Latest news with #Ukrainians
Channel 4
an hour ago
- Entertainment
- Channel 4
Life in Kharkiv: where the show must go on
At midday on Sunday, as Ukraine caught its breath after nights of unrelenting Russian bombardment and President Trump mulled providing the Ukrainian military with more weapons , we went to the ballet. Kharkiv's Opera House was hit by a Russian missile back in 2022, so the resident company was performing Snow White in what used to be a giant storeroom in the basement. 'It's a bit difficult,' said Olga Sharikova who was playing the title role. 'The lighting isn't very professional, and the audience is very close to us. But despite the war and everything happening around us, we keep dancing.' 'Despite the war and everything happening around us, we keep dancing.' – Olga Sharikova It's a scene I won't forget: an audience made up mainly of little girls and their mothers watching the spectacle rapt, forgetting for a glorious hour about drone and missile attacks and fathers fighting on the front. 'The war has intensified the need for this kind of relaxation,' one mother told me. 'It helps me to switch off, and it gives me strength.' Such moments are precious, as Russia steps up its summer offensive , trying to sap the will of Ukrainians and to make territorial gains, so they can negotiate – when they're forced to – from a position of strength. For more than a year the front line has scarcely moved, while both sides have been busy developing new military technology. Back in November 2022, I spent a rather alarming hour or so in a Ukrainian trench, as a Russian sniper, who was probably only 500 metres away, fired over our heads. Few Ukrainian soldiers are in trenches now, because anything that moves on the front line is immediately spotted and targetted by a drone. About 80% of battlefield casualties on both sides are now caused by ammunition dropped from drones. So the need for remote controlled weaponry, where the pilot can remain two kilometres or more behind the front line – is acute. Ukraine is in the forefront of innovation for both airborne drones and unmanned ground systems. At a drone workshop, hidden in a Kharkiv suburb, Anton Begmienko showed me the latest drones he and his colleagues in the company De Visu have invented. They used to be in a band – Anton was the drummer. 'It helps,' he says, showing me his dexterity on the controls. The Russians jam the radio signals of the drones the Ukrainian military initially used, so the latest drones are tethered to the operator by a ten or even 20 kilometre fibre optic cable. At first, few of the drones reached their targets because the cable snapped or got tangled, but De Visu and similar outfits, have changed the shape of the cylinder which contains the fibreoptic coil, and made other innovations. The success rate has improved. The problem is that the Russians are doing exactly the same. Anton shows me a Russian fibreoptic drone that he has reversed engineered. 'We are trying to learn from the Russians because they are smart,' he said. Innovation in drone technology like this has enabled the Ukrainians to hold back the Russian advance, but it's not helping them to win the war, because the Russians are not only innovating but also have a much bigger armed force. That means more drones and more operators, which is always going to be a problem for Ukraine. Still, Anton says motivation is more important than technology or numbers. 'They have more people than us, but their people are fighting for money,' he says. 'And we are fighting for our lives and our freedom.' Trump tells Putin to end Ukraine war in 50 days or face tariffs Ukraine war: Inside Kyiv during major Russia drone strike Ukraine war: on the scene of Russia's record drone strikes
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First Post
an hour ago
- Business
- First Post
Is Trump giving Putin reasons to believe he's ‘weak'? Russia expert explains Ukraine U-turns
Despite supporters hailing the '50-day ultimatum' to Vladimir Putin and the 'u-turn' with the arms package's announcement, US President Trump has not had any fundamental shift in the Russia-Ukraine war. Instead, he has encouraged the Russian leader to maximise territorial gains to achieve more favorable negotiating positions and push his maximalist demands. read more US President Donald Trump's refusal to punish Vladimir Putin for consistently refusing to make peace has not just allowed Russia to maximise gains on the battlefield but has also risked cementing the United States as a 'weak' party at the world stage. In what his supporters hailed as an ultimatum, Trump on Monday announced he could impose 100 per cent tariff on Russia if Putin would not reach a deal to end the war in the next 50 days. Far from an ultimatum, Trump essentially allowed Putin a free reign on the battlefield for 50 days. