Latest news with #UnitedWaStateArmy
The Star
a day ago
- The Star
Myanmar district chief suspended for raping four women, sentenced to 10 years in prison and 300,000 yuan compensation
YANGON: The United Wa State Army (UWSA)-controlled Hopang district chief, Ta Nyi Lin (pic), was sentenced to 10 years in prison and 300,000 yuan (US$4,177) in fines by the UWSA Judiciary Department on August 16 for raping four underage girls, Wa News Land reported, citing the Hopang City News and Information Department. The sentencing was held in public at the Hopang Cultural Center on the morning of August 16, with locals invited to come and listen to the verdict. In addition, the head, deputy head and cultural association leader who worked under the guilty district chief were also demoted from their current positions and suspended from their duties for three months. Of the four victims, two were raped, while the other two were sexually assaulted without being raped. Of the 300,000 yuan in compensation received from the culprit, 100,000 yuan each will be given to the two women who were raped, and 50,000 yuan each to the other two who were sexually assaulted. After the UWSA Judicial Department conducted several investigations into the rape and sexual assault of district chief Ta Nyi Lin, the information included in the appeal was submitted by the legal office to the court, which confirmed the testimonies of witnesses, oral evidence, written evidence and eyewitnesses. The cases are separate cases, and all cases will be examined together and the verdict will be rendered. - Eleven Media/ANN
Deccan Herald
18-07-2025
- Business
- Deccan Herald
China's weapons of statecraft
China has become the world's fourth-largest arms exporter, commanding 5.8 per cent of global weapons sales between 2019 and 2023. While China slashed its own arms imports by 64 per cent over the past decade, it simultaneously expanded its weapons footprint to 44 countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Apart from geographic expanse, the strategic footprint achieved as part of China's arms export strategy represents more than the mere logic of economics. Under Xi Jinping's military modernisation agenda, weapons sales are integral to statecraft to create dependencies, secure allies, and challenge Western influence in key strategic calculus behind the targeting of countries for arms sales and transfers coincides with the aspirations of making its military influence felt from the First Island Chain to the broader Indo-Pacific and beyond. China's strategic influence spans and dominates across the Indo-Pacific. As emphasised by President Xi, the move is aimed at constructing 'a common destiny of the Asia-Pacific'. .Between 2019-2023, 85 per cent of Chinese arms exports were concentrated in Asia. Pakistan, as an important all-weather ally, is a customer of China for 61-63 per cent of total exports. Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Thailand are secondary markets for small arms and ammunition. Bangladesh is currently the second-largest buyer of Chinese weapons in the region. China's strategic rationale lies in building a regional sphere of influence, especially when India is steadily emerging as a competitor in the African expansion is in the sub-Saharan region, with 9.8 per cent of the total arms imports. It is overtaking Russia as a top supplier with a special focus on countries noted for weak governance and resource wealth. The weapons sale also seems to be integrated with the Belt and Road Initiative projects and military training programmes. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), strategic penetration is limited in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, as there is competition between Chinese and Western players. China has also expanded its presence in Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Argentina, and Chinese arms sales model is based on three core factors. It prioritises generating profits as per foreign policy considerations, adopts a centralised, whole-of-government approach resulting in control over whom (not) to engage, and shows intent to reflect responsibility through adherence to the existing non-proliferation and arms treaty compliance, Chinese arms transfers have been found in violation due to their supplies through illegal networks reaching rebel groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Myanmar, ULFA in Assam, Maoist rebels in Nepal, and jihadist groups in Bangladesh. Such illegal transfers challenge China's commitment to existing international arms and dual-use treaties. Beijing accepted the accession to the UN Arms Trade Treaty (UNATT) in 2020, prohibiting signatory states from selling conventional arms to countries with the potential for genocide, crimes against humanity, or war emerged as the fourth most significant arms supplier to Africa in 1996-2000, reaching the second spot by 2013-2017, capturing 17% of Africa's entire market by 2017, just below Russia. China is still a non-signatory to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and exploits it through selling UAVs, including to regions under conflict. Beijing