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AllAfrica
24-07-2025
- Business
- AllAfrica
Costly Afghan immigration tests Iran's neighborly hospitality
Afghan migration has fundamentally reshaped Iran's demographics, labor market and public finances. While the Iranian economy gains from lower labor costs and higher productivity, the fiscal burden of untargeted subsidies, currency outflows and hidden social costs has turned migration into a national economic challenge. Without targeted reforms, the costs will keep rising. For more than four decades, Afghan migration to Iran has created a complex and evolving social fabric. The community is deeply heterogeneous: A large majority are Sunni Muslims – mainly Pashtuns and some Tajiks – whose customs and social norms diverge from Iran's Shia-majority society. In many respects, their traditional, tribal, and rural lifestyles do not align with the rules and rhythms of urban Iran. Shia minorities, mainly Hazaras, are linguistically and culturally closer to Iranians, easing their social integration. Other groups such as Uzbeks, Turkmens, Baloch and Ismailis add further complexity. Waves of Afghan migration to Iran (1979–2025) Year Total Afghan Population (Est.) Main Migration/Return Wave & Cause Returnees/Deportees (thousand) Remaining Population After Return (million) Share of Legal / Irregular Entry (%) 1979 <0.1 Pre-Revolution, Normal Status – <0.1 Mostly legal 1983 1.5 Soviet invasion, war, instability Low 1.5 Mostly legal 1986 2.5 Intensified war, greater insecurity Low 2.5 Mostly legal 1996 3.0 Civil war, weak central government Low 3.0 Mostly legal 2001 2.8 Taliban ascendancy, religious/ethnic repression ~300 2.5 Mostly legal 2003 2.2 Taliban fall, voluntary repatriation ~600 1.6 Legal & returning 2011 1.7 Elected govt, relative stability, economic crisis Low 1.7 Mostly legal 2016 2.5 New insecurity, Afghan economic crisis Low 2.5 Legal & irregular 2021 3.0 Kabul fall, Taliban return, violence escalates Low 3.0 Sharp rise in irregular entry 2023 4.5 Fifth wave, intensified crisis, surge in irregular ~700 ~3.8 Mixed; predominantly irregular 2024 3.8 Mass deportations & repatriations begin ~1,200 ~2.6 Irregular & legal 2025 3.8 Continued returns/deportations, population control (up to 1,200–1,500) ~2.5 Mostly irregular Family-centric culture, tribal traditions and practices such as polygamy, together with a significant gap between many migrants' social codes and those of mainstream Iran, have complicated coexistence and sometimes caused friction over education, health and civic participation. Still, second- and third-generation Afghans – especially in major cities – have become Persian-speaking and bicultural. They often experience dual Iranian-Afghan identity. Afghan migration has been driven by Afghanistan's political turmoil, Iran's labor needs and changing Iranian state policies. Today, this population – split between documented and undocumented migrants – shapes Iran's social and economic scene while posing a mounting challenge for fiscal policy. The consequences go far beyond population statistics, as detailed in the financial analysis below. Iran's economy is built on a vast, inefficient and non-targeted subsidy system – one of the world's costliest. For a large, low-income migrant population like the Afghans, this has turned a social issue into a fiscal dilemma. The analysis below examines each major line item using official Iranian sources and independent research. Energy subsidies: Fuel and energy subsidies are the largest component. State price controls and below-market energy costs lead to enormous hidden expenditures for gasoline, gas, diesel and electricity. The Parliament Research Center and the World Bank estimate Iran's annual hidden energy subsidy at up to 1,200 trillion tomans ($286 billion). While Afghan migrants – mostly from low-income deciles and generally without private cars – consume less than the average Iranian, everyone benefits via subsidized public transit and heating. The per capita annual fuel subsidy for Afghans is about 10-13 million tomans, well below the 30 million for Iranians. The undocumented sector, operating more in the grey market, creates additional fiscal pressure. Education subsidies: Iranian law requires that all Afghan children, regardless of documentation, be enrolled in public schools (Cabinet Resolution 2015; UNHCR 2024). The Ministry of Education and the Parliament Research Center estimate the average annual cost per Afghan student at about 4.5 million tomans. With an estimated 300,000 Afghan children in schools, this is a significant and growing burden, the same for both legal and undocumented residents. Healthcare subsidies: Healthcare access depends on insurance and residency status. About one million Afghans have public health insurance (UNHCR 2024); others use public services sporadically. Average annual health spending per Afghan is estimated at about 2-3 million tomans – comparable to the lowest-income Iranian deciles. Bread subsidies: Bread is a staple for both Iranians and Afghans, and the state's bread subsidy is among its largest fiscal commitments. Per capita, Afghans receive about 4-5 million tomans per year in bread subsidies, based on average consumption (160-180 kg) and the price gap between subsidized and market bread. Afghan households, typically larger, often consume up to 25% more than Iranian families. Even undocumented migrants have virtually unrestricted access to subsidized bread. Overall, bread subsidies remain a central – and expensive – pillar of food security for both communities. Water and electricity subsidies: In migrant-concentrated areas, water and power use per household is lower due to simpler lifestyles, but the total population puts chronic strain on infrastructure. Per capita subsidy is about 3-4 million tomans annually. Municipal services: Public transport, waste collection, green spaces, and urban services add another 500,000 tomans per person per year – low in isolation, but substantial in the aggregate in urban centers. Annual cost of Afghan migrants (2025 estimates, in millions of USD) Subsidy Estimated Annual Cost per Legal Migrant (USD) Estimated Annual Cost per Undocumented Migrant (USD) Legal immigrant population (millions) legal immigrant population (millions) Total Annual Cost Legal Migrants (m USD) Total Annual Cost Undocumented Migrants (m USD) Total Grand Annual Cost (m USD) Fuel & Energy 114 148 0.9 2.1 102.3 307.4 409.7 Education 51 51 0.3 0.3 17.2 17.2 34.4 Healthcare 34 23 0.9 2.1 34.1 54.0 88.1 Bread & Food 51 57 0.9 2.1 41.4 113.3 154.7 Water & Electricity 40 40 0.9 2.1 32.1 74.7 106.8 Municipal Services 6 8 0.9 2.1 4.9 20.1 25.0 Total 232.0 586.7 818.7 Despite these costs, Afghan migration generates tangible economic gains. Afghan workers, with lower wages and roughly 15-20% higher productivity than Iranian peers, create an annual private sector saving of about $852 million (75,000 bn tomans). These savings stabilize key industries – especially construction and agriculture – that face chronic domestic labor shortages. But the fiscal and social costs outweigh the gains. Afghans remit $1-1.5 billion annually, draining foreign currency. The state's annual outlay for subsidies and public services exceeds $819 million. Pressure on housing markets, especially in low-income areas, adds at least $34 million in annual costs for Iranian renters. Security and law enforcement related to migration adds another $57 million. Annual gains & losses (2025, in millions of USD) Item Economic Gain (m USD) Economic Cost (m USD) Wage & Productivity 852 – Currency Outflow – 1,000–1,500 Subsidies & Public – 819 Housing Impact – 34 Security Costs – 57 Total 852 1,910–2,410 Despite all positive economic effects, Afghan migration's bottom line for Iran's public finances is negative. The net annual loss – over $1 billion – could build two 500-megawatt power plants or 200 modern schools in disadvantaged regions. Each year, the government could otherwise expand national infrastructure or offer full health insurance to every uninsured Iranian. The true challenge is not just migration, but Iran's untargeted and inefficient subsidy system and lack of migration management. Without reform, these fiscal burdens will keep rising. Clear policy, targeted subsidies and robust data are essential for Iran to balance economic needs, social cohesion and national stability. A senior economic analyst and construction project manager based in Tehran, Amirreza Etasi ( has worked for more than a decade at the intersection of public finance, energy and development policy, both in executive roles and as a contributor to major media outlets in Iran and abroad.
