Latest news with #TalBeeri
Yahoo
15-07-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Hezbollah's Radwan Unit 'unfit' to carry out large-scale invasion into Israel
According to data collected by the Alma Center, the Radwan Unit was rendered unfit, at least temporarily, to launch a large-scale invasion into northern Israel. Since Hezbollah joined the Israel-Hamas war and until the ceasefire on November 27, 2024, Hezbollah suffered a 'fatal blow,' Tal Beeri, Head of the Research Department at the Alma Center for the Study of Security Challenges in the North, wrote in an analysis published Wednesday. The analysis, titled "Radwan Unit: The elimination of its operatives teaches about attempts to return to the South Litani and rebuild operational readiness," focused on IDF operations against the Radwan unit during the war and the organization's conduct since the ceasefire. Beeri estimated that after the attacks, the Radwan Unit was rendered unfit, at least temporarily, to carry out its central mission of launching a large-scale invasion into northern Israel. 'Even the chance of a more limited invasion, of 'only' dozens or 'only' a few hundred operatives, is extremely low," he wrote. Since the ceasefire, according to the data collected by the center, 108 Hezbollah operatives have been documented and confirmed as killed from open sources. Of these, 13 operatives, about 12%, were from the Radwan Unit. Beeri noted that this is a high percentage relative to the size of the unit within the total military force of Hezbollah, adding that "All 13 operatives of the Radwan Unit who were killed since the ceasefire were eliminated in the area south of the Litani River ('Area 1701')." "The first confirmed killing of an operative from the Radwan Unit, according to open-source materials, occurred on March 4, 2025,' Beeri wrote, adding that the unit began making its return to the area south of the Litani River 'no later than three months after the ceasefire began." "It seems that in the first months following the ceasefire, and in light of the damage done to it, the Radwan Unit lowered its profile and may have physically distanced itself from southern Lebanon, with an emphasis on the area south of the Litani River," he explained. The analysis detailed the process of rebuilding and regaining strength that the unit has begun implementing, explaining that operatives have begun carrying out recovery and rebuilding actions, 'including re-establishing their presence in southern Lebanon in general, and south of the Litani in particular. 'It seems that this renewed presence and activity began to be detected by Israel's intelligence collection sensors. As is known, intelligence collection sensors are not airtight, and accordingly, counteraction efforts are not airtight either." Beeri's analysis of the findings showed the Radwan Unit's repeated attempts to return and operate in southern Lebanon, 'largely in a covert manner." "As part of building its updated operational plans, the Radwan Unit is focusing on building readiness for carrying out targeted terrorist operations against the IDF's presence in southern Lebanon or for infiltrating into Israel,' he added. 'From details gathered from various reports about the eliminations of Radwan operatives in southern Lebanon, it is clear that the Radwan Unit is 'recalculating its course' and rebuilding its operational plans to be prepared to execute them." According to Beeri, such actions could manifest in "an attempt to infiltrate a specific area of Israeli territory using small cells, carrying out an attack against IDF forces in Lebanon, and so on." He emphasized the importance of maintaining the IDF's presence along the border, as well as stating that the deployment of the Lebanese Army didn't provide any real deterrence or control. "Recently, it was reported that the Lebanese Army is deployed in about 80% of the area south of the Litani River. However, it cannot be concluded that they control the entire area where they are deployed,' Beeri stated, adding that it was 'highly doubtful' that the Lebanese Army could deter the Radwan Unit in southern Lebanon. Beeri concluded by calling for the preservation of security capabilities in the border communities. "Alongside the IDF's preparation in southern Lebanon, it is necessary to preserve the ability of the border communities to defend themselves, maintaining the readiness of their response units as a last line of defense in situations where a small number of terrorists might infiltrate into the community."
Yahoo
08-07-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
'Lack of religious directive': Why didn't Hezbollah join Iran in the war against Israel?
