Latest news with #Salafi
Time of India
3 days ago
- Politics
- Time of India
India, Algeria all set to deepen ties against Pak-based Salafi terrorists
India and Algeria are exploring ties to boost counter-terror partnership against common terror threat from Pak-based Salafi forces. The issue was in focus when Indian MPs on a tour of key states in the Arab world met stakeholders in Algeria (currently a non-permanent member of UNSC), ET has learnt. The delegation to Algeria (known for its secular credentials) is being led by BJP MP Baijayant Panda. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Top Vet Warns: "Never Do This With an Aging Dog" Dr. Marty Watch Now Undo During their four-day visit, the members of the delegation are focusing on cross-border terrorism . "Taking India's message to the world! A warm welcome to all-party delegation of Members of Parliament led by Baijayant Jay Panda, upon their arrival in #Algiers...," said a post on X by Indian embassy in Algeria. Live Events Algeria, which has battled terrorism in the past, has lukewarm ties with Pakistan over ISI's alleged links with Algerian terror group, Islamic Salvation Front.
New Indian Express
25-05-2025
- Politics
- New Indian Express
Un-Islamic or intolerance? Debate on Sufi songs hits discordant notes
KOZHIKODE: A Salafi group has lashed out at the growing popularity of Sufi songs in Kerala, branding them un-Islamic and the major source of moral degeneration among the youth. 'Sufi songs that destroy the religion' was the most recent topic of discussion on Proof Point, the online platform of the Wisdom Islamic Organisation, where Salafi scholars talk on current issues. The scholars asserted that many un-Islamic ideas are being smuggled into Sufi songs in the name of artistic expression. 'Organisations such as the Samastha and the Jama'at-e-Islami are promoting it by arranging special sessions at their programmes,' Shuraih Salafi said during the discussion. He said Sufism is the tool developed by Shias to destroy Islam from within. They are promoting a spirituality that is prohibited in Islam and the Sufi claim that there is no difference between Allah and the individual amounts to 'shirk' (polytheism). 'The popularity of Sufi songs has seen the emergence of new musicians. They are being promoted as representatives of Islam because they appear in Islamic attire,' Salafi said. 'On the other side, youths are running after rappers. Thousands are jostling to listen to people who do gimmicks on stage, without even proper dress,' he said. 'They don't get the beauty...' Speaking to TNIE, Sufi musician Nazar Malik said Salafis cannot understand the beauty of Islam because they practice a dry religion. 'I think the Wisdom group started their attack on Sufi music by playing one of my songs at their conference in 2022, without my consent. The song was on Imam Hussain, the beloved grandson of Prophet Muhammad. Salafis are intolerant even to the family of the Prophet,' Malik said. 'Karbala, where Imam Hussain was murdered, was the theme of many songs of the Muslim families of Kerala. Many virtues of traditional Islam have disappeared with the advent of the Salafis,' he said. Malik said his music is his spiritual expression and no one has the right to oppose it. 'The Salafis attack us ideologically in places where they have no majority and no power. They would have done something else if they had power in Kerala. Even without power, they destroyed a dargah at Nadukani in Malappuram.' He said Sufi musicians have done nothing harmful, unlike the Salafi preachers, whose irresponsible speeches have become an easy tool for those attacking Islam. 'On the one hand, you see the Sangh parivar coming out against Vedan, the rapper. Here, Salafis are jumping on us,' Malik added.
