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Ya Biladi
12 hours ago
- Politics
- Ya Biladi
What a U.S. terrorist designation could mean for the Polisario Front
DR The bipartisan bill introduced by Representatives Joe Wilson (Republican) and Jimmy Panetta (Democrat) seeks to designate the Polisario Front as a « foreign terrorist organization » (FTO). However, even if the bill passes, the designation would not be automatic: under U.S. law, the final decision rests with the Secretary of State, who acts on advice from the Treasury Department and the Department of Justice (8 U.S.C. § 1189). To persuade Congress—and ultimately Secretary of State Marco Rubio—Joe Wilson emphasizes the Polisario's ties to Hezbollah and Iran. He could also highlight threats of terrorist attacks against foreign interests in Western Sahara by leaders of the separatist movement. If the «Polisario Front Terrorist Designation Act» succeeds and the State Department officially labels the Polisario as an FTO, here are four key consequences to expect: Implications of the FTO designation in the United States Asset freeze: The Treasury could block any funds controlled by the Polisario within U.S. jurisdiction. This freeze would be targeted; a global blockade would require an additional designation as a «Specially Designated Global Terrorist» (SDGT) by OFAC. In practice, many non-U.S. banks would likely halt processing dollar payments to avoid risks. Prosecution for «material support»: Anyone in the U.S. providing material assistance could face up to 20 years in prison (18 U.S.C. § 2339B). However, humanitarian licenses could still be granted, as has been done for groups like the Houthis, ensuring vital aid reaches civilians. Visas and border controls: Members and supporters would be legally inadmissible under INA § 212. Diplomatic exemptions might apply for UN personnel, but access to the U.S. would become the exception rather than the rule. Polisario's credibility and finances under pressure Loss of «liberation movement» aura: The FTO label would legally equate the Polisario with groups like Hezbollah or the PKK, seriously undermining its third-worldist narrative. Fundraising challenges: American payment platforms would sever ties, and European banks would adopt a strict cautionary stance. Non-dollar channels such as cryptocurrencies or Asian banks might persist unless secondary sanctions are imposed. NGOs under scrutiny: Humanitarian organizations would need OFAC licenses to operate in the Tindouf camps. Any advocacy or training involving the Polisario would become legally risky. Algeria in a delicate spot No automatic «State Sponsor of Terrorism» label: That designation requires clear, repeated support for attacks targeting U.S. interests. «Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act» law leverage: If Algeria pursues significant new Russian arms deals, CAATSA sanctions could be triggered, but this would be a highly political and conditional decision. Narrative costs: Supporting a group officially labeled as terrorist would damage Algeria's position, especially since some Sahel countries accuse it of backing terrorist groups in the region. Possible mitigation: Algeria might push for the disarmament of Polisario militias to ease international pressure. Multilateral repercussions: shifting from «decolonization» to «security» At the UN Security Council: The U.S. could push to add counter-terrorism to MINURSO's mandate during its next renewal. This would require a new resolution and must avoid a Russian or Chinese veto. Within the African Union: Some member states concerned about their image might distance themselves from the SADR, potentially leading to a formal suspension if 36 countries support amending the AU's founding charter. Bilateral relations: Hesitant countries would have a stronger rationale to openly back Morocco's autonomy plan. In short, if Washington finally brands the Polisario Front as an FTO, it would shine a spotlight on the alliances behind the Polisario—making them more visible, and more politically costly for countries like Algeria and South Africa to support.
Reuters
09-04-2025
- Business
- Reuters
False Claims Act: Theories of Liability
The FCA generally imposes civil liability for conduct involving fraud on the US government, including: Submitting false claims for payment to the government. Retaliating against an employee, contractor, or agent who takes steps to either bring an FCA case or attempt to stop FCA violations. (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733.) Although the government has targeted certain industries for FCA enforcement, understanding FCA liability is important for any entity or person that does business directly or indirectly with the government. This article explains the scope of civil liability under the FCA and identifies the elements of common FCA claims (for the complete version of this resource, which includes information on defenses to FCA claims and on FCA retaliation claims, see False Claims Act: Elements and Defenses on Practical Law). (For more on FCA claims generally, including defending FCA claims, see Understanding the False Claims Act on Practical Law; for information on enforcement and liability under the FCA in the health care and life sciences industries and in government contracting, see Health Care False Claims Act: Overview and Government Contracts: False Claims Act on Practical Law.)
