Latest news with #Sino-Pak
Scroll.in
11-07-2025
- Business
- Scroll.in
Caught between India and China, will Beijing's ‘SAARC alternative' find support in South Asia?
China and Pakistan are reportedly trying to create a new regional bloc that can be an alternative to the increasingly dysfunctional South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). India is likely to be excluded from the initiative. In a meeting held in Kunming on June 19, China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh apparently discussed the possibility of forming the new regional bloc to focus on economic integration, infrastructure development and regional connectivity. India's determination to isolate Pakistan and not engage with it has negatively impacted South Asian regionalism and the regional associations built around it, namely SAARC and South Asian Free Trade Association (SAFTA). Can the SAARC gap be filled by China? And would doing so serve China's strategic goals in the region? SAARC has not held a formal summit since 2014, in keeping with India's position of no engagement with Pakistan, a state it accuses of supporting terrorism. India's focus instead has been on strong bilateralism with its South Asian neighbours. So far, China has done the same by significantly building strong relations with South Asian countries. Pakistan-China 'all weather' ties China's favourite South Asian nation by far is Pakistan, with whom they have an 'all weather' relationship. Pakistan's geopolitical dalliance with the US and its willingness to play proxy to US interests, however, stops short of its loyalty to China. Even as India and China seek to improve their relations and deepen trade ties, the Sino-Pak relationship is a red light for India. Pakistan's perceived role in sponsoring terrorism against it deters India from building regional cooperation as it pressures its regional allies to shun Pakistan. The smaller South Asia nations, however, have their own way of hedging and leveraging regional powers, and each has its own agenda. Bangladesh courts China Bangladesh's relations with India took a nosedive after the recent regime change when India's known favourite Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was ousted by a populist student led movement. It brought economist-technocrat Mohammad Yunus as interim head of government and Hasina took political asylum in India. Yunus is systematically improving relations with Pakistan which had adversarial relations with Bangladesh ever since the painful and bloody independence from Pakistan in 1971, which India facilitated with a significant military role. Moreover, Yunus also seeks to strengthen Bangladesh's relations with China. Unlike with India, Bangladesh's relations with China remain not just unchanged but deepening after the ouster of Hasina. China already supplies 72% of Bangladesh military equipment. Now, Bangladesh's 'Forces Goal 2030' can boost Chinese arms imports to a new level. The difference is that while the Hasina Government took care of Indian sensitivities, Yunus has no such interest. Chinese ambassador to Bangladesh Yao Wen said that the changed regime in Dhaka has not set back China's commitment to develop ties with Bangladesh. Nepal's equidistant Nepal, which houses the SAARC Secretariate, hedges its foreign policy in regional geopolitics. Sandwiched between India and China, Nepal has a deep dependence on India for trade and transit but it also wants China's development assistance. Nepal benefits from India's open-door (visa-less) entry for Nepali citizens. However, India also has the capability to arm-twist Nepal and has blockaded it in 1989 as well as 2015 and intervening not so subtly in its domestic politics. Nepal has, however, learnt to balance between India and China. Nepal is a participant in China's Belt and Road initiative but it also has development compacts with India. Nepal clearly favours non-alignment and non-entanglement, keeping away from the Sino-Indian rivalry. Uneasy Bhutan and the Maldives Bhutan remains uneasy about China's declared claims for Bhutanese territory on the Doklam Plateau. The Tibet Autonomous Region of China has a 470-kilometre border with Bhutan. India on its part has pressured Bhutan on occasion withdrawing subsidies on gas and kerosene (Bhutan is dependent on India for these) and imposing its goods and services tax on Bhutanese imports into India. These steps make Bhutan cautious about both India and China as the Bhutanese are sensitive about their identity and sovereignty. The Maldives has got into a debt-trap with China to the tune of US$ 3.2 billion. However, it also seeks and receives Chinese development and infrastructure assistance. Now, Maldives is also trying to navigate stronger ties with India. Sri Lanka's balancing game Sri Lanka has also sought to balance between India and China. It was an early reformer