Shafaq News
24-05-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
The 15% ceiling: Islamist parties' complex path in Iraqi Kurdistan
Shafaq News/ Islamist movements in the Kurdistan Region are grappling with waning public support, evolving social dynamics, and mounting regional interference. Although Kurdish society blends religious conservatism with modern nationalist ideals, Islamist parties have struggled to convert that cultural fabric into lasting political traction. While party leaders claim growing influence, analysts argue that political Islam in Kurdistan has stalled—its momentum slowed by deep-rooted historical and ideological constraints. A Fragmented Rise Islamist political movements began to emerge in the Kurdistan Region in the late 20th century, shaped by regional developments and shifting domestic dynamics. The Kurdistan Islamic Movement (KIM) was established in 1987 by Sheikh Osman Abdul Aziz and a group of clerics, drawing ideological influence from both the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi currents. The political landscape shifted in 1991 following the Kurdish uprising against Saddam Hussein and the creation of a de facto autonomous administration in northern Iraq. This new environment allowed for the rise of various political actors, including Islamist factions. Among them was the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), launched as the Kurdish branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. In contrast to the KIM, the KIU, at that time, emphasized political participation and engagement with emerging institutions rather than armed activity. Throughout the 1990s, the KIM maintained an armed wing and became involved in a series of confrontations with secular Kurdish parties, particularly the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). These clashes reflected both ideological differences and local power rivalries. Over time, regional mediation efforts contributed to a gradual de-escalation and the partial demobilization of KIM forces. The group eventually moved toward greater involvement in formal political processes. Internal divisions continued to shape the Islamist camp. In the early 2000s, Ali Bapir, a senior KIM leader, split from the movement to form a new faction—the Islamic Group of Kurdistan, later renamed the Kurdistan Justice Group (KJG/ Jama'at Al-Adl Al-Islamiya). This party adopted a more pragmatic posture, combining Islamic values with advocacy for social and political reform, and gradually built a support base in certain areas of the region. Hardline factions also emerged. In 2001, Ansar al-Islam was established near the Iranian border, adopting a Salafi-jihadist ideology and imposing strict interpretations of Islamic law in territories under its control. The group pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and drew international attention during the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. It was targeted in joint operations involving Kurdish and American forces. Despite initial momentum and an established presence in some areas, Islamist parties have struggled to secure broad political influence. Collectively, they have rarely won more than 15% of the vote in Kurdistan Region parliamentary elections. Analysts attribute this to the sustained dominance of the two main secular nationalist parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the PUK, as well as internal divisions among Islamist factions. Leaders Claim Gains, Analysts See Dip The strength of Islamist parties in the Kurdistan Region remains a subject of debate, with party leaders defending their relevance while analysts highlight signs of decline. Ahmed Haji Rashid, senior leader in the Kurdistan Justice Group (KJG) and member of Iraq's federal parliament, rejected claims of waning influence. In remarks to Shafaq News, he pointed to the group's performance in Baghdad, where Islamist representation increased from four seats during the 2018–2021 terms to five in the current parliament—an outcome viewed as evidence of stable voter support. Addressing the 2024 Kurdistan parliamentary elections, Rashid noted that Islamist parties secured 10 out of 100 seats, down from 12 in 2018. He described the drop as marginal and underscored continued backing in conservative regions such as Halabja, Kirkuk, and parts of Erbil and al-Sulaymaniyah. He also distinguished between Islam as a cultural identity and Islamism as a political project. 'Kurdistan's religiosity is not seasonal, It's cultural, generational, and deeply ingrained.' In his view, this enduring social structure continues to sustain faith-based political movements. Others view the trajectory differently. Political analyst Fuad Majid, based in al-Sulaymaniyah, pointed to structural weaknesses within Islamist factions, many of which were built on models imported from abroad, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkiye's Justice and Development Party (AKP). These origins, he argued, limited their ability to align with Kurdish political traditions and resonate with younger voters. Majid also identified past links to extremism as a lasting burden. The legacy of Ansar al-Islam in the early 2000s and the more recent trauma of ISIS have contributed to public unease. 'Many people associate political Islam with instability and authoritarianism. Even among religious families, skepticism toward Islamist parties is on the rise,' he noted to Shafaq News. A 2024 survey conducted by the Kurdistan Institute for Political Studies reflected this trend. Only 11% of respondents supported Islamist parties, compared with 52% favoring nationalist or secular groups. Among voters under 30, support for Islamist factions dropped below 6%, indicating a sharp generational decline. Nearly 37% expressed no party preference, citing broad disillusionment with the political system. Observers also reported declining turnout in areas once considered Islamist bastions. Without internal reforms and a coordinated political vision, projections suggest Islamist parties may struggle to hold even 10% of the vote in future Kurdistan parliamentary elections. Undermining Kurdish Unity? Beyond electoral dynamics, analysts are voicing concern over the growing influence of cross-border Islamist movements in the Kurdistan Region, warning that these ideologies may be weakening national cohesion and reshaping social norms. Karzan Murad, an academic in international relations, described movements such as Salafism, political Shiism, and factions aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood as more than religious currents. In comments to Shafaq News, he characterized them as strategic tools used by regional powers to undermine Kurdish nationalism. 