Latest news with #TitanicWreck
CBC
3 days ago
- CBC
Voices call for justice, change after release of Titan implosion report
Family, friends, investigators and explorers say they're appalled and heartbroken, and are calling for accountability and justice after the United States Coast Guard released its final report on the implosion of the Titan submersible on Tuesday. The coast guard's Marine Board of Investigation report landed two years after OceanGate's Titan imploded while diving to the site of the Titanic wreck, killing all five people on board. The 335-page document outlines many problems with the company's operation, the integrity of the vessel and what led to the fatal incident in 2023. Hamish Harding, father and son Shahzada and Suleman Dawood, Paul-Henri Nargeolet and OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush were the crew members. The company suspended operations in July 2023. OceanGate spokesperson Christian Hammond told the Associated Press the company has been winding down, and was co-operating with the investigation. 'Not shocked' Harding was the chairman of Action Aviation. The company expressed its outrage over what the report revealed. "We are obviously appalled by the contents of the investigation report, but not shocked," Mark Butler, CEO of Action Aviation, said in a statement to CBC News. "It was very evident from the early stages of the investigation, now confirmed by the published report, that Mr. Rush had been trying to run his company on a shoestring, cutting corners, and paying little attention to basic safety and best practices." Butler took over for Harding after his death. He called Rush and his company's actions "selfish and senseless." Butler said Harding's family have no plans to comment at this time. WATCH | U.S. Coast Guard releases damning report on Titan implosion: U.S. Coast Guard releases damning report 2 years after Titan implosion 2 days ago Two years after the fatal Titan submersible implosion, the United States Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation has released its report on the disaster. As the CBC's Mark Quinn reports, it says the five deaths were completely preventable. The family of Shahzada and Suleman Dawood also weighed in on the report's findings. In a statement to CBC News, the family said the report confirms that "unregulated behaviour, a lack of accountability and a fundamentally flawed design" caused the tragedy. But, it won't bring back what they've lost. "No report can alter the heartbreaking outcome, nor fill the immeasurable void left by two cherished members of our family," the statement reads. The Dawood family also called for regulatory reform within the submersible industry. "We believe that accountability and regulatory change must follow such a catastrophic failure. We hope this tragedy serves as a turning point and one that drives meaningful reform, rigorous safety standards, and effective oversight within the submersible industry," the statement reads. "If Shahzada and Suleman's legacy can be a catalyst for regulatory change that helps prevent such a loss from ever happening again, it will bring us some measure of peace." The Shaheed Suleman Dawood Mosque now stands in St. John's, made possible by a donation from Hussain Dawood, father and grandfather of the deceased. Suleman Dawood was the Titan's youngest passenger. He was 19 years old. 'There were really no checks and balances' The family of renowned French explorer Paul-Henri Nargeolet also expressed their desire for justice — beyond the report's findings. "We also believe there are more entities legally responsible that weren't focused upon given how egregious OceanGate's conduct was," said Tony Buzzbee, the attorney representing Paul-Henri Nargeolet's estate, in a statement to CBC News. "We look forward now to continuing our efforts in court to obtain justice for the family." Jason Neubauer, chair of the Marine Board of Investigation for Titan implosion, said OceanGate's workplace culture and failure to prioritize safety were key factors in the tragedy. "OceanGate's culture was one of the worst, from a safety perspective, and it stems from a lot of different reasons," Neubauer said in an interview with CBC News. "But the primary was that you had the head of the company, the CEO, serving in so many different roles." In the MBI report, Rush's relationship to the vessel is stated as chief pilot, chief executive officer and secretary of OceanGate's board of directors. "He was a consolidation of power into one individual, and there were really no checks and balances," said Neubauer. If the CEO were still alive, Neubauer said MBI would recommend that a separate criminal investigation be opened for manslaughter. "There was negligence involved there, not only from not complying with any of the regulatory standards and certifications and testing, but also for a failure to maintain the vessel with any standard of care," he said. "There's negligence that would