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Express Tribune
5 days ago
- Politics
- Express Tribune
Comprehending Iran
The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@ and tweets @20_Inam While covering the Iran-Israel-US war in June this year, I had concluded that: a) the combined US-Israeli attack had badly damaged the Irani nuclear infrastructure and ambition, without obliterating it, as President Trump had claimed; b) Iran will never abandon its nuclear ambition and will sooner than later acquire nuclear arms; c) the Shia arc stands eclipsed before a Sunni crescent given that Iran's 3H proxies (Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthis) stand militarily degraded, and its client state Syria is out of Tehran's orbit; d) in 'missile economics' Iran retains the capability to target Israel with precision using cruise and ballistic missiles and that threat remains; e) contrary to Western expectations, Iranians rallied around clerics whose grip on power remains firm 'for now'; f) the battle redefines the nature of warfare, especially the non-contact conflict, particularly for India and Pakistan. Population on both sides must now contend with intense psy ops; and g) 'counterintelligence' and espionage emerge as niche force-multipliers in warfare. An eminent US scholar of Irani descent, Prof Vali Nasr recently published his new book, Iran's Grand Strategy: A Political History. The venerable professor, who has visited Pakistan and has previously worked with Richard Holbrooke, is a keen observer of the region. His MIT/Harvard educated father, Seyyed Hossein Nasr is also a respected scholar of Islam and a former professor at George Washington University. Mr Hossein has undertaken critical work on Allama Iqbal. Back to the work of Prof Vali Nasr, who concedes Iran's role in almost every crisis in the Middle East, that has caused 'serial humiliations' to Tehran recently. First, Prof Nasr thinks Iran's contemporary strategic vision is driven more by Iran's 'national security rooted in regional rivalries', and lesser by its revolutionary intent. Although Islam remains the language of Iran's politics, whose 'aims are now secular in nature'. Second, the eight years' war against Iraq in 1980s deeply affected every facet of Irani sociology and body politics. Western analysts generally downplay the effects of this conflict, as it mainly ended in a stalemate, despite overwhelming Western support to Iraq; and the West Plus subsequently took an embarrassing U-turn against Baghdad under Saddam Hussein. The ensuing strategic culture has guided Iran's behaviour blending 'encirclement fears with outsized ambition'. The response to Iraqi invasion in September 1980 strengthened Iran's ayatollahs; engendered some sort of strategic autonomy; and ushered in self-sufficiency, religious zeal and patriotism. There are chronicled tales of Basij Militia's heroism in the literature pertaining to Irani resolve during the war. Consequently, the war made Tehran lean towards and depend upon proxy power, and owing up the anti-Israel cause. A popular slogan among Irani volunteers was — "The path to Jerusalem runs through Karbala". Third, the strategic shift and revolutionary zest caused events like the 1979 storming of American embassy in Tehran and the ensuing 'Iran Hostage Crisis' for 444 days; the 1987 demonstration by Irani pilgrims at Mecca wanting to 'uproot the Saudi rulers'; the 1988 downing of Flight 655 by the US; and the 1992 bombing of Israeli embassy in Argentine, to mention a few. Khomeini perceived the US determined for regime change in Tehran, and his characterisation of the US, the 'Great Satan', was that of a dog, that needed to be firmly confronted to make it back off. Fourth, when President Rafsanjani pursued the 'Grand Bargain with the Great Satan' in the 1990s, and President Khatami in 2003 wrote a conciliatory letter to Washington, Khamenei - the successor to the leader of revolution, Imam Khomeini - held the view that rapprochement with the US was not possible. Emphasising continued resistance to the US, Khamenei reiterated that 'pursuit of the ideals is more important than attainment of the ideals'; that setbacks would be temporary; and that victory may be long drawn. This proclivity still guides Iran under the gerontocracy of Khamenei and his inner circle. Fifth, the war with Iraq gave the Pasadaran — the IRGC — more political power, a taste for private enterprise, and changed Iran into a 'technical autarky' resulting into self-sufficiency. The belief in rebounding from setbacks inspired Tehran's strategic doctrine of 'forward defence' formally adopted in 2003. The doctrine nurtured raising, equipping and manipulating proxies to neutralise threats to Iran before they reached Tehran. The slain General Qasem Soleimani, who used the IRGC's Quds and Jerusalem Brigades to deadly effect, was a great exponent of 'forward defence'. Soleimani shared intelligence with the 'Great Satan' over Afghan Taliban after 9/11; persuaded President Putin and Hezbollah in 2015 to intervene militarily in Syria; and used Afghan Shias in Syria. Sixth, however, despite heavy indoctrination through 'sacred defence museums' all over the country eulogising sacrifice, the Iranian old guard finds its rule over younger generations through revolutionary fervour and religious zeal, tenuous. Limited civil liberties, comparative oppression, economic hardships and lack of opportunity are making the young and the restless to question 'forward defence'. There is palpable but slow unravelling of the clergy's stranglehold on the levers of power. Seventh, Iran's limitations of resources finally caught up with its strategic overreach in the changed Middle East, where Israel backed by the US is now a resurgent and dominant power. Iran's loss of Syria, key to the region, is far greater than its diminishing influence in Iraq, Lebanon or Yemen cumulatively. Iran may, however, find it difficult to stomach and abandon 'forward defence' anytime soon. The Arab states, guided by similar calculations, sided ostensibly with Israel during the recent conflict to deflate Irani dominance. Finally, on the succession issue, Prof Nasr considers Mojtaba, the 56-year-old second son of Khamenei, as the likely and preferred candidate. He is principal advisor to his father. However, this succession might bring the 'Islamic Republic closer to becoming a hereditary monarchy'. The change might perpetuate the 'forward defence' doctrine more aggressively under a relatively younger ideologue and that might have implications for Iran, its people and politics, the region and the world. And despite efforts by the EU, the nuclear deal with Iran over terms favourable to West Plus is likely to remain a pipedream. In all this, the silver lining for Pakistan remains Tehran's post-conflict realisation of the value of its friendship with Islamabad, at least for now.
