Latest news with #SixthCircuit
Yahoo
4 days ago
- Business
- Yahoo
TQL takes its loss in a broker liability case to the Supreme Court
Broker liability is now knocking on the door of the U.S. Supreme Court twice, with two separate cases separately requesting that the high court review an issue it has chosen to pass on previously. As expected, Total Quality Logistics (TQL) has formally requested the Court grant certiorari in the case of TQL vs. Robert Cox. In early July, the Sixth Circuit overturned a lower court decision and found that TQL was not fully protected from liability by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (F4A), and that plaintiffs in the case could pursue damages against TQL under the act's so-called safety exception. The TQL case joins the case of Montgomery vs. Caribe II, a case that also has 3PL C.H. Robinson as a defendant, in asking the Supreme Court to clarify issues of broker liability under F4A. . In the Montgomery case, the Seventh Circuit found that the safety exception of the F4A did protect C.H. Robinson (NASDAQ: CHRW). The plaintiff in the case, Shawn Montgomery, has requested certiorari from the Supreme Court. Even the winners want SCOTUS to weigh in But to demonstrate the importance the 3PL industry is putting on the goal of getting the high court to weigh in on the issue, C.H. Robinson–even though it won at the circuit level–joined with Montgomerey and also asked the court to review the case. That isn't the first time that happened. In the case of Gauthier vs. TQL, the brokerage won at the 11th Circuit on its argument that F4A protected it against the claims of Katia Gauthier, widow of a woman killed in a crash with a truck hired by TQL. But when Gauthier made a request to the Supreme Court for review, TQL backed that request, also seeking clarity despite the fact it had been victorious at the circuit level. The Supreme Court rejected certiorari, as it did in the Ying Ye case against GlobalTranz in 2024 (the brokerage was victorious) and Miller vs. C.H. Robinson in 2022 (where C.H. Robinson lost on the question of protection under the safety exception). Earlier court denials total three That's three times the court has punted on the question of a brokerage's exposure to liability under the protections under 1994's F4A and, more specifically, the law's safety exception. With TQL's action, the Supreme Court now has two opportunities in front of it to reverse its earlier decisions to pass on the issue. It would be doing so with a pair of cases that present themselves as opposites: one where a circuit backed the 3PL and another where it didn't. That conflict among circuits has always been seen as increasing the odds that the Supreme Court might agree to a certiorari request. Marc Blubaugh, head of the transportation practice at the Benesch law firm, cautioned about the odds of success. 'As a matter of simple mathematics, the prospect of the U.S. Supreme Court accepting any case for review is always a statistical longshot,' he said in comments emailed to FreightWaves. 'A petitioner always has a less than 1% chance of the Court accepting a case for review.' But maybe the 3PL industry will get its wish, Blubaugh added. 'The chances of the Court accepting TQL's petition for review are greater than ever before,' he wrote. 'This is the fifth time that the Court has been asked to determine whether plaintiffs may sue freight brokers for state common law negligence on the basis that the so-called 'safety exception' saves such claims from federal preemption.' While there have been five broker liability cases that have sought review in recent years, they have come out of just four circuits, since two of them were from Seventh Circuit decisions. 'We now face an entrenched 2-2 circuit split (amplified by a wide range of conflicting lower federal court and state court decisions) on an issue that plaintiffs and defendants all agree is of great public importance,' Blubaugh said. 'In short, the time is now.' Once again the question: is a broker a motor vehicle? In its writ to the Supreme Court asking for certiorari, TQL summed up the issue before the court. 