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13-05-2025
- Politics
The US-Japan-ROK Trilateral After Yoon: Japan's and Korea's Security Choices in the Trump 2.0 Era
In August 2023 a historic summit of leaders from South Korea, Japan, and the United States was held at Camp David. Now that all three nations are under new leadership, with the next Korean president to be chosen on June 3, how Donald Trump, Ishiba Shigeru, and the new leader in Seoul will approach trilateral ties will determine their relationship's future in this uncertain security environment. Japan-Korea Strategic Cooperation: Essential, Not Optional South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol's imposition of martial law on December 3, 2024, precipitated a train of events that have raised grave concerns in Japan and globally about political stability in Korea. First, the South Korean National Assembly impeached President Yoon on December 14, at which point presidential duties were transferred to Prime Minister Han Duck-soo. Han was then himself impeached on December 27, resulting in Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Choi Sang-mok taking over the role of acting president. Han returned to the role on March 24 following his acquittal by the Constitutional Court of Korea. However, the same court then upheld the original impeachment of President Yoon on April 4, triggering an election to choose a new president. The current political vacuum is set to last until that election on June 3. At that point, South Korea's 'national crisis' will have extended for more than six months. The lack of both domestic and high-level diplomatic leadership could not have come at a worse time, given the return of Donald Trump to the American presidency and his administration's subsequent imposition of tariffs on the highly export-dependent nation. Japan has paid close attention to events during this period of instability and the absence of stable South Korean leadership. The Japanese government has provided resolute diplomatic support to South Korea and coordinated closely with the government in Seoul. Tokyo and Seoul have also not hesitated to push forward on closer Japan-ROK and US-ROK-Japan cooperation in the meantime. In a March 21, 2025, written response to questions from the Asahi Shimbun, South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-yul expressed appreciation to Japan and other countries that provided encouragement and support during a difficult time for the ROK, and expressed 'sincere gratitude' to Minister of Foreign Affairs Iwaya Takeshi for his decision to visit Korea in January earlier this year. When South Korea's constitutional court finalized Yoon's impeachment on April 4, Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru was quick to affirm that 'this year marks the sixtieth anniversary of the restoration of ROK-Japan relations. Regardless of the circumstances, we are going to make close cooperation between Japan and South Korea one of our top priorities.' What is behind this strengthened emphasis on Japan-Korea relations at such a delicate time? One reason is that constructive relations between Seoul and Tokyo are strategically more vital than ever to the respective government's diplomacy and security. Echoing former Prime Minister Kishida Fumio's sentiment that 'Today's Ukraine may be tomorrow's East Asia,' Cho also recognized the implications of the challenging international situation and current 'tectonic shifts' in the geopolitical environment. To this end, the foreign minister noted that 'the peoples of the two nations must firmly realize that cooperation is not an option but absolutely essential.' A High Point in Trilateral Relations Building on the improved bilateral relationship, in recent years Seoul and Tokyo have also pushed forward on trilateral strategic cooperation with the United States. While cooperation dates back to the Korean War in 1950, the first US-ROK-Japan summit, held in 1994 on the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Jakarta, represented the first effort at officializing trilateral cooperation tying together two of the United States' most important regional bilateral alliances. In 2019, near the end of the first Donald Trump administration, diplomatic developments threatened to unravel trilateral cooperation. Against the backdrop of the US-China strategic competition, the US State Department and Pentagon had invested significant energy into enhancing 'Indo-Pacific' strategic partnerships such as the Quad (Japan, the United States, India, Australia) and the trilateral with Japan and Korea. President Trump was more interested in engaging in dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The progressive leader of South Korea at the time, President Moon Jae-in, also prioritized North-South dialogue over strategic cooperation with allies and partners. The sudden shift in diplomatic priorities between the three countries also overlapped with a historical nadir in bilateral ROK-Japan relations. Over the two-year period of 2018–19, bilateral tensions broke out over the issue of compensation for wartime Korean laborers, Japan's tightening of export controls on South Korea, Seoul's announcement of the suspension of the GSOMIA information sharing agreement, and an incident where Japanese authorities complained that an ROK naval vessel directed its