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Time of India
06-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
China's expanding global espionage network under scrutiny
China is a police state, a nation whose people are under constant surveillance, plus it owns one of the world's largest espionage networks. It is unclear how many "spies" China has, but last year the BBC quoted a Western intelligence official who estimated China has some 600,000 people working on intelligence and security. #Pahalgam Terrorist Attack Pakistan's economy has much more to lose than India's due to the ongoing tensions, warns Moody's Ratings The day Pakistan got the power to poke India FM Sitharaman meets ADB chief and Italian FM, discusses economic issues; no mention of Pakistan Of course, it is difficult to quantify such things, especially because China utilizes not only paid employees, but proxy organizations like the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and also civilians that collect data for the government. The UFWD is designed to look benign, and so it often takes names like "friendship associations". All these organizations, subservient to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chairman Xi Jinping , have the aim of implementing a "community of common destiny". The main Chinese organization responsible for counterintelligence, foreign intelligence, domestic surveillance and national security intelligence is the Ministry of State Security (MSS), which was formed in 1983. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Play War Thunder now for free War Thunder Play Now Undo Despite Beijing's vehement protestations that it does not spy, there are growing numbers of allegations and the evidence that Chinese espionage is widespread and endemic. One of the latest incidents involves Germany, where a former aide to scandal-hit lawmaker Maximilian Krah from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party was charged for spying on behalf of Beijing. The accused, named as Jian G, is believed to have been working for China since 2002. Live Events Krah's assistant had allegedly "gathered information on the deliberations and decisions of the European parliament" for Chinese intelligence, according to German prosecutors. This included "procuring more than 500 documents, some of which had been classified as particularly sensitive". Other accusations concerned spying on Chinese dissidents in Germany and gathering intelligence on other AfD leaders. He even posed as an opponent of the Chinese government on social media to burnish his credentials. However, Guo Jiakun, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson, told media on 30 April, "The accusation of the so-called threat of 'Chinese spies' is groundless and ill-intentioned vilification. We urge Germany to stop smearing China and do something real to keep the sound momentum of development for bilateral relations." This is typical of the Chinese government, instantly dismissing accusations without tackling the evidence, and countering with its own allegations of "smearing" China. What about the United Kingdom? In August 2023, Ken McCallum, Director General of MI5, revealed that China's MSS had approached more than 20,000 UK nationals online in recruitment attempts. These approaches, designed to gain confidential information, were predominantly done through LinkedIn. France has reported a similar Chinese modus operandi. In 2018, a French intelligence report claimed the MSS had approached 4,000 individuals on LinkedIn. Meanwhile, the German government disclosed that 10,000+ approaches had been made to its citizens. In its latest Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community , released in March, the USA claimed: "Beijing will continue to expand its coercive and subversive malign influence activities to weaken the United States internally and globally ... Through these efforts, the PRC seeks to suppress critical views and critics of China within the United States and worldwide, and sow doubts in US leadership and strength. Beijing is likely to feel emboldened to use malign influence more regularly in coming years, particularly as it fields AI to improve its capabilities and avoid detection." A lot of Chinese espionage occurs through electronic means. The US report said China "remains the most active and persistent cyber threat to US government, private-sector and critical infrastructure networks." It presented evidence such as China's Volt Typhoon campaign to pre-position attack access on critical infrastructure, as well as Salt Typhoon to compromise US telecommunications infrastructure. This US intelligence report asserted "China has stolen hundreds of gigabytes of intellectual property from companies in Asia, Europe and North America in an effort to leapfrog over technological hurdles, with as much as 80% of US economic espionage cases as of 2021 involving PRC entities." China's Foreign Ministry lambasted the US report, describing it as "an irresponsible, biased and scaremongering piece that seeks to promote the false 'China threat' narrative and fan major-country