Latest news with #TablighiJamaat
&w=3840&q=100)
First Post
2 days ago
- Politics
- First Post
How religion, and not patriotism, motivates the Pakistan Army
The idea of patriotism never seems to have appealed to the Pakistani army, which grew up from the colonial past only to become an ideologically motivated force imagining itself as the legatee of the mediaeval Arab and Turkish armies read more Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif, Director General Inter-Services Public Relations (DG-ISPR), Pakistan, recently stated during a press briefing in Rawalpindi that Islam was not just integral to the faith of individual soldiers but part of the army's overall training. It was a lacklustre event on May 11, which, despite being delayed by four hours, failed to produce any visual evidence to back up its tall claims and was therefore dismissed as a poor attempt to emulate India's DGMO Press Conference. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD However, Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif's claim about Islam being part of Pakistan's Army's training is undoubtedly true. Late General Zia-ul-Haq, soon after he became the Chief of the Army Staff in 1976 — informs Shuja Nawaz (2008) — changed the motto of the army from Jinnah's 'Unity, Faith, and Discipline' to 'Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabilillah' (Faith, Obedience of God, and Struggle in the Path of Allah). Apart from encouraging commanders to join their troops in congregational prayers and elevating the regimental status of maulavis (though not with demur from old-type officers), he even allowed Tablighi Jamaat missionaries to preach at the Pakistani Military Academy (PMA) at Kakul, near Abbottabad in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Tablighi Jamaat preachers would deliver khutba (sermon) after Friday prayers at the PMA until 1984. In 1985, Major General Asif Nawaz prohibited their entry into the premises, stating that the place was a military academy, not a seminary (Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, P.384-385). General Zia-ul-Haq also contributed the foreword to Brigadier SK Malik's book The Quranic Concept of War (1979). It was pithy but instructive, which might explain the current scenario. 'JEHAD FI-SABILILLAH is not an exclusive domain of the professional soldier, nor is it restricted to the application of military force alone… The professional soldier in a Muslim army, pursuing the goals of a military state, CANNOT become 'professional' if in all his activities he does not take on the 'colour of Allah'. The non-military citizen of a Muslim state must, likewise, be aware of the kind of soldier that his country must produce and the ONLY pattern of war that his country's armed forces may wage.' STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Recent evidence about the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the constituted authority and terror network in Pakistan might appear to be a legacy of Zia-ul-Haq's policies. The visuals that have emerged from Pakistan, in the aftermath of India undertaking Operation Sindoor, are revealing. Corpses of slain terrorists were draped in the national flag of Pakistan during their last journey, with personnel of the Pakistani army and police giving them a ceremonial gun salute. A designated terrorist, Hafiz Abdur Rauf, led the Salat-ul-Janazah (funeral prayer) flanked by senior officers of the Pakistani Army. It is an ocular proof that the boundaries between the government and terror apparatus have been somewhat blurred in Pakistan. Even the fig leaf, which previously concealed this relation, has been dropped. How to deal with such a country, at a theoretical level, should constitute a challenge for the global community. Whereas India might be the immediate victim of Pakistan's terrorism, the threat has a wider canvas. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Pakistan's Army has two-fold origination — a) historical and b) ideological. Historically, the Pakistan Army, like its Indian counterpart, has its origin in the colonial Indian Army (or the British Indian Army). The ranks, formations, drills/manoeuvres, uniforms, badges, lifestyle/mode of recreation, etc, are a legacy of the colonial army. While this colonial army no doubt ensured the external security of India for almost two centuries, whereby notorious foreign aggressions were relegated to history, it was in no sense a national army. Not patriotism but colonial interests at home and abroad formed the motivating factor of this army. No wonder Indian battalions participated in the battles of World Wars I & II in foreign war theatres. 'As now constituted', — reads a pamphlet published by the All India Congress Committee, 'the armed forces under the Government of India are Indian in one sense only— in that their cost is borne by the people of India. In everything else they are either British or, at any rate, non-national, though an overwhelming proportion of their personnel is furnished by India' (Defence of India or Nationalisation of Indian Army, P.3). The author of the pamphlet was Nirad C Chaudhuri, who was literally an 'unknown Indian' at that time, before he became an internationally known scholar. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The transfer of power to the domains of India and Pakistan led to the formation of two sovereign armed forces. In a sovereign nation, patriotism must replace colonial interests as the driving force of the army. Interestingly, the Azad Hind Fauz (Indian National Army) led by Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose had provided a model of a patriotic national army to Indians during World War II. The INA, which shunned racial/religious divides and formed its brigades named after national leaders, had drawn participation from Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians alike in Southeast Asia. The INA was path-breaking not just in Indian but also global contexts, which taught uniformed men and women to fight and die for the nation's independence. Love of the country was its motive force. It had directly or indirectly influenced the Indian Army as we know it today. Major Somnath Sharma, India's first Param Vir Chakra awardee, who laid down his life combating invasion on Kashmir less than three months after independence of India, was decisively fighting for his country's security and honour. Similarly, Brigadier Mohammed Usman, who died fighting Pakistani invaders at Nausera (July, 1948) and earned the nickname 'Nausera Ka Sher' (the Tiger of Nausera), upheld the validity of patriotism over religious trapping. It is this religion-neutral patriotism that forms the motive force of the Indian Army. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The partition of India, which accompanied the independence, led to the reorganisation of the armed forces in two dominions, viz, India and Pakistan. The Indian Army and Pakistan Army, despite their shared past, grew along different lines. India chose to have an apolitical and secular armed force where the religious or linguistic identity of a soldier was his/her private affair. The military is actuated by the principle of patriotism. The Indian Army follows an honour code –'Naam, Namak, Nishan', ie, a) name/honour of the unit/Army/Nation, b) loyalty to the nation and c) insignia flag of one's unit/regiment/army/nation. The esprit de corps, or the spirit of comradeship and brotherhood of the brave, transcends caste, creed, religion or language. The Indian Army has had Hindu, Zoroastrian, Christian and Sikh Chiefs of Army Staff (COAS) since independence. At least once a Muslim has been at the top post of the Indian Air Force. But never have they been categorised as such. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD This would be unthinkable in Pakistan, which had not seen any Hindu commissioned officer after the 1950s. Late Major CR Dutt, who later joined Bangladesh Mukti Bahini, was one such officer. Simultaneously, there is an ideological source of origin of the Pakistan Army, viz, Islam. Whereas it might be true General Zia-ul-Haq heralded the Islamisation of the Pakistan Army in particular and of the nation in general during his presidency, throughout which he continued to be the COAS, there were other compulsions to underscore Islam in the pre-1971 period. The idea of patriotism never seems to have appealed to the Pakistani army. The only observation Major General Shaukat Riza could make about Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose in an official publication of the Pakistan Army was, 'The INA was headed by Subhas Chandra Bose, a former Congress President who was a rabid Hindu Brahmin' (The Pakistan Army 1947-1949, P.103). This observation was made in a chapter titled Indian National Army, though it was dealing with the Red Fort trial in particular. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose — not a Brahmin, anyway — was possibly the most secular nationalist. The chapter fails to explain why many Muslims, including General Shahnawaz Khan, General M Z Kiani, etc, fought in the Indian National Army alongside Hindus and Sikhs if Subhas Bose was 'rabid Brahmin'. This is because patriotism is a virtue alien to the Pakistan army. It fights on the zeal of Islam. Its army is merely a reflection of the Pakistani state, which was founded on religious rather than racial or territorial identity. Islam was the only glue that kept its western and eastern flanks of Pakistan together between 1947 and 1971. The eastern flank (today Bangladesh) was actually more populous than the western flank with its four provinces. Pakistan's army would like to imagine itself as the legatee of the Arab and Turkish armies of the mediaeval ages that carried the victorious banner of Islam through non-Islamic lands. Historically, this might be preposterous because Pakistanis, whether they were Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochs, Pathans, Hazaras or Bengalis (before 1971), were not remotely connected to the Arabs, Turks or Kurds. Their forefathers, if they had converted to Islam, converted mostly under coercion to avoid the humiliation of Jiziya, if not to escape the sword of Islam on their necks. The Muslims of Pakistan were actually themselves frontline victims of historical Islamist military aggression on India. Thus, truly speaking, the garrison state of Pakistan exists not so much on the map as much as in the minds of Pakistanis. During the 1965 War, when the Pakistan Army launched Operation 'GIBRALTAR' on August 7, 1965, to wrest Kashmir from India's control, the historical inspiration was obvious. It sought to recreate the valour of Tariq ibn Ziyad (670-718 AD), the commander of the Arab-Berber Muslim army, who invaded Spain from Morocco across the Strait of Gibraltar. The Rock of Gibraltar is a Spanish derivative of the Arabic name Jabal-Tariq, or the mountain of Tariq. It was this conquest that brought Spain under Islam's control for the ensuing seven centuries. 