has also utilised its UNSC influence and declined to vote on key resolutions, including UNSCR 1706 in 2006, related to human rights violations and the extension of the arms embargo in Sudan. .The quality China's expansive presence, there exist certain structural limitations to its arms business. Over-reliance on Pakistan and other smaller countries may risk market concentration. Beyond that, there is limited competition within China's defence industry. Western sanctions and diplomatic pressure on several countries restrict Chinese arms sales. Chinese defence systems also lack the technological finesse in comparison with top-tier Western relatively cheaper and increasing share of Chinese-origin military equipment was also reported to have problems, including technical malfunctioning, export of defective equipment, and sub-optimal performance. During Operation Sindoor, Chinese-origin air defence systems with the Pakistan military became subject to poor performance against the Indian military. The lack of accountability to perform maintenance and repair is another concern. Chinese weapons sales also face scrutiny over end-user certificates as Beijing's flexible export policies often bypass stringent verification processes, raising concerns about the weapons' diversion in hostile conflict these drawbacks, Chinese arms exports are an attractive option for some countries. China provides a flexible option leading to a win-win for countries under sanctions, political instability, and marked for poor human rights records. For China, the challenge lies in matching the qualitative parameters, including operational, training, and maintenance of sold defence items, with its statecraft-supporting arms export strategy..(Sameer is director, Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation; Ankit is an assistant professor at the Rashtriya Raksha University; Rahul is a research assistant with ORF)
Asia News Network
17-07-2025
- Business
- Asia News Network
Low-cost Myanmar rare earths feed China as border mines pollute Thailand
July 17, 2025 BANGKOK – When talking about Rare Earth Elements (REEs), a group of 17 essential metals used in high-tech applications ranging from smartphones to missiles, the global focus often shifts to China, the dominant player in the market. China controls 90% of the global rare earth processing market and leads in reserves, holding approximately 44 million tons in 2024—almost half of the world's known reserves, which total over 90 million tons. In contrast, the United States holds only 1.9 million tons in rare earth reserves and continues to rely heavily on imports. Other countries with significant reserves include Brazil (21.0 million tons), India (6.9 million tons), Australia (5.7 million tons), Russia (3.8 million tons), and Vietnam (3.5 million tons), according to estimates from the USGS for the same year. Interestingly, Myanmar is not listed among the countries with the largest rare earth reserves, despite intensive mining activities, especially in Shan and Kachin states. This clearly indicates that while Myanmar may 'produce' rare earth minerals, it does not 'own' the resources. It serves primarily as a transit point for initial extraction, with the minerals being sent to other countries, particularly China, for further processing. Myanmar Border Mines Surge The true source of China's rare earth dominance lies in Myanmar's border regions, where Shan and Kachin states are emerging as key centres for the mining of rare earth elements like terbium and dysprosium. These areas are experiencing rapid and uncontrolled growth in mining activities. In Shan State, rare earth mining has proliferated, particularly in the town of Poke, which falls under the influence of the United Wa State Army (UWSA). The number of mines has increased from just 3 in 2005 to 26 in 2025, an eightfold growth in just one decade. The mining technique used, 'ore leaching,' has led to chemical runoff contaminating major water sources, including the Kok and Sai rivers, which flow into northern Thailand. In the northern part of Myanmar, Kachin State, areas like Pang Wa, Manse, Momok, and Loy Ja have become intensive mining zones. In 2023, over 300 mines were operating, with more than 3,000 extraction pits. After the 2021 coup, production surged by 40%, and China purchased 41,700 tons of rare earth minerals from Myanmar within the same year. China's Investments in Foreign Mining Operations Interestingly, the process in Myanmar's Shan and Kachin states is not just about mineral extraction, but also reflects politics, ethnic relations, and the influence networks of China. Most mines are operated by armed groups or are supported by Chinese capital, with minimal oversight on environmental protection or human rights. China has strategically chosen to invest in rare earth mining abroad, particularly in Myanmar, as the Chinese government has tightened domestic regulations for several strategic reasons, including economic, environmental, and geopolitical factors. Moreover, China has declared that rare earth minerals are state-owned, and private entities have no right to claim them. Myanmar