Mint
06-07-2025
- Politics
- Mint
A defiant Iran draws on the lessons of an earlier war
Israel's 12-day campaign of airstrikes on Iran killed a number of top military leaders, wiped out its air defenses and pummeled symbols of its rulers' power. It wasn't the first time Tehran's theocratic leaders had been pushed to the brink. Across the country, schools and streets are named for soldiers and pilots killed in the brutal war fought four decades ago between Iran and Iraq. Then, as now, the conflict pitted the regime against a superior, U.S.-backed adversary. As now, Iran perceived itself as alone and cornered. Yet the regime refused to cave and outlasted Saddam Hussein's Iraq and withstood U.S. pressure. It ultimately grew into a far more potent regional power after the Iraqi leader ended up in America's sights. That experience shaped generations of Iranian leaders and laid the groundwork for strategies that culminated in the most recent war. It also offers guidance as strategists try to game Iran's next moves and its adversaries push to complete the job of winding up its nuclear program. 'That war really looms large in terms of the entire way in which they see themselves under siege, permanently under threat," said Vali Nasr, an Iran expert at Johns Hopkins University and author of 'Iran's Grand Strategy: A Political History." 'The mindset of the country now is that it dodged a bullet and that it still has to contend with a long term danger." While battered, Iran has remained defiant, most recently by ending cooperation with international nuclear inspectors, a move that closes the world's window on of its program. After the U.S. bombed Iran's core nuclear facilities, the regime vowed to keep its nuclear program going. Abdolrahim Mousavi, the new chief of staff of Iran's armed forces, said Iran 'won't back down." Israel had killed his predecessor days earlier. The pronouncements reflect wartime bravado. Israel's campaign, in which it quickly established dominance in Iran's skies and simultaneously hit many nuclear scientists and military leaders, demonstrated its overwhelming military superiority and the extensive penetration of the regime by its spies. Iran launched a major crackdown once the shooting stopped to reassert its domestic control. But Iran's leaders also have a genuine confidence in their ability to hold out against foreign threats. 'They know that they can survive a total war that lasts a long time," said Afshon Ostovar, an Iran military expert and associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. 'They know they can tolerate a lot more than maybe the Israelis can tolerate." As the cease-fire was about to take effect, Iran launched a salvo of missiles that killed several Israelis. Israeli planes were on the way to retaliate when President Trump demanded that they turn around. '[Iran's leaders] know if the war ends with Iran in a position of weakness, then they're going to be bullied at the negotiating table," said Ali Vaez, Iran project director at the International Crisis Group. 'This is one key factor in their calculations, informed by their experience in the Iran-Iraq war." The Iran-Iraq war began a year after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, when Saddam sent his troops into Iran seeking to exploit its political disorder and seize territory, including oil-rich areas. Over the ensuing nearly eight-year conflict, Iranians and Iraqis fought one of the deadliest global conflicts of the 20th century, with hundreds of thousands killed on both sides. Saddam used chemical weapons against Iran, and his troops targeted Iran's oil infrastructure but never seized any major oil fields. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was the country's president for the duration of the war. In 1982, Iran's darkest moment came after it launched a failed operation to seize the southern Iraqi city of Basra. It resulted in tens of thousands of Iranian casualties and exposed the country's military weakness. The war prompted Iran to reimagine its defensive strategy in ways that steered it toward a fight with Israel. When Iraq invaded, Iran's rulers tried to compete in the air by freeing jailed U.S.-trained fighter pilots who had fought for the ousted Shah. But they soon ran out of spare parts for their U.S.-made F-14 jet fighters. America, now their enemy, refused to resupply them, and some jets were grounded, gifting Iraq a military advantage. After the war—which Iran claimed as a victory but ended largely inconclusively—Tehran vowed never again to rely on foreign powers to supply weapons for its defense systems. It began to build its own ballistic missiles and drones, ramped up its nuclear program and nurtured a regional network of allied militias to protect its borders and deter its enemies. 'The Islamic Revolution gave the ideology, but the national security establishment, the national security mindset, came out of the Iran-Iraq war," Nasr, of Johns Hopkins, said. The embrace of missiles and other asymmetric weaponry was designed to head off the sort of war of attrition Iran faced against Iraq, which quickly sapped Iran's military resources and manpower, analysts said. 