Latest news with #SASC
Asia Times
01-05-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
US missiles fall short in long-range game with China
The US is arming up for a Pacific missile race but China may already be playing on a larger board. Last month, the US Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) unveiled legislation stating that the US Army will receive significant funding boosts for medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) programs under a new appropriations bill for fiscal year 2025. The legislation allocates US$175 million to expand production capacity for next-generation US Army MRBMs, aiming to enhance output and strengthen supplier bases. An additional $114 million is directed toward producing these next-generation systems, complementing the $300 million earmarked for the production of current Army MRBM platforms. Separately, $50 million has been set aside for the accelerated development of the US Army's next-generation medium-range anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM). The investments reflect a broad strategy to bolster the US Army's medium-range strike capabilities amid growing global missile threats. Funding for these programs is part of a broader munitions and supply chain resiliency initiative. The targeted outlays underscore the US Department of Defense's (DOD) increasing prioritization of flexible, survivable missile systems capable of addressing emerging threats across multiple theaters. Putting MRBM capabilities into perspective, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation describes the range of such weapons as falling between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometers, noting that these are 'theater-level' weapons. Fielded in the Pacific, such a weapon would represent a significant leap in capability over existing US systems such as the Typhon and Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), which have ranges of about 500 to 2,000 kilometers for the former firing Standard Missile-6 and Tomahawk cruise missiles, and 185 kilometers for the latter tactical anti-ship system. Further, ballistic missiles may be much more effective against hardened targets, such as aircraft shelters and missile silos, as they travel at hypersonic speeds during their terminal phase, giving them tremendous kinetic energy that allows them to damage such targets or cause them to collapse. Timothy Walton and Tom Shugart III mention in a January 2025 Hudson Institute report that since the early 2010s, China has doubled the number of its hardened aircraft shelters (HAS), of which it now has 3,000. Walton and Shugart say that China maintains 134 airbases within 1,800 kilometers of the Taiwan Strait, with 650 HAS and 2,000 non-hardened individual aircraft shelters (IAS). Meanwhile, Newsweek reported in December 2024 that China has 368 known missile silos, with 30 silos in its central region, 18 in the south, 90 in the north and 230 in the west. According to Ryan Snyder in a December 2024 article in the peer-reviewed Science & Global Security journal, those silos are estimated to be hardened to 1,500 pounds per square inch (psi), with older ones rated at 450 psi. Snyder says Chinese missile silos feature sophisticated shock isolation systems designed to attenuate horizontal missile movement within. As for the advantages of ASBMs over other types of anti-ship missiles, Andrew Erickson mentions in the 2013 book 'Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategic Implications' that such weapons can bypass traditional carrier defenses by striking from above at high speeds, effectively removing the carrier's air group—the primary line of defense—from the defensive equation. Erickson says this capability creates a severe targeting and interception challenge, as defending against missiles is inherently more difficult than defending against submarines or aircraft. He also notes that ASBMs exploit adversary naval vulnerabilities without requiring a direct match to those capabilities, offering potentially devastating, precise and hard-to-defend 'multi-axis' strikes. Tying up these developments into a larger operational picture, Thomas Mahnken and others mention in a 2019 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) report that the US maritime pressure strategy aims to dissuade Chinese leaders from aggression in the Pacific. The writers note the strategy entails establishing highly-survivable precision-strike networks in the First Island Chain spanning Japan's southern island of Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines, backed by naval, air, electronic warfare and other capabilities. Mahnken and others say that these decentralized networks would function as an 'inside force' optimized to attack People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces from inside its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) bubble, while supported by 'outside forces' able to join the fight from further afield. They note that land-based anti-ship, anti-air and electronic warfare units along the First Island Chain would serve as the backbone of the inside-out operational concept—both anchoring frontline defense and freeing up US ships and aircraft for higher-priority missions such as striking surveillance nodes, reinforcing gaps and exploiting opportunities created by ground-based strikes. However, Grant Georgulis argues in a 2022 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs article that the First Island Chain is neither a survivable nor a viable operating area due to Chinese military capabilities such as long-range bombers, cruise missiles and theater ballistic missiles. Underscoring that threat, the US DOD 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) shows that the First and Second Island Chain spanning the Bonin Islands, Mariana Islands, Caroline Islands and Western New Guinea are entirely within the range of the PLA's long-range strike capabilities. While Georgulis recommends strengthening the Second Island Chain, China has steadily expanded its regional influence, aiming to deny US access to potential island bases and emplace dual-use infrastructure to support power projection beyond the First Island Chain. In line with that, Shijie Wang mentions in a March 2025 Jamestown Foundation article that China aims to overcome US-imposed containment in the Pacific, deepening ties with Pacific Island countries such as Nauru, Micronesia, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Fiji and Samoa. Wang says China's recently signed 'Deepening Blue Economy Cooperation' memorandum with the Cook Islands has raised concerns about the potential dual-use infrastructure that could offer logistical support for the PLA Navy (PLAN) and expand its presence in the Third Island Chain, which spans the Aleutian Islands, American Samoa, Fiji, Hawaii and New Zealand. Underscoring China's increasing influence in the region, the Lowy Institute 2024 Pacific Aid Map mentions that while Australia remains the largest donor to Pacific Island countries, China has become the second-largest one, narrowly edging out the US while increasing its project commitments. While the US's development of MRBMs signifies it is doubling down on military containment of China in the First Island Chain, considering China's long-range strike capabilities and increasing influence among Pacific Island nations, such military-centric views risk underestimating the broader geopolitical landscape and China's rising regional entrenchment.