'The Gibraltar force'—informs the then COAS of Pakistan, viz General Mohammad Musa (1983)—'consisted of approximately 7000 Mujahidin from 'Azad Kashmir'. Most of it was given some guerrilla training within a short time before it was launched' (My Version: India-Pakistan War, 1965, P.36). General Musa admits that the operation ended in a failure. This, however, proves that there was a definite connection between the Pakistan Army and Mujahidin (terrorists) even prior to Zia-ul-Haq's era. The names of the units in Operation Gibraltar were also revealing. Shuja Nawaz informs us that the units were named after historical Muslim military heroes, viz, Tariq (bin Ziad), (Mahmud) Ghaznavi, Salahuddin, (Mohammed bin) Qasim, and Khalid (bin Waleed). Only one unit was named Nusrat (meaning Victory) in honour of the wife of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Crossed Swords, P.206). The Pakistan Army uses a prayer, which is called Tariq's prayer in honour of the aforesaid Tariq ibn Ziyad. Its English translation, as available on the website of Pakistan's Army (though not accessible from India at present), reads, 'These Ghazis, these devoted souls of your lordship/whom you have blessed with the zeal of your worship/their legions overcame deserts and rivers/and trample mountain to dust with fervour/they care not for the world's pleasure/the love of the lord are their treasures/the mission and the aim of Momim is martyrdom/not the booty of war, nor crave for a kingdom'. This prayer proves that Pakistan's Army is not a normal national army, which, actuated by a sense of patriotism, defends the territory of a nation. It rather likes to imagine itself as the modern-day avatar of Islam's mediaeval army of conquest. In its quest it could co-opt mujahidin, an honourable term in Islam for the automatic weapon-wielding terrorists. Pakistan might like to celebrate the legacy of Islamic conquests. The question is whether such things have a place in the 21st-century world. The writer is author of the book 'The Microphone Men: How Orators Created a Modern India' (2019) and an independent researcher based in New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
The Wire
4 days ago
- Politics
- The Wire
'Heart Lamp' Burns Bright: How Banu Mushtaq Illuminates Muslim Women's Hidden World
Let us start with the obvious categories of perception, that Banu Mushtaq is a Muslim, a woman and a writer. All three terms are important aspects of her identity that inform her literary perspective. Her lived experience as a Muslim woman undoubtedly shapes the intimacy and empathy with which she writes, influences her literary concerns, and contributes to the authenticity of her voice. However, to suggest that her recent honour – the Booker International Prize for her book Heart Lamp – stems from these identity markers alone would be reductive and unfair to her considerable literary merit. Her translator Deepa Bhasthi emphasises this point, saying 'it would be a disservice to reduce Banu's work to her religious identity, for her stories transcend the confines of a faith and its cultural traditions'. Indeed, her identity extends far beyond these markers, as evidenced by her conscious evolution the day she threw off the burkha and became an activist, a journalist, a protestor in public rallies and wore a black coat as any other lawyer and went to court. Banu's characters could well be named Gita and Sita instead of Arifa, and Jameela because the poverty that pervades Muslim women pervades the Hindu women too. That's where her universal appeal lies but the oppression of Muslim women is markedly different because the patriarchy that suppresses them is empowered and sanctioned by religious authority. The subterranean power of the 'Tablighi Jamaat' (a group of men that go home to home preaching how to be a 'good Muslim') is so pervasive that no woman can dare challenge it. By putting the women in burkha, the Muslim men have succeeded in erasing their individual identity. When you see them in a public space, you do not see Arifa and Jameela, you merely see a different gender walking out there. That's the power of Muslim patriarchy. They control their women's right to exist as individual beings. The woman first belongs to the family – the father, husband, brother, and son, similar to what 'Manu Smriti' prescribed for the Hindu woman. But in public spaces they are a large community of non-entities, thanks to the burkha. No Hindu woman has conceded that power to her man. And therein lies a huge difference. Also read: Banu Mushtaq's Importance Goes Much Beyond the BookerThe Hindu patriarchy, on the other hand, cannot impose its will on women on the implicit authority of religion, though caste factors do play an important role in the assertion of 'family honour' – a pride that always rests on denying the autonomy of the female agency. This is one crucial area where the Hindutva-led majoritarianism is reviving