'The question presented is whether a common-law negligence claim alleged against a freight broker, based on the broker's selection of a motor carrier to provide transportation of cargo, is preempted because it does not constitute an exercise of the 'safety regulatory of a state claim with respect to motor vehicles' within the meaning of the F4A,' TQL's writ says. The quote within the TQL statement is taken directly from the wording of the safety exception. When the Sixth Circuit overturned the lower court decision in the Cox vs. TQL case, according to the TQL writ, it 'reasoned that a common-law negligent-selection claim involves an exercise of the State's 'safety regulatory authority' and that the enforcement of such a claim against a freight broker constitutes an exercise of such authority 'with respect' to motor vehicles.'' TQL's writ described that decision as 'erroneous.' Among the other arguments TQL makes, it notes the two distinct parts of the F4A. In the key portion, passed by Congress to ensure states did not undercut the goals of transportation deregulation, the F4A prevents states from passing any legislation or regulation that could affect a 'price, route or service.' F4A also contains the safety exception, which says the restriction on state action on price, route or service 'shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.' But while there are portions of F4A that are specifically aimed at brokerages and freight forwarders, the TQL argument is that the safety exception is just for motor vehicles. And that brings the issue around to the debate that has gone on in the lower courts: is a broker a motor carrier? Blubaugh noted that two circuits-the Seventh and Eleventh-found that the phrase 'with respect to motor vehicles' excluded brokers, which meant that the safety exception that could be used to find a motor vehicle liable under state law–like a truck–didn't apply to brokers. Two others–the Ninth and Sixth–found the other way. 'Plaintiffs and defendants may find it hard to believe that the future of freight broker liability for negligence could turn on something as seemingly pedestrian as the meaning of the three words 'with respect to,'' Blubaugh said. 'However, this really is the heart of the dispute.' Litigation goes on elsewhere Blubaugh also noted that the issue of broker liability is messy beyond the cases in front of the Supreme Court. It is possible, he said, that the Supreme Court might lean toward granting certiorari but would want to wait until some of the other cases are resolved, though they are not all in the federal court system. There is a case in a South Carolina state court where Echo Global Logistics has come out on top so far, citing F4A and the safety exception. RXO (NYSE: RXO) in a North Carolina federal court is citing F4A as a defense in a case involving a load of stolen cell phones. And on Wednesday, Landstar revealed in a filing with the SEC that it was on the losing side of a verdict last week in a Texas state court that found Landstar Ranger (NASDAQ: LSTR) 15% liable for a fatal accident on the final day of 2021. That bill came to $3.42 million out of the total judgement of $22.8 million. Landstar said in the SEC filing that it had been found by a jury to be acting as a broker and not a motor carrier. More articles by John Kingston 'Impossible position' cited by truck manufacturers in lawsuit against California In brief comments, Trimble CEO introduces new product for matching capacity with shippers Truck sales in the second quarter might have been the worst performing metric of all The post TQL takes its loss in a broker liability case to the Supreme Court appeared first on FreightWaves.
Wall Street Journal
17-07-2025
- Politics
- Wall Street Journal
Emil Bove and the Trump Judiciary
The Senate Judiciary Committee voted out Emil Bove's nomination to be a judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on Thursday, with Democrats walking out in protest. Less remarked, given her sterling credentials, was the Senate's 46-42 vote Monday to send Whitney Hermandorfer to the Sixth Circuit. The contrast could make a difference for President Trump. The concerns about Mr. Bove's nomination aren't frivolous. He was at the center of the Justice Department turbulence after Mr. Trump invoked the 1798 Alien Enemies Act to deport illegal aliens without due process. At a March 14 meeting, discussing the possibility that a judge could block those removals, 'Bove stated that DOJ would need to consider telling the courts 'f— you' and ignore any such court order.' That's according to a 'whistleblower' letter by a former government lawyer. Testifying to the Senate, Mr. Bove didn't exactly deny uttering such a thing. 'I did not suggest,' he said, 'that there would be any need to consider ignoring court orders. At the point in that meeting, there were no court orders to discuss.' What about floating that the Justice Department might tell the judiciary to eff off? 'I don't recall,' Mr. Bove said. Doesn't this seem like something a top official would remember saying, or not? The whistleblower then released communications to back up his account. One is a text message from March 15, as Mr. Trump's deportation flights to El Salvador were about to land. 'Guess its find out time on the 'f— you,'' the lawyer wrote his supervisor. The boss's reply: 'Yup. It was good working with you.'
