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Exclusive: inside the spy dossier that led Israel to war
Exclusive: inside the spy dossier that led Israel to war

Hindustan Times

time8 hours ago

  • Politics
  • Hindustan Times

Exclusive: inside the spy dossier that led Israel to war

WHEN ISRAEL launched its war on Iran on June 13th it did so on the basis of intelligence that it claimed showed Iran had reached a 'point of no return' in its quest for a nuclear weapon. That evidence galvanised Israel's own security establishment to support an attack now. It has been shown to America and other Western partners, presumably playing an important role in their ongoing decision-making over whether to support or even join the war. The Economist has not seen the material directly, but has gained exclusive insights from an authoritative source, giving a view of Israel's dossiers, as shared with its allies, and the claims they make over enriched uranium and the speeding-up of Iran's programme. Some of the details are already known; some are new. These claims are proving contentious, with the intelligence services of some Western countries cautious about the imminence of the Iranian threat, and signs of divisions within President Donald Trump's administration. Our report provides context on these disputes. We understand that the information presented by Israel includes a detailed account of a recent, more urgent, push by Iranian scientists towards 'weaponisation', or the creation of an explosive nuclear device. The dossier provides two key pieces of reported evidence for this claim. The first is that an Iranian scientific team has squirrelled away a quantity of nuclear material, of unclear enrichment status, that is unknown to the monitors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a UN watchdog (on June 9th the IAEA assessed Iran had official stockpiles of over 400kg of highly enriched uranium). The second piece of reported evidence is that the scientists have accelerated their work and were about to meet commanders of Iran's missile corps, apparently to prepare for the future 'mating' of a nuclear warhead with a missile. More on the war between Israel and Iran: Much of Iran's previous dabbling with research and activity related to nuclear weapons was in the public domain already. The IAEA has published several reports documenting this, drawn in part from intelligence supplied by Israel and other countries. In 2018 a team at Harvard University also published their own analysis of Iranian documents purloined by Israel. Taken together, these sources described a broad and sustained Iranian effort towards making a uranium core for a bomb, the explosives required to implode that core in order to cause a chain reaction and a programme to place a spherical payload onto Iran's Shahab-3 ballistic missile. In a report published on May 31st, the IAEA noted that in 2003 Iran had planned to conduct what the Institute for Science and International Security, a think-tank, calls a 'cold test'—a simulated nuclear weapon which uses natural or depleted uranium rather than weapons-grade uranium. Israel's intelligence assessments repeat some of this information. They allege that a cohort of Iranian scientists have been working on overt and covert weapons-related research for years. This effort was originally part of Iran's formal nuclear-weapons research programme, known as AMAD, that it shut down in 2003, probably because it feared an American attack. The scientists' ongoing work is thought to be carried out under Iran's Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (also known by its Farsi acronym, SPND), under the cover of activity in fields like covid-19 vaccines and laser technology. One of a small number of non-scientists who were aware of the work was Major-General Mohammad Bagheri, who as chief of staff of Iran's military had oversight of both the regular armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). But the Israeli intelligence dossiers also contain information that, if correct, is genuinely new. They suggest that roughly six years ago the scientists formed a secret 'Special Progress Group', under the auspices of the former AMAD director, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. This group's aim was to prepare the way for a much quicker weaponisation process, if and when a decision was made by Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, to rush for a bomb. Mr Fakhrizadeh was assassinated by Israel in November 2020. On June 13th in the first hours of the war, the Israeli government published slides describing this backstory. But we have been told that it also shared further assessments with allies that suggest the Special Progress Group stepped up its research at the end of last year. Iran had a new incentive