Forbes
02-04-2025
- Business
- Forbes
9 Reasons Why CSA 2015 Is Vital For CISA's Success
CEO of Axon Global : an expert in AI & effective Cyber ERM. A recognized leader in his field by the U.S. Secret Service, NACD, and the WSJ. getty In October of 2025, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 is due to expire, unless Congress extends the deadline or renews the Act. The Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Division N, has played a transformative role in the U.S. cybersecurity landscape. It is particularly crucial for the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which relies on the law's provisions to effectively protect the nation's critical infrastructure. It is the enabler by which the private sector can contribute indicators of compromises without liability. It fosters collaboration between the public and private sectors and enables the timely sharing of cyber threat intelligence. A key element that makes this possible is the legal protections provided under Section 3.3 (B) v. of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015. These protections encourage companies to share information without fear of legal repercussions, ultimately strengthening national cybersecurity. One of the main objectives of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 is to promote better collaboration between the public and private sectors. In today's digital world, cyber threats are becoming more advanced, targeting sensitive data and disrupting critical infrastructure. No single entity can effectively counter these threats alone. And the government can do very little to help protect cybersecurity in the critical infrastructure without visibility into it. The Act facilitates the exchange of cyber threat indicators, empowering CISA to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the threat landscape. It serves as the single point of entry where the private sector can report indicators of compromise without liability, ensuring the information reaches the appropriate U.S. government agency. This collective effort is crucial for defending sectors like energy, healthcare, finance and critical infrastructure, which are largely managed by private companies. Section 3.3 (B) v. – Legal Protections That Foster Information Sharing Section 3.3 (B) v. of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 offers strong legal protections to organizations that share cyber threat information responsibly. These protections help alleviate concerns about liability and regulatory exposure, encouraging more companies to participate. The key legal protections include: 1. Protection from lawsuits related to sharing cyber threat indicators, provided the information is shared responsibly (6 U.S.C. §1505(b)). 2. Exemption from state public records laws, ensuring that sensitive information shared with government entities remains confidential (6 U.S.C. § 1503(d)(4)(B)). 3. Protection from state regulatory actions, giving companies confidence that shared information won't be used against them (6 U.S.C. § 1503(d)(4)(C)). 4. Preservation of attorney-client privilege, ensuring that sharing information doesn't compromise legal confidentiality (6 U.S.C. § 1504(d)(1)). 5. Recognition of shared data as proprietary information, protecting trade secrets and sensitive business information (6 U.S.C. § 1504(d)(2)). 6. Exemption from federal public disclosure laws, maintaining the confidentiality of shared threat intelligence (6 U.S.C. § 1504(d)(3)). 7. Waiver of ex parte communication rules, allowing open and honest discussions without legal consequences (6 U.S.C. § 1504(d)(4)). 8. Protection from federal regulatory actions, ensuring that shared information isn't used for enforcement purposes (6 U.S.C. § 1504(d)(5)(D)). 9. Immunity from antitrust laws, enabling competitors to collaborate on cybersecurity without legal risks (6 U.S.C. § 1504(e)). Why These Legal Protections Matter To CISA The legal protections provided by the Act are crucial for CISA's mission because they break down the barriers that previously discouraged companies from sharing vital cyber threat data. By offering liability protection and ensuring confidentiality, the Act fosters a culture of trust and collaboration. This enables CISA to gather a wide range of threat intelligence, improving its ability to identify and respond to emerging cyber threats quickly and efficiently. This proactive approach is key to protecting national security and maintaining public trust. How Private Companies Benefit The legal protections under Section 3.3 (B) v. aren't just good for national security, they also provide significant benefits to private companies. By minimizing legal risks and safeguarding proprietary information, the Act creates a secure environment for sharing threat intelligence. This collaborative approach allows companies to stay ahead of cyber adversaries while protecting their business interests. Additionally, the antitrust exemptions enable industry competitors to work together on cybersecurity solutions without fear of legal repercussions. This collective defense strategy enhances the overall security posture of the private sector. Conclusion The Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Division N, is a cornerstone of modern cybersecurity policy in the United States. By promoting public-private collaboration and providing robust legal protections, the Act enables CISA to build a more resilient and responsive cybersecurity infrastructure. The warranties offered under Section 3.3 (B) v. are particularly valuable, as they eliminate legal obstacles, encouraging companies to share critical threat intelligence. This collaborative framework not only strengthens national security but also empowers the private sector to better defend itself against cyber threats. According to the Executive Director of the DHS CISA, Bridget Bean, 'My team on the ground across the nation has the responsibility and the wonderful opportunity to bring together stakeholders, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and state and local government officials, to really tackle the problems that are facing our nation in cyber and physical.' If the CSA 2015 expires in October, the collaborative framework provided by CISA will no longer be viable, and this may have serious cybersecurity consequences for critical infrastructure and national security. Forbes Technology Council is an invitation-only community for world-class CIOs, CTOs and technology executives. Do I qualify?
