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Time of India
3 days ago
- Time of India
Bail on medical grounds meant for emergencies, not for attending social galas: SC
Bengaluru: The Supreme Court observed that actor Darshan, accused number 2 in the Renukaswamy murder case, had obtained bail on misrepresentation of medical grounds. "The bail order dated 13 Dec 2024, passed by the Karnataka high court, was granted primarily on the basis of the alleged urgent medical condition of the 1st respondent/A2. However, a bare perusal of the medical records and subsequent conduct of the accused reveals that the medical plea was misleading, vague, and grossly exaggerated," a bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan observed. Contrary to the impression created before the high court, Darshan made multiple public appearances, including participation in high-profile social events, was seen in fine health and mobility, and did not undergo any surgery or serious medical procedure post his release. This establishes that he abused the liberty of bail, which was obtained on a false and misleading premise, the bench added. You Can Also Check: Bengaluru AQI | Weather in Bengaluru | Bank Holidays in Bengaluru | Public Holidays in Bengaluru | Gold Rates Today in Bengaluru | Silver Rates Today in Bengaluru The Supreme Court consistently held that the bail granted on medical grounds must be based on credible, specific, and urgent need, not on general or future apprehensions, as seen in the State of UP vs Amarmani Tripathi and Dinesh MN vs State of Gujarat cases. The discharge summary dated Nov 28, 2024, issued by the hospital, mentions that Darshan is a patient with a history of diabetes, hypertension, and prior cardiac issues, and that he may require a CABG (coronary artery bypass grafting) surgery in future. However, the report does not indicate any current emergency or need for immediate medical intervention, any life-threatening condition warranting urgent release, or any inability of the prison medical system to manage his current state. Thus, there is no compelling medical necessity for the grant of bail, the bench added. In the Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs Rajesh Ranjan case, this court cautioned that "bail on medical grounds can be granted only in exceptional cases where the medical condition is serious, cannot be treated in custody, and necessary facilities are not available in jail." The burden to prove such necessity lies on the accused. In the present case, the accused failed to demonstrate that the jail hospital was incapable of managing his condition or that adequate treatment could not be given in judicial custody. Instead, the high court proceeded to grant bail without recording a definitive finding on the urgency, seriousness, or inadequacy of treatment in custody. This results in a perverse and legally unsustainable bail order, liable to be cancelled as per the principles laid down in Puran and Samarendra Nath Bhattacharjee vs State of West Bengal, the top court observed while setting aside the bail granted by the high court single bench judge Justice S Vishwajith Shetty to Darshan. Stay updated with the latest local news from your city on Times of India (TOI). Check upcoming bank holidays , public holidays , and current gold rates and silver prices in your area. Get the latest lifestyle updates on Times of India, along with Happy Independence Day wishes , messages , and quotes !
The Hindu
06-07-2025
- The Hindu
Social media posts: judicial magistrates cautioned against deviating from law while ordering remand
The Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court (HC) of Andhra Pradesh issued a circular on July 5, instructing the judicial magistrates in the State to satisfy themselves before ordering remand, particularly in cases relating to social media postings / comments, that the investigating officers complied with the law laid down in the Arnesh Kumar vs State of Bihar and Imran Pratapgarhi vs State of Gujarat judgments. It was mentioned in the given judgements that the magistrates should satisfy themselves that the accused committed repeated and multiple offences, and, if not ordered to be remanded to judicial custody, the accused might influence the witnesses or tamper evidence that the police require for custodial investigation. The Registrar observed that it had been brought to the notice of the HC that the judicial magistrates were remanding the accused in cases pertaining to social media postings / comments without adhering to the principles laid down in the above judgments. While quashing the FIR in the Imran Pratapgarhi vs State of Gujarat case, the Supreme Court held that, before registering an FIR involving speech, writing, or artistic expression (where the offences carry three to seven years of imprisonment), the police must conduct a preliminary inquiry under Section 173 (3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, and such inquiry shall be preceded by an approval from the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the same must be concluded within 14 days. The judicial magistrates have to follow the circular scrupulously, and any deviation thereof would be viewed very seriously, and they would be rendering themselves liable for contempt of the HC, besides facing departmental inquiry.
