Latest news with #USNI
AllAfrica
06-08-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
Dark Eagle: US hypersonic deployment has China squawking
US deployment of its Dark Eagle hypersonic missile system to Australia's Northern Territory for the 2025 Talisman Sabre joint military drills has reshaped deterrence dynamics vis-à-vis China in the Indo-Pacific. Capable of striking targets up to 2,700 kilometers away, Dark Eagle is operated via a battery of four launchers and command vehicles, allowing precision strikes at hypersonic speeds. The deployment, conducted by the Hawaii-based 3rd Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) represented the weapon's first operational use west of the International Date Line, USNI reported. Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), stated that the military exercise, held from July 13 to August 4 with over 30,000 personnel from 19 nations, validated the US Army's ability to deploy and operate the system in forward environments. Prior to this, the weapon had only been tested in Florida and integrated into Navy-led command drills. During Talisman Sabre, the MDTF also launched an SM-6 missile from its Mid-Range Capability (MRC) platform against a maritime target—a shot that provoked strong protests from Beijing, which warned that such moves risk destabilizing the region and triggering a new arms race. The US Navy plans to field a variant of the hypersonic missile aboard Virginia-class submarines and Zumwalt-class destroyers by fiscal year 2028, reinforcing the Pentagon's long-range strike architecture aimed at penetrating Chinese and Russian anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) networks. As noted by Ankit Panda in an October 2023 report for the Carnegie Endowment, the US strategy increasingly favors mobile, land-based missile systems whose ability to reposition rapidly complicates adversary targeting and enhances survivability in contested environments. These wheeled launchers, employed in shoot-and-scoot tactics, are seen as effective tools for bolstering deterrence without incurring the diplomatic costs of permanent basing. Panda notes that such systems enable a sustained forward presence while adapting to the demands of a more fragmented and escalation-prone Indo-Pacific theater. This evolving doctrine is embedded within the MDTF concept, which integrates capabilities across land, air, sea, space and cyber to counter enemy A2/AD strategies. According to Wilson Beaver and Anna Gustafson in an April 2025 article for the Heritage Foundation, MDTFs are uniquely designed to deliver tailored, theater-specific strikes that degrade adversary capabilities while restoring US freedom of maneuver. Their agility and domain integration make them ideal for operating long-range precision fires in environments where fixed installations are highly vulnerable. At the operational level, forward-deployed missile forces also serve broader strategic goals. In testimony before the US Senate in April 2025, Admiral Paparo stressed that defending Taiwan and preserving Indo-Pacific stability demands forward-deployed missile, sensor and command systems across allied territories, including Japan, the Philippines, Guam and Palau. He described this posture as essential to denying adversaries their strategic objectives, emphasizing that geographic dispersion, allied interoperability and resilient early warning and precision-strike capabilities form the backbone of a combat-credible deterrent embedded across the region's front-line archipelagos. These capabilities have triggered deeper strategic concerns. Aaron Shiffler, writing for the Joint Air Power Competence Center in an October 2023 article, notes that hypersonic weapons compress decision timelines and complicate traditional defense postures. Their extreme speed and maneuverability reduce early-warning windows, increasing the risk of miscalculation. Shiffler argues that these systems could undermine mutual vulnerability—the bedrock of nuclear deterrence—by enabling rapid, precise strikes against high-value targets. In his view, this shift raises the prospect of crisis instability if adversaries perceive a first-strike advantage. While advocates tout the deterrent value of hypersonic weapons, Shiffler warns that without arms control frameworks, proliferation of these weapons may erode both nuclear and conventional strategic balances. But the growing momentum behind hypersonics has met stiff resistance from skeptics, such as David Wright and Cameron Tracy, who argue in a March 2024 article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that the systems offer little advantage over legacy missiles. They cite intense heating and aerodynamic drag during low-altitude flight as limiting factors that degrade speed, range and survivability. Unlike ballistic missiles, which briefly heat during reentry, boost-glide vehicles face sustained thermal stress during their glide phase—up to 30 minutes—making faster, longer-range designs difficult. They need large rocket boosters and emit bright infrared signatures, making them visible to early-warning satellites despite claims of stealth. Wright and Tracy contend that the technology suffers from fundamental design compromises and may be more about optics than operational advantage. Shawn Rostker echoes this skepticism in a February 2025 RealClear Defense article, where he critiques the growing political pressure in the US to match Chinese and Russian hypersonic deployments. Rostker argues that recent calls for expanded hypersonic funding rest on inflated threat assessments and that many technical hurdles remain unresolved. He states that both glide vehicles and cruise-type hypersonics lack a compelling strategic rationale beyond symbolic parity. Despite the limited operational success of China's DF-ZF or Russia's Tsirkon, Avangard and Kinzhal, their existence fuels anxiety in Washington, creating a momentum that may not be justified by battlefield utility. Rostker warns that absent clear strategic value, hypersonics risk becoming expensive distractions rather than game-changing deterrents. Yet China's response indicates that it takes these developments seriously. Veerle Nouwens and others, in a January 2024 report for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), state that Chinese analysts view US plans to deploy land-based missiles across the First and Second Island Chains as a direct threat to China's strategic mobility and posture. According to Nouwens and others, Beijing sees these forward deployments as a deliberate effort to undermine its A2/AD systems and target inland facilities. In response, Chinese strategists anticipate a surge in their land-based missile deployments—including conventional and nuclear systems—to break out of perceived encirclement. Nouwens and others caution that such dynamics risk spiraling into a full-blown arms competition and destabilizing the region's already fragile security architecture. That concern has deepened with a June 2025 report by Kyle Balzer and Dan Blumenthal for the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) think tank showing that Chinese strategists now view these long-range precision missile deployments as existential threats to China's regional deterrence and national survival. They say Chinese analysts believe these systems could enable decapitation strikes on the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) in a crisis, prompting accelerated efforts to modernize the force. This line of effort includes expanding mobile and silo-based platforms to ensure mission survivability and retaliatory capability. Balzer and Blumenthal argue that this shift reflects a broader consensus in China that survivable, land-based nuclear forces are vital to counter US denial strategies and preserve credible deterrence. The US bet on forward-deployed hypersonics aims to fracture China's A2/AD bubbles before they harden—but the payoff hinges on credibility, not just capability. As China accelerates countermeasures, the strategic equation is shifting toward a high-stakes contest of precision, survivability and political will.