fire-control radar at a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force patrol aircraft. Domestic sentiment in both countries toward the other soured considerably. As these wide-ranging diplomatic, economic, and national security issues were unfolding between two critical American allies, President Trump made no effort to mediate. This situation was transformed, however, with changes in the leadership in both Washington DC and Seoul. Inaugurated in 2022, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol was particularly proactive in restoring ROK-Japan relations, while Yoon and Trump's successor, President Joe Biden, were eager to enhance bilateral US-ROK and trilateral US-ROK-Japan security cooperation. Japanese Prime Minister Kishida responded positively to such overtures, leading to the August 2023 US-Japan-Korea summit meeting that produced the 'Camp David Principles'—the first-ever stand-alone summit held among the three countries. The Camp David meeting was groundbreaking not only for spelling out the strategic importance of deepened security coordination, but also for broadening the focus of trilateral cooperation beyond the traditional focus on North Korean and Korean Peninsula issues. The reinvigorated trilateral relationship was positioned by the leaders as one of the core institutions underpinning the three nations' Indo-Pacific strategy—with an eye on China. Responding to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the three countries also committed themselves to upholding the rule of law, common values, and the international order. Beyond the geopolitical realm, the three leaders agreed at Camp David to forge a 'comprehensive partnership' to address and coordinate on issues such as economic and technological security, development assistance, and climate change. A 'Trilateral Coordinating Secretariat' was also established to promote consultation and implement shared commitments, to further institutionalize the trilateral relationship. In hindsight, the Camp David years were a result of a rare coincidence of events and leaders that moved the wheels of history. Adapting to Trump 2.0: The China-Taiwan Challenge The inauguration of the second Trump administration in January 2025 raised concerns about the sustainability of the trilateral relationship, but so far, the framework has been sustained. The Joint Leaders' Statement released on February 7, following Prime Minister Ishiba's visit to Washington DC for his first official meeting with President Trump, omitted 'Camp David,' but mentioned that 'the two leaders intend to advance multilayered and aligned cooperation among likeminded countries,' noting the importance of the Quad and the US-ROK-Japan, US-Japan-Australia, and US-Japan-Philippines trilaterals. The Japanese and American leaders also 'affirmed the importance of the Japan-US-ROK trilateral partnership,' particularly in addressing North Korea–related issues. Two foreign-minister-level meetings have subsequently taken place among the trilateral partners, suggesting that the Trump administration will preserve the trilateral framework forged under the previous administration for the time being. Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru (left) receives a commemorative gift from President Donald Trump at a joint press conference following the US-Japan summit, April 7, 2025, in Washington DC. (© Jiji) The relationship, however, is likely to be shaped to meet the priorities of the Trump administration. One of these is Washington's 'China-Taiwan shift' as it relates to the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Attitudes toward foreign affairs in the Trump administration can be roughly divided into two factions. One faction is represented by Vice President JD Vance, who has been described as a 'soft isolationist' when it comes to the commitment of American military forces overseas. Another faction contains traditional Republicans who support a hardline stance against American strategic rivals like China and tend to be more alliance-oriented. The latter group includes National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby. Both factions demand that allies bear their share of the burden and aim for the United States to take a focused approach to strategic competition and foreign affairs. While there is significant debate over the American defense posture as it relates to Ukraine and Europe, there is no sign of a desire to withdraw or reduce US forces in the Indo-Pacific. The United States may well strengthen its Indo-Pacific military posture—predicated on cooperation and increased burden sharing from allies and like-minded countries. How this relates to China and Taiwan is reflected in the US Department of Defense's Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance, as detailed by the Washington Post on March 29, 2025. In the document, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth identifies China as 'the Department's sole pacing threat, and denial of a Chinese fait accompli seizure of Taiwan . . . [as] the Department's sole pacing scenario.' This points to a China-Taiwan-related contingency as the focus of force planning, considering the much-discussed '2027' timeline regarding preparations for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. As the United States focuses on potential conflict with China, most of the burden