Yahoo
05-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Supreme Court revives straight woman's 'reverse discrimination' suit
June 5 (UPI) -- The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled Thursday that a straight woman can move forward with her Title VII Civil Rights Act job discrimination lawsuit, which claimed "reverse discrimination." The justices voted 9-0 to side with Marlean Ames, ruling that she faced a higher burden to be able to sue for discrimination as a straight woman after she was passed up for job opportunities in favor of two LGBTQ applicants. "We conclude that Title VII does not impose such a heightened standard on majority-group plaintiffs," the court wrote. Ames sued the Ohio Department of Youth Services after she was denied a management position in favor of a lesbian woman hired for that job. She also lost out on another job at the agency when a gay man was hired instead as a program administrator. The lower court judgment was vacated and the Ames case was remanded back to the lower court to be heard applying the Supreme Court's finding. The decision said the Sixth Circuit erred when it "implemented a rule that requires certain Title VII plaintiffs-those who are members of majority groups-to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard." The ruling makes it easier for majority-group plaintiffs to argue "reverse discrimination" lawsuits. At issue was the "background circumstances" rule. As interpreted by the Sixth Circuit, that rule requires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard in Title VII lawsuits. "Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone," the Supreme Court decision said. "The Sixth Circuit's 'background circumstances' rule requires plaintiffs who are members of a majority group to bear an additional burden at step one. But the text of Title VII's disparate-treatment provision draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs." The Supreme Court said that provision "focuses on individuals rather than groups, barring discrimination against 'any individual' because of protected characteristics." The high court rejected Ohio's argument that the "background circumstances" rule does not subject majority-group plaintiffs to a heightened legal standard when they sue alleging discrimination under Title VII. "The 'background circumstances' rule -- which subjects all majority-group plaintiffs to the same, highly specific evidentiary standard in every case -- ignores the Court's instruction to avoid inflexible applications of the prima facie standard," the Supreme Court wrote. The Supreme Court held that "the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group." The Civil Rights Act bars discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Ohio maintained Ames was not chosen for the jobs in question due to her lack of the necessary vision and leadership skills, not because she was straight. A three-judge Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel agreed that Ames would have been likely to prevail if she was a gay woman. But they ruled against her due to the higher burden created by the Sixth Circuit interpretation of the "background circumstances" rule.
UPI
05-06-2025
- Politics
- UPI
Supreme Court revives straight woman's 'reverse discrimination' suit
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled Thursday that a straight woman denied a management position in favor of gay hires can revive her Title VII Civil Rights Act job discrimination lawsuit. File Photo by Fred Schilling, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States/UPI | License Photo June 5 (UPI) -- The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled Thursday that a straight woman can move forward with her Title VII Civil Rights Act job discrimination lawsuit, which claimed "reverse discrimination." The justices voted 9-0 to side with Marlean Ames, ruling that she faced a higher burden to be able to sue for discrimination as a straight woman after she was passed up for job opportunities in favor of two LGBTQ applicants. "We conclude that Title VII does not impose such a heightened standard on majority-group plaintiffs," the court wrote. Ames sued the Ohio Department of Youth Services after she was denied a management position in favor of a lesbian woman hired for that job. She also lost out on another job at the agency when a gay man was hired instead as a program administrator. The lower court judgment was vacated and the Ames case was remanded back to the lower court to be heard applying the Supreme Court's finding. The decision said the Sixth Circuit erred when it "implemented a rule that requires certain Title VII plaintiffs-those who are members of majority groups-to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard." The ruling makes it easier for majority-group plaintiffs to argue "reverse discrimination" lawsuits. At issue was the "background circumstances" rule. As interpreted by the Sixth Circuit, that rule requires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard in Title VII lawsuits. "Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone," the Supreme Court decision said. "The Sixth Circuit's 'background circumstances' rule requires plaintiffs who are members of a majority group to bear an additional burden at step one. But the text of Title VII's disparate-treatment provision draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs." The Supreme Court said that provision "focuses on individuals rather than groups, barring discrimination against 'any individual' because of protected characteristics." The high court rejected Ohio's argument that the "background circumstances" rule does not subject majority-group plaintiffs to a heightened legal standard when they sue alleging discrimination under Title VII. "The 'background circumstances' rule -- which subjects all majority-group plaintiffs to the same, highly specific evidentiary standard in every case -- ignores the Court's instruction to avoid inflexible applications of the prima facie standard," the Supreme Court wrote. The Supreme Court held that "the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group." The Civil Rights Act bars discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Ohio maintained Ames was not chosen for the jobs in question due to her lack of the necessary vision and leadership skills, not because she was straight. A three-judge Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel agreed that Ames would have been likely to prevail if she was a gay woman. But they ruled against her due to the higher burden created by the Sixth Circuit interpretation of the "background circumstances" rule.