Expert Tal Beeri discussed how it is unknown why the religious directive had not been given, but if it were, Hezbollah would have joined the war against Israel on Iran's side. Hezbollah refrained from entering the war between Israel and Iran on Iran's side due to a lack of religious directive, expert Tal Beeri said. Beeri is the head of the Research Department at the Alma Center for the Study of Security Challenges in the North. He has published a detailed analysis titled 'Why Didn't Hezbollah Join Iran in the War against Israel?' In it, the Middle East expert challenged prevailing explanations for Hezbollah's decision to refrain from entering the war on Iran's side and also discussed the perceived gap between Hezbollah's weakness and the actual reality. Beeri noted: 'There is a significant gap between the existing portrayal of Hezbollah's supposed weakness and the actual reality.' Beeri discussed the conflict that unfolded between June 13 and June 24, 2025 — 'Operation Rising Lion' — during which Israel engaged Iran directly. He argued that, contrary to common belief, Hezbollah did not join the fighting not due to deterrence or domestic pressures, but for a singular reason: 'It did not receive a religious directive.' He emphasized, 'Throughout the war against Iran, from June 13 to June 24, 2025, Hezbollah refrained from joining the fighting alongside Iran against Israel. This was the case even as Israel continued its aggressive 'mowing the grass' strategy against Hezbollah's activities in Lebanon, targeting the group's infrastructure and eliminating operatives.' Beeri outlines the two most common explanations for Hezbollah's restraint: Firstly, internal Lebanese pressure suggests that Hezbollah's influence is weakening due to social, political, and economic challenges in Lebanon. Secondly, external deterrence by Israel - asserting that Hezbollah is held back by Israeli military pressure and the consequences of past confrontations. However, Beeri found both arguments insufficient: 'The internal aspect certainly exists,' he conceded. 'But in our understanding, the argument that leans on this overestimates its influence on Hezbollah's status and decision-making. There is a wide gap between the current narrative of Hezbollah's alleged weakness and the actual situation.' Hezbollah's civilian support structure — referred to as the Resistance Society — remains intact, Beeri explains. The group's Shi'ite base, described as a 'captive audience,' continues to benefit from a robust infrastructure operated by Hezbollah's Executive Council, functioning in parallel to the deteriorating Lebanese state. Beeri acknowledged: 'There are quite a few financial difficulties in supporting civilian reconstruction,' but insisted the infrastructure still operates. 'Hezbollah can only be meaningfully affected by pressure from its Shi'ite base. Is that pressure currently significant? The answer is no, mainly because of the 'captive audience' principle.' He warned against misreading the group's current stance: 'The claim that Hezbollah is deterred creates a dangerous illusion and takes us back to the days before October 7, 2023.' To reinforce his argument, Beeri cited Ibrahim Al-Amin, editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar, Hezbollah's main media outlet. A week before the ceasefire on November 27, 2024, Al-Amin wrote: 'The current round [Hezbollah's fighting against Israel that began on October 8, 2023] is just another phase in the war against Israel, which must be destroyed. Hezbollah will work to rebuild its capabilities and regain strength…' Beeri explained: 'There is no peace. There are no compromises. There is only one ideology — endless armed resistance. Hezbollah's core — armed resistance — is not a means but an identity. Hezbollah is here to stay.' He continued: 'The word 'deterred' doesn't exist in the vocabulary of an extremist ideological–religious organization like Hezbollah (or Hamas). Decisions about launching military or terrorist operations are based on religious directives. Any relevant interest (in this case, rehabilitation) is only a supporting factor in the decision-making process.' According to Beeri, 'No religious directive was issued to Hezbollah to join Iran in the war against Israel. While there were reportedly Iranian pressures on Hezbollah at the operational–military level, the religious directive never came. It did not come from the Wilayat al-Faqih — that is, neither Iran's Supreme Leader nor Hezbollah's current leader issued such a command.' He argued that Hezbollah's need to rebuild — especially militarily — reinforced its choice to avoid escalation: 'Hezbollah needs time. Hezbollah needs 'reconstruction quiet.' Therefore, its interest was to avoid a major escalation with Israel that could severely undermine its rebuilding efforts.' Hezbollah, Beeri noted, has factored the Israeli strategy of 'mowing the grass' into its current risk calculus: 'The current state of Israeli 'mowing the grass' is one that Hezbollah can absorb while still managing reasonable reconstruction.' 'We don't know why the religious directive didn't come or whether it was even considered. But if it had come, Hezbollah would have joined the war alongside Iran. In that case, the popular claims of internal Lebanese pressure or deterrence would have collapsed.' In conclusion, Beeri stressed that Israel has inflicted significant damage to Hezbollah's military capabilities — but not destroyed them. Despite mounting challenges, which could worsen in the post-Iran war period, Hezbollah's efforts to rebuild and rearm are well underway. He suggested existing resources may now be directed more toward military restoration, even at the expense of civilian services to its base, which remains a 'captive audience.' Beeri concluded, 'Hezbollah's various units are rebuilding and adjusting their operational plans, 'rerouting,' restoring capabilities and even preparing infrastructure for terrorist activity against Israel — both within Lebanon and beyond. In our assessment, Hezbollah's relevant units are capable of launching operations against Israel at any given moment.' 'Given the command — the religious directive — Hezbollah could have joined the war alongside Iran, both in terms of arsenal redundancy and operational–military capacity.'