to advance to a bomb. It was reeling from the limited impact of its missile attacks on Israel, and the depletion of its air defences by Israeli strikes in October 2024. And it was facing the collapse of its proxies, Hamas and Hizbullah, in Gaza and Lebanon. Lastly, Israel's intelligence states that a meeting had been scheduled between the scientists and commanders of the IRGC's air force, who are in charge of ballistic missiles. The information shared by Israel with its allies argues this proposed meeting was a rubicon, with the missile chiefs being let in on the secret for the first time, suggesting in turn that planning for the 'mating' process of a nuclear device to a missile warhead was about to begin. Iran had done some of this work in the past—in 2011 the IAEA cited claims that Iran had done computer modelling studies to see how a 'spherical payload', such as a warhead, would stand up to the stresses of being launched on a ballistic missile. Miniaturising and mating a warhead to a missile are highly complex tasks that could still take Iran a substantial time to master. Israel's new claims are feeding into an American intelligence community that already has a range of views on the Iranian threat. In March Tulsi Gabbard, America's director of national intelligence—and a longstanding opponent of war with Iran—repeated the view that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon. In recent days the Wall Street Journal, New York Times and CNN have reported that American intelligence agencies are sceptical of the new Israeli claims. On June 17th Rafael Grossi, the director-general of the IAEA, said that his agency had not been presented with 'proof of a systematic effort to move into a nuclear weapon', although a week before the IAEA confirmed that Iran 'did not declare nuclear material and nuclear-related activities' at three undeclared locations in Iran. Mr Trump may nonetheless have been influenced by the Israeli view. On June 17th he declared, 'I don't care what she said,' referring to Ms Gabbard. 'I think they were very close to having one [a bomb].' David Albright, an American nuclear physicist and weapons expert who is consulted by intelligence agencies, says that most of the claims contained in the recent Israeli dossiers are 'generally accepted among [Western] intelligence communities'. However he accepts that there are claims that are new to him, over the diversion of nuclear material and the suggestion of an imminent meeting with missile forces. And he says that American intelligence analysts also agree that Iran has accelerated preparations for weaponisation—in July last year the director of national intelligence omitted the traditional wording that Iran 'isn't currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device' in a report to Congress, according to the Wall Street Journal. Assuming Israel's dossiers are factually accurate, there is still room for what Mr Albright calls the 'the interpretation of the facts'. Even if American analysts accept that Iran has the intent to pursue a bomb and has accelerated its push, they may disagree that it has crossed a threshold or that the threat is truly imminent. Meanwhile, the Israelis, he says, 'may think it's a bit faster and worry about their own ability to detect and act in time'. Israeli officials used to present their assessments of Iran's nuclear push using timelines measured in months and years. Since the war began, they have talked of the 'point of no return'—a moment at which Israel would no longer be capable of halting an Iranian dash to a bomb. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, has spent decades warning of the threat from Iran. That means confirmation bias is a risk. But the stance of Israel's intelligence community is unified and consistent with the government's view. Perhaps it has been put under political pressure, but it has clashed with Mr Netanyahu and other prime ministers on the nuclear file in the past. Now it backs the war. Nuclear physics is a science. Intelligence assessment is not, but has enormous real-world consequences. In 2003 America and its allies went to war in Iraq based on faulty assessments of its alleged weapons of mass destruction. In the opening strike of the war on June 13th, Israel assassinated key scientists and officials. Nuclear facilities have been bombed. The Israelis claim they have removed the imminent danger of Iran dashing towards weaponisation. Still, setting Iran's nuclear programme back by years also depends on destroying, or at least inflicting significant damage, on Iran's main underground uranium-enrichment plants in Natanz, and in Fordow, which has not yet been hit. Mr Trump may decide this is a job for America, whatever his spooks say. Get 360° coverage—from daily headlines to 100 year archives.