has become a target for private investors due to its relatively low regulation and enforcement, making it an attractive location for shifting polluting activities abroad. Meanwhile, processing and value-added operations remain in China. Additionally, mining costs in Myanmar are significantly lower. According to Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, the cost of producing heavy rare earth elements like dysprosium and terbium in Myanmar is seven times cheaper than in China. This lower cost structure enables Chinese companies to compete more effectively in global markets, particularly in the electric vehicle and wind energy industries. Mines, Chemicals, and Rivers Pianporn Deetes, Director of Southeast Asia Campaigns at International Rivers, stated in an interview with Bangkok Business that the cross-border pollution crisis is severely impacting millions of people in Chiang Rai, who are facing risks to their lives and health due to heavy metal contamination, particularly arsenic, in the Kok River, which flows into the Mekong and Sai rivers. 'Local residents can no longer engage in traditional activities like fishing or operating tour boats, and farmers are worried that rice grown using water from the Kok River may be contaminated with arsenic, as rice tends to absorb arsenic well. Additionally, there have been reports of fish with unusual parasites, which correlate with mining activities disturbing the soil.' Pianporn criticised the Thai government's response as 'slow,' urging them to acknowledge this as the largest cross-border pollution crisis Thailand has ever faced and to take immediate action. 'The only solution is to halt mining activities.' She further called for the Thai government to urgently negotiate with Myanmar and China, using various measures, including economic, diplomatic, and even food-related pressures, to halt mining activities. 'If the soil continues to be disturbed and mining continues, the people of Chiang Rai will be 'slowly dying.' The restoration of rivers contaminated with heavy metals is extremely difficult and time-consuming, as seen with the unresolved issue of the Klity Creek contamination, which has persisted for over 30 years.'
Hans India
13-07-2025
- Business
- Hans India
India has huge rare earth metal reserves, but production is low
'Rare earth elements' (REEs) are not actually rare in the Earth's crust, but their extraction and processing are challenging. Hence, making them economically and strategically is more important. India has the fifth-largest REE reserves globally, particularly in coastal and inland placer sands. However, despite these substantial reserves, India's contribution to global REE production is less than one per cent. This is due to limited investment in mining and refining infrastructure, as well as challenges in extracting REEs from low-grade deposits and developing advanced separation and refining technologies, particularly compared to China, the US, and Japan. India possesses significant REE reserves, estimated at 6.9 million metric tons, making it the fifth-largest globally. However, its production remains low, with less than one per cent of global REE output. India is the fifth-largest rare earth resource globally, with significant deposits in the monazite minerals. There are around 13.07 million tonne of REEs, mainly found in the monazite sand, which contains 55-60 per cent total Rare Earth Elements oxide. India's primary REE deposits are found in coastal beach sands, which often contain low mineral content. India's decision to cordon off its rare earth output set the tone for a nervous week in critical mineral markets. New Delhi ordered Indian Rare Earths Limited (unlisted) to halt neodymium exports to Japan, a dramatic break with a 13-year supply pact and a reminder that Chinese licensing controls have given every producer political leverage. Although India mined only 2,900 tonne of neodymium oxide last year, officials now pledge to reserve enough for a future magnet industry and to sweeten domestic processing with incentives. Beijing answered from the shadows. Satellite imagery and local reports show the United Wa State Army—long backed by China—ring-fencing freshly opened dysprosium and terbium-rich deposits in Myanmar's Shan State. Trucks already carry concentrate across the border, offsetting supply lost to fighting farther north and tightening China's grip on the heavy rare earths that temper heat in electric-vehicle (EV) motors and precision-guided munitions. While exploration efforts are underway, particularly in Rajasthan, commercially viable deposits of magnet-grade REEs haven't been verified yet. India lacks the technology and infrastructure for large-scale mining and processing of REEs, leading to reliance on imports, particularly magnets, mainly from China. The Indian government is actively working to develop a self-reliant REE supply chain through the National Critical Mineral Mission and exploration projects. Efforts are being made to develop advanced separation and refining technologies to process REEs domestically, reducing reliance on imports and increasing domestic production.