AllAfrica
16-07-2025
- Business
- AllAfrica
Carrier crunch leaves US unprepared for a China fight
The US Navy is running out of aircraft carriers—and time—as global threats multiply faster than it can build, launch or sustain its next-generation warships. USNI reported this month that delivery of the USS John F Kennedy (CVN-79), the US Navy's second Ford-class aircraft carrier, has been delayed by two years due to ongoing challenges with integrating Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) and Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE). Originally scheduled for July 2025, the carrier is now expected to enter service by March 2027, according to the US Navy. That will reduce its fleet to 10 carriers, below the legally mandated 11 units, for nearly a year following the May 2026 retirement of USS Nimitz (CVN-68). The delay stems from the Navy's 2020 decision to shift from a dual-phase to a single-phase delivery plan, which was meant to enable earlier incorporation of the F-35C Joint Strike Fighter and Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar. Lessons learned from CVN-78 were only partially applied to CVN-79, and retrofitting proved complex, according to Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII). The US Navy is now coordinating with stakeholders to explore preliminary acceptance prior to full delivery. Similar delays also affect the CVN-80 Enterprise, now projected for July 2030, due to supply chain and material availability issues, extending its timeline by 28 months. These setbacks highlight broader integration and sustainment challenges in the Ford-class program, with US Navy officials working to mitigate operational gaps and preserve readiness amid increasingly strained global commitments. Persistent delays, spiraling costs and unresolved technical flaws in the Ford-class program are undermining the US Navy's ability to field and sustain the kind of forward-deployed force needed to deter rising multi-theater threats from near-peer and regional adversaries like China. Summarizing key concerns, Brent Eastwood notes in a June 2025 National Security Journal article that the Ford-class's $13 billion per unit cost, $5 billion in R&D and 23% cost overrun have alarmed lawmakers. Chris Panella notes in a March 2025 Business Insider piece that delays in procuring CVN-82 threaten over 60,000 jobs across more than 2,000 firms. Without immediate action, he says 96% of sole-source suppliers could halt production by 2027, raising costs and risking the loss of skilled workers. Eastwood also warns that repeated construction delays—such as the USS Enterprise's slip to 2029—undermine fleet readiness, just as emerging threats like hypersonic missiles, drone swarms and cyberattacks raise serious doubts about carrier survivability in conflict scenarios. He adds that munitions and fuel resupply demands place additional pressure on logistics chains already stretched thin. Eastwood further notes that unproven technologies such as the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and AAG have contributed to deployment delays. A January 2025 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states that although both systems aboard the USS Gerald R Ford have shown improvement, they still fall well short of US Navy reliability goals—EMALS averaging just 614 cycles between failures against a target of 4,166, and AAG at 460 against 16,500. The CRS report says these persistent gaps have led the US Navy to enhance testing protocols and data collection for further refinement. At the operational level, Ford-class delays are straining the Navy's ability to meet global Carrier Strike Group (CSG) commitments. Steven Wills observes in a July 2024 article for the Center for Maritime Strategy (CMS) that the US Navy's carrier force remains overstretched, operating with only 11 carriers in a world that demands at least 15 for sustained global presence. Wills writes that repeated crises, particularly in the Red Sea, have pushed deployments beyond readiness cycles, disrupting both maintenance and training. He points out that the US Navy's reliance on temporary solutions—like rushing Pacific-based carriers to relieve overburdened ships—reflects persistent gaps in force structure and planning. These shortfalls, Wills argues, are degrading air superiority in key theaters like the Indo-Pacific and the Levant and are the consequence of years of procurement underreach. He also criticizes the logic of 'cheating the math' by slashing carrier numbers without adjusting mission demands. Ishaan Anand, in a CMS article this month, further stresses that concurrent maritime crises in the Red Sea and Indo-Pacific reveal the US Navy's growing dual-theater challenge. He notes that the extended deployment of the Eisenhower CSG to counter Houthi threats in CENTCOM's area of responsibility has diverted assets from priority Indo-Pacific zones, enabling China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to ramp up exercises near Taiwan and the Luzon Strait. Anand writes that the absence of forward-deployed carriers like the USS Ronald Reagan has forced the US Navy to rely on destroyers and littoral combat ships with far less power projection capability. He argues this operational tradeoff—between Middle Eastern deterrence and Indo-Pacific stability—shows the US Navy's inability to maintain a carrier-led presence in two contested regions simultaneously. And yet a third front