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Associated Press
25-04-2025
- Business
- Associated Press
The Myth of Nuclear Verdicts: Why Senate Bill 30 Is an Unnecessary Response to Judicial Self-Regulation in Texas
Benson Varghese shares insights into why SB30 benefits corporate interests rather than ordinary citizens FORT WORTH, TX, April 24, 2025 (EZ Newswire) -- Benson Varghese, founder and managing partner of Varghese Summersett, a Texas law firm that represents clients in significant wrongful death and injury cases, examines the proposed Senate Bill 30 (SB30) in Texas, which purports to address the issue of 'nuclear verdicts' in civil litigation. Through analysis of Texas Supreme Court precedents and empirical evidence from previous tort reform efforts, this paper argues that the existing judicial framework already provides sufficient safeguards against excessive verdicts, making legislative intervention unnecessary and potentially harmful to injured plaintiffs. The article concludes that SB30 primarily benefits corporate interests rather than ordinary citizens and recommends against its passage. Introduction In the current Texas legislative session, Senate Bill 30 (SB30) and its companion House Bill 4806 (HB4806) have been presented as necessary reforms to rein in 'nuclear verdicts' and reduce costs for Texas businesses and consumers. A nuclear verdict is generally defined as an award that exceeds $10 million, particularly when it includes substantial non-economic or punitive damages ( Behrens & Silverman, 2017 ). Proponents argue these bills are essential to protect Texas from excessive litigation costs, employing rhetoric similar to that used to justify medical malpractice reforms passed in 2003 ( Silver et al., 2008 ). However, such legislation is unnecessary given the Texas judiciary's demonstrated willingness and ability to address excessive verdicts through established legal principles and appellate review. Moreover, based on evidence from previous tort reform efforts, there is reason to doubt that SB30 could deliver its promised consumer benefits ( Black et al., 2005; Paik et al., 2012 ). The Texas Supreme Court's Effective Framework for Reviewing Verdicts While large verdicts may capture headlines, the empirical reality is that such verdicts rarely survive appellate review intact when they are deemed excessive or inadequately supported by evidence ( Hyman et al., 2007 ). The Texas Supreme Court has systematically developed a robust framework for reviewing damage awards that effectively addresses concerns about excessive verdicts without requiring legislative intervention. Well before the landmark Gregory v. Chohan decision, the Texas Supreme Court established clear precedents requiring that damages—both economic and noneconomic—must be grounded in evidence rather than speculation or arbitrary figures. In Saenz v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. 1996), the Court held that plaintiffs must present evidence not only of the existence of compensable mental anguish but also evidence to justify the amount awarded. This principle has been consistently reinforced in subsequent cases such as Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. 2002) and Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. 2018). The Texas Supreme Court further strengthened these principles in its landmark decision in Gregory v. Chohan, 670 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. 2023). The Court explicitly rejected the notion that damages awards should be upheld merely because they do not 'shock the conscience,' instead requiring a rational connection between the evidence presented and the amount awarded. The Court specifically condemned the use of 'unsubstantiated anchors,' such as comparing the value of human life to the price of fighter jets or famous paintings, and prohibited arguments encouraging juries to 'pick a number' without a logical basis tied to the facts of the case. As Justice Devine noted in his concurring opinion in Chohan, 'the jury system holds its own cure' for excessive verdicts through the existing appellate review process. This judicial framework provides a nuanced, case-by-case approach to evaluating damages that rigid statutory caps or formulas cannot match. The Unfulfilled Promises of Previous Tort Reform Proponents of SB30 claim it will reduce costs for Texas consumers, echoing arguments made for medical malpractice reforms enacted in 2003. However, empirical research demonstrates that those earlier reforms failed to deliver their promised benefits. A comprehensive study by Silver et al. (2008) found that despite significant reductions in medical malpractice claims and payouts after the 2003 reforms, healthcare costs in Texas continued to rise at rates equal to or higher than the national average. The researchers concluded there