Yahoo
27-03-2025
- Automotive
- Yahoo
President Donald Trump's new 25% auto tariff policy: What it says
On Wednesday, President Donald Trump imposed 25% tariffs on cars not made in the U.S. starting April 3. The tariffs will also apply to light-duty trucks imported into the U.S. As a presidential candidate, Trump regularly blasted trading arrangements he said had hurt U.S. workers and characterized tariffs as a way to spur a domestic manufacturing renaissance. Before his latest order Wednesday, Trump twice delayed imposing auto-related tariffs. Here's what Trump's presidential proclamation on tariffs says: 1. On February 17, 2019, the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) transmitted to me a report on his investigation into the effects of imports of passenger vehicles (sedans, sport utility vehicles, crossover utility vehicles, minivans, and cargo vans) and light trucks (collectively, automobiles) and certain automobile parts (engines and engine parts, transmissions and powertrain parts, and electrical components) (collectively, automobile parts) on the national security of the United States under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1862) (section 232). Based on the facts considered in that investigation, the Secretary found and advised me of his opinion that automobiles and certain automobile parts are being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States. 2. In Proclamation 9888 of May 17, 2019 (Adjusting Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts Into the United States), I concurred with the Secretary's finding in the February 17, 2019, report that automobiles and certain automobile parts are being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States. I also directed the United States Trade Representative (Trade Representative), in consultation with other executive branch officials, to pursue negotiation of agreements to address the threatened impairment of the national security of the United States with respect to imported automobiles and certain automobile parts from the European Union, Japan, and any other country the Trade Representative deems appropriate. 3. The Trade Representative's negotiations did not lead to any agreements of the type contemplated by section 232. 4. In Proclamation 9888, I also directed the Secretary to monitor imports of automobiles and certain automobile parts and inform me of any circumstances that, in the Secretary's opinion, might indicate the need for further action under section 232 with respect to such imports. 5. The Secretary has informed me that, since the February 17, 2019, report, the national security concerns remain and have escalated. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed critical vulnerabilities and choke points in global supply chains, undermining our ability to maintain a resilient domestic industrial base. In recent years, American-owned automotive manufacturers have experienced numerous supply chain challenges, including material and parts input shortages, labor shortages and strikes, and electrical-component shortages. Meanwhile, foreign automotive industries, propelled by unfair subsidies and aggressive industrial policies, have grown substantially. Today, only about half of the vehicles sold in the United States are manufactured domestically, a decline that jeopardizes our domestic industrial base and national security, and the United States' share of worldwide automobile production has remained stagnant since the February 17, 2019, report. The number of employees in the domestic automotive industry has also not improved since the February 17, 2019, report. 6. I am also advised that agreements entered into before the issuance of Proclamation 9888, such as the revisions to the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), have not yielded sufficient positive outcomes. The threat to national security posed by imports of automobiles and certain automobile parts remains and has increased. Investments resulting from other efforts, such as legislation, have also not yielded sufficient positive outcomes to eliminate the threat to national security from such imports. 7. After considering the current information newly provided by the Secretary, among other things, I find that imports of automobiles and certain automobile parts continue to threaten to impair the national security of the United States and deem it necessary and appropriate to impose tariffs, as defined below, to adjust imports of automobiles and certain automobile parts so that such imports will not threaten to impair national security. 8. To ensure that the imposition of tariffs on automobiles and certain automobile parts in this proclamation are not circumvented and that the purpose of this action to eliminate the threat to the national security of the United States by imports of automobiles and certain automobile parts is not undermined, I also deem it necessary and appropriate to establish processes to identify and impose tariffs on additional automobile parts, as further described below. 