THE ECONOMIST: Inside the spy dossier that led Israel to war
THE ECONOMIST: Inside the spy dossier that led Israel to war

West Australian

time9 hours ago

  • Politics
  • West Australian

THE ECONOMIST: Inside the spy dossier that led Israel to war

When Israel launched its war on Iran on June 13 it did so on the basis of intelligence that it claimed showed Iran had reached a 'point of no return' in its quest for a nuclear weapon. That evidence galvanised Israel's own security establishment to support an attack now. It has been shown to America and other Western partners, presumably playing an important role in their ongoing decision-making over whether to support or even join the war. The Economist has not seen the material directly, but has gained exclusive insights from an authoritative source, giving a view of Israel's dossiers, as shared with its allies, and the claims they make over enriched uranium and the speeding-up of Iran's programme. Some of the details are already known; some are new. These claims are proving contentious, with the intelligence services of some Western countries cautious about the imminence of the Iranian threat, and signs of divisions within President Donald Trump's administration. Our report provides context on these disputes. We understand that the information presented by Israel includes a detailed account of a recent, more urgent, push by Iranian scientists towards 'weaponisation', or the creation of an explosive nuclear device. The dossier provides two key pieces of reported evidence for this claim. The first is that an Iranian scientific team has squirrelled away a quantity of nuclear material, of unclear enrichment status, that is unknown to the monitors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a UN watchdog (on June 9th the IAEA assessed Iran had official stockpiles of over 400kg of highly enriched uranium). The second piece of reported evidence is that the scientists have accelerated their work and were about to meet commanders of Iran's missile corps, apparently to prepare for the future 'mating' of a nuclear warhead with a missile. Much of Iran's previous dabbling with research and activity related to nuclear weapons was in the public domain already. The IAEA has published several reports documenting this, drawn in part from intelligence supplied by Israel and other countries. In 2018 a team at Harvard University also published their own analysis of Iranian documents purloined by Israel. Taken together, these sources described a broad and sustained Iranian effort towards making a uranium core for a bomb, the explosives required to implode that core in order to cause a chain reaction and a programme to place a spherical payload onto Iran's Shahab-3 ballistic missile. In a report published on May 31st, the IAEA noted that in 2003 Iran had planned to conduct what the Institute for Science and International Security, a think-tank, calls a 'cold test'—a simulated nuclear weapon which uses natural or depleted uranium rather than weapons-grade uranium. Israel's intelligence assessments repeat some of this information. They allege that a cohort of Iranian scientists have been working on overt and covert weapons-related research for years. This effort was originally part of Iran's formal nuclear-weapons research programme, known as AMAD, that it shut down in 2003, probably because it feared an American attack. The scientists' ongoing work is thought to be carried out under Iran's Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research (also known by its Farsi acronym, SPND), under the cover of activity in fields like covid-19 vaccines and laser technology. One of a small number of non-scientists who were aware of the work was Major-General Mohammad Bagheri, who as chief of staff of Iran's military had oversight of both the regular armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). But the Israeli intelligence dossiers also contain information that, if correct, is genuinely new. They suggest that roughly six years ago the scientists formed a secret 'Special Progress Group', under the auspices of the former AMAD director, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. This group's aim was to prepare the way for a much quicker weaponisation process, if and when a decision was made by Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, to rush for a bomb. Mr Fakhrizadeh was assassinated by Israel in November 2020. On June 13th in the first hours of the war, the Israeli government published slides describing this backstory. But we have been told that it also shared further assessments with allies that suggest the Special Progress Group stepped up its research at the end of last year. Iran had a new incentive to advance to a bomb. It was reeling from the limited impact of its missile attacks on Israel, and the depletion of its air defences by Israeli strikes in October 2024. And it was facing the collapse of its proxies, Hamas and Hizbullah, in Gaza and Lebanon. Lastly, Israel's intelligence states that a meeting had been scheduled between the scientists and commanders of the IRGC's air force, who are in charge of ballistic missiles. The information shared by Israel with its allies argues this proposed meeting was a Rubicon, with the missile chiefs being let in on the secret for the first time, suggesting in turn that planning for the 'mating' process of a nuclear device to a missile warhead was about to begin. Iran had done some of this work in the past—in 2011 the IAEA cited claims that Iran had done computer modelling studies to see how a 'spherical payload', such as a warhead, would stand up to the stresses of being launched on a ballistic missile. Miniaturising and mating a warhead to a missile are highly complex tasks that could still take Iran a substantial time to master. Israel's new claims are feeding into an American intelligence community that already has a range of views on the Iranian threat. In March Tulsi Gabbard, America's director of national intelligence—and a longstanding opponent of war with Iran—repeated the view that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon. In recent days the Wall Street Journal, New York Times and CNN have reported that American intelligence agencies are sceptical of the new Israeli claims. On June 17th Rafael Grossi, the director-general of the IAEA, said that his agency had not been presented with 'proof of a systematic effort to move into a nuclear weapon', although a week before the IAEA confirmed that Iran 'did not declare nuclear material and nuclear-related activities' at three undeclared locations in Iran. Mr Trump may nonetheless have been influenced by the Israeli view. On June 17th he declared, 'I don't care what she said,' referring to Ms Gabbard. 'I think they were very close to having one (a bomb).' David Albright, an American nuclear physicist and weapons expert who is consulted by intelligence agencies, says that most of the claims contained in the recent Israeli dossiers are 'generally accepted among (Western) intelligence communities'. However he accepts that there are claims that are new to him, over the diversion of nuclear material and the suggestion of an imminent meeting with missile forces. And he says that American intelligence analysts also agree that Iran has accelerated preparations for weaponisation—in July last year the director of national intelligence omitted the traditional wording that Iran 'isn't currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device' in a report to Congress, according to the Wall Street Journal . Assuming Israel's dossiers are factually accurate, there is still room for what Mr Albright calls the 'the interpretation of the facts'. Even if American analysts accept that Iran has the intent to pursue a bomb and has accelerated its push, they may disagree that it has crossed a threshold or that the threat is truly imminent. Meanwhile, the Israelis, he says, 'may think it's a bit faster and worry about their own ability to detect and act in time'. Israeli officials used to present their assessments of Iran's nuclear push using timelines measured in months and years. Since the war began, they have talked of the 'point of no return'—a moment at which Israel would no longer be capable of halting an Iranian dash to a bomb. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's Prime Minister, has spent decades warning of the threat from Iran. That means confirmation bias is a risk. But the stance of Israel's intelligence community is unified and consistent with the government's view. Perhaps it has been put under political pressure, but it has clashed with Mr Netanyahu and other prime ministers on the nuclear file in the past. Now it backs the war. Nuclear physics is a science. Intelligence assessment is not, but has enormous real-world consequences. In 2003 America and its allies went to war in Iraq based on faulty assessments of its alleged weapons of mass destruction. In the opening strike of the war on June 13th, Israel assassinated key scientists and officials. Nuclear facilities have been bombed. The Israelis claim they have removed the imminent danger of Iran dashing towards weaponisation. Still, setting Iran's nuclear programme back by years also depends on destroying, or at least inflicting significant damage, on Iran's main underground uranium-enrichment plants in Natanz, and in Fordow, which has not yet been hit. Mr Trump may decide this is a job for America, whatever his spooks say.