The Diplomat
18-07-2025
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Recent Violence Underscores Problems Facing Afghanistan's Badakhshan Province
The geographic and social conditions that make Badakhshan difficult for the Taliban to control also make it difficult for any widespread unrest to spill out from the region. An early July counternarcotics operation by Taliban authorities triggered a week-long outbreak of violence in Khash District in central Badakhshan Province, resulting in as many as 15 dead. Protests and repression in the area are not new, as violence also broke out during last year's poppy cultivation season. The drug trade, competition over minerals, ethnic and religious tensions, and the presence of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) will likely continue to challenge the Taliban regime's ability to exert control over Badakhshan, a province where it historically enjoyed only limited support. Unless things escalate further, the recent unrest in Badakhshan seems unlikely to pose a threat to the Taliban's control over the country. However, the province should serve as a bellwether for the Taliban's attempts to adapt its dogmatic governance to an increasingly underserved national population. Badakhshan Province was never ruled by the Taliban during the first emirate, though the movement did enjoy some support in the area. Several key members of the Taliban are from the province, including the current Chief of Army Staff Qari Fasihuddin Fitrat. During the insurgency, the Taliban presence increased in the central districts of the province after 2014. While the Taliban lacked the manpower in the northeast to expand their base of support past a few districts, the Taliban's presence around Faizabad meant that it was only the ninth provincial capital to fall once the group began its takeover of the country in 2021. Since the takeover, the Taliban have been careful in their governance of the province, seeking to manage their lack of support in the more remote districts of the province. The ethnic disposition of the Badakhshan presents a problem for the Taliban. Tajiks and Uzbeks make up the overwhelming majority of the province's population with a limited number of Pashtuns sprinkled among the urban areas, working as traders or government officials. In an effort to accommodate local sensitivities, the Taliban has allowed Badakhshi commanders and officials to hold government posts in their local areas, something not generally allowed elsewhere in the country. However, as time as passed, there is an increasing tension between local Tajik and Uzbek Taliban members and Pashtun senior leaders from outside of the province. There are also sectarian elements to the instability in Badakhshan as the Deobandi Taliban have sought to assert control over Salafi mosques and Ismaili prayer houses and cultural centers in the province. Religious tensions in the province likely caused the killing of a local Agha Khan Foundation official on July 9 and a local Salafist Taliban leader on May 27. While it has been quiet in recent months, ISKP has a historic presence in Badakhshan, capitalizing on the area's religious and ethnic fault lines. The Taliban target ISKP cells in the province as they are identified, to mixed results. Iranian officials claimed the Islamic State's January 3, 2024 attack in Kerman was facilitated out of Badakhshan. However, ISKP only conducted four attacks inside the province in 2024, and has not claimed an attack in Badakhshan this year. Despite the group's recent decline, its actions set the stage for the current problems in the province. On June 6, 2023, ISKP killed the deputy governor of Badakhshan with a car bomb. ISKP then conducted a suicide attack on the deputy governor's funeral two days later. Recognizing the need for a firmer hand in the province, the Taliban named Muhammad Ayub Khalid, a Pashtun, to be Badakhshan's governor. Khalid's prior experience as a military commander suggests the regime is increasingly focused on security in the region. The movement of additional Pashtuns into intelligence and police positions in the province set the stage for renewed tensions with the local populace as the national government seeks to tighten its control over Badakhshan. Competition between local leaders and the national government over Badakhshan's rich mineral resources is a critical driver for instability. The province has aluminum, gold, and limestone deposits as well as jewels such as rubies and lapis lazuli. The Taliban regime awarded mining contracts in 2024 for the region's large deposits and tried to crack down on illegal mines run by the local population. Control over the province's mines is no trivial matter. The Taliban seek to exploit Afghanistan's mineral wealth in order to mitigate the pressure of Western sanctions and impact of persistent budget shortfalls. For Badakshis, the mines provide a critical revenue stream for many to meet their basic needs as the government provides only minimal services and the terrain and climate limit agricultural opportunities in the province. Conflict over the drug trade is also increasing in Badakhshan. After the Taliban banned poppy cultivation across the country, Badakhshan has emerged as the new center of the Afghan drug trade. The Taliban anti-drug efforts largely depend on deterrence of farmers, rather than aggressive eradication or interdiction campaigns. The Taliban was able to deter poppy cultivation in other parts of the country through strong networks of supporters and allies that convinced the population of the rectitude of the ban. The Taliban in Badakhshan lacked that support network. In fact, many local Taliban commanders did not enforce the ban. Further, southern Pashtun drug traffickers established connections with Badakhshi growers to refine their opium to heroin for shipment to international markets. The eruption of cultivation eventually became something Taliban senior leadership could not ignore. As the Taliban began eradication in the province in spring of 2024, they moved largely Pashtun fighters into Badakhshan from other provinces. The new troops almost immediately began fighting not only with the local population, but eventually with local Badakhshi Taliban as well. As they seek to smooth over ethnic and religious turbulence and improve control, the Taliban have made significant investments in Badakhshan. The government has built canals and bridges in addition to a terminal for international cargo handling. The most notable, and ambitious, infrastructure project is a road through the Wakhan Corridor to