patriarchy by undergirding family values and community unity in the face of threats from the Other. A typical example of this are the laws passed by some BJP-ruled states aimed at the imaginary crime of 'love jihad' – which have now ended up as a joke because in UP they could not even find half-a-dozen such cases. There is a more important identity of Banu Mushtaq that I wish to focus on – one that she has crafted for herself and suits her far more significantly than anything else. That she is a 'critical insider'. She proclaimed this identity, quite justifiably, at a recent event in Mysore before the Booker prize was announced. Let us develop these two terms a bit more. Belonging, as she does to the 'Bandaya Movement' that produced the 'Bandaya Sahitya' of the mid-1970s in Kannada literature, critical thinking and questioning were a necessary precondition to her writings and public acts. The pioneers of the movement came from the oppressed classes, the Muslims, Dalits, and women. And she has a foot in two of the three camps – an authenticity that is doubly reinforced. She acknowledges without any hesitation, the contribution of Baraguru Ramachandrappa and P. Lankesh to her own literary and social awareness. It was P. Lankesh who prodded her to become a journalist by filing stories for his famous Lankesh Patrike on the events in her home-town Hassan and its surroundings. Later, he encouraged her to tell her story and the stories of others in her community. From a journalist to an activist to a lawyer, her journey has been one of continuous progression in social and political consciousness that has regularly found literary back to the issue of being a 'critical insider', let us understand where she stands with the help of her stories. The most frequent characters that recur in her stories are women, mostly poor and uneducated, the maulvis and mutawallis (those who interpret the Sharia laws). All of them operate within the pervasive control of the mosque and the madrassa. They seem to live in a different universe. And different rules and an arcane system of justice apply there. Banu Mushtaq tells their stories with great empathy and at times, wry humour. Being an 'insider', Banu Mushtaq implicitly accepts the cosmology and the world-view of her faith, abides by its holy scriptures – the Qur'an and the Hadith. But being 'critical' she questions the men that mediate between her and her Allah. She questions their knowledge of the holy texts and their ability to perceive the humanism and the nobility inherent in it. She questions the web of institutions and the rules built by the men of religion to subjugate other men and more so, the women. But the critical insider doesn't go beyond questioning, or perhaps that is the journalist in her, who sees her role as the asker of questions rather than the provider of answers. Her protagonists certainly protest but it seems muffled, and they do not rebel. They seem to have only two options – to die by suicide or fall in line. Walking out of the all-enveloping confines and fear of the jamaat does not exist as an option in her stories, except in one, 'Huttu' – 'Birth' (not included in Heart Lamp but in the larger Kannada collection, Hasina and other Stories). Here the young girl, Nishat, elopes with her tuition teacher, a Hindu boy, but then, in an act of repentance and as an expiation of her guilt, sends back her five-year-old daughter to live with her grandparents and her mamas and mamis. But why? Why should she sacrifice her dearest daughter to the very confines from which she has escaped? The wider world that seems the natural habitat of a similarly placed Hindu protagonist does not seem to be an easy option for her character. Also read: No Story Is Ever 'Small': Banu Mushtaq's International Booker Acceptance SpeechIn one poignant story, the woman drops the match-stick that she was about to strike after dousing herself in kerosene, at the heartrending cry of her eldest daughter, as in 'Heart Lamp', or the wife of the mutawalli walks out of home, as in 'Black Cobras', determined to get a vasectomy operation done for herself. Here the vasectomy operation is seen as a slap to the mutawalli who has been preaching to all the women that getting such an operation is 'haram' – against the will of God. One must accept that Banu Mushtaq writes of present-day reality in Muslim society with profound insight. And the reality is depressing and disturbing. A poor, uneducated Muslim woman's life is indeed hellish and brutal. Their men are mainly responsible for this, and religion hardly provides any succour. As a chronicler of her community's state of affairs, Banu Mushtaq could not have been more accurate. As a 'critical insider', she offers something invaluable to young Muslim girls—a mirror to see their reality clearly and a voice that validates their struggles. Her own journey from traditional constraints to becoming an activist, journalist, and award-winning writer serves as a powerful testament to what is possible. Through her authentic storytelling and public presence, she creates space for protest, rebellion, and reform within her community. Her work doesn't provide easy answers, but it asks the essential questions and shows that transformation, however difficult, remains within Joshi was formerly in the Cabinet Secretariat.