Breaking down Iran's missiles: Speed, range, and the regional equation
Breaking down Iran's missiles: Speed, range, and the regional equation

Shafaq News

time3 days ago

  • Politics
  • Shafaq News

Breaking down Iran's missiles: Speed, range, and the regional equation

Shafaq News/ Tensions between Iran and Israel have brought renewed attention to the Islamic Republic's expanding missile arsenal, which plays a central role in its military strategy and regional deterrence capabilities. According to recent data compiled by regional experts and defense sources, Iran now possesses one of the most diverse and domestically produced missile programs in the Middle East, with systems ranging from short-range battlefield missiles to advanced medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), long-range cruise missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles. The following are the most relevant missiles: - Shahab-1 and Shahab-2: Liquid-fueled missiles based on Soviet-era designs, with ranges of approximately 300–500 km. - Fateh-110 and Fateh-313: Solid-fueled missiles with improved range (300–500 km) and satellite-guided precision. - Qiam-1: A radar-evading design with a range of up to 800 km, notable for lacking aerodynamic fins to reduce detection. - Zolfaghar: A solid-fueled missile with a 700 km range and advanced warhead separation to evade missile defense systems. - Shahab-3: One of Iran's earliest MRBMs, with a range of 1,300 km and multiple payload options. - Emad: A modified Shahab-3 variant with an extended range of 1,700 km and a maneuverable re-entry vehicle for better accuracy. - Ghadr-1 (Qadr): An MRBM with a 1,950 km range, using lighter materials for improved flight. - Sejjil: A solid-fueled, two-stage MRBM with a 2,000 km range, known for its fast launch readiness and maneuverability. - Khorramshahr: Capable of exceeding 2,000 km, this missile reportedly reaches hypersonic speeds and incorporates terminal guidance. - Kheibar Shekan: A next-generation missile with advanced internal navigation and curved flight paths to evade interception. - Qasem Soleimani missile: A newly developed precision-guided missile derived from the Qiam series, built for accuracy and evasion. - Soumar: A long-range cruise missile modeled after the Russian Kh-55, with a range between 2,000 and 3,000 km. Its low-altitude trajectory makes it harder to detect. - Fattah: Iran's first hypersonic missile, revealed in June 2023. With a range of around 1,400 km and speeds exceeding Mach 5, it can maneuver mid-flight, complicating interception by air defenses. Strategic Shift By transitioning from liquid-fueled to solid-fueled systems, Iran has enhanced its launch speed, operational flexibility, and survivability in the event of preemptive strikes. In recent confrontations, including Operation True Promise 3 — Iran's retaliation for Israeli strikes on its nuclear and military infrastructure — Tehran deployed multiple variants of its ballistic missile systems, including the Fateh, Zolfaghar, and Emad classes. Defense analysts say the inclusion of hypersonic and long-range cruise platforms in Iran's arsenal increases its ability to strike targets with precision across the Gulf, the Levant, and beyond. The missiles also pose a challenge to existing missile defense systems, particularly when launched in large numbers or from multiple directions. Iran maintains that its missile program is defensive. However, regional powers and Western officials have voiced growing concern over the increasing accuracy and reach of Iranian projectiles, particularly in light of their use in Syria, Iraq, and, most recently, Israel.

