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Straits Times
4 hours ago
- Entertainment
- Straits Times
Concert review: SCO's Metamorphosis a harmonious celebration of SG60
Metamorphosis Singapore Chinese Orchestra Singapore Conference Hall July 19, 7.30pm The Singapore Chinese Orchestra's (SCO) opening concert for the 2025/2026 season, led by principal conductor Quek Ling Kiong, was a celebration of SG60. Sixty years of Singapore's nation-building were premised on a multicultural identity and social harmony, all represented in this concert. The evening opened with SCO composer-in-residence Wang Chenwei's Lion City Rhapsody, a modern look at the baroque concerto grosso. Its concertino group of soloists played 14 different instruments and covered the five Chinese dialect groups in Singapore, each with its own distinct colour. Its infectious and kinetic energy founded upon the Nanyin classic Trotting Horses culminated in a greeting for National Day in Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese, Hakka and Hainanese. Of a more descriptive nature was Chen Si'ang's The Grand Canal, which began quietly with serene scenes of quaint river towns on the 2,500-year-old water system. Working itself into a big climax as it empties into the great Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, the quasi-cinematic work was symbolic of longevity and endurance. Former SCO composer-in-residence Law Wai Lun's The Stories Of Singapore highlighted landmarks in the nation's history as viewed in the pages and photographs of local Chinese-language newspapers. The accompanying images to the music's optimistic and self-congratulatory tone have been updated to include defeating the Covid-19 pandemic and the ascensions of Prime Minister Lawrence Wong and President Tharman Shanmugaratnam. There were two concertante pieces, both featuring Young Artist Award-winning percussionists. Top stories Swipe. Select. Stay informed. Singapore 1 in 3 vapes here laced with etomidate; MOH working with MHA to list it as illegal drug: Ong Ye Kung Singapore HSA extends hotline hours, launches new platform to report vaping offences Singapore Tampines regional centre set to get more homes, offices and public amenities Multimedia How to make the most out of small homes in Singapore World Diplomats dismissed: Inside the overhaul reshaping Trump's foreign policy Life US tech CEO Andy Byron resigns after viral Coldplay 'kiss cam' video Opinion I thought I was a 'chill' parent. Then came P1 registration Singapore 'God and government are the only things beyond our control,' says Group CEO India-born tabla player Nawaz Mirajkar was soloist in his Soul Of Damaru, a raga-based work where he performed on one tabla and five damarus (hourglass-shaped Indian drums). The hypnotic spell generated was most magical when heard in counterpoint with Benjamin Boo's xylophone. A quite different atmosphere came with Riduan Zalani helming no less than eight frame drums (including tambourines) in Taiwanese composer Chang Yung-chin's Within And Beyond. In its sequence of increasingly exuberant dances, there were spots for ad libbing and even audience interaction, which kept the episodic work edgy and absorbing. Then came the world premiere of Wang's Converging Resonances, which commemorated 60 years of the Singapore Conference Hall's history. Its metamorphosis from National Trades Union Congress headquarters to SCO's performing home unfolded in the form of a passacaglia, an inventive series of short varaations on a ground bass. While its inspiration came from Johannes Brahms' Fourth Symphony, the immaculate execution with numerous instrumental solos was wholly Chinese in character and feel. Closing the concert was Felix Phang's Pasat Merdu, translated as 'melodious marketplace', another concerto grosso-like work where diverse cultures and ideas are welcome. This adaptation by Germaine Goh for Chinese orchestra placed centrestage four members of The Straits Ensemble – Govin Tan (tabla), Nizar Fauzi (rebana), Azrin Abdullah (oud) and Phang (double bass) – in a raucous and colourful melange. This and the encore of Tamil song Iyarkaiyin Kaatchi, which included guest of honour President Tharman in a clap-along, were enjoyable reminders that multiculturalism in harmony is what makes Singapore tick.