for deterrence measures against Russia, Iran, and North Korea will fall on allies in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. If the Interim Guidelines are followed through, the US alliances with Korea and Japan and the trilateral partnership will face greater challenges. The 'complex contingency' scenario in which a Korea contingency is interlocked with a Taiwan contingency has been an issue, but due to its sensitivities, official talks regarding the division of roles for the three partners have not progressed. Seoul in particular would be further concerned by the prioritization of a Taiwan contingency as the 'sole pacing scenario' and its implications for the Korean Peninsula. There is also a lack of clarity about whether President Trump will embrace the US-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group established under his predecessor. The NCG was established to reassure Seoul about the United States' commitment to extended deterrence through the nuclear umbrella in the face of an increasingly capable North Korean nuclear weapons and missile development program. The aforementioned Interim Guidance also stimulated South Korean concerns that past discussions about 'strategic flexibility' will re-emerge and result in the reduction of American troops on the peninsula, or the deployment of United States Forces Korea to other areas of the Indo-Pacific, leaving the ROK potentially vulnerable. These worries have further complicated discussions about the long-delayed transfer of wartime operational control of Korean military forces under the US-ROK Combined Forces Command from an American to a Korean commander. The US-Japan alliance also faces a similar dilemma of how to balance its response to Taiwan and Korean Peninsula contingencies while ensuring that Japan remains appropriately protected. Additionally, the United States is seeking cooperation from its allies in a wide range of areas with a view to enhancing deterrence against China. In addition to joint exercises and operational cooperation, the United States wants to see the establishment of integrated logistics and industrial supply chains that would include US Navy ships to receive better access to MRO (maintenance, repair, and overhaul) and replenishment while deployed to the region. Cooperation among allies on shipbuilding is also a focus for the Trump administration, given the current limited capacity of the United States' own industry. This was made clear in the joint statement released following a foreign-minister-level trilateral meeting in Brussels on April 3. While the issue had previously been raised at the July 2024 trilateral meeting, the three sides at Brussels recognized the need to collectively maintain 'a modern maritime fleet, a robust shipbuilding industry, and a strong workforce.' Making progress in defense logistics and industrial integration will also require cooperation with the Philippines, as well as with Australia and Britain through the AUKUS initiative. If successful, deepened industrial and logistical cooperation between regional allies and the United States could contribute to avoiding war with China over Taiwan by enhancing deterrence. President Trump's deal-focused style of transactional diplomacy, however, will continue to pose risks by exposing allies to sudden geopolitical changes. Trump continues to express interest in dialogue with Kim Jong-un, which would likely result in Japan and South Korea being sidelined. Trump's attachment to tariffs to address perceived economic imbalances, meanwhile, undermines the principles of free trade, but can also become an obstacle to enhanced industrial and defense supply chain cooperation. There is clearly a pressing need to discuss these issues from both economic and national security points of view and restore stability to Indo-Pacific strategic relationships. Tokyo and Seoul should make use of the Trilateral Coordinating Secretariat, among other mechanisms, to push forward policy coordination and ensure dialogue on regional security hotspots. South Korea's Choice: Is a Center Shift Possible? Another factor that will have a major impact on the sustainability of trilateral US-ROK-Japan strategic coordination is the domestic political situation in South Korea. During his short presidency, Yoon Suk Yeol committed Seoul to a much more ambitious foreign policy based on his vision of South Korea as a 'Global Pivotal State.' In this vision, Yoon positioned the US-ROK alliance as the main pillar of South Korea's foreign policy. In terms of South Korea's role in US strategic competition with China, the former president also moved Seoul's position away from 'strategic ambiguity'—as pursued under the Moon administration—to one of 'strategic clarity.' Describing Korean security interests as going beyond the peninsula, Yoon quickly moved to widen Seoul's strategic vision. He adopted a Korean version of the Indo-Pacific strategy, committed South Korea to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and committed to the principles agreed to at the Camp David Summit. Previously, when the Moon administration announced its New Southern Policy in 2021, it indicated that it would align with the United States on Indo-Pacific strategy, including on the Taiwan Strait. In reality, however, Moon's vision remained peninsula-focused. Strategic alignment with the Indo-Pacific