Iran opens 'door to hell' for Israel with 30 years of preparation; it's like Gaza..., America will...
Iran opens 'door to hell' for Israel with 30 years of preparation; it's like Gaza..., America will...

India.com

time3 days ago

  • Politics
  • India.com

Iran opens 'door to hell' for Israel with 30 years of preparation; it's like Gaza..., America will...

New Delhi: When Israel attacked Iran's capital Tehran, Fordo Nuclear Facility and military bases in Isfahan, the world's eyes were fixed on Iran's counter attack. Iran had been saying for years that if Israel attacks, it will be given a befitting reply. This time, after the Israeli attack began, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei said that 'Israel will be rendered helpless.' And Iran has done what it had been warning the world about for years. It has launched a flurry of ballistic missiles against Israel. Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps i.e. IRGC has fired more than 200 missiles and drones simultaneously. Many of these missiles were medium range, whose range is between 1000 to 2000 kilometers. Iran is firing at least 150 missiles at Israel at a time. Although experts say that Israel has largely destroyed Iran's ability to fire ballistic missiles, it is still able to fire at least more than 150 advanced ballistic missiles at a time, which shows how strong Iran's ballistic missile programme is. It has even been revealed that Iran was preparing to fire 1000 ballistic missiles at a time and if it was able to do so, no one would have been able to stop Israel from becoming like Gaza, because no air defense system in the world can intercept 1000 ballistic missiles at once. Iran has rapidly expanded its ballistic missile power The strongest pillar of Iran's military strategy is its ballistic missile capability. In the last 25 to 30 years, Iran has advanced its ballistic missile capability significantly. It now has advanced ballistic missiles which Israel is failing to intercept. After years of hard work, Iran has accumulated a stockpile of hundreds of surface-to-surface missiles, including short range, medium range and intermediate range missiles. Missiles like Fateh-110, Zulfiqar, Shahab-3 and Khorramshahr are no longer just names, but strategic messages. In retaliatory attacks against Israel, Iran has shown by using these missiles in an exceptionally coordinated manner that it has not just rockets but also high-precision strike capability. The USA and Israel believe that Iran may have around 3000 ballistic missiles. Apart from this, the Israeli defense system has also destroyed missiles outside the earth's atmosphere, which means that Iran has also used intercontinental ballistic (ICBM) missiles. The use of ICBM missiles means that Iran has already built missiles that can drop nuclear bombs and it is just waiting to make nuclear bombs. The US National Intelligence Director's Office said that the ballistic missile stockpile that Iran has is the largest in the Middle East. Kenneth McKenzie, the head of the US Central Command, warned in March about the 'increasing size and sophistication of Iran's missile force'. He said that 'Tehran's missiles, combined with its nuclear capability, pose a complex deterrent challenge.' What kind of ballistic missiles does Iran have? To attack Israel, Iran needs ballistic missiles with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers. Iran's state-run news outlet ISNA published a graphic last year showing nine types of Iranian missiles that it said could reach Israel. However, it is not clear at the moment what type of missiles Iran has used in its recent attacks. But previous attacks have reportedly included medium-range ballistic missiles such as Imad and Ghadr-1 and Iran's first hypersonic Fatah-1. So far, the attacks show that Iran has used three types of medium-range ballistic missiles, with a range of between 1,400-1,700 kilometers. Apart from this, the most important thing seen in Iran's attacks so far is that a lot of payload i.e. gunpowder has been used in the missiles so that maximum level of destruction is spread. Israeli military officials said that Iran has so far attacked Israel with about 400 ballistic missiles and it has 3000 ballistic missiles in its stock. Speaking to the New York Times, two members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said that Iran had originally planned to launch 1,000 ballistic missiles on Israel in response to Israeli attacks on Iran. But this could not happen due to Israeli attacks. Israel's strong air defense systems include Iron Dome, which is for short-range threats. Iron Dome is one of the most effective air defense systems in the world. David's Sling, Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 are providing defense against medium and long-range Iranian missiles. Israel also has the American Patriot system, which has a range of about 160 km, which is also protecting Israel. Still, some missiles are falling.

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