absolutely constitute a referral to the Department of Justice for a separate investigation." Neubauer said the company failed to follow through with safety systems put in place, disregarding safety data, even though "warnings were there" from the 2022 operating season. He also noted his surprise at the level of cost-cutting that occurred in OceanGate's operations. "They downgraded the size of the support vessel so that the Titan had to be towed thousands of miles," said Neubauer. The submersible was also stored outside over the winter in St. John's. "That should have never occurred for a carbon fibre craft that is susceptible to porosity and moisture. Those things stand out," said Neubauer. The future of submersible exploration Larry Daley, Titanic expedition specialist, visited the Titanic wreck in a submersible himself in 2003, and considered Nargeolet a close friend. To him, the report revealed that the tragedy was one that could have been avoided. "I knew in my heart and soul this was going to end poorly," Daley told CBC News. Daley said expeditions to the Titanic should continue, but safety should be a priority. "Exploration is good. It'll keep going on for years. But you got to separate the fame from the fortune," Daley said. "It all comes down to doing it safely and having the right equipment." Neubauer said the Titan, in his view, is a good case for regulatory change at an international level. Involving multiple nations and occurring on the high seas, he says it's one the International Maritime Organization could look at. "In regard to submersible standards right now, they're recommendatory. We're going to recommend that they be mandatory just in case you have a situation like this," he said.
WIRED
5 days ago
- General
- WIRED
US Coast Guard Report on Titan Submersible Implosion Singles Out OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush
Aug 5, 2025 6:17 PM A report on the death of five people in the Titan submersible blames design, maintenance, and inspection flaws for its failure. 'It all came back to Mr. Rush,' the head of the investigation told WIRED. Photograph: Paul Daly/ The Canadian Press via AP The US Coast Guard's Marine Board of Investigation has issued a scathing report on the implosion of the Titan submersible in 2023, singling out OceanGate's CEO and founder Stockton Rush for many of the company's technical and managerial failings. It says that he made 'sustained efforts to misrepresent the Titan as indestructible' and accuses the company of 'glaring disparities between their written safety protocols and their actual practices.' Jason Neubauer, who was the deputy chief of the Coast Guard's Office of Investigations, chaired the investigation and tells WIRED: 'All of the evidence pointed to a very singular leader in this operation. It all came back to Mr. Rush.' Rush was piloting the Titan on a trip to the wreck of the Titanic in June 2023 when the submersible imploded, instantly killing all five crew. Also on board were Paul-Henri Nargeolet, a veteran submariner known as 'Mr. Titanic,' and three paying passengers: entrepreneur Hamish Harding and a father and son pair, Shahzada and Suleman Dawood. The Titan had made 13 previous successful dives to the famous site. The Coast Guard launched its investigation five days after the fatal incident and held two weeks of public hearings in September 2024. Technical testimony presented there detailed numerous flaws within the Titan's innovative carbon fiber hull, and highlighted operational failures on previous Titanic missions. These included one of the sub's titanium domes falling off after the sub's first attempt to reach the Titanic in 2021, and it being left outside in freezing conditions the winter before its final dives. Carbon fiber composites can degrade if water freezes in small voids in the material. Witnesses also alleged that Rush had ignored or glossed over numerous safety concerns raised by others in the submersible community and even by OceanGate's first director of marine operations, David Lochridge. Lochridge, who has not responded to inquiries, was fired in 2018 after detailing dozens of issues in an internal report. None of OceanGate's current senior executives testified at the hearings, nor were those responsible for managing operations of the final dive called to testify at the hearings. The new report says Rush fostered a toxic workplace environment, using the looming threat of being fired to dissuade employees from expressing safety concerns. The Titan was not registered or flagged with any nation, and had not been inspected or certified by any Coast Guard recognized organization. The report found that Rush himself had lied about the submersible's specifications when applying for his Coast Guard credentials, and the company had suggested several times that the Titan was or would be flagged in the Bahamas. 'The most surprising aspect of the investigation is how far outside of compliance that the Titan was operating and for how long,' says Neubauer. 