Latest news with #USAirForceGlobalStrikeCommand
India.com
22-05-2025
- Science
- India.com
World's most powerful nuclear missile tested by US, has alarming strike range, capable of global destruction, hard to intercept, it is called…, can travel at speed of…
The United States has once again tested its Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile. The launch was carried out on May 21 by a team from the US Air Force Global Strike Command at Vandenberg Space Force Base in California. What makes this test significant is that the missile was equipped with a single Mk-21 high-fidelity reentry vehicle. This upgrade is expected to significantly boost America's nuclear strike capabilities. The Minuteman III missile can hit targets anywhere in the world and is extremely hard to intercept, even with advanced air defense systems. US air force issues statement In a statement, the US Air Force explained that Vandenberg Space Force Base is the primary testing ground for the deterrence capabilities of the Air Force's Global Strike Command. They clarified that the missile test was part of routine operations and not a response to any current global events. The statement clarified that over 300 similar tests have been conducted in the past. This latest launch was meant to demonstrate that the US nuclear deterrent remains secure, reliable, and capable of addressing modern-day threats while reassuring allies of its strength. US calls missile test essential for national security General Thomas Bussiere, Commander of the Air Force Global Strike Command, emphasized the importance of the recent ICBM test, saying, 'This launch highlights the readiness of the nation's nuclear deterrent and the ICBM leg of the nuclear triad.' He credited the dedicated team of Airmen including missile operators, defenders, helicopter crews, and their support teams for maintaining this powerful security system that ensures the safety of the U.S. and its allies. The test was overseen by the 377th Test and Evaluation Group at Vandenberg Space Force Base. This unit is the country's only dedicated ICBM testing organization, conducting professional evaluations that assess both current and future capabilities of America's land-based missile force. About the Minuteman III Missile The full name of the missile is LGM-30G Minuteman III. Here's what the designation stands for: L = Launched from a silo G = Ground attack capability M = Guided missile 30 = Part of the Minuteman missile series G (at the end) = Refers to the current Minuteman-III variant This missile is powered by three solid-fuel rocket motors: Stage 1: ATK M55A1 Stage 2: ATK SR-19 Stage 3: ATK SR-73 The total weight of the Minuteman III is approximately 36,030 kilograms. This powerful weapon can travel thousands of kilometers and is a key part of the US nuclear deterrent, designed to remain effective against 21st-century threats. Minuteman III can strike targets up to 10,000 km away The Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) has an impressive range of up to 10,000 kilometers, allowing it to strike targets across the globe. It can travel at a staggering speed of 24,000 kilometers per hour. One of its most powerful features is its ability to carry up to three nuclear warheads, which means it can hit three different targets in a single launch. Each Minuteman III missile costs around USD 7 million, and the United States currently has about 530 active units in its arsenal. The missile is developed and manufactured by Boeing Defense, one of America's leading aerospace and defense companies.
Asia Times
08-05-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
The rotting, aging silos housing America's nukes
Crumbling missile silos are forcing a multibillion-dollar rethink of how, where and whether to base the next generation of US nuclear weapons. This month, multiple media outlets reported that the US Air Force now expects to construct predominantly new silos for the LGM-35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system, abandoning plans to reuse 55-year-old Minuteman III silos after concluding that doing so poses unacceptable cost, schedule and performance risks. Initially seen as cost-effective when Sentinel launched a decade ago, silo reuse has proven unfeasible following a failed test conversion at Vandenberg Space Force Base and subsequent analyses under the Nunn-McCurdy Act cost breach review. In April, General Thomas Bussiere, commander of the US Air Force Global Strike Command, confirmed that reusing old silos would jeopardize affordability, timelines and technical feasibility. As a result, the Air Force will build new silos primarily on federally owned land within existing missile fields across the states of Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota and Wyoming. Developed by Northrop Grumman, Sentinel aims to replace 400 aging Minuteman III missiles, but its US$141 billion price tag—driven mainly by launch infrastructure—has delayed its debut beyond 2029. Critics, including the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), accuse the US Department of Defense (DOD) and its contractor of mismanagement and underestimating the program's complexity. Still, officials insist Sentinel is essential to preserving the nuclear triad and must proceed despite soaring costs and logistical obstacles. Time and Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reports describe near-daily breakdowns, water intrusion, misaligned doors, collapsed conduits and obsolete parts, some reportedly sourced from museums. Silo modernization now requires full reconstruction of command centers and thousands of kilometers of new fiber optics, those reports said. But infrastructure woes aren't the only factor driving debate—there's also disagreement over whether fixed ICBMs still belong in the triad. Steve Fetter and Kingston Reif argued in an October 2019 War on the Rocks piece that silo-based ICBMs act as a 'sponge' deterrent: with 450 silos spread across vast territory, an adversary would need to expend hundreds of warheads to disable them in a first strike. They also serve as a tripwire, guaranteeing retaliation if the US homeland is attacked, and provide a hedge against possible vulnerabilities in nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) and strategic bombers. However, they warned that fixed ICBMs must be launched within 30 minutes of an incoming strike, giving the president less than 10 minutes to decide, raising the risk of mistaken retaliation based on incomplete data. If submarines and bombers are already on alert and dispersed, they argued, they offer more than enough retaliatory capability, making silo-based missiles redundant in both survivability and flexibility. However, if an SSBN is destroyed, unable to launch or loses contact with command, its entire missile load is lost. Thomas Mahnken and Bryan Clark noted in a June 2020 The Strategist piece that with as few as one SSBN on patrol at a time, a single loss could cripple a third of the triad. Emerging sensor technologies could soon render oceans transparent, challenging the future viability of sea-based deterrents. Likewise with strategic bombers, Sidney Dean pointed out in a December 2022 article for European Security and Defense (ESD) that they rely on forward bases with fixed locations, making them and their infrastructure susceptible to preemptive attack. Dean noted that ICBMs can reach targets in under 30 minutes, while bombers may take hours to reach their weapon deployment zones, giving adversaries ample time to track, intercept or mount defenses. He added that bombers are vulnerable to enemy air defenses, interceptors and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks. Given the mounting vulnerabilities of all triad legs—fixed, sea and air—combined with rising costs, the 2023 US Strategic Posture Report recommended that some ICBMs be deployed in a road-mobile configuration to mitigate silo limitations. In a January 2024 Heritage Foundation article, Robert Peters endorsed this approach, suggesting that road-mobile Sentinels on transporter erector launchers (TELs) would be difficult for adversaries to target. Peters suggested that in a crisis or for signaling, mobile ICBMs could operate on randomized, pre-approved routes, moving hundreds of kilometers daily, making them nearly impossible to target. He added that mobile ICBMs could head to launch sites to await further orders if an attack were detected, significantly enhancing survivability. Yet the mobile option introduces its risks. Brian Wish, writing in a Real Clear Defense article, warned that mobile ICBMs are more vulnerable to terrorist attacks, politically controversial if deployed on public roads and logistically difficult to keep on constant alert. He argued that they should only supplement—not replace—a hardened, dispersed single-warhead silo-based arsenal, which he views as the most stable configuration for nuclear deterrence.