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD For weeks, it had been known that Putin had been preparing for a major summer offensive to maximise gains on the ground. He told the same to Trump. Per Axios, Putin told Trump during on July 3 that he would launch maximise territorial gains in the ground offensive in the next 60 days. The 60th day will be September 1. As per Trump's announcement, he will wait until the 50th day starting Monday —Sept. 3— to impose any tariff. This means that Trump will wait until after the conclusion of Russian ground offensive to take any action, giving Putin a license to maximise his gains and kill Ukrainians at will in aerial attacks. Trump encourages Putin to maximise gains on ground While it is encouraging that President Trump appears to have begun to grasp that the only factor capable of influencing Vladimir Putin is force or a credible threat of force, the Monday's announcement does not suggest any real change in his approach, says Kseniya Kirillova, a Russia analyst at Washington DC-based Jamestown Foundation. Kirillova tells Firstpost, 'It seems that President Trump is once again demonstrating inconsistency and offering Putin an opportunity to achieve gains on the battlefield. Given that Russia has long made clear its reliance on a summer offensive to secure more favorable negotiating positions, President Trump's stance effectively hands Putin just such an opening. Therefore, I cannot yet conclude that President Trump's position on Russia has fundamentally changed.' Putin is likely to interpret Trump's inconsistency as a sign of weakness and feel emboldened about the summer offensive. 'Vladimir Putin interprets any concession as weakness and therefore seeks to extract the maximum possible advantage for himself,' says Kirillova. Russia can sustain the war on Ukraine — but Putin has chinks in armour By all accounts, Putin does not see a reason to make peace at the moment — particularly after getting the 50-day window from Trump to hit Ukraine with everything he has got. And Putin has got a lot to hit Ukraine with. Even as Ukraine's weapons supplies have been disrupted as Europe finds itself unable to provide the best arms and Trump remains non-committal, Russia's allies continue to do everything to ensure its victory: China is keeping Russian economy afloat in every way possible; China is providing Russia not just with raw material and machinery to make weapons but also with military goods like drones; Iran has not just provided Russia with drones but has transferred production know-how; and North Korea has not just provided arms and ammunition but has provided tens of thousands of soldiers as well. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Even as economists agree that the Russian economy, which saw a war-induced boost in 2022, has now stagnated, they maintain that Russia retains sufficient resources to sustain the war at its current intensity for at least two more years. However, the two constraints on Russia are Ukraine's advance capabilities in drone warfare and depleting ranks — the Trump administration has assessed that around 100,000 Russian soldiers have been killed this year alone. 'The success of Russia's offensive will largely depend on its ability to shift the balance of power in the drone war. Another key factor is Russia's capacity to replenish its manpower. This is why US military aid will be critical to the outcome of Putin's summer campaign. The scope and urgency of US deliveries will offer a clearer indication of President Trump's true position on the Russia–Ukraine war,' Kirillova, the Russia analyst at Jamestown, tells Firstpost.
Newsweek
an hour ago
- Business
- Newsweek
How Will Putin React to Trump's Ukraine Pivot? Newsweek Contributors Debate
President Donald Trump announced this week that the U.S. will send Patriot air-defense missiles to Ukraine and threatened new tariffs on Russia. Will Vladimir Putin back down? What should Trump's next move be? And what does the future hold for Ukraine? Newsweek contributors Daniel R. DePetris and Dan Perry debate: Daniel R. DePetris: The Trump administration is betting that more U.S. military aid to Ukraine, coupled with additional sanctions in the form of secondary tariffs, will eventually compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to seriously negotiate a peace deal. This is precisely what the Biden administration believed too, and while U.S. support beefed up Kyiv's defenses, it did next to nothing to alter Putin's strategic calculations. Biden left office and passed the war over to Trump, who was highly reticent about continuing U.S. involvement. Trump believed Ukraine ultimately mattered more to Russia than it did to the United States. That was a correct assessment, and it's unlikely additional U.S. military assistance to Kyiv will change it in any way. Dan Perry: Trump's announcement signals that U.S. arms will keep flowing to Ukraine—just indirectly. By routing weapons through NATO and shifting to sales instead of free transfers (which accounted for most aid under Biden), Trump maintains deniability with his MAGA base while turning a profit and forcing the Europeans to spend money. He seems to have concluded that Russia must still be resisted, however much he likes the dictator Putin personally. He'd be right. Putin isn't settling for Eastern Ukraine, which Trump's willing to hand over; Putin wants it all. Some red lines are still red, even for Trump. DePetris: I agree that this latest aid scheme is a relatively ingenious attempt by Trump to kill two birds with one stone: increase the pressure on Putin and make some hefty profits for U.S. defense contractors in the process. I also acknowledge Putin would like to gobble up all of Ukraine if he could. But intent is only as relevant as capability. If Putin doesn't possess the military capability to actually fulfill his wildest dreams—and Russia's war performance to date provides little evidence that he does—then it amounts to empty rhetoric. Perry: Well, Putin's desire to eliminate Ukraine as an independent state could still prolong the war, which Trump hates. Trump has actually changed his tune on the war here, while