was 'no evidence that Texas spending levels or growth in spending declined relative to other states' following tort reform ( Silver et al., 2008, p. 1867). Similarly, Paik et al. (2012) found that Texas's healthcare spending actually increased faster than the national average in the years following tort reform. Their research showed Medicare spending in Texas rose 1-2% faster than in comparable states without similar reforms, directly contradicting claims that limiting litigation would lower healthcare costs. Black et al. (2005) found that while medical malpractice insurers benefited substantially from the 2003 reforms through reduced claims and payouts, these savings were not passed on to consumers through lower healthcare costs or insurance premiums. This history of unfulfilled promises provides substantial reason to be skeptical of similar claims being made about SB30. How SB30 Would Restrict Access to Justice SB30 would create several significant barriers to justice for injured Texans that go well beyond addressing truly excessive verdicts. Restricting Evidence of Medical Expenses The bill would severely limit what evidence can be presented regarding medical expenses. Currently, injured plaintiffs can present evidence of the full amount billed for their medical care. Under SB30, they would be limited to presenting evidence of the amount actually paid (often reduced rates negotiated by insurance companies) or amounts capped at 300% of Medicare rates—which are typically far below market rates for many services ( Hyman & Silver, 2006 ). This change fails to account for the reality that many Texans receive care under 'letters of protection,' where medical providers agree to treat patients and wait for payment until their case resolves—arrangements particularly important for Texas's large uninsured population ( Hyman et al., 2015 ). Intrusive Disclosure Requirements SB30 would require plaintiffs to disclose detailed information about medical treatment and referrals, including whether their attorney referred them to a healthcare provider. These provisions raise significant privacy concerns and could create barriers to obtaining necessary medical care after an injury ( Baker, 2005 ). Narrowing Definitions of Compensable Harm The bill introduces restrictive definitions of 'mental or emotional pain or anguish' and 'physical pain and suffering,' setting high thresholds that would make it more difficult for injured plaintiffs to receive compensation for genuine harms. For example, the definition requires that mental anguish be 'debilitating' and cause 'substantial disruption in a person's daily routine"—a standard significantly more stringent than current Texas law ( Finley, 2004 ). The Myth of the Nuclear Verdict Crisis While proponents of SB30 point to high-profile, large verdicts as evidence of a crisis requiring legislative intervention, empirical research demonstrates that such verdicts are statistical outliers that rarely survive appellate review ( Vidmar & Wolfe, 2009 ). According to data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the median awards in personal injury trials have remained relatively stable over time when adjusted for inflation, and only a tiny fraction of cases result in what might be termed 'nuclear verdicts' ( Cohen & Smith, 2004 ). Moreover, as demonstrated in the previous section, the Texas Supreme Court has already established effective mechanisms for reviewing and, when appropriate, reducing excessive verdicts. The focus on these exceptional cases diverts attention from the thousands of legitimate claims that would be harmed by the proposed changes. For every headline-grabbing verdict, numerous injured Texans struggle to obtain even modest compensation for genuine harms caused by corporate negligence (Baker, 2005). Who Benefits from SB30? The evidence from previous tort reform efforts suggests that SB30 would primarily benefit corporate defendants and their insurers, not ordinary Texas consumers (Black et al., 2005). By making it more difficult for injured plaintiffs to recover fair compensation, SB30 would effectively shift costs from negligent corporations to injured individuals and, ultimately, to taxpayers through increased reliance on public assistance programs (Finley, 2004). The 2003 medical malpractice reforms provide a cautionary tale. While those reforms succeeded in dramatically reducing medical malpractice claims and payouts to injured patients, the promised benefits to consumers in the form of lower healthcare costs and insurance premiums never materialized (Silver et al., 2008). Instead, the primary beneficiaries were insurance companies, which saw substantial increases in profitability without passing those savings on to consumers (Black et al., 2005). Conclusion The Texas civil justice system already possesses robust mechanisms for addressing