was constrained by Moon's own China policy when he committed to 'Three Nos': no additional deployments of the THAAD, or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, missile defense system, no involvement in a wider US-led missile defense network, and no involvement in a 'trilateral military alliance' with the United States and Japan. Cooperation among the three nations would be limited to issues with North Korea. Despite the deterioration of the security environment, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, deeper Russia–North Korea security cooperation, and tensions across the Taiwan Strait, it is possible that there will be another sudden shift in Seoul's strategic orientation, if there is a change of leadership from conservative to progressive. Will South Korea's next president continue an approach to national security based on a global and Indo-Pacific vision of South Korea's role? Will cooperation with Japan, bilaterally and in the trilateral framework with the United States, continue to be seen as 'not an option but absolutely essential' in Seoul? As South Korea emerges out of its leadership vacuum, it will attempt to find 'balance' in its diplomacy in its own way. Seoul's choice in the post-Yoon era should be watched with great interest given its potential significance for regional and global cooperation. Clearly, the ruling conservative People Power Party faces an uphill battle to keep the presidency due to Yoon's declaration of martial law and his subsequent impeachment. The election, after all, is taking place only two months after the constitutional court ruling affirmed his removal. Focus has therefore shifted to the possibility of a return to progressive leadership. The opposition's leading candidate is Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party of Korea, who previously ran against Yoon in the 2022 presidential election. The extent of current Korean political division has purportedly alienated political independents, who want to see a return to stability above all else. Thus, Lee must win the support of the 'middle-of-the-road' voters to prevail in the presidential race. Diplomatically, facing various national crises, a progressive president will also have little choice but to cooperate with the United States and Japan. Recently, Lee and the DPK are promoting a more pragmatic line based on 'realism' at home and abroad. This realism includes recognition of value of the US-ROK alliance, strengthened ROK-Japan cooperation, and the US-ROK-Japan trilateral. However, there remains substantial ambiguity on progressive positions on China and the Taiwan challenge, as well as toward North Korea as the situation on the Korean peninsula rapidly changes. For example, in a recent interview with the Washington Post (February 14, 2025), Lee welcomed the idea of US–North Korea dialogue. He went as far to say that he would nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize if the president was able to achieve a 'significant breakthrough' on nuclear weapons and missile issues, saying that 'it would be beneficial for everyone.' Although concerns remain, on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of ROK-Japan diplomatic normalization, one hopes for a shift toward the political center, the 'middle of the road,' in South Korea. It will be essential for both countries to overcome the challenging security environment together. (Originally published in Japanese on April 12, 2025. Banner photo: From left, South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Japanese Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi at a sideline meeting at the NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs gathering in Brussels on April 3, 2025. © AFP/Jiji.)
Korea Herald
10-04-2025
- Business
- Korea Herald
Xi 'seriously' considering visit to S. Korea for APEC summit: Chinese official
Chinese President Xi Jinping is seriously considering a visit to South Korea in conjunction with the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, a senior official from China's top legislature said Thursday. Losang Jamcan, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, made the remarks during a meeting with South Korean National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik in Seoul. "President Xi places great importance on a potential visit to South Korea in conjunction with the APEC summit. It is important to maintain close communication on this matter," Losang was quoted as saying by Woo's office. "China maintains a positive attitude toward bilateral cultural exchanges. The two sides should continue to build on the recent momentum of active exchanges and cooperation," he added. Woo asked for China's continued attention to Xi's potential trip to South Korea. South Korea is scheduled to host the APEC summit in Gyeongju, about 275 kilometers southeast of Seoul, from late October to early November. China is the host for the multilateral gathering next year. Speaking of the bilateral free trade agreement, which marked its 10th anniversary this year, Woo called for joint efforts to accelerate follow-up negotiations on services and investment that are expected to help enhance bilateral economic cooperation. Woo also asked for China's support for South Korean firms to do business in China "under stable and predictable circumstances," his office said. (Yonhap)