rivalry". Of course, lax behavior at the top of the US government can make China's job easier. Because of "Signalgate", which claimed National Security Advisor Mike Waltz's job, both China and Russia may have been aware of imminent US strikes against Houthis in Yemen, and passed information on to the intended victims. It is presumed that Russia and China can intercept Signal communications. At a House Intelligence Committee hearing, Republican Don Bacon said, "There's no doubt that Russia and China saw this stuff within hours of the actual attacks on Yemen or the Houthis." China is also believed to be actively recruiting US federal workers who recently lost their jobs, after Elon Musk's scything blade decimated workforces in a cost-slashing attempt. For example, four Chinese companies sharing the furtive Smiao Intelligence website's IP address were actively courting laid-off workers. These Chinese firms placed ads to recruit workers, although it is still unclear if these activities were related to Chinese government-led intelligence efforts. Interestingly, in recent days the CIA released two new Mandarin-language videos designed to persuade Chinese officials to spy for the USA. A tweet from CIA Director John Ratcliffe said, "One of the primary roles of the CIA is to collect recruiting assets that can help us steal secrets." The two-minute videos provided an online link for prospective Chinese to register their details. The productions attempt to leverage disillusionment within China. One video, for example, plays on party members' perpetual fears that they may be scooped up by Xi's anti-graft campaign. The narrator says, "As I rise within the party, I watch those above me get discarded like worn-out shoes, one after another. But now I realize that my fate is just as precarious as theirs." The second video seeks to tap disenchantment among the younger generation who cannot find work or get ahead, whilst corrupt CCP cadres fill their boots. In October 2024, targeting Chinese, Iranian and North Korean citizens, the CIA also released a video that gave step-by-step instructions on how to securely contact the agency online. Such videos might seem amateurish attempts at recruiting spies, and one wonders if their prospects for success are slim at best. As one person commented on X, "Those two clumsy and laughable videos only show your ignorance and incompetence, and how dangerous it will be working for you." Nonetheless, a CIA official told Reuters, "If it weren't working, we wouldn't be making more videos." The CIA claims the videos are penetrating China's "great firewall" of internet censorship. The FBI also warned about Chinese activities. It says on its website: "The counterintelligence and economic espionage efforts emanating from the government of China and the CCP are a grave threat to the economic wellbeing and democratic values of the United States ... The Chinese government is employing tactics that seek to influence lawmakers and public opinion to achieve policies that are more favourable to China." Elsewhere, a New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service report issued last year warned, "The intelligence arm of the PRC is well known for using professional social networking sites to identify unwitting candidates, including New Zealanders." It also warned that China uses deceptive, coercive or corruptive methods, including long-term influence building, to ensnare citizens. Chinese spies are just as active in Asia too. In late April, just two weeks before Philippine midterm elections, the authorities arrested a Chinese man who was accused of conducting surveillance near the country's election commission office. Ferdinand Lavin, spokesman for the Philippine National Bureau of Investigation, said the Macau passport holder had visited the site three times. The man had an "IMSI catcher" in the rear of his car, a device that mimics a cell tower and can snatch messages from the air in a 1-3 km radius. Lavin said the suspect had also visited locations such as the Philippine Supreme Court, Philippine Department of Justice and US Embassy. China immediately disavowed any knowledge of the man, saying, "We will not and have no interest in interfering in such internal affairs of the Philippines." A Chinese spokesman added, "We also advise individual politicians in the Philippines not to take the chance to hype up issues related to China, make something out of nothing and seize the opportunity to profit." As part of an ongoing bilateral tit-for-tat exchange, China announced on 3 April that it had arrested three Filipinos for espionage, after Manila arrested five other Chinese nationals a week earlier. Over in South Korea, its National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported eleven separate incidents of Chinese people photographing military bases and other sensitive facilities such as ports and airports since June 2024. Most were Chinese short-term visitors who claimed they were just taking travel souvenirs. However, the NIS assessed they were "deliberate attempts to circumvent Korean law", constituting low-intensity intelligence activities