may already be forming. As Russia becomes more assertive in the Arctic and North Atlantic, US carrier strike groups have been forward-deployed to Northern Europe as part of NATO deterrence efforts. This signals a growing awareness in Washington that even while juggling crises in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East, Europe cannot be neglected. The convergence of these crises has elevated the specter of a simultaneous three-front contingency in the Pacific, Middle East, and Europe, testing whether a US Navy built for peacetime presence can withstand wartime demands. Hal Brands warns in an October 2022 Bloomberg article that Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China's designs on Taiwan, and Iran's nuclear provocations expose fundamental US vulnerabilities under its current 'one-war' defense planning framework. He argues that while these adversaries are not formally aligned, their actions could generate overlapping crises that would force the US into unacceptable tradeoffs, fracturing its global posture. Mackenzie Eaglen underscores this point in an August 2024 National Security Journal article, stating that the 'one-war' force-sizing construct is increasingly seen as obsolete in the face of converging near-peer threats from China and Russia, alongside regional challengers such as Iran and North Korea. Eaglen cites the US Commission on the National Defense Strategy, which warns that the US lacks the capabilities and capacity to prevail across multiple theaters—a vulnerability that could embolden adversaries to test US resolve. She writes that despite calls for a 'Multiple Theater Force Construct,' the US military remains smaller, older, and less ready, with naval, ground, and air assets stretched across outdated global postures. Pivoting between regions, she argues, invites dangerous strategic gaps that erode deterrence and compromise leadership at a time when unity of effort is most crucial. The Ford class's technical limits, operational wear, and inability to meet multiple strategic demands suggest the US Navy's carrier-focused force isn't prepared to deter or fight future wars.
Yahoo
31-01-2025
- Science
- Yahoo
US to deploy ‘hellscape' of drones in Taiwan Strait by 2025 to counter China
The US seems to be rapidly advancing with its ambitious 'Replicator' initiative. Under this program, the US aims to deploy swarms of lethal autonomous drones in the Taiwan Strait by August 2025. Interestingly, US officials have called this deployment an 'unmanned hellscape.' Captain Alex Campbell, the maritime portfolio director of the Defense Innovation Unit, confirmed the August 2025 target date at the recent West 2025 conference. 'It's not another [science and technology] project. It is meant to get to production, meant to field systems, in this case, in support of [US Indo-Pacific Command],' said Campbell, as reported by the US Naval Institute (USNI). These unmanned systems, deployed across air, surface, and underwater, will be networked to form a cohesive force. This strategy aims to create a powerful deterrent that China would be unwilling to risk a military operation against Taiwan. Eventually, the Navy's goal is to develop a hybrid fleet of manned and unmanned craft, and the underlying connective command and control and software decisions that are part of Replicator will inform the effort, noted USNI. The sheer number of drones, combined with their ability to coordinate and adapt, is intended to create a "hellscape" for any adversary. This emphasis on rapid deployment reflects the situation's urgency and the perceived need to counter China's growing military power. 'It's a lot of taking… a pretty wide and diverse set of systems and a wide and diverse set of software, and smashing them all together at a pace that is really more akin to commercial software tempos,' added Campbell. The Pentagon has already allocated approximately $1 billion to fund the initial phase of Replicator. The Navy has also established specialized units to operate and maintain these new drone systems. One such unit, Unmanned Surface Vessel Squadron 3, known as the "Hell Hounds," recently received its first four Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Crafts (GARC). While the specifics of their missions remain classified, these vessels are expected to play a crucial role in the Replicator network. Beyond offensive capabilities, Replicator also focuses on defensive measures, specifically developing counter-drone technologies. This reflects the understanding that future conflicts will likely involve a complex interplay between offensive and defensive unmanned systems. The US and China are investing heavily in drone technology, leading to a potential arms race. The push to create an "unmanned hellscape" in the Taiwan Strait marks a bold gamble on the future of naval combat. The success of Replicator could significantly alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. Amid the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia, the use and importance of drones have increased manifold. Subsequently, new developments have also been taking place in this sphere. Recently, Ukraine introduced a drone that can soar to 13,000 feet with a 90-mile range. With these specifications, the drone can operate beyond the reach of many enemy air defense systems. Meanwhile, a Chinese start-up aims to develop a supersonic drone capable of reaching four times the speed of sound.