into neoliberal economic restructuring but started facing unprecedented political and economic crises since 2022 – due to a combination of factors that include the impact of Covid-19 on tourism, the Ukraine conflict, its earlier civil war with its Tamil minority, political corruption and international debt. This forced Sri Lanka to seek International Monetary Fund loans 16 times. Nearly 80% of Sri Lankan debt is from International Sovereign Bonds – not China. Moreover, the US has an interest in Sri Lanka as a strategic marine base. China plays up to Afghanistan China has sought to mediate to smoothen the turbulent relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan but has not met with much success. However, it does have an economic relationship with the Taliban government in Afghanistan since it envisages expanding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) northwards to Afghanistan and then the Central Asian Republics. At the same time, China has concerns about Taliban's links with radical Islamic groups especially the Uighurs present in Afghanistan. With these geopolitical tugs and pulls between regional powers would China manage to build a SAARC-like organisation? The prospect seems quite unlikely. China is interested in advancing its trade and exercising economic leverage. Getting into any new formal regional organisation that competes with India pushed SAARC — even if it is defunct does not serve its purpose currently. India and SAARC As far as India and SAARC is concerned, India needs to revive a regional body. If not SAARC, then SAFTA. While India is plagued by the terror issue allegedly emanating from Pakistan, it cannot allow regionalism trade and related issues to be held hostage on account of the zero-sum game with Pakistan. Moreover, putting pressure on smaller neighbours gives India the reputation of a regional bully – something that India implies about China of. India itself does not like the biggest bully, the US, pressuring South Asian countries, including India. It makes no sense for India, therefore, to do precisely what it criticises in others. Clearly, most of the small regional states would like a regional organisation to vent their views. After all, most other regions have a working regional organisation that gives them collective heft, like ASEAN, the African Union, the Economic Commission for Latin America and so on. At the same time, the smaller nations of South Asia neighbouring India and China would be unlikely to join a regional organisation that would alienate either of them. Both India and China understand that.
Express Tribune
04-06-2025
- General
- Express Tribune
Military notes; Indo-Pak conflict: deterrence, pre-battle manoeuvres
The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@ and tweets @20_Inam Listen to article We continue to discuss various aspects of the recent Indo-Pakistan military standoff. Third, deterrence per se. More than a billion lives escaped Modi's madness in a closer than ever nuclear Armageddon. Besides the conventional side of warfare, the more dangerous 'nuclear parity' still overhangs South Asia perilously. With deterrence in 'conventional terms re-established', one hopes India under Modi would avoid another wasteful adventure of humiliation, and resume talks over the table, rather than in the skies and through brinkmanship. The future India-Pakistan conflict scene will no longer be unilateral. It will be dictated and decided by Sino-Pak military alliance especially in collaboration with China's Western Theater Command. And this would augment deterrence for rational players on the Indian side, if any. Pakistan's Military, in South Asia's modern history, showcased the most integrated defensive strategy and real-time coordination. And just to reiterate, in military literature, a weaker side is supposed to have won an asymmetrical contest, if it denies outright victory or the attainment of war's aims and objectives to the stronger side, which Pakistan did to a larger India. So perceptually speaking, deterrence in the Indo-Pakistan context would, henceforth, be defined by the conventional military capabilities plus nuclear arms, and the fragility of psychological threshold on both sides, as discussed in my piece, 'India, Pakistan — redefining deterrence', printed in this space on May 22, 2025. And in Pakistan's context, deterrence would remain to be fortified by the Sino-Pakistani alliance, and the resolve of Pakistan's civil and military leadership, through Islamabad's 'quid-pro-quo Plus' strategy, to never let India prevail. So, peace, the perusal of which now squarely lies with a mellowed but bellicose India that still pursues its intended water wars, would remain elusive if we do not recognise each other's capabilities, and do not engage each other with dignity, mutual respect and patience, and not with ignorance or arrogance. Fourth. The