Egypt Independent
21 hours ago
- Politics
- Egypt Independent
China was on the sidelines of the Iran-Israel war. That's just where it wanted to be
Hong Kong CNN — Weeks after his country was battered by waves of Israeli strikes and the US bombed three of its prized nuclear facilities, Iran's foreign minister came to a gathering of regional diplomats in China this week with a simple ask. Their group, the Beijing and Moscow-backed Shanghai Cooperation Organization, should have a way to coordinate response to military aggression and play a 'central role' in addressing such threats, Abbas Araghchi said, according to Iranian state media. Along with Iran, fellow SCO members China and Russia are key members of what lawmakers in Washington have dubbed an 'axis' of authoritarian nations or a growing anti-American alignment of Iran, North Korea, China and Russia. But Iran's proposal didn't seem to get the direct endorsement of the group, a regional security body whose 10 members include close partners China and Russia, but also rivals India and Pakistan. And contained in Araghchi's message was a public hint of Iran's disappointment: that in its time of need last month – when Israeli and US forces struck at will at top military and technological targets – its powerful friends in Beijing and Moscow appeared to sit on the sidelines. Even still, in a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in China's Tianjin on Wednesday, Araghchi 'thanked China for its valuable support to Iran,' according to a Chinese readout. Earlier this month at a summit of BRICS, another China- and Russia-backed grouping of major emerging economies, member state Iran got little more than a statement of 'serious concern over deliberate attacks on civilian infrastructure and peaceful nuclear facilities.' The declaration 'condemned' the strikes but did not name Israel or the US. China's public response – to explicitly condemn the attacks, but not take an evident direct role in peacemaking – however, was widely seen as a sign of the limits to its power in the Middle East, despite its bid in recent years to ramp up its economic and diplomat clout in the region. Beijing has instead focused on using the conflict to play up another message: that China does not want to be a global leader that uses power in the same way as the US. Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi mets Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting on July 15 in Tianjin, China. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affair/Anadolu/Getty Images China's security vision The propaganda machine of China's ruling Communist Party has long decried America's 'hegemony' and its 'wanton use' of force as its rolls out examples of US' involvement in multiple conflicts of recent decades. Frictions with Washington over trade and tech make selling that messaging more important for Beijing, as it needs friends now more than ever. And it sees US President Donald Trump's brash 'America First' foreign policy as creating an opening there. Over the past decade, Chinese aggression to enforce its disputed claims in the South China Sea, its military intimidation of Taiwan, and the growing reach of its expanded navy, whose aircraft carrier strike groups recently conducted drills further from home shores and in greater strength than ever before, have raised alarm among its neighbors – and fueled Washington's urgent warnings to its allies against dealing too closely with China. Beijing has cried 'hypocrisy' and, in 2022, Chinese leader Xi Jinping unveiled his own vision for global security architecture – short on detail, but clear that it opposed the US-led alliance system and military intervention. That vision has brought together Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose shared mistrust for NATO – and view that it's a provocative actor – is a key point of alignment, and a subtext for why Beijing has never condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Experts say China's apparent lack of a role even in mediating the conflict between Israel and Iran, a country with which Beijing has deep historic and economic ties, shows the limits of its influence in the region. But they also say Beijing has little interest in wading into the region's security as a power player. 'In terms of providing mediation, (China) has offered and is more than willing … but it has little capacity to project military power in the Middle East, and even less political will to be openly and directly involved,' said William Figueroa, an expert of China-Iran relations and an assistant professor at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. Unlike the US, which maintains substantial military assets to back its allies and interests in the region, China's on the ground military presence is limited to a naval base in the Horn of Africa nation of Djibouti. Indeed, Beijing's only military alliance is a historic one with neighboring and fellow one-party communist state North Korea. Beijing also shied away from joining international efforts last winter to protect key shipping lanes under attack from Houthi rebels in Yemen following Israel's war on Gaza. The attacks put China's commercial interests at risk even though the Houthis said they won't target Chinese or Russian vessels. And when it comes to efforts to push for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, China has again been on the sidelines, despite positioning itself as leading international voice calling for a ceasefire and criticizing Israel's war. Some experts have argued that if China