'That fact stands out to me above any other incident I've ever investigated.' The new Coast Guard report stops short of finding a definitive mechanical cause for the fatal implosion, which occurred almost instantaneously at around 3,000 meters depth. However, it says that the facts strongly suggest that it was either the failure of a glue joint between the Titan's carbon fiber hull and a titanium ring, or a delamination within the carbon fiber itself, where layers of the materials separated from each other. The company never properly analyzed or tested the hull to understand flaws during manufacture or how long it might last, according to the Coast Guard. The report says that data from acoustic sensors and strain gauges on board indicated that the hull had suffered a delamination after a dive to the Titanic in 2022, causing a loud bang. Rush was said to have dismissed that noise, and the report found that there was no one left at the company in 2023 who was able to adequately interpret the sensor data. The company's director of engineering quit two months before the implosion. 'The power was consolidated in Mr. Rush,' says Neubauer. 'There was no set standard for how loud a noise or how many noises would make you take it out of service. I think that was intentional. They didn't want to take it out of service in the end.' The report contains numerous recommendations that would increase federal oversight of submersibles operated by US companies. It would also require them to be certified with third-party organizations, such as Lloyd's Register or the American Bureau of Shipping, even if they were operating in international waters like the Titan. That would practically rule out building a hull from carbon fiber, as none of those organizations have classed a crewed carbon fiber submersible to date. 'It doesn't seem to be the right material because of the way it takes cumulative damage over time,' says Neubauer. Tony Nissen, OceanGate's original director of engineering, questions the report's blanket criticism of the carbon fiber hull and its acoustic monitoring system. He notes that problems with the Titan's first hull were identified, in part, using the acoustic sensors, leading it to be scrapped and replaced. 'The design was not inadequate. For anyone to say the design was inadequate they would have to address the original manufacturer's analysis, and the success of the first hull,' he says. 'The real-time monitoring worked as designed and intended but for the second hull they ignored it.' 'We commend the US Coast Guard for its thorough work in confirming what industry experts have long known about the Titan tragedy—it was preventable,' says Will Kohnen, executive director of the non-profit World Submarine Organization. 'The challenge now is to move forward, building a better national and international regulatory framework for submersible operations, so that safety and responsible governance are the standard across this unique and complex industry.' The Coast Guard report also touches on issues with the search and rescue response after the Titan went missing. Neubauer says that some of the organizations listed as OceanGate's emergency contacts were not aware of the Titan's dive plans, and that the company should have had a robotic remotely operated vehicle (ROV) capable of diving to the same depth as the submersible. Although the world was on tenterhooks during the four day search and rescue effort for the Titan, Neubauer is skeptical that it could ever have succeeded. 'Even though we eventually found the submersible within the 96 hour window that was being advertised, I don't think we could have recovered the sub or the people if they had survived and it was entangled at the bottom,' he says. The ROV that located the debris had only a minimal capability to move or free the Titan, especially given that there would have been less than an hour of oxygen remaining. The Coast Guard report notes that if Rush had survived, he would possibly have been subject to criminal prosecution for negligence. It does not identify anyone else as subject to investigation. However, WIRED reported last year that the Southern District of New York was pursuing a criminal investigation into OceanGate, possibly related to its financing. The Department of Justice has not confirmed that investigation and its current status is uncertain. Relatives of Nargeolet are suing OceanGate, Rush's estate, and others involved in the Titan's manufacture in Washington state. Survivors of Rush, Nargeolet, and the paying passengers have not responded to requests for comment. OceanGate supplied the following statement: 'We again offer our deepest condolences to the families of those who died on June 18, 2023, and to all those impacted by the tragedy. After the tragedy occurred, the company permanently wound down operations and directed its resources fully towards cooperating with the Coast Guard's inquiry through its completion.'