connect the province with China. A road project to better connect Badakhshan to Panjshir and Nuristan is also underway. These roads serve to improve the security forces' access to restive parts of the country and increase the government's ability to establish additional mines in Badakhshan and elsewhere in the northeast. With the transportation network improving and Pashtuns now firmly entrenched in key positions in the province, the Taliban are gradually moving to bring governance in Badakhshan in line with Afghanistan's other provinces. Since Khalid's installation as governor, local officials have begun floggings for moral offenses, removing women from educational positions, seizing weapons, and regulating holiday celebrations, things that started long ago in other parts of the country. These moves have further exacerbated popular grievances. When Taliban forces showed up in Darayim and Argo districts in 2024 and in Argo, Jurm, and Khash districts in May and July this year to eradicate local poppy crops, violence was an extraordinarily likely outcome. The Taliban seem to be developing a playbook for such disturbances: withdraw the offending troops and reconstitute, flood the zone with reinforcements, cut off local access to internet, arrest any complicit local commanders, and employ senior Badakhshi Taliban leaders like Fitrat and others to mediate. Little has been done to address core grievances in Badakhshan, so additional violence next May, June, and July is likely as Taliban forces again eradicate poppy ahead of the harvest. Leaders of the anti-Taliban resistance, like General Jalaluddin Yaftali and Vice President Amrullah Saleh, were quick to encourage Badakhshan's population to expand the revolt. It was not to be. The geographic and social conditions that make Badakhshan difficult for the Taliban to control make it difficult for any widespread unrest to spill out from the region. Badakhshan will remain turbulent, though it might be possible for unrest to challenge the regime's ability to control the neighboring portions of Takhar and Panjshir provinces. Unless there is a substantial deterioration in conditions, it is likely the Taliban will do just enough to keep northeastern Afghanistan under control. However, Badakhshan should be watched closely for any further challenges to Taliban authority.
France 24
26-06-2025
- Business
- France 24
Migrant money from Russia a lifeline for Central Asia
The project in Batken is a snapshot of how important emigrant labour has become for economies across Central Asia. The flow of remittances to the region came in at record amounts last year, according to World Bank data. An all-time high of $3 billion flowed into Kyrgyzstan from migrant workers living abroad, accounting for around 25 percent of the country's gross domestic product. In neighbouring Tajikistan, the $6 billion made-up almost half its GDP -- the highest level in the world. Uzbekistan, the region's most populous nation, received $14.8 billion -- 14 percent of GDP. "When I worked in Moscow, I donated 300 som ($3) a month," said Akhmatov, who is supervising the construction of the building in his home village. He said some 1,500 migrants recently contributed to build a new school in Batken, where the average salary is around $235. A new sports centre is a particular source of pride for teacher Abazbek Abdinabiyev. "Children would play in the dust ... now we have this, and a pitch," he told AFP, showing off the bright blue and yellow indoor sports court. "The contribution made by migrants has been enormous. Despite being far away, they have all helped to ensure that their children and brothers could have this opportunity," Abdinabiyev told AFP. 'Duty of every citizen' Local currencies have slipped against the Russian ruble in recent months, pushing up the spending power of what migrant workers send back. The Kyrgyz government estimates that without remittances, the country's poverty rate would shoot up from 29 percent to 41 percent. Unable to fund such projects alone, governments encourage the contributions. "Beautifying the country is the duty of every citizen," reads a government banner stretched over the road in Mehrobod, northern Tajikistan. "Each district is trying to solve its own problems: getting our children into school, keeping the streets clean and well-maintained," said villager Abdukakhor Majidov. Around him, crews on rollers and with shovels were levelling the ground ahead of tarmacking. A new school and bridge were already completed last year. "As soon as one street is repaired, we move on to the next," said Majidov, who handles fundraising. 'Less emigration' But leaving for Russia has lost some of its appeal since Moscow invaded Ukraine in 2022. While Russia's arms factories are booming and job opportunities are plenty, many fear being sent to fight in Ukraine. Around 20,000 Central Asian migrants who received Russian citizenship are already serving in the army, Moscow said last month. The recruitment triggered a backlash among Russia's traditional allies in the region. Without specifying what he was referring to, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon has expressed concern about the "hundreds of repatriated coffins" coming back from Russia, filled with those who had left "to earn bread for their families." There has also been a surge in anti-migrant sentiment in Russia following the arrest of four Tajiks as the suspected perpetrators of the 2024 massacre at a music venue outside Moscow, Russia's deadliest terror attack in two decades. Alongside a spike in violence and street harassment, Moscow passed laws making it easier to expel migrants. Kadyrbek Tashimbekov, 29, is among the 300,000 Kyrgyz who have left Russia -- willingly or by force -- between 2023 and 2024, according to Bishkek's statistics. The exodus accounts for more than half of all Kyrgyz migrants who were living in Russia. "I was expelled after working there for eight years," he told AFP. Now he operates the crane picking up the beams for the frame of Batken's new school. Kyrgyzstan President Sadyr Japarov has pledged to encourage labour migrants back to the country. Meanwhile locals hope to use their funds to boost living standards at home and break the cycle of emigration. The three former migrants that AFP spoke to -- Abdinabiyev, Akhmatov and Tashimbekov -- all said salaries were growing at home and do not plan to return to Russia. "We are building this with the hope that if we have such centres, we will train them in the right professions, guide them," said Akhmatov. "And maybe there will be less emigration."