Al Arabiya
01-04-2025
- Politics
- Al Arabiya
Trump's pick to be next Joint Chiefs chair acknowledges being an ‘unconventional nominee'
US President Donald Trump's nominee to be the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged Tuesday that he was an unconventional pick, but vowed to garner the support of American lawmakers and the public. 'I acknowledge that I'm an unconventional nominee; these are unconventional times. It is 9:48PM in Beijing, 6:48PM in Tehran, 4:48PM in Moscow, and 10:48PM in Pyongyang. As we sit here now, our nation faces an unprecedented rising global risk,' retired Lt. Gen. Dan Caine said. Caine said US adversaries were advancing, global nuclear threats were on the rise, and deterrence was paramount. 'Our national defense requires urgent action and reform across the board. We must go faster; we must move with a sense of urgency. We can never forget that our number one job is to create peace through overwhelming strength, and if need be, fight and win our nation's wars,' he said during a hearing in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). Earlier this month, President Donald Trump dismissed the top US military general in a social media post, while the Pentagon chief simultaneously announced the removal of several senior officers. Trump revealed that Caine would be his choice to replace General CQ Brown, who had served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for 16 months under the Biden administration. A career fighter pilot, Caine—also known as 'Razin'—most recently served as the associate director for military affairs at the CIA. He previously held key roles in Iraq, with Trump touting his efforts as 'instrumental' in defeating ISIS. However, controversy arose when Trump claimed that Caine had expressed admiration for him and had worn a MAGA hat. Caine denied the account, stating: 'I think the president was actually talking about somebody else. I've never worn any political merchandise or said anything to that effect.'
Yahoo
14-02-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Drones Over U.S. Bases May Be Threatening Spy Flights: NORTHCOM Commander
Some of the hundreds of drones flying over U.S. military bases and other sensitive areas last year were likely operated with nefarious intentions, the general coordinating the response to domestic incursions told a Senate hearing today. As a result, U.S. Air Force Gen. Gregory M. Guillot, commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), testified that he needs increased authority to better protect these installations. 'The primary threat I see for them in the way they've been operating is detection and perhaps surveillance of sensitive capabilities on our installations,' Guillot explained to a Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) budget request hearing. He was responding to a question about the numerous drone incursions over U.S. military facilities, like the ones over Langley Air Force Base in 2023 that we were the first to cover. Guillot was not asked, nor did he volunteer information about who was operating these drones. A NORTHCOM spokesperson later declined to elaborate. Defense Officials Testify on 2026 Defense Budget Request @SASCGOP @SASCDems – LIVE online here: #SASC — CSPAN (@cspan) February 13, 2025 The limits on defending against drones are, at best, relegated to electronic warfare countermeasures, with simply providing awareness largely being the extent of the counter-drone systems deployed at installations in the United States. At this time, directed energy weapons, like lasers and high-power microwave systems, let alone kinetic capabilities, remain off-limits. This is a glaring issue we raised after our trip to see Guillot at his headquarters in Colorado Springs last year. The threat, Guillot told the committee, is widespread. 'There were 350 detections reported last year on military installations, and that was 350 over a total of 100 different installations of all types and levels of security,' Guillot pointed out. Last month, U.S. Sen. Mark Kelly (D-AZ) told reporters that 'an aspect of this is our adversaries, it just makes sense that they would do this.' 'When I was stationed down at the Pax River Test Center, we used to have North Koreans on the fence,' Kelly explained. 'So how do you get better video of something? You get better video from a drone over the field than you can by standing at the fence of a military base.' NEW EXCLUSIVE: What UAPs? 'It's our adversaries," Sen. Mark Kelly says foes regularly invade US airspace (unpaywalled) — @AskaPol_uaps (@AskaPol_UAPs) February 8, 2025 As we previously reported, in the wake of drone incursions like those over Langley, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Picatinny Arsenal, and others, NORTHCOM was given the role of synchronizing the U.S. military response. U.S. INDOPACOM was given a similar role for the Pacific. This new role ensures 'standardized training, response, tactical techniques and procedures,' stated Guillot. 