'Iran became very sensitive to losses after the Iran-Iraq war," said Ostovar from the Naval Postgraduate School. 'Politically, it was a huge deal. So they built up this deterrence matrix." But that strategy also brought them into conflict with Israel. Iran's regional allies such as Hamas and Hezbollah frequently confronted Israel, and Israel viewed Iran's nuclear ambitions as an existential threat. Iran's perceived triumph in holding back Iraq also made its leadership complacent, said Ali Ansari, professor of Iranian history at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. While Iran built a missile arsenal, it failed to acquire sufficient air defenses to protect its citizens. As Israeli missiles rained on Tehran, there were no air sirens to warn residents or shelters for them to seek cover in. 'They've come away with an overinflated view of what the achievement in the Iran-Iraq war means for the future," Ansari said. 'They haven't really understood what the impact of a proper air war would be." Moreover, the regime's other key vehicle of deterrence, its allied regional militias, have been degraded by Israeli attacks and remained on the sidelines, leaving it more vulnerable. 'Iran is left with no deterrence and with a military that was not designed to really fight a conventional war," Ostovar said. 'The only thing that Iran really has left to fight with is its missiles and drones." In 1988, after sustained chemical attacks, a renewed Iraqi offensive and the U.S. accidentally shooting down an Iranian passenger plane, killing 290 civilians, Iran signed a cease-fire agreement, forgoing war reparations or even an Iraqi admission of guilt. A tombstone in Tehran for a man killed during the Iran-Iraq war.A funeral in Tehran earlier this month for those killed by Israeli strikes. Iran, despite its global isolation during the war, ended the conflict with Iraq without ceding any territory. Iran's leaders declared their successful resistance a victory. They have done the same today, declaring victory over Israel and the U.S. and vowing to continue enriching uranium and rebuild their nuclear program. 'This strategic loneliness of Iran affects them today," said Arash Azizi, an Iranian historian and author. 'It's not a far cry to see why some people would advocate for nuclear weapons and why Iran would need to have its own defense industry." Write to Sudarsan Raghavan at and Sune Engel Rasmussen at
The Wire
02-07-2025
- Politics
- The Wire
What is the Impact of 12-Day War on Iran – its Leadership and People?
Vali Nasr, a Majid Khaddouri professor of international affairs and Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and the author of Iran's Grand Strategy: A Political History, talks about Iran's isolation from the western world and if they could face another wave of the war with Israel. Karan Thapar in an interview with Vali Nasr. What is the impact of the 12-day war on the country's leadership? And, in particular, on Ayatollah Khamenei's control of the country? Will there be a reckoning? Could a struggle to succeed him start? And what about the Iranian people? How do they view their government? In an interview with Karan Thapar for The Wire, Vali Nasr, a Majid Khaddouri professor of international affairs and Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and the author of Iran's Grand Strategy: A Political History, answers these questions. Nasr talks about Iran's isolation from the western world and if they could face another wave of the war with Israel. On the question how concerned Iranians are, currently, given the ease and efficiency with which Israel eliminated nuclear scientists and penetrated the Iranian system, Nasr says, "Very concerned". "Actually, Iranians are shocked, embarrassed and offended by the intelligence puncture. They hold the government responsible," he says, adding that "by and large, the sense is: a national security vulnerability [has been] exploited by the enemy – which Israel is, the enemy, now." The Wire is now on WhatsApp. Follow our channel for sharp analysis and opinions on the latest developments.
Al Jazeera
29-06-2025
- Politics
- Al Jazeera
Was the Iran war to establish Israel's control over the Middle East?
Political scientist Vali Nasr warns that the US 'doesn't have a regime change option' in Iran. Direct US involvement in Israel's unprovoked attack on Iran was a dangerous decision, argues Vali Nasr, professor of international affairs and Middle East history at Johns Hopkins University. Hours before a ceasefire between the US, Israel and Iran was announced, Nasr told host Steve Clemons that 'the US doesn't have a regime change option in Iran' and should be wary of humiliating Tehran, which would lead to long-term consequences. Nasr argues that the 12-Day War was meant to establish Israel's dominance as the premier Middle East power, backed by Washington, with no room for challengers.
CNN
22-06-2025
- Politics
- CNN
On GPS: A new era in the Middle East?
In the second part of this conversation, Fareed asks Johns Hopkins' Vali Nasr and Columbia University's Nadav Eyal about how the US' direct involvement in the conflict could transform the geopolitics of the Middle East.