Business Recorder
23-06-2025
- Politics
- Business Recorder
‘Ball of Confusion'
'Ball of Confusion' is a 1970 hit song by a US band called The Temptations, and is an example of the 'psychedelic soul' style and is also noteworthy for its overtly political themes. This article will endeavor to compare the lyrics with what is happening in Pakistan. It is not a protest but a tilt towards the compulsion of highlighting the ground realities. The first lyric states, People moving out, people moving in. Why, because of the color of their skin. In Pakistan, there has been a marked increase in the exodus of young talent leaving for better prospects, better quality of life, safety and security, and income commensurate with their experience and academic qualifications. Pakistan is also plagued with illegal migrants under the garb of refugees, entering from, at times, the porous borders. Afghans came in multitudes after the Taliban took over the country once again from NATO forces and the then Kabul government in 2021. The menace of Afghan refugees is not for the first time. Pakistan was faced with a deluge of refugees even when the original Taliban established their 'Emirates' in 1996. Moreover, there has always been a continuing inflow of refugees from countries such as Bangladeshis, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Indians, Sri Lankans, Burmese, etc. Hence color of their skin can denote ethnicity, language, and traditions. The second lyric, states Vote for me and I'll set you free. Election fervour in Pakistan has candidates and their political parties promising the moon, and despite failed promises of the past, the voters, like drones in a beehive, faithfully and consistently brave the elements of nature to flock to the grounds to listen and cheer their leaders and vote for them. They are insensitive when told by those opposing their party that their vote went to naught because most of the promises just vanished in the air. Political parties present their manifestos, ostensibly written by expert scriptwriters, and pledge that they would conscientiously adhere to the contents of their manifesto and, once elected, there will be deliverance for the masses. Election win, government sworn in, promises renewed, and then the manifesto is relegated to the proverbial dustbin. Citizens are left to the mercy of these parties and despite biting the bullet, they still remain captive of the party. The next line states, Well, the only person talking about love thy brother is the preacher/And it seems nobody's interested in learning but the teacher. The pulpit symbolizes the authority and centrality of the religious authority or the Imam of the Masjid. Traditionally, those who sat and orated from the pulpit enlightened the congregation with verses from the Holy Book and the teachings of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and his Companions on various subjects including human values, tolerance, public welfare, and charity for noble causes, etc. Today, many preachers and leaders of religio-political parties have made a paradigm shift to an alarming and prejudiced agenda. Many of the government schools have teachers who are unfortunately non-qualified and even schools are a mess. What knowledge would they impart to students? Moreover, 23 million children are out of school for different reasons, primarily because their parents cannot afford the fees, because parents make them work instead of studying, and because there are no schools close proximity to their abodes. The next line highlights Segregation, determination, demonstration, integration, aggravation, humiliation, obligation to our nation. In areas where there is a patriarchal ecosystem, the women are deprived of their rights, including vote franchise, taboos on them working outside their homes, and even from participating at events. There are a widespread bunch of people, individually or in groups, who are determined to create horrible issues that negatively impact on the national security and territorial integrity of the motherland. Creating mischief requires funds, and external and internal disruptors are always there to provide finances and logistical support to achieve their nefarious objectives. Demonstrations are routine all over the country. Roadblocks, sit-ins, marches, and protests, for whatever reasons have made lives miserable for the citizens who may or may not support these demonstrations. Saner elements in the country harp in the notion that there should be national integration of ideas, opinions, and goals. Notwithstanding the kinetic nationalist pride displayed during and after the recent clash with the belligerent neighboring country, there is a growing vacuum in consolidating the people under one umbrella. Pugnacious insolence is more prevalent in many aspects due to the resigned capitulation of many