'And if the base and the service aren't able to handle the incursion, we can bring in help from across the interagency and DOD to support and, perhaps most critically, is we can work closely with the interagency to give them the authority to operate the systems once they arrive, due to our close relationship with the FAA.' In addition, 'in the near future, I think we will have our own capabilities to bring in from NORTHCOM once we procure them to assist if the service and the installation cannot handle the incursion.' However, the responsibility for defending these installations still rests with the local commanders. Often confusing legal and regulatory hurdles limit how and when many counter-drone systems can be employed within the homeland. Concerns about risks of collateral damage resulting from the use of active anti-drone capabilities factor very heavily, too into this equation. Guillot told the Senators that only about half of the 360 bases in the U.S. – considered 'covered installations – even have permission to defend against drones. There are nine criteria allowing bases to be covered, Guillot explained. 'It ranges from nuclear deterrence, missile defense all the way down to if it's a test facility,' he said. Given all these issues, Guillot said he wants to see an expansion of anti-drone authorities under U.S. law known as '130(i).' That's a reference to subsection of Title 10 of the U.S. Code (10 USC 130i), covering current authorities for the 'protection of certain facilities and assets from unmanned aircraft.' Under 130i, the U.S. military has the authority to take 'action' to defend against drones including with measures to 'disrupt control of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, without prior consent, including by disabling the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft by intercepting, interfering, or causing interference with wire, oral, electronic, or radio communications used to control the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft' and the 'use reasonable force to disable, damage, or destroy the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.' The law, however, does not go far enough, Guillot posited, saying it should be expanded to pertain to 'all military installations and not just those that are covered,' he urged. Guillot also asked Senators to expand the distance from a base that countermeasures can be employed. 'I'd also like to see the range expanded to slightly beyond the installation, so they don't have to wait for the threat to get over the installation before they can address it,' he proposed. That's because 'many of these systems can use side-looking or slant range [sensors]. And so they could surveil the base from outside the perimeter, and under the current authorities, we can't address that.' An expansion of authority under 130 (i) is being considered. Senator Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas) explained that he and Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) introduced legislation that would 'give these commanders the legal authority they need, plus the capability required to protect their bases from these kinds of incursions and then hold them accountable for doing so.' Any change in 130 (i) authorities would be on top of the Pentagon's new counter-drone strategy it released in December, which you can read more about here. Among other things, it builds upon a number of existing efforts, including the establishment of the Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO) in 2020. It is also set to tie into a new Pentagon initiative to help speed up the acquisition and fielding of new counter-drone capabilities dubbed Replicator 2. The first Replicator effort has been focused on getting more uncrewed systems into the hands of U.S. warfighters. Because they took place outside the continental United States, the incursions last November over four U.S. Air Force bases in England, which we were also the first to write about, were not addressed by Guillot. The general also did not bring up the thousands of drone sightings that took place at the end of last year that were not over U.S. military installations or sensitive facilities. Biden administration officials downplayed that, saying those drones posed no threat nor had any foreign nexus. In addition, most of the sightings were likely not even drones. However, the incidents sparked an FBI investigation and spurred the FAA to issue scores of Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs), mostly over power facilities. We reached out to the FBI today to find out the status of that investigation. Last month, the FBI told us that they had no suspects and recovered no drones. U.S. President Donald Trump has taken a strong interest in drone incursions and declared he would tell the public what was actually happening in the first days of his administration. However, his press office later claimed that the so-called New Jersey Drones were largely FAA authorized or research-related. TWZ saw no evidence of large scale drone incursions over New Jersey, with a chronic issue of people reporting normal aircraft as mysterious drones being glaringly apparent. .@PressSec Karoline Leavitt reads statement from President Trump: "The drones that were flying over New Jersey in large numbers were authorized to be flown by FAA for research and various other reasons…this was not the enemy." — CSPAN (@cspan) January 28, 2025 For years, The War Zone has raised concerns about dangers posed by drones, and had laid out a detailed case through dozens of reports that adversaries were taking advantage of the lack of aerial domain awareness over and above the homeland. The issue unidentified aerial phenomena, or UAP, is also tied up in this deeply, which is problematic in its own right. You can read all about this here. Guillot's testimony is a clear acknowledgment of this reality and the challenges of defending against it. Whether it spurs Congress to give him greater authority to deal with the problem is something that we will know more about in the coming months. Contact the author: howard@