Exterior Manoeuvre. Without going into the nuts and bolts of the diplomatic war, the Indian efforts to paint Pakistan into endemically bad light and as a state sponsor of terrorism, had very few takers, regionally and internationally. Indian diplomatic overtures focused on painting itself taller by telling the world its military response was calculated and non-escalatory and that this 'new India' would respond muscularly to the so-called terrorist attacks, without wanting a wider war with Pakistan and its people. Essentially contradictory iterations. No country condemned Pakistan for the 'alleged' terrorism; none appreciated India's 'carefully calibrated' military response. The world, contrarily, was preoccupied with the IAF's French Rafael jets being shot down by PAF's Chinese J-10C fighters using PL-15 E air-to-air missiles. Even the US after some initial ambivalence from VP Vance had to forcefully intervene to affect a ceasefire, without giving India the blank cheque of unilateralism and brinkmanship. Russia, India's traditional friend, withheld the 'expected' diplomatic support for India. And Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and the entire OIC, the UN all called for restraint and then ceasefire. Major capitals responded with studied neutrality despite India sending seven diplomatic delegations to 32 countries. Beijing's signalling and posturing in support of Pakistan were overtly clear. Washington's ceasefire appeal re-hyphenated the two nuclear neighbours, to India's great chagrin. New Delhi even refused to acknowledge any US role, for which Trump had publicly taken credit. The paradox of Indian 'Exterior Manoeuvre' was laid bare, as to why was it accepting a ceasefire, irrespective of whether it was reached bilaterally (as India claimed) or under US interlocution (as Trump tweeted), if it had an upper hand militarily. During the conduct of operations, fiasco after fiasco derided New Delhi's aspirations and outsized ego. From denial to acknowledging downing of planes including Rafaeles, to persistent lies on the state and social media, greatly diminished India's shine, sheen and diplomatic weight. New Delhi's comical effort to influence the World Bank under its Indian-origin president, Mr Ajay Banga, from sanctioning loan to Islamabad failed spectacularly. The extent of India's hostility towards Pakistan permeated not only its body politics, but also its cultural elite (read Bollywood), its state behaviour; and resulted in a compulsive obsession with Pakistan, whom India's intellectual wizards proudly claim to have pushed into irrelevant ignominy. This paradox - Pakistan's irrelevance and Islamabad being an uncomfortable reality - remains unresolved and has been damaging India's 'perceived' important power aspiration and status, without pundits realising it. Fifth, The Inner Front. India whipped up its jingoist anti-Pakistan narrative in order to jell its inner front, silencing opposition, muzzling rationality and suppressing truth in the process. And it failed. The Modi Government had to launch Operation "Tiranga Yatra (tricolour journey)" for intense domestic messaging, to manipulate outcomes during Operation Sindoor. From annihilating Pakistan to dominating South Asia as the new hegemon, its efforts, however, could not convince most of its 200 million Muslims, who constitute 10.9 per cent of its population, is the world's 3rd largest Muslim population, and the largest Muslim-minority globally. Its illegally occupied Kashmir, the expected battle zone, simmers with hate, discontent and a resurgent anti-India sentiment, making operations and rear-area security a nightmare for the Indian Military. Assam, Christian Mizoram, Nagaland, the Naxalite insurgency in the 'Red Corridor', Khalistan Movement in Punjab and abroad, and other insurgencies drive wedges in the India Union. Even the Brahman-dominated decision-making elite had and have reservations on the direction secular India has taken under Hindutva-laced Modi Sarkar. Indian security sector and armed forces saw removals, arrests and demotions during the stand-off; and its population is still experiencing arrests for supporting Pakistan, as per press reports. By comparison, Pakistan's inner front jelled like it always does in a crisis with India. RAW-financed terrorism in KP and Balochistan, and the expected political uprising by some political forces against the armed forces, in hilarious formulation of Indian intelligence, failed and failed miserably. Pakistan's national will, determination, resolve and motivation across the political spectrum and across the nation was tougher and firm. Pakistan's 'relative' demographic homogeneity compared to India's heterogeneity is always an asset and a force-multiplier. Such demographic truism also permeates Pakistan's armed forces, making it a formidable fighting machine. Continues...