who feel deprived and hence prefer to vent their feelings through various modes of aggravation. Although they may have conceded the fact that they would not gain much, these types of provocation muddle lives everywhere. Humiliation is now a rarity. Pseudo-masochism is the name of the game, whether in business, politics, media, or on the streets. The apology factor has faded away. I am right, you are wrong, is the catchword. The less acceptance of humiliation sensitivity, the better. It will not change. As patriots, it is incumbent upon citizens to understand and practice prescribed obligation to the country, whether in paying dues or protecting the land or fulfilling the duties as citizens. The motherland has provided a lot despite ordeals, challenges, sufferings, and difficulties. The hard times faced due to political instabilities, bad governance, denial of justice, pathetic physical infrastructure networks, less availability of means of incomes, dearth of social safety nets for the marginalized citizens, aggression from across the eastern and western fronts, etc, are, of course, overarching components that have put a rusted spanner in the progress, prosperity, as well as quality of life over nearly eight decades. For those who cannot accept all these, the message is love Pakistan or leave Pakistan. Then the next lines are The sale of pills are at an all-time high/Young folks walking round with their heads in the sky. A very disturbing issue that is eating away the future fabric of Pakistan. Youth are becoming junkies, and pragmatic steps are not being taken to effectively control this growing number. Methamphetamine, commonly known as ICE, has become the rapidly spreading drug in Pakistan, and has overtaken marijuana and heroin as the drug of choice. At a rehabilitation center in the northwestern city of Charsadda providing treatment for drug addicts, around 85 percent of patients, mostly young people, are ICE addicts. Then there is Ecstasy. The panic among parents is that teenagers, and even pre-teens would succumb to the marketing of drug pushers or elder colleagues and siblings. Resorting to drugs is a form of rebellion, insubordination, and defiance. The pleasure is temporary, but the ramification is tragic. It is a national catastrophe that must be forcefully handled. Then is the line The cities ablaze in the summertime. The continuous and depressing outcome of Climate Change has affected Pakistan as one among the top five countries that are very vulnerable. The weather becomes hot and unbearable, disrupting mobility, equipment, infrastructure, and even fatalities. The hot weather timeframe increases year after year. The shortage of water availability in cities and towns further exacerbates the situation making daily life miserable. Industrial production slows down and even footprints in marketplaces trickle down too. Resultantly, shops and plazas stay open till late, and this increases the load on electric supply. Loadshedding is a daily menace. The vicious circle goes on and on. The final line worth commenting is Politicians say more taxes will solve everything. Wasteful governmental non-development expenditure, wasteful indulgence of resources on white elephant projects, and wasteful outlay on pomp, pageantry, self-promotion, and benefits to elite capture, compound into a situation where the government is in a straitjacket syndrome and thus resorts to expensive loans from domestic banks and external sources, including IMF. There is little recourse to defy the conditionalities of the lenders who are the modern-day Pied Pipers. The political government meekly obeys the dictates of the major lenders and has no choice but to tighten the noose of tax on the hapless citizens. Previously the mandarins of Ministry of Finance prepared the Federal Budget while today, the gnomes in the back room of IMF have assumed the mantle. The genuine and sincere taxpayers always face the double-edged sword and keep on getting slaughtered at the altar of tax collecting agencies, while non-taxpayers, such as agriculturists, retailers, or cottage industries, keep on enjoying their 'tax-free' status. As the song's final lines point out, And the band played on. So, round and around and around we go. Where the world's headed, nobody knows. Just a ball of confusion. The 'band' in the case of Pakistan refers to the nonchalant, arbitrary, and lackadaisical attitude of the people in the corridors of power. The citizens try to make their way going round and round to get their issues and matters resolved but then mostly it is back to square one. The 'world' for most of them is their own country. For them there is Fear in the air, tension everywhere. In the song, the repeated usage of the phrase 'and the band played on' signaled that no one was paying proper attention to most of the problems, burdens, and aspirations of the citizens. Who do they call? The song pleads to Great Googa Mooga, can't you hear me talking to you? But even this deity or idol or leader is not doing anything, and this is the Ball of Confusion. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