9. Section 232 provides that, in this situation, the President shall take such other actions as the President deems necessary to adjust the imports of the relevant article so that such imports will not threaten to impair national security. 10. Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), authorizes the President to embody in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) the substance of statutes affecting import treatment, and actions thereunder, including the removal, modification, continuance, or imposition of any rate of duty or other import restriction. NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 301 of title 3, United States Code; section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended; and section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, do hereby proclaim as follows: (1) Except as otherwise provided in this proclamation, all imports of articles specified in Annex I to this proclamation or in any subsequent annex to this proclamation, as set out in a subsequent notice in the Federal Register, shall be subject to a 25 percent tariff with respect to goods entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 3, 2025, for automobiles, and on the date specified in the Federal Register for automobile parts, but no later than May 3, 2025, and shall continue in effect, unless such actions are expressly reduced, modified, or terminated. The above ad valorem tariff is in addition to any other duties, fees, exactions, and charges applicable to such imported automobiles and certain automobile parts articles. (2) For automobiles that qualify for preferential tariff treatment under the USMCA, importers of such automobiles may submit documentation to the Secretary identifying the amount of U.S. content in each model imported into the United States. "U.S. content" refers to the value of the automobile attributable to parts wholly obtained, produced entirely, or substantially transformed in the United States. Thereafter, the Secretary may approve imports of such automobiles to be eligible to apply the ad valorem tariff of 25 percent in clause (1) of this proclamation exclusively to the value of the non-U.S. content of the automobile. The non-U.S. content of the automobile shall be calculated by subtracting the value of the U.S. content in an automobile from the total value of the automobile. (3) If U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) determines that the declared value of non-U.S. content of an automobile, as described in clause (2) of this proclamation, is inaccurate due to an overstatement of U.S. content, the 25 percent tariff shall apply to the full value of the automobile, regardless of the actual U.S. content of the automobile. In addition, the 25 percent tariff shall be applied retroactively (from April 3, 2025, to the date of the inaccurate overstatement) and prospectively (from the date of the inaccurate overstatement to the date the importer corrects the overstatement, as verified by CBP) to the full value of all automobiles of the same model imported by the same importer. This clause does not apply to or otherwise affect any other applicable fees or penalties. (4) The ad valorem tariff of 25 percent described in clause (1) of this proclamation shall not apply to automobile parts that qualify for preferential treatment under the USMCA until such time that the Secretary, in consultation with CBP, establishes a process to apply the tariff exclusively to the value of the non-U.S. content of such automobile parts and publishes notice in the Federal Register. (5) For avoidance of doubt, clause (4) of this proclamation does not apply to automobile knock-down kits or parts compilations. Clause (4) of this proclamation applies only to individual automobile parts as defined by Annex I to this proclamation that otherwise meet the requirements of clause (4) of this proclamation. (6) The Secretary, in consultation with the United States International Trade Commission and CBP, shall determine the modifications necessary to the HTSUS to effectuate this proclamation and shall make such modifications to the HTSUS through notice in the Federal Register. (7) Within 90 days of the date of this proclamation, the Secretary shall establish a process for including additional automobile parts articles within the scope of the tariffs described in clause (1) of this proclamation. In addition to inclusions made by the Secretary, this process shall provide for including additional automobile parts articles at the request of a domestic producer of an automobile or automobile parts article, or an industry association representing one or more such producers, where the request establishes that imports of additional automobile parts articles have increased in a manner that threatens to impair the national security or otherwise undermines the objectives set forth in any proclamation issued on the basis of the Secretary's February 17, 2019, report or any additional information submitted to the President under clause (3) of Proclamation 9888 or clause (9) of this proclamation. When the Secretary receives such a request from a domestic producer or industry association, the Secretary, after consultation with the United States