CTV News
5 days ago
- General
- CTV News
Fisheries Department offered support to firm behind doomed Titan submersible
Debris from the Titan submersible, recovered from the ocean floor near the wreck of the Titanic, is unloaded from the ship Horizon Arctic at the Canadian Coast Guard pier in St. John's on Wednesday, June 28, 2023. THE CANADIAN PRESS/Paul Daly HALIFAX — A U.S. Coast Guard investigation into the 2023 sinking of the Titan submersible south of Newfoundland says that Canada's Fisheries Department sent a letter of support to the sub's American owner two years before the deadly implosion. The 300-page investigation report says the sinking, which claimed five lives, was 'preventable.' It says the company responsible for organizing the trip, OceanGate, mishandled the vessel's construction and its preparation leading up to the accident. As for the Fisheries Department, the report says it sent a letter to OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush in May 2021, saying the department planned to work with the company to assess the potential of its submersibles for scientific research. According to the report, the letter goes on say the department could contribute funds for future missions, but the coast guard's investigation found no evidence of any further collaboration or funding. The small sub was on its way to the wreck of the Titanic when it broke apart near the bottom of the ocean, almost 700 kilometres south of Newfoundland on June 18, 2023. This report by The Canadian Press was first published Aug. 5, 2025. The Canadian Press
CBS News
5 days ago
- CBS News
Titan submersible owner OceanGate used "intimidation tactics" to avoid scrutiny before implosion, U.S. Coast Guard says
The U.S. exploration company OceanGate used "intimidation tactics" to "evade regulatory scrutiny" in the years leading up to the June 2023 Titan submersible tragedy, according to findings released by the U.S. Coast Guard Tuesday. Those conclusions are part of an over 300-page report released by officials into the incident, which killed five people onboard when the sub imploded underwater while on an expedition to see the wreckage of the Titanic. "This marine casualty and the loss of five lives was preventable," Jason Neubauer, who led the Coast Guard's investigation into the incident, said in a statement Tuesday. "For several years preceding the incident, OceanGate leveraged intimidation tactics, allowances for scientific operations, and the company's favorable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny," the Coast Guard report said. "By strategically creating and exploiting regulatory confusion and oversight challenges, OceanGate was ultimately able to operate TITAN completely outside of the established deep-sea protocols." The report outlines several key causes behind the Titan submersible's demise. That included the fact that the "design and testing processes for TITAN did not adequately address many of the fundamental engineering principles that would be crucial for ensuring safety and reliability in such an inherently hazardous environment," the report said. The report also faulted OceanGate for its continued use of the Titan sub even though the vessel had previously been damaged in "a series of incidents that likely compromised the integrity of the hull and other critical components of the submersible." On the day of the tragedy, the sub's hull "experienced a critical event that compromised the structural integrity of its pressure vessel, resulting in an instantaneous and catastrophic implosion," according to the Coast Guard's investigation. The Coast Guard report also found that OceanGate had a "toxic" safety culture and corporate structure, and that its operational practices were "critically flawed." That included a workplace environment which "used firings of senior staff members and the looming threat of being fired to dissuade employees and contractors from expressing safety concerns." In February 2018, OceanGate's former director of marine operations filed a whistleblower complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, alleging he was dismissed because he voiced safety concerns about the "first TITAN hull's development and testing plans." In response to the complaint, OceanGate filed a lawsuit against the former employee, accusing him of violating a confidentiality agreement he had signed with the company. That whistleblower complaint was not processed in a timely fashion by relevant U.S. federal agencies, according to the Coast Guard's report, and the ex-employee withdrew the complaint, citing the "emotional toll of the ensuing legal battle." "The two-year investigation has identified multiple contributing factors that led to this tragedy, providing valuable lessons learned to prevent a future occurrence," Neubauer said. Among those killed aboard the doomed vessel was Stockton Rush, co-founder of OceanGate, the Washington state company that owned the Titan. The implosion also killed veteran Titanic explorer Paul-Henri Nargeolet; two members of a prominent Pakistani family, Shahzada Dawood and his 19-year-old son Suleman Dawood; and British adventurer Hamish Harding. The Coast Guard's findings pointed the finger of blame largely at Rush, who investigators said ignored warnings about the hull damage that had been identified during a previous exploration in 2022. "Mr. Rush's overconfidence influenced OceanGate's personnel, contractors, and mission specialists, creating an environment where safety concerns were ignored or underemphasized in favor of operational continuity," the Coast Guard's analysis found. Had Rush survived the tragedy, the Coast Guard said that it would have recommended the U.S. Department of Justice to consider pursuing a criminal investigation into his actions, which the report said "exhibited negligence that contributed to the deaths of four individuals."