Kuwait Times
21-06-2025
- Politics
- Kuwait Times
Unfamiliar calm on Central Asia's disputed borders
VORUKH, Tajikistan: Bus driver Amrullo Yusupov has long faced challenges navigating the winding mountain passes of Central Asia — but a recent historic border agreement has brought calm to the troubled region. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed in March the last of a series of deals to formalize the long-disputed borders between the countries in the Fergana Valley, a region that has ignited several violent clashes. 'Everything is calm, now that the borders have been demarcated,' Yusupov told AFP. Navigating the maze of Tajik exclaves — pockets of territory embedded within Kyrgyzstan — had been a challenge. 'I used to be afraid to drive here at night. The road was a bit problematic,' Yusupov said. The Fergana Valley, which spans the three countries, has seen hundreds of deadly skirmishes, in disputes over access to roads and water, a precious resource in the arid agricultural region. Local disputes would quickly escalate as troops got involved to protect their citizens and the land on their side of the invisible border. In brief wars in 2021 and 2022, hundreds of Tajiks and Kyrgyz were killed and wounded, according to official estimates from both sides. The complicated geography is a legacy of the Soviet Union, with internal borders drawn up based on economic considerations, rather than ethnic, cultural or linguistic dividing lines. With its collapse, the lines became international frontiers, isolating tens of thousands of people in the exclaves. Barbed wire fences Even locals can sometimes be disoriented. 'On the left is Kyrgyzstan and on the right is Tajikistan, yes?' some passengers asked as Yusupov's bus pulled away from Vorukh, a Tajik exclave the size of Paris. Linking Vorukh to the rest of Tajikistan, his bus travels along a neutral road that passes through Kyrgyz territory but does not stop there. 'Over the past 30 years, we have had several conflicts with the Tajiks,' said Raykhan Isakova, who lives in the neighboring Kyrgyz village of Kapchygay. 'It was very violent, we suffered heavy losses. All the houses were destroyed,' the 60 year-old said of the fighting in 2022. 'But thanks to the authorities, we started again from scratch, houses were built,' she added. When AFP visited the village in 2022, it stood in ruins. Three years later, it is unrecognizable, completely rebuilt — unlike some other places. Although peace has returned, AFP journalists who were given rare access to both sides of the border, saw a heavy military presence. Fences stood where crossing the street used to mean entering a different country. Locals say erecting a physical border will help bring security. 'Once the barbed wire is up, the borders will be defined and everyone will be at home. People will know that Tajikistan starts here and Kyrgyzstan there,' said Shamshidin Kattabekov, 42, from the Kyrgyz border village of Aksai. Meanwhile, official checkpoints have reopened for the first time in four years. 'I am happy that the border has reopened so that I can come and see my family,' said Aitgul Khojamberdieva, a 58-year-old Tajik citizen. 'My mother and uncle died when the border was closed and we couldn't go' to the funeral, she told AFP. 'Eternal friendship' The reconciliation between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was achieved without mediation from Russia, a rare feat in the post-Soviet space that Moscow still considers its own backyard. The three presidents sealed the border deals with a pact of 'eternal friendship' earlier this year. Huge portraits of the smiling leaders are on display in Tajikistan and a giant friendship monument has also been erected where the three countries meet. 'Once the border work is finished, we believe that peace will reign,' said Ashyrali Erkebayev, head of a community of Kyrgyz border municipalities. So far, the agreements have led to territory swaps, sections of road declared neutral and guarantees to ensure unhindered access to energy infrastructure. But locals are still concerned about how an agreement to share water more equitably will work — a crucial challenge given how exposed the region is to climate change. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have agreed a deal for access to the Tortkul reservoir, the only source of fresh water in the area, located in Kyrgyzstan. 'Water for crops is a problem,' said Isakova, a farmer. 'There was a pipe before which went to Tajikistan,' she added. 'Everybody just made a hole and took water from there.' — Reuters