had more global military might then it may throw around that weight more outside its own region. But in the Israel-Iran conflict, Beijing's focus was instead on 'presenting its support for international law as a superior alternative to what it portrays as the West's militaristic, unlawful interventions,' according to Tong Zhao, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 'While this narrative has limited traction among Middle Eastern states, it plays well in the Global South—where it serves to burnish China's image and reinforce its strategic competition with Washington at the global level,' Zhao added. Iran's Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh (second from left) joins SCO counterparts in a meeting in China's Qingdao a day after the Israel-Iran ceasefire last month. Pedro Pardo/AFP/Getty Images Fair weather friends? Even if Beijing's reaction was not surprising to Tehran, going to China and 'acting like everything's great' may have a been 'a bitter pill to swallow' for Araghchi and Iran's Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh as both traveled to China in recent weeks, according to Jonathan Fulton, a senior fellow for the Atlantic Council's Middle East Programs. Beijing and Tehran have no mutual defense treaty, and the relationship has largely been an economic one. China takes more than 90% of Iran's oil trade, imported through intermediaries, which totaled some $40 billion in profits for Iran last year, according to Muyu Xu, a senior oil analyst at trade intelligence firm Kpler. Even when it comes to China's closest international partner, Russia, Beijing has tread carefully: stopping short of large-scale supply of military goods for Moscow's war in Ukraine, instead buying up Russian fuel and supplying it with dual-use goods that can power its defense industrial base. That support, and more direct military backing from Iran and North Korea for Russia's war, has raised alarm in the West about emerging coordination among members into a so-called anti-American 'axis.' But the latest stress-test of the 'axis' appeared to show its weaknesses: as Israeli and US bombs rained down on Iran, Russia and China looked more focused on their own interests and rhetoric, analysts say, rather than backing Iran materially or using their weight to push Israel or the US to stop the fighting. Xi and Putin did, however, use the conflict to stress their own united front. That said, when it comes to ties with Iran, the real test is likely what's next. 'This is a good example (that) there are limitations to what China's going to do in terms of direct intervention in a military conflict,' Brian Hart, a fellow of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank, said during a recent talk held by the Washington-based center. But 'it's too soon to count China's support for Iran out.' China's model for Russia of 'largely walking right up to that line of not providing overt military support,' could become a dynamic that develops here, Hart said, as Beijing looks to help the regime in Tehran say in power. Dual-use Chinese-made chemicals needed to produce missile fuel were delivered to Iran earlier this year, CNN reporting shows. Even still, Beijing may be looking more skeptically at Iran as a powerful partner in the region in light of the country's 'inability to project power to defend its airspace' against Israel last month, according to Atlantic Council's Fulton. And when it comes to how the latest events may impact any coordination between the so-called 'axis' countries, the fundamentals have not changed, he said. Far from being an alliance or a bloc like those in the West, China, Iran, Russia and North Korea have an 'alignment of grievances' against the West, but 'very different ideas' of how to reshape global rules to address that, Fulton said. And for Beijing, 'what it needs in the Middle East is economically motivated – it needs a stable region, and Iran doesn't really support that. Iran causes as many problems as it solves for Beijing.'
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First Post
a day ago
- Politics
- First Post
RIC vs reality: Why India is cautious of a troika with China and Russia
Perhaps India should privately share its concerns with the Russian leadership and tell them that for the moment, Delhi sees Brics and the SCO as providing enough scope for trilateral cooperation between Russia, India, and China read more 'If a diplomat says yes, he means maybe. If he says maybe, he means no. If he says no, he's not a diplomat.' I was reminded of this old saying by the remarks made by the Official Spokesperson of India's Ministry of External Affairs in the context of the revival of the Russia-India-China (RIC) troika. Russia's deputy foreign minister, Andrei Rudenko, had said recently that Moscow wants the resumption of the RIC format and is negotiating on this issue with Beijing and New Delhi. He said, 'We are interested in making this format work, because these three countries are important partners, besides being the founders of Brics.' He added that 'in this regard, we expect that these countries will agree to resume work within the framework of the RIC'. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Asked for his reaction to Rudenko's comments, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian expressed support for Russia's initiative and said, 'China-Russia-India cooperation not only serves the respective interests of the three countries but also helps uphold peace, security, stability, and progress in the region and the world.' On the other hand, India responded to the Russian proposal in a cautious manner. Randhir Jaiswal, spokesperson for India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), said that the RIC is considered a valuable platform for discussing global and regional issues of shared interest, and India's decision to resume the dialogue hinges on finding a 'mutually convenient manner' for all three nations involved. Thus, without responding negatively to the Russian proposal, India's response is akin to saying 'maybe' in a skilful and diplomatic manner. It is important to note that the RIC framework has been largely inactive in recent years, primarily due to the military tensions between India and China at the Line of Actual Control (LAC). While Russia and China have publicly expressed strong support for revitalising the group, India's stance reflects the need to navigate the delicate balance of its relationships with both countries, particularly in light of unresolved border disputes with China. It would be recalled that speaking at a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eurasia in the city of Perm in the Ural Mountains on May 29, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had also conveyed Russia's interest in reviving the Russia-India-China Troika (RIC). Lavrov had said, 'I would like to confirm our genuine interest in the earliest resumption of the work within the format of the troika—Russia, India, and China—which was established many years ago on the initiative of (ex-Russian prime minister) Yevgeny Primakov and which has organised meetings more than 20 times at the ministerial level since then, not only at the level of foreign policy chiefs but also the heads of other economic, trade, and financial agencies of the three countries.' He also said, 'Now that, as I understand, an understanding has been reached between India and China on how to calm the situation on the border, it seems to me that the time has come to revive this RIC troika.' STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Contrary to what Lavrov had said, tensions remain high along the India-China border, particularly in eastern Ladakh, despite recent agreements and de-escalation efforts. While both sides have shown a willingness to engage in dialogue and reduce the potential for clashes, the underlying territorial disputes and the buildup of military forces continue to fuel concerns about potential escalation. In essence, while there have been some positive steps towards de-escalation, the India-China border situation remains complex and potentially volatile, with the risk of future clashes and escalation as long as the underlying territorial and strategic issues remain unresolved. Increased infrastructure development and troop deployments along the border by China in recent years have further exacerbated tensions. The 2020 Galwan Valley clashes and ongoing border disputes have continued to strain the relationship between India and China. As General Upendra Dwivedi, the Indian Army Chief, said earlier this year, India will not reduce the number of its troops deployed along the Line of Actual Control with China anytime soon, asserting there is still 'a degree of standoff' persisting between the rival armies and the two countries need to rebuild trust to de-escalate overall tensions. General Dwivedi's statement makes it quite clear that there is a lack of trust for China. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The India-China territorial dispute stems from differing interpretations of the border, with China continuing to dispute India's claims over regions like Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. China has issued maps showing Aksai Chin—an area of India's state of Jammu and Kashmir mostly controlled by China since the 1962 war—and the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh within Chinese territory. As recently as May 14 this year, China has reasserted its territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh. Despite professed claims about efforts to improve diplomatic ties with India, the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs published its latest names for places in Arunachal Pradesh, which China calls Zangnan and says is part of the Tibetan autonomous region. The renaming of 27 places covered an array of geographical features: 15 mountains, five residential areas, four mountain passes, two rivers, and one lake. India rejected the new Chinese names for places in Arunachal Pradesh as a 'preposterous' attempt to alter the 'undeniable' reality that the state 'was, is, and will' always be an integral part of India. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD It is, in fact, an old Chinese habit to periodically issue lists of new names for locations in Arunachal Pradesh. India describes the names as 'inventions' by China and has consistently and unequivocally dismissed them. China's renaming of places in Arunachal Pradesh is a strategic move to assert unilateral claims, which India firmly rejects, emphasising Arunachal's integral status. Strengthening infrastructure, military deterrence, and global alliances is crucial for India to counter China's tactics and safeguard sovereignty. There are important geopolitical considerations that also need to be taken into account. China supports Pakistan against India through various means, including providing military equipment, intelligence, and economic assistance. This support is often seen as part of a strategic alliance aimed at countering India's influence in the region. Consequently, India