Yahoo
05-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Supreme Court Gives Win To Majority Group Claims Of Discrimination
'Reverse discrimination' just got a lot easier to prove. The Supreme Court issued a unanimousruling Thursday that reduces the burden of proof that people who are part of a 'majority group' must provide when they sue for discrimination and remanded the decision back to the Sixth Circuit. 'This Court's precedents reinforce that understanding of the statute, and make clear that the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group,' the opinion states. Justice Kentanji Brown Jackson wrote the opinion for the court on Thursday. At question was the standard of proof that members of majority groups must bring when claiming discrimination, and whether they should be held to a higher standard than members of 'protected classes.' The ruling stems from a lawsuit that started in 2020, when Marlean Ames sued her former employer, the Ohio Department of Youth Services, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for discrimination based on her sexual orientation. Ames, who is straight, alleged that she had been discriminated against by gay superiors. Ames started working at the agency that oversees juvenile corrections in 2004 and, after a decade, she had moved up the ranks from the role of an executive secretary to program administrator. When a bureau chief position opened up at the department in 2019, she applied. Just a year earlier, Ames underwent a performance evaluation by her boss, a gay woman. Her boss found Ames mostly met expectations but rarely exceeded them. According to court records, there were concerns that Ames lacked the 'vision' and leadership skills required for the bureau chief role. Ames was passed over for the promotion and then demoted to another role that paid less than she had previously been earning. According to Ames, this wasn't due to her performance but because she was straight. The agency said it passed on Ames because of concerns over her leadership abilities and that, historically, she had been 'abrasive and not collaborative' though her work ethic was considered strong. When she sued for discrimination based on her sexual orientation, Ames noted that the person who evaluated her was gay and so was the person who got the promotion she had applied for. The individual who actually made the hiring decision for that position, however, was straight. Initially, a federal district court in Ohio tossed Ames' lawsuit, finding she had failed to prove there was a pattern of discrimination by gay people at the department against straight people. As a heterosexual, the courts consider Ames part of a majority group, as opposed to people who are part of a protected class. Protected classes cover a person's sex, sexual orientation, age, ancestry, color, religion and more. But for a person in the majority to successfully sue for discrimination, some courts — not all — require evidence of 'background circumstances' to support their claim. Background circumstances must show that the person or people outside the majority are engaged in an unusual pattern of discrimination against the majority. Ames never proved that pattern, according to the district court, and when she appealed, judges for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit didn't think she had proved it either. (Currently, only a handful of circuits require background circumstances, including the 6th Circuit; others, like the uber-conservative 5th Circuit, don't apply the standard at all. And notably, the background circumstances rule has also been rejected by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission itself, the very body that oversees enforcement of laws that make discrimination illegal.) When Ames' lawyers came to the Supreme Court in February and asked the high court to reverse the 6th Circuit's decisions, the justices seemed to signal how they would rule, as they asked questions about the fairness of requiring more burden of proof for one group of people versus another when they are suing for discrimination. 'For most plaintiffs,' Justice Jackson wrote, the initial steps they must take to provide a burden of proof 'is not onerous.' 'A plaintiff may satisfy it simply by presenting evidence 'that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.' But, under Sixth Circuit precedent, plaintiffs who are members of a majority group bear an additional burden at step one: They must also establish 'background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.'' The Sixth Circuit's 'background circumstances' rule, the justice added, can't 'be squared with the text of Title VII or our longstanding precedents.' 'And nothing Ohio has said, in its brief or at oral argument, persuades us otherwise,' she wrote. With the background circumstances doctrine unwound, the Supreme Court may have granted the Trump administration a huge gift: Since January, the administration has been dismantling diversity, equity and inclusion programs at a near constant clip. With the door now flung open, reverse discrimination cases are expected to flourish. This is a developing story. Please check back for updates.