excessive verdicts through the appellate review process. The Texas Supreme Court has consistently demonstrated its willingness and ability to reduce or reverse verdicts that are not supported by evidence or that are deemed excessive. SB30 represents an unnecessary and potentially harmful legislative intervention that would primarily benefit corporate defendants and their insurers at the expense of injured Texans seeking fair compensation. Rather than protecting consumers, the bill would shield negligent actors from accountability and shift costs to individuals and taxpayers. Based on the evidence from previous tort reform efforts and the Texas Supreme Court's established framework for reviewing damages awards, this article concludes that SB30 is an unnecessary solution to a largely fictional problem. As Justice Devine aptly noted in Chohan, 'the jury system holds its own cure' for truly excessive verdicts. Rather than enacting SB30, Texas lawmakers should trust in the judiciary's demonstrated ability to address excessive verdicts through existing legal principles and appellate review. Benson Varghese is the founder and managing partner of Varghese Summersett, a Texas law firm that represents clients in significant wrongful death and injury cases. He is also the creator of Lawft, a law practice management platform built for growth, and the author of Tapped In, a soon-to-be-released book on law firm growth. He can be reached at[email protected]. References About Varghese Summersett Varghese Summersett is a premier personal injury, criminal defense, and family law practice dedicated to helping people through life's greatest challenges. The firm's roster is comprised of experienced, award-winning attorneys committed to providing exceptional legal services. Varghese Summersett has been named a fastest-growing law firm by Inc. 5000. It has also been named a 'Best Law Firm,' a 'DFW Favorite,' a 'Best Place to Work' and a 'Best Places for Working Parents,' among numerous other accolades. The firm has locations in Fort Worth, Dallas, Southlake, and Houston, allowing clients throughout Texas to access top-tier legal representation. For more information, visit Media Contact Melody Lanier [email protected] ### SOURCE: Varghese Summersett Copyright 2025 EZ Newswire
Reuters
24-04-2025
- Business
- Reuters
The Myth of Nuclear Verdicts: Why Senate Bill 30 Is an Unnecessary Response to Judicial Self-Regulation in Texas
FORT WORTH, TX, April 24, 2025 (EZ Newswire) -- Benson Varghese, founder and managing partner of Varghese Summersett, a Texas law firm that represents clients in significant wrongful death and injury cases, examines the proposed Senate Bill 30 (SB30) in Texas, which purports to address the issue of "nuclear verdicts" in civil litigation. Through analysis of Texas Supreme Court precedents and empirical evidence from previous tort reform efforts, this paper argues that the existing judicial framework already provides sufficient safeguards against excessive verdicts, making legislative intervention unnecessary and potentially harmful to injured plaintiffs. The article concludes that SB30 primarily benefits corporate interests rather than ordinary citizens and recommends against its passage. Introduction In the current Texas legislative session, Senate Bill 30 (SB30) and its companion House Bill 4806 (HB4806) have been presented as necessary reforms to rein in "nuclear verdicts" and reduce costs for Texas businesses and consumers. A nuclear verdict is generally defined as an award that exceeds $10 million, particularly when it includes substantial non-economic or punitive damages (Behrens & Silverman, 2017). Proponents argue these bills are essential to protect Texas from excessive litigation costs, employing rhetoric similar to that used to justify medical malpractice reforms passed in 2003 (Silver et al., 2008). However, such legislation is unnecessary given the Texas judiciary's demonstrated willingness and ability to address excessive verdicts through established legal principles and appellate review. Moreover, based on evidence from previous tort reform efforts, there is reason to doubt that SB30 could deliver its promised consumer benefits (Black et al., 2005; Paik et al., 2012). The Texas Supreme Court's Effective Framework for Reviewing Verdicts While large verdicts may capture headlines, the empirical reality is that such verdicts rarely survive appellate review intact when they are deemed excessive or inadequately supported by evidence (Hyman et al., 2007). The Texas Supreme Court has systematically developed a robust framework for reviewing damage awards that effectively addresses concerns about excessive verdicts without requiring legislative intervention. Well before the landmark Gregory v. Chohan decision, the Texas Supreme Court established clear precedents requiring that damages—both economic and noneconomic—must be grounded in evidence rather than speculation or arbitrary figures. In Saenz v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. 