maintaining some deniability. Putin is being told—with Trump's mafia-like rhetoric now directed at Moscow—that Ukraine will not run out of arms. It is quite a big deal, to use language Trump will understand. More should come. Photo-illustration by Newsweek/Getty/AP DePetris: Sure, Trump is sending Putin a loud message. But how long will it last? Trump doesn't have a history of sticking to his policy decisions. Case in point: his latest policy decision on Ukraine, after months of putting more pressure on the Ukrainians than the Russians. While he seems to have flipped his position, there's a decent chance he could flip again. I suspect Putin understands this factor, and will account for it. Perry: You're right about Trump's flip-flops, but here's another way to look at it: Trump misjudged Putin's current position, but not his own. Imagine if Trump made this offer: Russia keeps the areas it captured thus far and wins amnesty and an end to sanctions, while Ukraine gets security guarantees without NATO membership and a fast track to the EU. Otherwise, 500 percent tariffs on whoever trades with Russia. Why not? He's said far crazier things, and coupled with the new weapons regime, it might just work. DePetris: Ultimately, this all comes down to Putin and Zelensky, not Trump. This conflict is a war of attrition, and the result will depend on the combatants' ability to sustain it. Putin's strategy is high-intensity, wasteful, and morally bankrupt, but he still has more lives to play with. I'm not sure there's anything, short of turning Ukraine's war into America's own—which nobody is advocating for—that will convince Putin to prioritize talking over fighting at this stage. That's the depressing reality. Perry: I have an alternate depressing reality: this war is already is America's—or more correctly, the Western world's, which the U.S. once sought to lead. You'll agree there are times in history when you cannot run away. Now, I fear, is such a time. If Putin really wants more than Eastern Ukraine, it is time to lower the boom on this international outlaw. Let's hope the prospect of an endless supply of weapons for Ukraine, combined with serious punishment on the trade front, will do the trick. DePetris: At the risk of pretending I have a crystal ball, here's what I envision over the next few months: more U.S. weapons to Ukraine will help solidify Kyiv's defenses as the Russians press on with their counteroffensive. The Russians, in turn, will experience even more casualties, leading some in the U.S. media to speculate (yet again) that the war has reached a turning point. But those assessments repeatedly prove far too optimistic as Putin continues with the status quo, because a defeat—or even the perception of defeat—is simply intolerable to his legacy and the country he represents. I'd be happy to be proven wrong. Perry: We agree on that! I'd also be happy to prove you wrong. And it may happen soon if Trump lays an ultimatum on the table, as I advised earlier. Let me just conclude with one lesson I have learned, both from history and from covering scores of countries, including Russia: no leadership is permanent. Dictatorships seem invulnerable, and then one day they're gone. People speak of the Russian "system" behind Putin and sure, there is one. But it can be shape-shifting and deceptive, and Putin is a singular leader. Russia has taken many forms in the past century alone. And Putin, too, shall pass. Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune. Dan Perry is the former Cairo-based Middle East editor (also leading coverage from Iran) and London-based Europe/Africa editor of the Associated Press, the former chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem, and the author of two books. Follow him at The views expressed in this article are the writers' own.
India.com
4 hours ago
- Politics
- India.com
NATO chief warns India, China over..., says 'If you live in Beijing or Delhi...'
NATO chief warns India, China over..., says 'If you live in Beijing or Delhi...' In a stern message to India and China, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte that countries such as Brazil, China and India could be hit very hard by secondary sanctions if they continued to do business with Russia. While meeting with senators in the US Congress, Rutte said, 'My encouragement to these three countries, particularly is, if you live now in Beijing, or in Delhi, or you are the president of Brazil, you might want to take a look into this, because this might hit you very hard.' What Trump said? His comments came a the day after President Donald Trump announced new weapons for Ukraine and threatened 'biting' secondary tariffs of 100% on the buyers of Russian exports unless there is a peace deal in 50 days. He said that under the agreement with Trump, the U.S. would now 'massively' supply Ukraine with weapons 'not just air defense, also missiles, also ammunition paid for by the Europeans.' Rutte added, 'So please make the phone call to Vladimir Putin and tell him that he has to get serious about peace talks, because otherwise this will slam back on Brazil, on India and on China in a massive way.' Asked if long-range missiles for Ukraine were under discussion, Rutte said, 'It is both defensive and offensive. So there's all kinds of weapons, but we have not discussed in detail yesterday with the president. This is really being worked through now by the Pentagon, by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, together with the Ukrainians.'
