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Bangkok Post
6 days ago
- Politics
- Bangkok Post
Alaska talks will test the desire for peace in Ukraine
Is there now a chance to end Russia's war in Ukraine? Are both sides in this bloody stalemate finally willing to give peace a chance, despite real reservations by both Moscow and Kyiv to keep the fighting going just a little longer? More importantly, are Ukraine's backers, notably the US and European countries such as the UK, Germany and Poland, able to exert enough pressure on Vladimir Putin to make a deal? A few months ago, it became clear to Moscow that the US and the Europeans were on the same page to push for additional support for Ukraine's sovereignty; the geopolitical realignment by the US-Nato places increased pressure on Russia. Now, President Donald Trump is set to meet Mr Putin during a landmark summit in Alaska this week as a prelude to presumably further negotiations, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. This is long-shot diplomacy, which may get a long-awaited ceasefire in the war, or it could be just another opportunity for Mr Putin to smile and stall, to keep the clock running in Kyiv. While the meeting on American soil offers Moscow's leader both the legitimisation of diplomatic breakout without being slapped with an ICC arrest warrant, it offers Mr Putin the first in-person meeting with Mr Trump since 2018. This certainly trumps (no pun intended) Mr Putin's meetings with Arab leaders, a host of African potentates, and Brazil's Lula da Silva. This is gold standard stuff. Yet the Ukraine peace talks are set in the shadow of an overlooked backdrop of another diplomatic development very close to Mr Putin's concerns, as it borders Russia's southern frontier. Just last week, the Trump administration sponsored a quietly arranged peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. There's a poignant lesson here for the Ukraine talks. Though the mountains and rugged Caucasian region are far removed from the flat steppes of Ukraine, the fact remains that both the longtime antagonists, Armenia and Azerbaijan, were once, as was Ukraine, also part of the former Soviet Union. For 35 years, Armenia, a small ancient Christian land, has been militarily bullied by a Muslim and oil-rich Azerbaijan. Conflicts over borders ensued, and fighting flared as recently as two years ago. Equally, Azerbaijan borders Iran and has long featured in Tehran's strategic concerns. This forgotten conflict in the Caucasus was addressed by American diplomacy, as Mr Trump brokered a deal that ended decades of conflict and offered both sides economic incentives. So, beyond the style of the summit, what substance can we expect? First, it's doubtful Mr Putin will make the proverbial peace deal. Instead, he will play the moment politically, spin subterfuge and offer hints of future concessions. The wish that Russia will withdraw troops from the nearly 20% of Ukrainian territory it occupies is a dream few hold, even in Kyiv. There can be rich rhetorical arguments, but there's a red line the Russian leader can't cross without looking weak to his own security apparatus. Mr Putin holds a neo-Soviet imperial view of Ukraine in which this former part of the Soviet Union has broken away and dares to confront the Kremlin. Crimea, with its key naval ports, especially, is viewed as a sacred part of the Russian motherland. Compromise isn't in the Russian vocabulary. Second, the US will pressure and cajole Mr Putin and warn that he will face wider sanctions. While tough measures will be threatened, Washington and the Europeans have not broken Russia's petro-driven economy. Both China and India remain major consumers of Russian petroleum. Third, a major Russian military offensive still has time for at least six weeks of good weather. While the Ukrainians are fighting valiantly with additional US and European military supplies, the Russians still have the raw numbers. Though Mr Putin has often stupidly used Russian conscripts and North Korean troops as cannon fodder, the bloodletting has emasculated Ukraine. Can Kyiv seriously fight Moscow to a draw? While European leaders have welcomed news of the Trump/Putin meeting, the Europeans are pushing for an uncompromising Ukrainian stance towards Moscow. Yet, a Gallup Poll taken in July shows "69% of Ukrainians say they want a negotiated settlement as soon as possible, while 24% support fighting until victory." The Trump administration aims to end this bloody conflict for the families on both sides. State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on FOX News, "The killing has to end…What Ukraine needs now is a ceasefire." Indeed so, and soon.
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First Post
04-07-2025
- Business
- First Post
A new Nato in the making: Will ‘distributed deterrence' work?