aimed at gathering information on US and Korean defence capabilities. The NIS stated, "We are preparing response protocols and working to improve information-sharing among counterintelligence agencies." However, Taiwan is the real hotbed of Chinese spying. Former Military Intelligence Bureau director Liu Te-liang recently estimated the number of Chinese spies in Taiwan is likely higher than a previous, and dated, estimate of 5,000. Liu warned that the Chinese spies could be embedded in government bodies, political parties, think tanks and corporations, although it typically takes 2-3 years to gather evidence in such cases. Indeed, a string of espionage cases in Taiwan have brought the topic of Chinese spying to the fore. In March, for instance, a Taiwanese court charged four soldiers, three of whom worked in the presidential security team, for spying for China. They each received sentences of up to seven years. They had received relatively paltry payments ranging from USD 7,850 to USD 20,000 in exchange for taking photos of sensitive documents. In March, President Lai Ching-te designated China as a "foreign hostile power," enabling a swathe of new measures to counter Chinese intelligence efforts, such as reinstating military courts to hear cases of espionage. Many of those arrested in Taiwan for spying are current or retired military personnel. Taipei reported that 64 people were arrested for spying for China in 2024, compared to 48 in 2023 and just ten in 2022. China is paranoid about foreign spies within its own borders too. It has a very active public campaign urging the populace to watch out for espionage, and the once-secretive MSS now has a massive following on social media. China's Anti-Espionage Law was amended on 26 April 2023, and the revised law came into effect on 1 July 2023. The law is rather ambiguous when it comes to defining espionage and what activities are harmful to national security. For example, even collecting publicly available documents that do not include state secrets could constitute an act of espionage if the state believes it infringes upon Chinese national interests. Of course, China deliberately keeps the wording of the law ambiguous so it can prosecute anyone it wishes. The law stipulates, for example, that responsibility for acts of espionage by foreign institutions, organizations or individuals must be legally pursued. Interestingly, the MSS recently gave German diplomats and businesspeople in China a briefing about the impact of the revised Anti-Espionage Law. This move to brief foreigners is thought to be unprecedented for the MSS. Nor is this broad law limited to Chinese territory, for Beijing can apply it to activities conducted anywhere in the world. As an example, the MSS detained a Japanese woman in 2015, purportedly for violating the Criminal Code of the People's Republic of China and the Anti-Espionage Law of the People's Republic of China, even while she resided in Japan. Apparently, the woman shared information about China's policy on the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with Japanese government officials. Later, she was arrested in Shanghai whilst on a business trip, and was duly sentenced to six years in prison. Such actions by China should give pause to anyone traveling to China, as there is potential for them to be treated like this Japanese woman.
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First Post
02-05-2025
- Politics
- First Post
China-linked group accused of meddling in Australian elections as country heads to poll on May 3
As Australia gears up for an important election, reports are suggesting that a China-backed group is supporting independent candidates to influence the federal elections read more A voter walks past election posters for the Australian Labor Party outside a pre-polling centre in Sydney on May 2, 2025, ahead of Australia's federal election scheduled for May 3. (Photo: AFP) As Australia gears up for an important election, the latest viral video suggested that a Chinese Communist Party-linked group have mobilised volunteers to support an independent candidate ahead of the polls. The video that spurred allegations of foreign interference featured members of the Australia Hubei Association, a Chinese diaspora group with known links to the United Front Work Department (UFWD). It is pertinent to note that UFWD is part of the CCP's network that seeks to advance China's influence abroad. The group has dispatched volunteers to assist candidates in the Australian federal election. Last week, Tharini Rouwette, the founder of COMPELL, an organisation dedicated to multiculturalism in Australian politics, shared a video on TikTok showing these volunteers at work, Nikkei Asia reported. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In the video, the volunteers were seen representing the member of parliament, Monique Ryan, in the seat of Kooyong in Melbourne. 'Australia Hubei Association President Ji Jianmin – how do I say it - demanded that Chinese people support her,' the volunteer said in Mandarin, as quoted by Nikkei Asia. 