&w=3840&q=100)
First Post
12-05-2025
- Politics
- First Post
From piety to proxy war: How General Munir embodies Pakistan's military-jihadi complex
Rawalpindi is facing a crisis, with rumours, talk of coups and General Munir's influence, all tied to its long history read more Few days back there were rumours circulating on social media about General Asim Munir 's possible arrest or ouster within Pakistan's military establishment, reflecting internal dissent or power struggles. As circumstances have unfolded of late in Pakistan, the country definitely needs a coup against General Munir. The puppet Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif can be dealt with later. General Munir's religious profile General Munir , the Chief of the Pakistan Army and a devout Muslim , is an Islamic scholar. His mastery over The Koran is perhaps enviable to many a Muslim who perhaps aspire such depth of knowledge of the holy scripture. But the problem is in what way is he using his vast knowledge on The Koran. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD What virtue will he achieve when he leaves his legacy as one of the jihadi generals of Pakistan? Pakistan has no dearth of such figures. Several senior Pakistani military figures have been notably associated with allegations of supporting or enabling jihadist groups as part of broader strategic objectives. Precedents of military-jihadi symbiosis General Zia ul Haq: 'Maulvi' who put faith in arms General Zia ul Haq, who ruled Pakistan as the head of the government, from 1977 to 1988 is considered as the original proponent of the policy of using faith to feed terrorism. A devout Muslim who saw Islam as the panacea for Pakistan's ills as well as the glue to hold the nation together, he was also referred to as 'Maulvi Zia-ul-Haq' by some in Pakistani military circles. What he did was to create multiple terror outfits on brigade lines, a policy that came to be known as Islamisation or Shariaisation of the Pakistan state, which had maintained somewhat secular credentials until that point of time. Zia changed the Pakistan Army's motto from MA Jinnah's 'Unity, Faith, and Discipline' to 'Faith, Piety, and Jihad for the sake of Allah'. He made Islamic prayers and studies mandatory and presided over the proliferation of religious seminaries with fundamentalism as the core driving force. He encouraged the Jamaat-e-Islami and Islamic revivalist group Tablighi Jamaat to spread their ideas among the soldiers. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD This is where began Pakistan's proxy war of terrorism against India, a policy Zia saw as a means to 'bleed India by a thousand cuts' because his country could not match India's might in the battlefield. General Hamid Gul: 'Godfather of the Taliban' General Hamid Gul, who served as Pakistan military's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief from 1987 to 1989, is perhaps the most emblematic of this trend. Often referred to by critics as the 'Godfather of the Taliban,' Gul openly supported jihadist elements in both Afghanistan and Jammu and Kashmir. He did not shy away from praising jihad as a strategic tool to achieve Pakistan's regional goals, particularly against India. General Pervez Musharraf: Double game General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's Army chief and the country's president from 1999 to 2008, outwardly allied with the United States following the 9/11 attacks. However, he has been accused of duplicity—allowing safe havens for groups like the Taliban while simultaneously receiving Western support. The Kargil war and ongoing support for the Kashmir insurgency unfolded during his tenure, adding to suspicions of state-sponsored militancy. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD General Kayani and the 'dual track' policy General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who led the army from 2007 to 2013 and previously headed the ISI, was seen as a key figure in maintaining Pakistan's 'dual-track' policy: targeting some militants while shielding others. His tenure saw increasing criticism from the United States, particularly over Pakistan's failure to act against the Haqqani Network, which was blamed for deadly attacks on US and the Nato forces in Afghanistan. Lt General Shuja Pasha and the bin Laden debacle Lt Gen Ahmad Shuja Pasha, the ISI chief from 2008 to 2012, came under intense scrutiny following the U.S. raid in Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden. Under his leadership, the ISI was accused of harbouring high-profile militants, leading to deteriorating trust between Washington and Islamabad during a critical period of the 'War on Terror'. General Bajwa: Moderate image, questionable actions General Qamar Javed Bajwa, who served as Army chief from 2016 to 2022, was often portrayed as more moderate compared to his predecessors. Yet, during his leadership, extremist political groups such as Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) were allowed to operate and expand influence. He was also accused of political engineering, including manipulating elections and tolerating extremist rhetoric to maintain the military's grip over civilian politics. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD These generals represent different shades of a long-standing pattern within segments of the Pakistani military establishment—balancing international alliances with internal strategies that have, at times, involved leveraging Islamist militancy for strategic depth. General Munir vs Hafiz Saeed: Where's the difference? Apart from his uniform, in what way is General Munir different from say someone like Hafiz Saeed, the founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), in any capacity? Both are killing machines of innocents although operating in a different manner but the ultimate goal is the same – the end of India. India is no longer fighting a secessionist war in Kashmir, it is fighting Islamic fanatics in the garb of separatists who ultimately want to establish a Caliphate. Hafiz Saeed is 74 years old and although it might sound very outrageous General Munir by dint of his inclination and nature of his conduct could well replace him after retirement. Piety or politicisation of faith? Leading Pakistan's military since November 2022, General Munir is known for his conservative religious views and has held significant positions, including Director-General of Military Intelligence and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). It is under his watch that Pakistani military officials attended funerals of individuals linked to terrorist activities. The charge of politicisation of piety as prescribed in faith stems from his repeated affirmations of the two-nation theory, which is often viewed as a justification for religious differences and division, and his alleged suppression of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party led by Imran Khan. Munir has publicly reiterated his belief in the two-nation theory, which posits that Muslims and Hindus are separate nations. This was the original premise on which Jinnah unleashed communal violence in an undivided India, giving the British an opportunity to divide India. Since then this theory, though rejected by scholars and historians, has been used to justify the creation of Pakistan and has been a source of tension and persecution of Hindus and other minorities in Pakistan. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Violence in Pahalgam A deadly incident in the town of Pahalgam on April 22, which resulted in 26 fatalities — 25 tourists including one from Nepal and a local pony-ride operator who tried to snatch the assault from one of the terrorists — sparked widespread outrage and renewed scrutiny of a senior Pakistani military figure, General Asim Munir. Just days before the attack, Munir delivered a contentious address emphasising Pakistan's claim over Kashmir by invoking emotionally charged historical rhetoric. Observers have drawn a connection between his inflammatory remarks and the subsequent eruption of violence. Munir, who previously led Pakistan's intelligence agency during the 2019 Pulwama tragedy, has also been accused by ex-military officer Adil Raja of orchestrating the Pahalgam assault to advance his own political agenda. General Munir, however, might have underestimated India's retaliation, prompting his DGMO to beg India for de-escalation. This came after India's serious military response in the form of Operation Sindoor, and a clear message that 'Asim Munir will not be given a face-saver exit'. Criticism at home Within Pakistan, General Munir faces growing dissatisfaction over his alleged interference in civilian affairs. He has come under fire for targeting political rivals, particularly the PTI party led by former prime minister Imran Khan. The military, under his watch, is accused of detaining civilians connected to the May 9 unrest and subjecting them to trials in military courts—a controversial move that has intensified accusations of authoritarianism. Khan has openly claimed that Munir not only violated previously agreed-upon boundaries between the military and civilian leadership but also engaged in plotting acts of political sabotage, including attempts on his life. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Cracks within the ranks General Munir's leadership has faced dissent within the Pakistan Army, including forced retirements of senior officers and calls from junior officers for his resignation, partly due to failures in security and handling of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). International condemnation A US lawmaker, Ro Khanna, urged punitive measures against Munir, accusing him of harassing relatives of individuals advocating for democratic reforms. Experts such as Michael Kugelman have expressed concern that Munir's prolonged leadership is deepening the military's dominance while weakening democratic institutions. Commentator Michael Rubin went so far as to liken Munir to a terrorist figure, drawing parallels to Osama bin Laden in the wake of the Pahalgam incident. Munir and the militarisation of Islam General Munir is another example in Pakistan's long history of army leaders who are linked to extremist ideas and interfering too much in politics. Even though he appears to be a religious man and an Islamic scholar, his proximity to terror chiefs operating from Pakistan is well known. From generals like Zia-ul-Haq to Hamid Gul, the pattern has been clear: using religious extremism as a tool to stay in power and go after political goals, especially against India. Munir's time as army chief has made things worse—with reports of repression inside Pakistan, support for terrorist activities and rising unrest within the army itself.
