Taiwan bans academic exchanges with 3 mainland Chinese universities
Taipei also said it would not recognise degrees from those institutions to discourage Taiwanese from attending them, in the latest move to counter what it sees as Beijing's efforts to influence Taiwanese.
The move has sparked a backlash against the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party government, with critics saying it is further restricting the type of exchanges considered crucial for improving mutual understanding between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Education Minister Cheng Ying-yao announced the new restrictions on Thursday, citing the UFWD's political agenda.
'Chinese universities affiliated with the UFWD serve a political purpose rather than a purely academic one,' Cheng said. 'To prevent political influence operations we must halt cooperation and exchanges.' Jinan University in Guangzhou is one of three institutions targeted by the ban. Photo: He Huifeng
The ban specifically targets three mainland institutions: Jinan University in Guangzhou, Huaqiao University in Xiamen and Quanzhou, and Beijing Chinese Language and Culture College.
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