International Trade Commission and CBP, shall issue a determination regarding whether to include the articles within 60 days of receiving the request. Any additional automobile parts articles that the Secretary has determined to be included within the scope of the tariffs described in clause (1) of this proclamation shall be so included on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time the day after a notice in the Federal Register describing the determination of the Secretary. The notice in the Federal Register shall be made as soon as practicable but no later than 14 days after the Secretary's determination. (8) Any automobile or automobile part, except those eligible for admission under "domestic status" as defined in 19 CFR 146.43, that is subject to the duty imposed by this proclamation and that is admitted into a United States foreign trade zone on or after the effective date of this proclamation, in accordance with clause (1) of this proclamation, must be admitted as "privileged foreign status" as defined in 19 CFR 146.41, and will be subject upon entry for consumption to any ad valorem rates of duty related to the classification under the applicable HTSUS subheading. (9) The Secretary shall continue to monitor imports of automobiles and automobile parts. The Secretary also shall, from time to time, in consultation with any senior executive branch officials the Secretary deems appropriate, review the status of such imports with respect to national security. The Secretary shall inform the President of any circumstances that, in the Secretary's opinion, might indicate the need for further action by the President under section 232. The Secretary shall also inform the President of any circumstance that, in the Secretary's opinion, might indicate that the increase in duty rate provided for in this proclamation is no longer necessary. (10) No drawback shall be available with respect to the duties imposed pursuant to this proclamation. (11) The Secretary may issue regulations and guidance consistent with this proclamation, including to address operational necessity. (12) CBP may take any necessary or appropriate measures to administer the tariffs imposed by this proclamation. (13) Any provision of previous proclamations and Executive Orders that is inconsistent with the actions taken in this proclamation is superseded to the extent of such inconsistency. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-sixth day of March, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth. --- Contact Clara Hendrickson at chendrickson@ or 313-296-5743. This article originally appeared on Detroit Free Press: Trump's new 25% auto tariff policy: Read what it says
Reuters
03-03-2025
- Business
- Reuters
Social Media Influencer Marketing: Managing Risks
Advertisers are allocating increasing amounts of their budget to influencer marketing given its cost-effective digital content and high engagement and conversion rates. Influencer marketing, however, is not without risks. Influencer activities can expose advertisers to false and deceptive advertising claims and lead to reputational damage. The FTC actively enforces its guidance that influencers must disclose their connections to advertisers clearly and conspicuously in their posts. (For more on social media advertising, including influencer endorsements, see Advertising and Promotions on Social Media in the April 2024 issue of Practical Law The Journal.) Legal Framework Influencer marketing in the US is governed and guided primarily by: Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), which prohibits misleading, deceptive, and unfair advertising (15 U.S.C. § 45). The FTC's Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (Endorsement Guides) (16 C.F.R. §§ 255.0 to 255.6), which provide guidance on how to avoid misleading and deceptive advertising when using endorsements (with special attention to endorsements posted on social media). The FTC released an updated version of the Endorsement Guides on June 29, 2023. The FTC's Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking (Endorsement Guides FAQs), a set of frequently asked questions that provides detailed examples on how the FTC applies the Endorsement Guides to social media influencer endorsements. The FTC released an updated version of the Endorsement Guides FAQs on June 29, 2023. The FTC's guidance, Disclosures 101 for Social Media Influencers, directed specifically to influencers to help them comply with the Endorsement Guides. Other relevant FTC guidance, such as: The FTC's enforcement activities also provide guidance on keeping influencer marketing legally compliant. To date, the FTC's enforcement activities have primarily focused on the companies that engage influencers. FTC settlements have mapped out the FTC's expectations for companies using influencer marketing. When the FTC updated the Endorsement Guides in 2023, it clarified that not only can advertisers and influencers be held liable for deceptive endorsements, but also intermediaries, like advertising agencies and public relations firms, can be held liable for their role in creating deceptive endorsements.