Hindustan Times
22-04-2025
- Hindustan Times
Delhi high court reserves verdict on pleas in 2020 Tablighi shelter case
The Delhi High Court on Monday reserved its judgement on petitions filed by several Indian nationals accused of providing shelter to foreign nationals during the 2020 COVID-19 outbreak. The case, associated with the Tablighi Jamaat gathering, was under legal examination due to its alleged impact on public health and its adherence to regulatory guidelines during the pandemic. Advocate Ashima Mandla appeared for the Indian nationals against whom FIRs were filed under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, Epidemic Diseases Act, Disaster Management Act and Foreigners Act. She placed on record a compilation of judgements passed by other courts in relation to the incident. Advocate Mandakini Singh also appeared on behalf of the Petitioners. The bench of Justice Neena Bansal reserved the judgement in a batch matter of 16 FIRs involving 70 Indian nationals associated with Tablighi Jamaat who have been chargesheeted u/s 188/269/270/120-B IPC for housing foreign nationals in different masjids during the Covid-19 outbreak between March 24, 2020 and March 30, 2020. Also Read: Delhi HC asks NIA response on PFI leader plea for custody parole The 195 foreign nationals who were housed by these Indian nationals were also named in the FIR; however, in most chargesheets, they were not chargesheeted or cognisance refused by the Trial Court, on principles of double jeopardy, as the same set of foreign nationals were chargesheeted for the same set of offences and had entered plea bargaining for purposes of repatriation or were discharged in an FIR. The Delhi Police Crime Branch registered an FIR under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Epidemic Diseases Act, the Disaster Management Act, and the Foreigners Act against Indian and foreign nationals in connection with alleged violations during the COVID-19 outbreak. A series of chargesheets were filed, with many foreign nationals entering plea bargains. Additionally, 28 FIRs were registered across Delhi against 193 individuals, leading to quashing petitions before the Delhi High Court. Questions arose regarding the legal validity of charges against petitioners, particularly under sections of the IPC that require specific procedural conditions. Courts across India have previously quashed similar cases, citing procedural lapses and insufficient evidence.
Indian Express
22-04-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
Delhi HC reserves verdict in cases seeking quashing of FIR against Tablighi Jamaat members accused of spreading COVID-19
The Delhi High Court Monday reserved a verdict in a slew of petitions seeking quashing of 16 FIRs involving 70 Indian nationals associated with the Tablighi Jamaat who were accused of spreading COVID-19 in 2020. Justice Neena Bansal Krishna reserved a verdict in the 16 First Information Reports involving the Indian nationals. They were charged under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), including criminal conspiracy, for allegedly housing foreign nationals in different mosques during the pandemic between March 24, 2020, and March 30, 2020. While 195 foreign nationals were named in the FIRs, however, in most chargesheets, they were not charge sheeted, or the cognisance of the chargesheet was refused by the magistrate court on principles of double jeopardy. The Delhi Police's Crime Branch initially instituted an FIR under Section 3 of the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897, and IPC sections 188, 269, 270, 120-B, and 271, along with provisions of the Disaster Management Act, 2005, against seven Indians. The Crime Branch then filed 48 chargesheets and 11 supplementary chargesheets, including under Section 14(b) of the Foreigners Act, 1946, against 955 foreign nationals, of whom 911 entered plea bargains before the magistrate court. Later, 28 other FIRs, including at Chandni Mahal Police Station, were registered across Delhi for similar offences, against 193 foreign nationals and Indian nationals as well. The magistrate court had taken cognisance of the chargesheet at the Chandni Mahal Police Station FIR against the Indian nationals.