Time of India
31-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
US, Pak, China: The post-Sindoor world calls for a strategic reset
India's pushback to Pakistan's provocation in Pahalgam is an inflection point in regional geopolitics. There are big-picture lessons that must be absorbed to reorient Indian statecraft in a rapidly changing international and regional setting. The Sino-Pakistan axis has acquired an operational reality that is difficult to ignore and not straightforward to counter. Most strategists recognise that India's conventional superiority over Pakistan means little in the context of controlled limited conflicts that are likely to occur under the nuclear shadow. For all practical purposes, Pakistan is a near-peer military competitor. This is now further complicated by the presence of China's military industrial complex that can selectively tilt the scales in Pakistan's favour. China's PLA, whose primary mission is to deny access to and potentially defeat the US in the Taiwan Straits, has spent the past decade modernising its forces for such a scenario. The focus has been on developing capabilities such as modern sensors, electronic intelligence satellites, electronic warfare, long range air-to-air missiles, and advanced tactical-combat aircraft. It is apparent that some of these capabilities have made their way to the Pakistan military. Build on thaw: While the Sino-Pak axis is worrying, there is room to wean China away from Pakistan China can buttress Pakistan's conventional power to keep pace and perhaps even surpass India in select areas in the future. What works to India's advantage is that unlike US and NATO hardware that come with well-known caveats and geopolitical risks, our 'no-strings attached' partnership with Russia's advanced military -industrial complex allows the Indian military to integrate its growing indigenous capacities with select high-technology systems to maintain a qualitative edge. This being said, it is futile for India to engage in an all-out arms race (in essence, with China) or frantically build up conventional power. Strategic nuclear and conventional deterrence for major contingencies is robust and expected to strengthen over time. Remember, the main challenge is countering asymmetric warfare with the new doctrine of assured and calibrated cost imposition on Pakistan. The means can vary over time — from the conventional to the sub-conventional to non-traditional areas like water security. There are obvious limits to China's ability to protect Pakistan from the blowback of its asymmetric warfare. There are larger questions that Indian policymakers can no longer brush under the carpet. Why did the Sino-Pak axis acquire such momentum in recent years? And, should India do anything to reshape Beijing's calculations in the subcontinent? First, there is no doubt that India's declared China-centric alignment with the US over the past decade was the lightning rod for Beijing to deepen ties with Rawalpindi much beyond its traditional partnership model. But the US had no desire to open a geopolitical front with China in the subcontinent and did little to shore up India's regional position. The US was primarily interested in drawing India into an extra-regional maritime role to support its security goals in the Western Pacific. Quite extraordinarily then, the Chinese counter to India's bold balance of power move with the US not only went unchallenged in the subcontinent, it actually led to a tacit convergence between Washington and Beijing on upholding Pakistan's basic position in the regional order and the primacy of the Pakistan army at home. Nothing demonstrated this stark geopolitical reality to Delhi more than the recent crisis. Can Indian statecraft arrest the deterioration in the regional chessboard that is partly the result of miscalculation from its own geostrategies? Beijing's primary geopolitical threats emanate from its eastern seaboard and will only grow over time. There is room to wean China away from Pakistan and bring Beijing's regional policy back towards a balance that is acceptable to Delhi. For this to occur, India must build on the 2024 thaw reached between the two leaderships and explore the possibility of a framework to normalise India-China relations. As for the US, the normal will be different with or without Trump. There is no scope for a balance-of-power play with the US in the subcontinent. It was self-deception to imagine India could simply ride American power to emerge as South Asia's leading power. That outcome will have to be earned the way all regional and great powers acquired their material and normative strength — through broadening the domestic industrial, technological and human capital base of the Indian economy while intelligently leveraging the international environment. There is no other way in our multipolar age. India doesn't have to get bogged down in a low-level game with the Pakistan army. Nor should India swing into a proxy crusader against a rising China whose sights are set on countering the US in the Western Pacific. This crisis is an opportunity to craft a sophisticated grand strategy for a multipolar world. Only geopolitical incompetence can disrupt the India story from its long-range goals. Facebook Twitter Linkedin Email Disclaimer Views expressed above are the author's own.
Express Tribune
29-05-2025
- Politics
- Express Tribune
Chinese expert shuts down General Bakshi in live TV debate over Pakistan-China ties
Victor Gao, Vice President of the Center for China and Globalization, delivered a stinging rebuke to retired Indian General G.D. Bakshi during a heated live television debate that quickly spiraled beyond routine foreign policy discourse. The fireworks started when General Bakshi accused Pakistan of harboring terrorists and questioned the durability of Sino-Pak relations. Gao fired back without hesitation: 'General Bakshi, you need to study history,' he said coldly, drawing an audible gasp from the panel. 'No power in the world can break the China-Pakistan friendship,' Gao continued, invoking decades of diplomatic, military, and economic ties between Beijing and Islamabad. He dismantled Bakshi's claims with sharp historical references, turning the debate into a one-sided lesson that left the retired general visibly rattled and scrambling to pivot. The turning point came when Gao dismissed Bakshi's inflammatory remarks as "aggression and irresponsibility, not diplomacy," urging a focus on dialogue and evidence over blanket accusations and calls to action. Highlighting joint military ventures like the JF-17 fighter jet and deep-rooted defense collaborations, Gao described the China-Pakistan partnership as 'rock-solid and forged in strategic trust,' emphasizing that their alliance isn't born of fleeting interest but is deeply institutionalised. Bakshi, a regular on Indian news channels known for his jingoistic tirades, appeared unprepared for such a frontal intellectual assault. As he attempted to steer the conversation elsewhere, Gao calmly held ground, commanding the room — and the narrative.