'These groups exploit social vacuums to instill sectarian loyalty in place of national belonging,' Murad explained, pointing to a rising trend among such movements to reject ethnic identity altogether, often framing it as religious deviation. 'They regard national identity as heresy,' he observed. Murad identified the 2014 ISIS offensive on Sinjar and the subsequent Yazidi genocide as a turning point that revealed the social impact of extremist ideologies. He linked the massacre to a broader erosion of Kurdish cultural foundations. 'Their rise has fueled extremism and weakened traditional Kurdish values,' he said. He also raised concerns over changing demographics in disputed areas, where Iran-backed armed groups and other regional actors have been accused of influencing population patterns. These efforts, he argued, form part of a broader campaign to dilute Kurdish presence and fragment collective identity. Piety vs. Politics The evolution of Islamist movements in Kurdistan has not occurred in isolation from regional dynamics. Over the past few decades, the Middle East has witnessed recurring waves of political Islam—from the Iranian revolution to the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the emergence of jihadist groups. Though these movements primarily unfolded elsewhere, they still had an indirect impact on the Kurdish political landscape. External support for Kurdish Islamist factions from regional powers, such as the close relationship between the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) and Turkiye, and the ideological continuity of the Muslim Brotherhood across borders, helped shape the local political-Islamic current. However, as the threat of ISIS loomed large, many Kurds turned to their nationalist parties, seeking security and stability. In the face of existential dangers, the appeal of Islamist discourse waned, as Kurdish political priorities shifted toward safeguarding the region's future. Between 2014 and 2017, as Kurdish forces led battles against ISIS, voter turnout in some conservative districts shifted decisively in favor of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Yet, popular piety remains deeply embedded in Kurdish society. Daily religious practices—ranging from wearing the hijab and attending mosques to following Sufi traditions—coexist with strong political loyalty to secular nationalist parties. This creates a paradox: while Islam holds a significant emotional and cultural presence, it has not translated into the same political traction. As Ahmad Haji Rashid observed, "deep-rooted popular Islam is one thing, and political Islam is another," underscoring the distinction between personal devotion and political engagement. Despite these complexities, the Kurdistan Islamic Union has remained a notable opposition force, rejecting what it perceives as populist rhetoric. "We chose not to join the latest government due to service and economic challenges and a lack of transparency," Political Bureau member Ghazi Saeed explained to Shafaq News. "Nevertheless, we preserved a solid level of representation—in fact, our seats in the Kurdistan Parliament rose from five to seven, even though the total number of contested seats was reduced." Saeed further emphasized that while some parties may experience temporary electoral success, "they quickly dissolve." The KIU, he added, places greater importance on consistency and principles than on chasing fleeting political waves.
Al-Ahram Weekly
22-05-2025
- Politics
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Intense skirmishes in Libya - World - Al-Ahram Weekly
The flareup of violence in the Libyan capital Tripoli last week was a stark remainder of the fragility of the security situation in the country and the looming possibility of a slide back into civil war The Libyan Presidential Council, in cooperation with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), launched a mechanism to stabilise the truce and ceasefire in Tripoli on 18 May. Meanwhile, the Libyan capital was rocked by intense skirmishes last week between the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Terrorism and Organised Crime (RADA), which is affiliated with the Presidential Council, and the 444th Combat Brigade, which is part of the internationally recognised Libyan Government of National Unity (GNU). As these forces clashed, several armed groups in Western Libya attempted to march on the capital. The unrest erupted after a security operation carried out by the GNU against the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) following the assassination of SSA commander Abdulghani Al-Kikli in Tripoli on 12 May. The circumstances surrounding his assassination remain unclear. Al-Kikli (also known as Ghnewa) had commanded one of the largest militia groups in Tripoli. While nominally subordinate to the Presidential Council, it operated independently. According to some reports, Al-Kikli was killed following disputes with leaders of other armed factions from Tripoli and Misrata over control of key government facilities in the capital, such as the Libyan Telecommunications Holding Company and the Audit Bureau. During the GNU security operation, government forces took over the Abu Salim district in Southern Libya, which had served as Al-Kikli's and the SSA's stronghold. Tensions in the capital then heightened further when GNU Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah issued a