AllAfrica
5 hours ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
10 billion euros nowhere near enough to rebuild Ukraine
Clearly angered by the intensification of Russia's air campaign against Ukraine, Donald Trump has pivoted from the suspension of US military assistance to Ukraine to promising its resumption. Russia's strikes on major cities killed more civilians in June than have died in any single previous month, according to UN figures. Over the past two weeks, the US president has made several disparaging comments about his relationship with Vladimir Putin, including on July 13 that the Russian president 'talks nice and then he bombs everybody in the evening.' Not only will the US resume delivery of long-promised Patriot air defense missiles, Trump is now also reported to be considering a whole new plan to arm Ukraine, including with offensive capabilities. And he has talked about imposing new sanctions on Putin's regime. This is the background against which the eighth Ukraine Recovery Conference took place in Rome on July 10 and 11. The event, attended by many Western leaders and senior business executives, was an important reminder that while the war against Ukraine will be decided on the battlefield, peace will only be won as the result of rebuilding Ukraine's economy and society. Ending the war anytime soon and on terms favourable to Kyiv will require an enormous effort by Ukrainians and their European allies. But the country's recovery afterwards will be no less challenging. According to the World Bank's latest assessment, at the end of 2024 Ukraine's recovery needs over the next decade stood at US$524 billion. And with every month the war continues, these needs are increasing. Ukraine's three hardest-hit sectors are housing, transport and energy infrastructure, which between them account for around 60% of all damage. At the same time, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided a relatively positive assessment of Ukraine's overall economic situation at the end of June, forecasting growth of between 2% and 3% for 2025 – likely to grow to over 4% in 2026 and 2027. But the IMF also cautioned that this trajectory – and the country's macroeconomic stability more generally – will remain heavily dependent on external support. Taking into account a new €2.3 billion package from the EU, consisting of €1.8 billion of loan guarantees and €580 million of grants, the cumulative pledge of over €10 billion (£8.7 billion) made by countries attending the Ukraine recovery conference is both encouraging and sobering. It is encouraging in the sense that Ukraine's international partners remain committed to the country's social and economic needs, not merely its ability to resist Russia on the battlefield. But it is also sobering that even these eye-watering sums of public money are still only a fraction of Ukraine's needs. Even if the EU manages to mobilise its overall target of €40 billion for Ukraine's recovery, by attracting additional contributions from other donors and the private sector, this would be less than 8% of Ukraine's projected recovery needs as of the end of 2024. As the war continues and more of the (diminishing) public funding is directed towards defence expenditure by Kyiv's western partners, this gap is likely to grow. Money is not the only challenge for Ukraine recovery efforts. Rebuilding the country is not simply about undoing the physical damage. The social impact of Russia's aggression is hard to overstate. Ukraine has been deeply traumatised as a society since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. Generally reliable Ukrainian casualty counts – some 12,000 civilians and 43,000 troops killed since February 2022 – are still likely to underestimate the true number of people who have died as a direct consequence of the Russian aggression. And each of these will have left behind family members struggling to cope with their loss. In addition, there are hundreds of thousands of war veterans. Even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there were nearly half a million veterans from the 'frozen' conflict that followed Russia's annexation of Crimea and incursion into eastern Ukraine. By the end of 2024, this number had more than doubled to around 1 million. Most of them have complex social, economic, medical and psychological needs that will have to be considered as part of a society-wide recovery effort. According to data from the UN refugee agency (UNHCR), there are also some 7 million refugees from Ukraine and 3.7 million internally displaced people (IDPs). This is equivalent to one quarter of the country's population. The financial needs of UNHCR's operations in Ukraine are estimated at $800 million in 2025, of which only 27% was funded as of the end of April. Once the fighting in Ukraine ends, refugees are likely to return in greater numbers. Their return will provide a boost to the country's economic growth by strengthening its labour force and bringing with them skills and, potentially, investment. But like many IDPs and veterans, they may not be able to return to their places of origin, either because these are not inhabitable or remain under Russian occupation. Some returnees are likely to be viewed with suspicion or resentment by those Ukrainians who stayed behind and fought. Tensions with Ukrainians who survived the Russian occupation in areas that Kyiv may recover in a peace deal are also likely, given Ukraine's harsh anti-collaboration laws. As a consequence, reintegration – in the sense of rebuilding and sustaining the country's social cohesion – will be a massive challenge, requiring as much, if not more, of Ukraine's partners' attention and financial support as physical reconstruction and the transition from a war to a peace-time economy. Given the mismatch between what is needed and what has been provided for Ukraine's recovery, one may well be skeptical about the value of the annual Ukraine recovery conferences. But, to the credit of their organizers and attendees, they recognize that the foundations for post-war recovery need to be built before the war ends. The non-military challenges of war and peace must not fall by the wayside amid an exclusive focus on battlefield dynamics. Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