'Her ideas are more well-suited to the Chinese diaspora's needs. She can speak for the Chinese people, that's why we support her,' another volunteer was heard saying in the video. Meanwhile, local news outlets have been reporting that the same group plans to send out dozens of Chinese volunteers to support the Labour Minister, Clare O'Neil and a Greens Party candidate in the Victoria electorate of Hotham. Australia keeps its eyes open in light of Chinese influence In light of this, the Australian Electoral Commission's integrity assurance task force said that it would review the video. It is important to note that the body comprises federal police and intelligence agencies, and violation of the law on foreign influence in polls can constitute a criminal offence. While economic ties between Australia and China have stabilised in recent years, there's a looming fear in Canberra that China might influence its elections. Last year, Sunny Duong, a Chinese Australian businessman, became the first person in the country to be convicted of a foreign interference offence due to his linkages to the Chinese government. In a statement to Nikkei Asia, Labour Party's O'Neil said: 'My office has not had any direct contact with the Hubei association. When an intermediary contacted my office with the offer of Hubei volunteers, my office politely declined.' The Story of the Australia Hubei Association The Australian group was identified in a 2018 parliamentary submission. At that time, it was referred to as a 'United Front-linked business group' operating in Australia. While speaking to Nikkei Asia, Clive Hamilton, co-author of 'Silent Invasion: China's Influence in Australia,' pointed out the group's interest in targeting independent candidates. 'I think the CCP has made an assessment and decided the teals may hold a balance of power in the next parliament, and therefore Beijing wants to have access to important teals who might be persuaded to articulate and push for Beijing's viewpoint,' he said. In Australian politics, the term 'teal' generally indicates independent candidates who are 'socially liberal, yet economically centrist'. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Shadow Home Affairs Minister James Paterson of the Liberal Party told Sky News on Wednesday that 'if you were a foreign authoritarian government, and you wanted to weaken or destabilise Australia, you would probably prefer that there be a hung parliament – that no party have a majority.' Hence, it will be interesting to see the kind of impact these groups would have on the results of the Australian elections.
Irish Times
30-04-2025
- Politics
- Irish Times
How China uses soft power to exert influence in Ireland
Following recent revelations of the China Targets project – an investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) involving 42 media partners, including The Irish Times – of Chinese party-state interference activities in Ireland, the discreet, highly impactful influence activities of the party state with regard to Irish citizens also deserve attention. At the core of party-state influencing is the Chinese Communist Party's United Front Work Department (UFWD). This is a key institution involved in building relationships with individuals and organisations outside the party, including among Chinese communities overseas. UFWD work seeks to foster connections, encourage support for Beijing's positions and promote unity among ethnic Chinese people globally. This is often done through cultural outreach, forums and community events. Experts describe the UFWD as playing a strategic role in shaping how overseas Chinese communities relate to both China and their host societies. Organs of the Chinese party state affiliated with United Front work have been active in Ireland, engaging with various levels of government and civil society. Part of its work involves interacting with policymakers, industry and opinion leaders abroad through various intermediaries – from official party-state affiliated organisations to more covertly connected media organisations, associations and other entities that often present themselves as independent. The goal is to counter criticism of the CCP, secure support for it and advance the country's national interests. Rather than coercion, this approach mainly relies on incentives – offering events, training and media engagement. These efforts often operate beneath the radar of national governments and can result in foreign individuals or institutions unknowingly advancing CCP interests. READ MORE The International Liaison Department (ILD), which sits directly under the highest organ of the CCP and is affiliated with United Front work, has engaged Irish leaders in Ireland and China. It focuses on party-to-party diplomacy, cultivating ties with foreign political parties and indirectly influencing adjacent sectors such as academia, civil society and policymaking circles. In Ireland, the head of the ILD has met TDs such as Fianna Fáil's Cork East TD James O'Connor , as well as an Irish think tank, and has engaged in subnational diplomacy. The concept of the United Front has its roots in the Soviet Union. In