Arabian Post
21-06-2025
- Health
- Arabian Post
Northern Thai Rivers Face Escalating Arsenic Crisis
Tests by Thailand's Pollution Control Department have revealed that arsenic concentrations in the Kok River and tributaries now exceed national safety limits by up to five times. Biochemical analysis indicates that these toxic levels are linked to unregulated mining operations in Shan State, Myanmar, particularly within territories controlled by the United Wa State Army. The Kok River, which begins its 285km course in Myanmar's Daen Lao Range before entering Thailand through Mae Ai and flowing into Chiang Rai and eventually the Mekong, has become the focus of mounting alarm. Tests conducted between late May and early June demonstrated elevated arsenic at all 15 tested points along the Kok and Sai rivers, with further contamination detected in two Mekong sampling sites. Local fishermen have reported adverse impacts to aquatic life and livelihoods. Prices for catch in Chiang Rai have dropped by nearly half, as consumer fear surrounding contamination takes hold. Fisherman Sawat Kaewdam told AFP: 'They say, 'There's arsenic. I don't want to eat that fish.''. ADVERTISEMENT Satellite imagery and drone footage show dozens of active mining sites emerging since around 2022, believed to involve both gold and rare earth minerals. These mines operate under minimal environmental safeguards, with tailings and chemical-laden effluent discharged directly into rivers. One environmental campaigner described the situation as Thailand's 'largest-ever case of transboundary pollution'. Health experts warn that while immediate poisoning symptoms may not materialise, long‑term exposure through contaminated water and fish consumption could lead to chronic arsenic poisoning. Somporn Phengkham of the Community Health Impact Assessment Platform emphasised the risk of gradual accumulation, urging increased scrutiny of wells and irrigation systems. Communities along the Kok River have experienced unusual water discolouration, persistent skin irritations, and fish deformities. Chiang Rai environmentalists staged protests on 5 June, tying ribbons along the river bridge to demand intervention and mine closure. In Chiang Mai's Mae Ai district, a monk from Wat Thaton confirmed that the river's appearance and use had become culturally and practically untenable. Thailand's federal government has initiated emergency measures. Deputy Prime Minister Prasert Jantararuangtong has overseen a new response centre, while the Pollution Control Department is conducting enhanced sampling. Officials reassure domestic water supplies are safe, although the contamination source remains external. Proposals for containment include constructing a dam across the Kok River to trap sediments, dredging heavily polluted sections, and pursuing diplomatic negotiations with Myanmar and China. The Foreign Affairs Committee is engaging Beijing to urge oversight of Chinese mining companies operating within UWSA territories. Challenges persist as Shan State's mines lie beyond Myanmar's central control. With the UWSA exerting autonomy and Chinese-linked firms driving extraction operations, finding a direct negotiating partner proves elusive. Regional analysts warn that building physical barriers without curbing source pollution will yield temporary alleviation at best. Environmental advocates underscore the urgency of scaling up real-time monitoring and cross-border coordination. They highlight growing concerns that contamination could extend throughout the Mekong basin, threatening agriculture, fisheries, and water security across Southeast Asia. Experts like Tanapon Phenrat of Naresuan University stress that addressing the problem requires systemic reform: mandated tailings treatment, strict environmental standards, and international cooperation. 'We need to act now,' he stated.
