, and signed a civil nuclear deal with the US. There was no high-intensity friction with the US, and so the triangle never took off. Later, things got more complicated when China flouted boundary agreements, and started the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or CPEC, which passes through occupied Indian territory. Meanwhile, Russia's ties with the West were frayed after it took Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. And yet, by 2019, there was a formal leaders-level RIC summit in June 2019, on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Osaka, Japan. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, President Vladimir Putin, and President Xi Jinping met and discussed global issues, multilateralism, and reform of institutions like the WTO and the UN. This was significant, but the high was over soon. China's border aggression in the Himalayas led to the bloody Galwan clash, after which India-China ties unravelled. Moreover, if you fast forward from 2019 to today, the world is messier. The West is divided. The US under Trump is unpredictable. Trade wars are heating up. And the Ukraine war and subsequent Western sanctions have pushed Russia even closer to China. Both Russia and China want to revive the RIC format. Russia has openly called for it. China has nodded in agreement. But India hasn't said much—at least not yet. While Russia's crashing ties with the West are a factor in India's hesitation, the real issue is China. There's deep strategic discomfort with China. India and China are in the midst of a reset. Rebuilding rules of engagement and seeking a bare-minimum level of trust is required to normalise economic relations and scale down military build-up on both sides at the border. Most recently, India reopened tourist visas for Chinese nationals after China's resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra. Yet, there is a giant trust deficit—with China's unwavering support to Pakistan even during Operation Sindoor, its weaponisation of trade dominance in rare earths, its claims on Arunachal Pradesh and an ambitious dam project on the Yarlung Tsangpo which may affect water levels in the Brahmaputra river. Still, the RIC is significant. For India, it's about leverage. By teasing the idea of RIC, India gets to build leverage. It's an obvious geographical mandate that the three Asian giants should come together and build a mutual understanding on matters of concern. Russia and China are craving for it— to seek India out and send a collective message to the West. Meanwhile, Trump threatens 10 per cent tariffs for BRICS countries, and a whopping 100 per cent tariff on nations buying Russian oil. Europe has sanctioned a major Indian refinery. And the US-India trade deal still hangs in the balance, with no certainty. Moreover, with the White House warming up to Pakistan and Trump repeating claims that he ended the India-Pakistan conflict, even when India denies that— there is something fundamentally broken in the India-US relationship. Trump's threats and coercion are challenging and his overtures to Pakistan are further eroding trust. By keeping the RIC option open, India signals to the West that its partnership shouldn't be taken for granted, while also strengthening the ongoing reset in relations with China—both of which are strategically important. RIC for India is not about being anti-western. At its core, RIC was never meant to be anti-Western. It was supposed to be a counterbalance—an alternative centre of power in a multipolar world. A non-West construct. Today's version of RIC seems more loaded. With Russia under Western sanctions, and China increasingly hostile to US allies in the Indo-Pacific, the grouping risks looking like a bloc of grievance rather than a vision. India doesn't want to be part of an anti-West club. It still values its partnerships with the US, Japan, Australia, and Europe. But it also wants to keep its options open. And for that, flirting with the RIC idea makes sense. RIC is not about shifting camps. India doesn't want to be in anyone's camp. It's about hedging bets, playing the field smartly, and maintaining strategic autonomy. About the Author Shubhangi Sharma Shubhangi Sharma is News Editor - Special Projects at News18. She covers foreign affairs and geopolitics, and also keeps a close watch on the national pulse of India. tags : China donald trump India pakistan Russia United states view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: July 28, 2025, 15:29 IST News opinion Finepoint | RIC Returns: The Russia-India-China Trilateral Builds Leverage For India Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. 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Time of India
3 days ago
- Business
- Time of India
Mann Ki Baat: PM Modi Says Villages, Poor & Daughters Are Focus of Khelo Bharat Niti 2025
'It Is Reasonable That...': Indian Envoy's Big Remark On Russia-India-China Troika Revival Indian Ambassador to the UK, Vikram Doraiswami, defended India's strategic ties with Russia and China, calling it "reasonable" for the country to coordinate on shared security interests. His remarks came in response to questions about a possible Russia-India-China 'triangle.' Addressing concerns over India's relationship with Russia, Doraiswami emphasized the country's critical energy needs. "India is the third largest energy consumer in the world. We import 80% of our energy. What do you want us to do? Switch off our economy?" he said, underscoring the economic imperative behind maintaining diversified global partnerships.#indiaukrelations #indiarussia #indiachina #strategicpartnerships #energysecurity #geopolitics #vikramdoraiswami #foreignpolicy #globaltrade #toi #toibharat 1.2K views | 8 hours ago
Time of India
3 days ago
- Business
- Time of India
London Round 15 Qualifying: Pole Battle & Drama
'It Is Reasonable That...': Indian Envoy's Big Remark On Russia-India-China Troika Revival Indian Ambassador to the UK, Vikram Doraiswami, defended India's strategic ties with Russia and China, calling it "reasonable" for the country to coordinate on shared security interests. His remarks came in response to questions about a possible Russia-India-China 'triangle.' Addressing concerns over India's relationship with Russia, Doraiswami emphasized the country's critical energy needs. "India is the third largest energy consumer in the world. We import 80% of our energy. What do you want us to do? Switch off our economy?" he said, underscoring the economic imperative behind maintaining diversified global partnerships.#indiaukrelations #indiarussia #indiachina #strategicpartnerships #energysecurity #geopolitics #vikramdoraiswami #foreignpolicy #globaltrade #toi #toibharat 1.2K views | 8 hours ago
Time of India
4 days ago
- Business
- Time of India
'It Is Reasonable That...': Indian Envoy's Big Remark On Russia-India-China Troika Revival
/ Jul 27, 2025, 09:12AM IST Indian Ambassador to the UK, Vikram Doraiswami, defended India's strategic ties with Russia and China, calling it "reasonable" for the country to coordinate on shared security interests. His remarks came in response to questions about a possible Russia-India-China 'triangle.' Addressing concerns over India's relationship with Russia, Doraiswami emphasized the country's critical energy needs. "India is the third largest energy consumer in the world. We import 80% of our energy. What do you want us to do? Switch off our economy?" he said, underscoring the economic imperative behind maintaining diversified global partnerships.#indiaukrelations #indiarussia #indiachina #strategicpartnerships #energysecurity #geopolitics #vikramdoraiswami #foreignpolicy #globaltrade #toi #toibharat