China, it became a foundational component of CCP ideology when Mao Zedong described the United Front as one of the CCP's three 'magic weapons'. Since then, it has been a steady pillar of the CCP's governance model. The importance of United Front work has been incorporated into Xi Jinping 's ruling ideology. The department's efforts are primarily steered by a top-level small group headed by Wang Huning, one of China's most senior leaders and the party's chief ideologue. The UFWD has grown significantly under Xi, who views it as a tool for China's 'great rejuvenation'. Established in 1949, it has branches in all levels of government. One of its key bureaux focuses specifically on overseas Chinese and people of Chinese descent, with the goal of cultivating loyalty to the PRC. Domestically, the UFWD targets non-party groups, such as religious groups and ethnic minorities, to bring them into the CCP's sphere of influence. It employs soft power and targeted engagement to bring individuals and organisations into ideological alignment with the party. Internationally, it builds networks that subtly guide the political and cultural discourse of Chinese diaspora communities with the aim of shaping how China is perceived abroad, inconspicuously influencing local policy environments, and ultimately ensuring that loyalty to the party trumps dissent. Another organisation that has been active in Ireland and is affiliated with United Front work is the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC). It presents itself as a NGO but operates under the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs and forms part of the United Front system. It focuses on people-to-people diplomacy, often working through city-to-city exchanges, local governments and academic institutions. Its goal is to promote CCP objectives – like the One China Principle and Belt and Road Initiative – through grassroots relationships. The CPAFFC uses a bottom-up strategy to cultivate sympathetic foreign individuals and institutions. Its former president Li Xiaolin described its aim as being to 'create a favourable and friendly atmosphere' towards China through 'targeted co-operation'. In June 2024, Fianna Fáil TDs James O'Connor and Pádraig O'Sullivan and Louth-based Senator Erin McGreehan met its chairman Yang Wanming in Dublin . Later that month, the three politicians travelled to China where they met CPAFFC vice-president Yuan Mindao. In a readout from the Chinese side, O'Connor is stated to have said that the Ireland-China Parliamentary Friendship Group is committed to strengthening communication with the CPAFFC and deepening practical co-operation in high technology. O'Connor again met with the ILD, this time with its vice-president, during his visit to China. [ China's intimidation of an Irish citizen in Dublin: 'I wanted to escape. It's scary' Opens in new window ] The work of the ILD and CPAFFC blurs the lines not only between party and state diplomacy but also between state and non-state diplomacy. Their activities in Ireland reflect the CCP's broader strategy: influencing without confrontation through soft power and informal ties. Despite their strategic role, they often operate without national-level protocol or oversight. Ultimately, we should pull back the cloak of neutrality that party-state affiliated organisations often wear, to see who entities active in Ireland are connected to in China and engage with a clear understanding of what objectives they serve – so that co-operation is informed, transparent and in the public interest. Alexander Davey is an analyst with the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics), Berlin
South China Morning Post
20-02-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Taiwan bans academic exchanges with 3 mainland Chinese universities
Published: 8:49pm, 20 Feb 2025 Taiwan has barred the island's universities from collaborating with mainland Chinese institutions affiliated with Beijing's United Front Work Department – the ruling Communist Party's overseas arm. Taipei also said it would not recognise degrees from those institutions to discourage Taiwanese from attending them, in the latest move to counter what it sees as Beijing's efforts to influence Taiwanese. The move has sparked a backlash against the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party government, with critics saying it is further restricting the type of exchanges considered crucial for improving mutual understanding between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Education Minister Cheng Ying-yao announced the new restrictions on Thursday, citing the UFWD's political agenda. 'Chinese universities affiliated with the UFWD serve a political purpose rather than a purely academic one,' Cheng said. 'To prevent political influence operations we must halt cooperation and exchanges.' Jinan University in Guangzhou is one of three institutions targeted by the ban. Photo: He Huifeng The ban specifically targets three mainland institutions: Jinan University in Guangzhou, Huaqiao University in Xiamen and Quanzhou, and Beijing Chinese Language and Culture College.