feels that the China-Pakistan axis, characterised by strong military and economic ties, poses a strategic challenge for India. This axis is working against Indian interests, particularly due to China's support for Pakistan in regional disputes. China is a major supplier of military equipment and technology to Pakistan, further strengthening their relationship but escalating mistrust with India. China has emerged as Pakistan's largest arms supplier, accounting for almost 81 per cent of Islamabad's weapon systems inventory. Among the weapons supplied by China to Pakistan are fighter jets, missiles, drones, radar systems, warships, and submarines. China has also been implicated in assisting Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Following the Pahalgam terror attack, China moved swiftly to arm Pakistan. Reports suggest Beijing delivered advanced PL-15 air-to-air missiles to Pakistan's air force within days. Debris from one such missile, found undetonated in India's Punjab, points to Chinese involvement in Pakistan's latest assault. Pakistani jets used in combat were also Chinese-made. During the recent clashes with India, China reportedly provided Pakistan with air defence and satellite support, including adjusting satellite passes to monitor Indian troop movements. China's support for Pakistan, particularly in the context of terrorist groups, further fuels India's concerns. China and Pakistan reportedly objected to the inclusion of The Resistance Front (TRF) and its parent organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in a UN Security Council statement condemning the April 22, 2025, Pahalgam attack. This aligns with a past pattern where China has blocked India's attempts to designate Pakistan-based terrorists and outfits under the UN's 1267 sanctions regime. China had blocked India's proposal at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to ban five Pakistan-based terrorists who carried out terrorist acts against India. These five terrorists are Abdul Rauf Asghar, Sajid Mir, Abdur Rehman Makki, Talha Saeed, and Shahid Mehmood Rehmatullah, who have been involved in several terror attacks in India, including the 26/11 attacks, the 2019 Pulwama attacks, the 2016 Pathankot attack, the 2001 Parliament attack, and the IC 814 hijack. India wanted to get them designated by the UN Security Council as global terrorists, but China blocked this effort. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In conclusion, it needs to be said that the state of the bilateral relationship is not yet such that we should let ourselves be drawn into a closer embrace of China, whose policies are harmful to us beyond doubt. India's approach towards China needs to be a cautious blend of security, economic, and geopolitical considerations. While both countries recognise the benefits of economic engagement, India must remain wary of China's intentions and its policies aimed at undermining India's strategic interests and regional standing. Perhaps we should privately share our concerns with the Russian leadership and tell them that for the moment, we see Brics and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as providing enough scope for trilateral cooperation between Russia, India, and China. The writer is a retired Indian diplomat and had previously served as Consul General in New York. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD


Indian Express
a day ago
- Politics
- Indian Express
China must keep India's red lines in mind
Recent developments in India-China relations, including high-level meetings, suggest that ties are on the mend after prolonged estrangement caused by the bloodletting at Galwan in 2020. The meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping at the 16th BRICS summit at Kazan on October 23, 2024, gave new direction to ties. The resumption of patrolling and grazing activities in eastern Ladakh at the remaining friction points paved the way for disengagement. During recent visits to China for SCO meetings, both Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar have spoken of the need for early de-escalation in the border areas to facilitate normalisation of ties. The resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra this year after a gap of five years has been well-received across India. Yet several key issues remain to be addressed, such as direct flights, stationing of journalists, business visas and the issue of upper riparian river waters data. Initial statements from China after the April 22 terrorist attack in Pahalgam had disappointed India. At the SCO defence ministers' forum in June, Rajnath Singh held firm in rejecting any document that failed to condemn cross-border terrorism. In a positive turnaround, the BRICS Joint Declaration issued following the summit meeting in Brazil, attended by PM Modi, specifically condemns the terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir. It censures terrorism, rejects safe havens and calls out the double standards in countering terrorism. This is the first time that a BRICS statement has specifically condemned any terrorist attack in J&K. This vindicates Modi's proactive stance on combating terrorism as well as the dispatching of all-party delegations to sensitise key nations about Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and Operation Sindoor. It should be recalled that the horrendous 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack had failed to find a place in the then BRIC Countries' Leaders Joint Statement the following year. There was only a generic