decree dissolving the RADA and dispatched the 444th Brigade to seize the RADA headquarters in Eastern Tripoli. In response, Abdelraouf Kara, the commander of the RADA, sought support from militia factions in Warshefana and Zawiya, tribal areas west of Tripoli opposed to Dbeibah. As has occurred before with many of the armed factions that proliferated in post-Gaddafi Libya, Kara and 444th Brigade Commander Mahmoud Hamza had once been allies. Both are from the Souq Al-Jumaa district of eastern Tripoli, share a similar radical Salafi ideological outlook, and worked closely together until their rupture in 2022. According to Libyan sources, the Warshefana and Zawiya militias aimed not just to defend Kara and the RADA but also to join forces with him to topple Dbeibah and replace him with a new prime minister representative of various influential forces in Western Libya. The clashes between the RADA and the 444th Brigade last week brought life in the capital to a halt and caused significant damage to public and private property in Tripoli. Although a ceasefire was announced after two days of fierce fighting and neutral forces have been deployed as peacekeepers, the authorities have yet to release any official casualty figures. Meanwhile, Dbeibah is also facing pressure from other quarters. Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) Aguila Saleh called on the Attorney General to launch an investigation into the GNU prime minister in connection with the assassination of Al-Kikli and the events in the capital and impose a travel ban on him. Khaled Al-Mishri, who is contesting the validity of the elections that led to his replacement as the head of the High Council of State (HCS) by Mohamed Takala, has called for the formation of a new government in coordination with the HoR. The GNU has lost its legitimacy, Al-Mishri declared. As though to confirm this, anti-government protests then erupted over the weekend, demanding Dbeibah's removal and the appointment of a new interim prime minister to oversee the rest of the transitional period until national elections are held. To quell the violence and de-escalate tensions triggered by Dbeibah's actions, Mohamed Al-Menfi, head of the Presidential Council, officially annulled Dbeibah's decrees to restructure the security agencies, including the order to dissolve the RADA. He also proclaimed a truce and reached an agreement with UNSMIL to secure the current ceasefire and enhance security in the capital. The agreement was concluded in the presence of UN Special Representative and UNSMIL head Hanna Tetteh and her Deputy for Political Affairs Stephanie Khoury. The mechanism calls for a 'Truce Committee' tasked with promoting a permanent ceasefire among the militia factions in Tripoli, protecting the civilian population, and reaching an agreement on security arrangements for the capital. In a televised address on 17 May, Dbeibah attempted to explain the government's security operation in Abu Salim. It was part of broader security arrangements for Tripoli that had targeted a militia that was beyond the control of the state, had extorted public institutions, had taken over six banks, and had exploited the Internal Security Agency for private gain, he said. The militia had committed many violations in the areas it controls and had contributed to the fragmentation of sovereign institutions. Dbeibah attributed the subsequent violence to an attempted 'coup' masterminded by Aguila Saleh, commander of the Libyan National Army in Benghazi, and Khaled Al-Mishri. He stressed his commitment to restoring order and consolidating state authority in Tripoli and expressed his dismay over the protests calling for his removal and the formation of a new government. He cast the GNU, which is not an elected body or created by an elected body, as a manifestation of the democratic gains of the 17 February 2011 Revolution. The sudden flareup of violence in the capital last week was a stark remainder of the fragility of the security situation and the looming possibility of a slide back into civil war. Dbeibah's insistence on implementing what he called new security arrangements but what others read as a bid to consolidate power is a reflection of his government's fragility, as manifested in the HoR's withdrawal of confidence and the resignation of several ministers. Some reports suggest that he is now engaged in talks with various political forces to engineer a cabinet reshuffle. Towards this end, he hopes to take advantage of the fragmentation among his political rivals as well as the general animosity between the HoR and HSC, which continue to haggle over details regarding the electoral laws and the constitutional framework. Meanwhile, international stakeholders are still divided over how to handle the Libyan crisis. Dbeibah is in a delicate position. He wants to demonstrate his ability to enforce the new security arrangements in Tripoli, dismantle the power centres of rival militias, and remove them from government institutions that they saw as their own turf. However, achieving this will require international support, something that was largely absent during the recent clashes, although now it may have quietly reemerged in the form of UNSMIL's coordination with the Presidential Council on ceasefire stabilisation. If Dbeibah succeeds in eliminating the RADA, as he did the SSA last week, he will have secured his personal control over the capital, sidelining rivals and bolstering his influence as the main power in Western Libya. This presents a dilemma for both Libyans and the international community. On the one hand, if the Tripoli-based GNU can assert its control over the capital and Western Libya, this might ensure the success of efforts to reform the government institutions. However, tensions would seethe dangerously beneath the surface due to the ongoing opposition to Dbeibah and his government among significant political forces. Conversely, Dbeibeh's failure to secure control over the capital would contribute to perpetuating the ongoing security chaos and institutional collapse, which are hampering efforts to rebuild and improve the country's degraded public services. This is why many believe that institutional and structural reform should take priority, especially given the ongoing deadlock in the political process. The aim of this is to lay the legislative and practical groundwork for the long overdue Libyan presidential and parliamentary elections to restore the legitimacy of the country's institutions and leadership. * A version of this article appears in print in the 22 May, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