The Hindu
14-05-2025
- Politics
- The Hindu
Principled criminalisation and the police as pivot
Procedural law tends to receive less attention than substantive law in criminal law discussions. A major reason for this is that procedural criminal law is seen as dealing with the prosaic question of 'how', while the more dramatic question of 'what' crimes and punishments exist are associated with substantive criminal law. But, in reality, procedure is the beating heart of action. The recent Supreme Court of India ruling, in Imran Pratapgarhi vs State of Gujarat, is a reminder of how principled criminalisation is contingent on the adherence of the police to India's criminal procedure law, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). A straightforward way of thinking about criminalisation is in terms of the exercise of state power and duty. Criminalisation is about the state's power to name a wrong/harm as 'crime' and impose 'punishment'. It is, equally, about the state's duty to address wrongdoing by holding individuals accountable publicly and administering appropriate penalties. Criminal law in a constitutional democracy seeks to ensure that this enormous authority and responsibility is exercised properly. Legal philosopher Victor Tadros suggests that the state's duty/power to criminalise wrongful conduct is part of a larger complex duty/power to criminalise, prosecute, convict, publicly condemn and punish the conduct. Within the broader normative context, criminalisation exists as part of social institutions and practices that address wrongdoing, such as families and private law. The claim, therefore (and importantly), is that criminalisation has a role independent of its effects that can be realised through the operations of the criminal law. The basis That said, the full force of criminalisation depends on criminal law and the workings of the criminal justice system. Given the powerful symbolic and concrete effects of criminalisation, legal scholars have sought to identify one (or more) 'master principle(s)' on the basis of which the kinds of behaviours that should be criminalised can be satisfactorily decided. Tatjana Hörnle makes a cogent case for three principles: conduct should be criminalised only if first, it is incompatible with important collective interests, second, it constitutes a violent attack against other persons, and third, it violates another person's right to non-intervention. These principles can be seen at the core of criminalisation under India's substantive criminal law, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). Even if the substantive criminal law structures criminalisation in accordance with pragmatic and restrictive principles, some social groups and behaviours can be over-criminalised and others under-criminalised. This is because beyond the conceptual labelling lies the actual labelling of acts and individuals as 'crime' and 'criminal' through the process of detecting, recording, arresting, charging, prosecuting, convicting and sentencing. Therefore, it is essential to pay equal, or possibly more, attention to the powers and functions of criminal justice agencies under the procedural law that governs the process. The police as the focus In this context, the focus inevitably shifts to the role of the police because they spearhead the process of criminalisation by detecting, registering, investigating crime, and, most conspicuously, by arresting suspects. There is general consensus that the police exercise considerable discretion in their daily work. As a result, the nature and the extent of criminalisation is largely shaped by how this discretionary authority is regulated and used. A case in point here is the possibility of overzealous policing of non-harmful wrongdoing (minor infractions) deflecting attention from harmful wrongdoing (serious offences). A key provision in the BNSS is Section 173(3), which ostensibly confers more discretion on the police to decide which cases to investigate, but should actually be viewed as directed towards preventing unnecessary criminalisation due to police overreach. Under the provision, when the officer in charge of a police station receives information relating to the commission of a cognisable offence punishable for three years or more but less than seven years, they need not immediately register a First Information Report (FIR) and investigate. Rather, they have the option to conduct a preliminary inquiry within 14 days to check whether a prima facie case exists to proceed in the matter. The case in question In Imran Pratapgarhi, the Court has interpreted such a preliminary inquiry as a positive obligation on the police where an offence covered under the provision is allegedly committed in the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court quashed a first information report against Mr. Pratapgarhi, a Member of the Rajya Sabha, for posting what was alleged to be an inflammatory poem on a social media platform. The Court found that the police had gone overboard by launching an investigation without complying with the provision that enables them to first conduct a preliminary inquiry. Referring to Section 173(3), the judgment notes that '[t]he intention appears to be to prevent the registration of FIRs in frivolous cases….' Principled criminalisation is no doubt central to the legitimacy of the state's power to criminalise. Also, it is as crucial for substantive law to be defined by judicious principles as it is for procedural law to be able to control the actual effects of criminalisation. But none of this works unless the police show a commitment to responsible criminalisation and are held accountable. Pupul Dutta Prasad is an IPS officer with a PhD in Social Policy from the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is currently working as Professor of Practice, Lloyd Law College, Greater Noida, on deputation. The views expressed are personal