As Nato countries rewrite their rules of security engagement with the United States in the European security architecture, the dark clouds of mistrust and misperceptions seem to be looming large read more The highlight of the recently concluded North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (Nato) Summit in the Hague, Netherlands, was the almost unanimous decision among its members to increase their defence spending to 5 per cent of GDP in the next decade, by 2035. This issue has been at the heart of US-Nato dynamics through different presidencies, cutting across Republicans and Democrats, but has become more tenuous during the Trump presidency with differences turning into public rants. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD However, what was deemed unreasonable by the Nato members a few years back, has now become a stated goal to achieve in ten years. Well, European geopolitics and the Russia threat in the European neighbourhood has undergone a dramatic shift in the last three years since the Russia-Ukraine war started. The urgency of confronting Russian aggression has grown manifold, even as the European Union and major European powers were already training their strategic sights on the Indo-Pacific region. The Nato summit declaration stated that 'allies commit to invest 5 per cent of GDP annually on core defence requirements as well as defence-and-security-related spending by 2035' to meet the threats and challenges, particularly 'posed by Russia to Euro-Atlantic security and the persistent threat of terrorism'. At least 3.5 per cent will be allocated to 'resource core defence requirements, and to meet the Nato Capability Targets' and 1.5 per cent is projected to cover associated areas, such as to protect 'critical infrastructure', defend 'networks', ensure 'civil preparedness and resilience', 'unleash innovation', and strengthen Nato's 'defence industrial base'. While the defence spending targets are now clearer, and in alignment with what the Trump administration has been demanding, is the strategic purpose of such a move clear or still ambiguous? Why are European powers being categorically told to pick up the slack in the European security theatre and stop free riding on America's transatlantic security commitments. Washington currently views China as the only country with the ability and the intention to challenge US primacy in the international system and would want European allies to do more, in terms of deterring the Russia threat, so that America's national power can be employed against China's aggression and coercive activities. Speaking to a Ukraine Defence Contact Group earlier this year in February, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth emphasised on, 'prioritising deterring war with China in the Pacific, recognizing the reality of scarcity, and making the resourcing tradeoffs to ensure deterrence does not fail'. 'As the United States prioritizes its attention to these threats, European allies must lead from the front,' he said. Looking at the battle lines drawn between Nato and Russia, one can be forgiven to assume that the history of this relationship saw no efforts towards any form of détente. However, history can be stranger than the present, and the post-Cold War era did see mutual efforts between the US, Russia and the Nato countries, such as creating the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in 1997, to regularly consult on security issues. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD However, just two years later in 1999, the Nato airstrikes in Kosovo significantly ruptured the budding thaw. However, efforts resumed in 2001 towards initiating cooperation, with the PJC being transformed into Nato-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002. Yet again, geopolitics of the post-Soviet space intervened in 2008 with the Georgian war, sprouting from the interest shown by Tbilisi and Kyiv to become Nato members during the 2008 Bucharest Summit. Significantly, France and Germany showed discomfort with the move, with then German Chancellor Angela Merkel warning the Alliance that Russia would interpret any further eastward expansion of Nato as an existential threat. Merkel's prophetic observation came true as Russia attacked Georgia and made South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent provinces. Nato countered by freezing most of military and political cooperation with Moscow and the NRC was suspended. Informal meetings continued though to forge a strategic partnership, expecting quid-pro-quos of Russian troop's withdrawal from Georgia and Russia's integration into the Western community of states. However, with the Russian takeover of Crimea in 2014, the relationship went into a downward spiral and has never really recovered from there. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, Nato leaders made clear that an improvement in the Alliance's relations with Russia would be contingent on a clear and constructive change in Russia's actions – one that demonstrates compliance with international law and Russia's international commitments. Until then, Nato and Russia cannot return to 'business as usual'. Nato's membership expansion in Moscow's eyes translates quite categorically into territorial expansion, and hence from a Russian worldview, an unrelenting intrusion into its sphere of influence. Amidst all these ups and downs, Nato also kept an active communication channel open with Ukraine. Nato justifies its action of opening the membership to countries who are willing to join, including Ukraine and Georgia based on an 'open-door' policy. The ex-Soviet states such as Georgia and Ukraine clearly perceive Russia as an existential threat and Ukraine's devastation in the last three years might doubly solidify these fears. With the Russia-Ukraine war turning into a war of attrition, Europe clearly views Russia as the clear and present danger while China for Europe is a distant power and an economic partner as well. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD So, as Nato countries move towards a decade-long vision of rapidly increasing their defence spending and rewrite their rules of security engagement with the United States in the European security architecture, the dark clouds of mistrust and misperceptions seem to be looming large. Any cursory assessment of the regional security environment will lead to the conclusion that the increase in defence spending will not help in reducing the tension between the Nato and Russia rather the opposite might accrue, where Russia's threat perception will simultaneously push it to accelerate its defence innovation and spending. Moreover, as the Trump administration aims to 're-establish deterrence', will the burden-sharing plan across work linearly and clinically, with Europeans willingly taking up the heavy lifting in Europe while automatically freeing up America's strategic calendar for the Indo-Pacific? Amidst this rearmament drive in Europe, is Trump administration also inadvertently pushing European partners to de-risk against undue dependence on the US for security of the European theatre? For long, Europe or more specifically, the European Union has been accused of short-sightedness for lacking a common defence and security policy, and lacking the teeth to facing geopolitical realities with its normative power. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD So, is Europe witnessing the beginning of an uncertain path towards rearmament, and defence posturing that will not only change the nature of transatlantic US-Europe alliance, but also disrupt the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region. The European Union and major European powers had started reorienting their strategic outlook to play a greater role in the Indo-Pacific region, and it will be naïve to expect that they will retrench and surrender the play of influence to the Americans. Perhaps in a controlled war gaming and simulation room, this burden sharing and 'distributed deterrence' might play out as planned but perhaps not in the badlands of geopolitics. Monish Tourangbam is a Senior Research Consultant and Indrani Talukdar is a Fellow at the Chintan Research Foundation (CRF), New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