Scoop
18-05-2025
- Politics
- Scoop
Rehabilitation And Confidence Tricks: al-Sharaa, Trump And Sanctions
Contrary to the propaganda of moral upstarts, terrorism pays. It proves rewarding. It establishes states and reconstitutes others. It encourages change, for ill or otherwise. The stance taken, righteously pitiful, on not negotiating with those who practise it, is as faulty as battling gravity. The case of Syria's interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is a brilliant example of this. While seen as a new broom that did away with the government of President Bashar al-Assad in such stunning fashion, al-Sharaa's bristles remain blood speckled. The scene says it all: a meeting lasting 37 minutes in Riyadh with a US President holding hands in communal machismo with a bearded Jihadi warrior who once had a $10 million bounty on his head. Present was the delighted Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan joining by telephone. It proved most rewarding for al-Sharaa, who has become a salesman for the new Syria, scrubbing up for appearances. His main message: remove crushing sanctions barring access to investment and finance. It also proved rewarding for the efforts made by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in convincing the Trump administration that a new approach towards Damascus was warranted. 'The sanctions,' reflected Trump, 'were brutal and crippling and served as an important, really, an important function nevertheless at the time, but now it's their time to shine.' But lifting sanctions would offer Syria 'a chance at greatness'. This signalled a striking volte face from the stance taken in December 2024, when Trump expressed the view that Syria was 'a mess', not a friend of the United States and not deserving of any intervention from Washington. In remarks made by Trump to journalists keeping him company, the US President expressed admiration for the strongman, the brute, the resilient survivor. 'Tough guy, very strong past.' And what a past, one marked by links to al-Qaeda via the affiliate Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group that were only severed in 2017. HTS's predecessor, Jabhat al-Nusra, was commanded by al-Sharaa, then known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. In January 2017, HTS was born as a collective of Salafi jihadists comprising Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki, Liwa al-Haq, Jaysh al-Sunna and Jabhat Ansar al-Din. Even at present, a shadow lingers over al-Sharaa's interim government. In March, over 100 people were butchered in the coastal city of Banias. These atrocities were directed against the Alawite minority and instigated by militias affiliated with the new regime, ostensibly as part of a response to attacks in Latakia and Tartous from armed groups affiliated with the deposed Assad regime. According to Amnesty International's Secretary General Agnès Callamard, 'the authorities failed to intervene to stop the killings. Once again, Syrian civilians have found themselves bearing the heaviest cost as parties to the conflict seek to settle scores.' The announcement by Trump on lifting US sanctions sent officials scurrying. While the plan to bring Syria out of the cold had been on the books for some months, the timing, as with all things with the US president, was fickle. Presidential waivers on sanctions do, after all, only go so far and the more technically minded will have to pour over the details of repeal. The Secretary of State Marco Rubio offered a dose of clarification some 24 hours after the announcement. 'If we make enough progress, we'd like to see the law repealed, because you're going to struggle to find people to [invest] in a country when [at any point] in six months, sanctions could come back. We're not there yet. That's premature.' Progress is in the works, with Rubio meeting his Syrian counterpart, Foreign Minister Asad Hassan al-Shaibani in Antalya on May 15. In comments from State Department spokesman, Tammy Bruce, the Secretary 'welcomed the Syrian government's calls for peace with Israel, efforts to end Iran's influence in Syria, commitment to ascertaining the fate of US citizens missing or killed in Syria, and elimination of all chemical weapons.' In answers to a press gathering, Rubio revealed how much of a success al-Sharaa has been in wooing Washington. 'We have governing authorities there now who have expressed, not openly and repeatedly, that they do – that this is a nationalistic movement designed to building their country in a pluralistic society in which all the different elements of Syrian society are able to live together.' There had also been an interest in normalising ties with Israel and 'driving out foreign fighters and terrorists and others that would destabilize the country and are enemies of this transitional authority.' While no mention is made of al-Sharaa's own colourful, bloodied past, the previous ruler, Assad, comes in for scathing mention. His rule was 'brutal', one characterised by gassing and murdering 'his own people'. It was Assad who sowed the seeds that would allow foreign fighters to take root in Syria's soil. How curious that HTS would have attracted those very same fighters. Things have come full circle. The Assad dynasts, who kept a watchful eye on fundamentalist Islamists, are gone. The Islamists, with their various backers, Turkey and Saudi Arabia being most prominent, are now nominally in charge. The rest is a confidence trick that might, given al-Sharaa's recent performance, just work.