condemnation of 'terrorism in all its forms and manifestations'. It was in the BRICS Leaders Declaration of September 2017 that mention was made of Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad for the first time. This shows that India and China can reach a consensus on terrorism as part of a broader multilateral context. It may instil confidence at the bilateral level. In the past, China has placed technical blocks on listing Pakistan-based terrorists at the UN. However, the forthcoming SCO summit declaration may not reflect the BRICS formula on terrorism, given Pakistan's membership of the grouping. Going by the statements made by the Indian leadership in recent months, it is evident that peace and tranquillity on the border remain integral to the normalisation of ties. It took years to rebuild ties after the border war in 1962. Subsequent developments, unfortunately, belied early hopes of forging a mutually beneficial trade and economic partnership or maintaining peace and tranquillity in the border areas. Frequent tensions have only served to reinforce negative perceptions of one another. In recent years, the adverse balance of trade with China and the lack of reciprocal market access have shaped public and political opinion in India. Fresh concerns have recently arisen over restrictions placed by China on the export of rare earth magnets for EVs to India, wind turbines and electronics, besides tunnel boring machines and certain high-value fertilisers. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Communist Party of China (CPC) had a jaundiced view of India. Jawaharlal Nehru was maligned as an 'imperial lackey'. China failed to appreciate India's civilisational ethos and the value attached to peace and non-violence. Mahatma Gandhi's pacifist teachings stood in sharp contrast to Mao Zedong's advocacy of class struggle and violent means to bring about change. The CPC's Marxist lens, unfortunately, disregarded the teachings of Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism, which were part of China's heritage. They provided a better civilisational connect with India. Even today, Chinese assessments betray deep suspicion about India's ties with the US. Beijing views the Quad as an 'exclusive clique' that seeks to contain China. Recently, China convened a trilateral meeting with Pakistan and Bangladesh during the China-South Asia Cooperation Forum in Kunming. China's expanding footprint in South Asia lacks transparency and plays a role in widening the existing fault lines. China's 'all-weather friendship' with Pakistan has soured bilateral ties with India. The strategic cooperation with Pakistan, including in the defence and nuclear fields, is a case in point. As Operation Sindoor unfolded, Chinese analysts undertook misinformation campaigns to question India's military success and cast aspersions on its equipment and tactics. India's non-participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Beijing's three Global Initiatives is for a valid reason. The CPEC, a flagship project of the BRI, traverses Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and violates India's sovereignty. Lack of consultation and transparency in regard to China's growing presence in the region, including the Indian Ocean, is cause enough for misgivings. Equality and mutual respect should form the bedrock of bilateral relations. Respect for core concerns cannot be one-sided. China frequently seeks reaffirmation from India of the One China principle with regard to Taiwan and Tibet. The presence of the Dalai Lama in India and the succession question are viewed by Beijing as sensitive issues. Yet, Beijing has failed to reciprocate on India's core interests, whether on Jammu & Kashmir or its nexus with Pakistan. On the question of equality, it is noteworthy that China considered itself an equal of the US in the 1950s and 1960s at a time when the Chinese economy was but a fraction of what it is today. The moot question is whether China is willing to follow the same logic today in dealing with others, regardless of asymmetries in power. Perceptions matter. They play a major role in India-China relations. The positive signs in India-China relations are encouraging. The deep deficit of trust, however, calls for sustained efforts. The two sides must move forward with realistic expectations. The road ahead is arduous. Yet, forging a stable and cooperative relationship between the two Asian neighbours is a goal worth pursuing. The writer is a former ambassador and director general of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. Views are personal


Indian Express
2 days ago
- Business
- Indian Express
Xi-Jaishankar meeting, Nvidia's Jensen Huang in Beijing, and GDP data
Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar met Chinese President Xi Jinping during his first visit to China after the 2020 standoff along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) began. Jaishankar was in Tianjin to attend the meeting of foreign ministers from Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) countries on July 14 and 15. China had another high-profile visitor this week in Jensen Huang, the CEO of the tech giant NVIDIA. Earlier this month, it became the first public company in history to achieve a market capitalisation of $4 trillion. Huang spoke in Mandarin at an event in Beijing and signed autographs as part of what's been described as a 'charm offensive'. Finally, as we mentioned last week, China's latest GDP numbers for April to June were released, revealing a better-than-expected 5.2% growth. Here is a closer look at these developments: Following Defence Minister Rajnath Singh's June visit to China, which holds the rotating SCO presidency this year, Jaishankar went to Tianjin in northeastern China last week. While Singh refused to sign a draft statement that did not mention the Pahalgam terror attack, Jaishankar also used the platform to speak about terrorism. He said the SCO was founded in 2001 to combat the 'three evils' of 'terrorism, separatism and extremism', and that the grouping needed to take an 'uncompromising position on this challenge'. In a post on X, the minister said he 'Apprised President Xi of the recent development of our bilateral ties. Value the guidance of our leaders in that regard.' UPSHOT: In a statement during a meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, Jaishankar noted that 'Since our leaders' meeting in Kazan in October 2024 (for the BRICS summit), the India-China relationship has been gradually moving in a positive direction. Our responsibility is to maintain that momentum.' That month, India and China completed the process of disengagement of troops in the Depsang Plains and Demchok areas of eastern Ladakh, two friction points along the LAC. 'We have made good progress in the past nine months for the normalization of our bilateral relations. It is a result of the resolution of friction along the border and our ability to maintain peace and tranquility there,' he said. This was significant, given the lack of discussion on these locations until recently. Easing of border-related disagreement, at least to an extent, has heightened the pace of cooperation in other areas, such as the resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra. An opinion article published in Global Times, the Chinese state media website, also had an interesting perspective about the slow pace of normalisation. 'New Delhi… begun to highlight its economic and security concerns regarding China. Many Chinese analysts pointed to the US factor behind Indian hesitation, while Indian scholars emphasized that India not be defined solely by its relationship with the US. How New Delhi handle the US divide-and-rule tactics will significantly affect its efforts on how and when to reset ties with China.' The Xi-Jaishankar meeting also led some commentators to speculate that Prime Minister Narendra Modi may visit China in late August for the SCO annual summit. The Taiwan-born CEO of the chip-designing giant has made several trips to China in recent years. This was his third trip in roughly the last six months. Huang did a host of things — he met Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng, and Xiaomi founder and CEO Lei Jun, whom he called 'a brilliant business person' according to a CNBC report. At one point, he 'swapped his signature leather jacket for traditional Chinese-style attire and delivered a speech at the opening ceremony of a government-backed business fair, partly in Chinese,' The Wall Street Journal reported. He called China's supply chain 'a miracle,' praising the country's researchers, developers and entrepreneurs. UPSHOT: The visit came as Nvidia announced on Tuesday that it may soon sell its H20 chips again. They were meant for the Chinese market after its higher-quality chips were restricted by the US government. However, these chips were also prevented from being sold in China later. It was part of the policy to deprive China of key AI technology for strategic and security reasons, as the capability gap between the two countries narrows. 'NVIDIA is filing applications to sell the NVIDIA H20 GPU again. The U.S. government has assured NVIDIA that licenses will be granted, and NVIDIA hopes to start deliveries soon,' a statement from the company said. Relatively less advanced, these chips were positioned by the company as preventing the growth of Chinese indigenous companies, while also conveniently benefiting an American company. The New York Times recently reported that Huang recently met US President Donald Trump in the Oval Office and 'pressed his case for restarting sales of his specialized chips'. 'He argued that American chips should be the global standard and that the United States was making a grave mistake by ceding the giant Chinese market to homegrown rivals,' it added. However, Huang has also been criticised by some US politicians for excessively attempting to deepen ties with China. Since the second quarter covered the period when Trump announced his 'Liberation Day' tariffs, the release of this data was eagerly awaited to see how the Chinese economy fared. Undoubtedly, maintaining an above-5% growth rate is a positive sign, but the data also showed lower growth in domestic consumption, something long described as a problem area. We wrote two explainers breaking down the data this week. First, we looked at how the numbers stand and the recent factors that helped and hurt the economy. Second, we spoke to an analyst of the Chinese economy about the larger causes behind deflation and a slump in consumption. The bottom line is that while exports and manufacturing remain important drivers, domestic issues need to be addressed as well. Moreover, the data from later in the year could drive decisions on stimulus packages. Rishika Singh is a Senior sub-editor at the Explained Desk of The Indian Express. She enjoys writing on issues related to international relations, and in particular, likes to follow analyses of news from China. Additionally, she writes on developments related to politics and culture in India. ... Read More