CBC
5 days ago
- General
- CBC
U.S. Coast Guard releases report on OceanGate, 2 years after fatal Titan implosion
Titan submersible imploded while diving to Titanic wreck site, killing all 5 on board The United States Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation has released a final report on the operating company responsible for the Titan submersible, which imploded two years ago while attempting to dive to the wreckage of the Titanic, killing all five on board. The report, released on Tuesday, says the MBI found that OceanGate didn't follow engineering protocols for safety, testing or vessel maintenance. The 335-page document also highlighted problems with how the business operated, its workplace culture and the need for improvements for regulatory oversight for "manned submersibles and vessels of novel design." "For several years preceding the incident, OceanGate leveraged intimidation tactics, allowances for scientific operations and the company's favourable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny," the report reads. "By strategically creating and exploiting regulatory confusion and oversight challenges, OceanGate was ultimately able to operate Titan completely outside of the established deep-sea protocols, which had historically contributed to a strong safety record for commercial submersibles." The event prompted an international search and rescue operation at the time. The Titan had lost contact with its support vessel the Polar Prince on June 18, 2023. It was eventually determined the vessel's hull lost structural integrity and imploded, killing the crew that included OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush, British billionaire explorer Hamish Harding, father and son Shahzada and Suleman Dawood and renowned Titanic researcher Paul-Henri Nargeolet. "This marine casualty and the loss of five lives was preventable," said Jason Neubauer, Titan MBI chair. "The two-year investigation has identified multiple contributing factors that led to this tragedy, providing valuable lessons learned to prevent a future occurrence. There is a need for stronger oversight and clear options for operators who are exploring new concepts outside of the existing regulatory framework." 'Critically flawed' The "primary causal factors" for the tragedy was the company failing to address engineering issues, reads the MBI reports, and a lack of understanding of how the hull of the vessel would react to the "inherently hazardous environment." The company also continued to use the Titan after several incidents that compromised the hull's integrity. The report also listed contributing factors, like OceanGate's "critically flawed" safety culture and operational practices. "At the core of these failures were glaring disparities between their written safety protocols and their actual practices," the report reads. "OceanGate's chief executive officer's sustained efforts to misrepresent Titan as indestructible due to unconfirmed safety margins and alleged conformance with advanced engineering principles provided a false sense of safety for passengers and regulators." The U.S. Coast Guard said there was a "missed opportunity" on the government's part to intervene before the tragedy, pointing to a 2018 OceanGate whistle-blower as well as deficient communication between Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the U.S. Coast Guard on Seaman's Protection Act protocols. "Early intervention may have resulted in OceanGate pursuing regulatory compliance or abandoning their plans for Titanic expeditions," it said. Ultimately, the report made 17 recommendations, including establishing an industry working group to review and update the framework to help submersibles achieve safety standards similar to the ones of surface vessels. The report also said the U.S. Coast Guard should push for federal requirements to expand so there would be "proper regulatory oversight" for the types of submersibles that carry our oceanographic research operations. Another recommendation calls for required communication on all submarines and submersibles that conduct commercial or scientific operations, and a new requirement for submersible owners to give notification to local U.S. Coast Guard officers, which would include a dive plan and an emergency response plan.