1996), the Court held that plaintiffs must present evidence not only of the existence of compensable mental anguish but also evidence to justify the amount awarded. This principle has been consistently reinforced in subsequent cases such as Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. 2002) and Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. 2018). The Texas Supreme Court further strengthened these principles in its landmark decision in Gregory v. Chohan, 670 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. 2023). The Court explicitly rejected the notion that damages awards should be upheld merely because they do not "shock the conscience," instead requiring a rational connection between the evidence presented and the amount awarded. The Court specifically condemned the use of "unsubstantiated anchors," such as comparing the value of human life to the price of fighter jets or famous paintings, and prohibited arguments encouraging juries to "pick a number" without a logical basis tied to the facts of the case. As Justice Devine noted in his concurring opinion in Chohan, "the jury system holds its own cure" for excessive verdicts through the existing appellate review process. This judicial framework provides a nuanced, case-by-case approach to evaluating damages that rigid statutory caps or formulas cannot match. The Unfulfilled Promises of Previous Tort Reform Proponents of SB30 claim it will reduce costs for Texas consumers, echoing arguments made for medical malpractice reforms enacted in 2003. However, empirical research demonstrates that those earlier reforms failed to deliver their promised benefits. A comprehensive study by Silver et al. (2008) found that despite significant reductions in medical malpractice claims and payouts after the 2003 reforms, healthcare costs in Texas continued to rise at rates equal to or higher than the national average. The researchers concluded there was "no evidence that Texas spending levels or growth in spending declined relative to other states" following tort reform (Silver et al., 2008, p. 1867). Similarly, Paik et al. (2012) found that Texas's healthcare spending actually increased faster than the national average in the years following tort reform. Their research showed Medicare spending in Texas rose 1-2% faster than in comparable states without similar reforms, directly contradicting claims that limiting litigation would lower healthcare costs. Black et al. (2005) found that while medical malpractice insurers benefited substantially from the 2003 reforms through reduced claims and payouts, these savings were not passed on to consumers through lower healthcare costs or insurance premiums. This history of unfulfilled promises provides substantial reason to be skeptical of similar claims being made about SB30. How SB30 Would Restrict Access to Justice SB30 would create several significant barriers to justice for injured Texans that go well beyond addressing truly excessive verdicts. Restricting Evidence of Medical Expenses The bill would severely limit what evidence can be presented regarding medical expenses. Currently, injured plaintiffs can present evidence of the full amount billed for their medical care. Under SB30, they would be limited to presenting evidence of the amount actually paid (often reduced rates negotiated by insurance companies) or amounts capped at 300% of Medicare rates—which are typically far below market rates for many services (Hyman & Silver, 2006). This change fails to account for the reality that many Texans receive care under "letters of protection," where medical providers agree to treat patients and wait for payment until their case resolves—arrangements particularly important for Texas's large uninsured population (Hyman et al., 2015). Intrusive Disclosure Requirements SB30 would require plaintiffs to disclose detailed information about medical treatment and referrals, including whether their attorney referred them to a healthcare provider. These provisions raise significant privacy concerns and could create barriers to obtaining necessary medical care after an injury (Baker, 2005). Narrowing Definitions of Compensable Harm The bill introduces restrictive definitions of "mental or emotional pain or anguish" and "physical pain and suffering," setting high thresholds that would make it more difficult for injured plaintiffs to receive compensation for genuine harms. For example, the definition requires that mental anguish be "debilitating" and cause "substantial disruption in a person's daily routine"—a standard significantly more stringent than current Texas law (Finley, 2004). The Myth of the Nuclear Verdict Crisis While proponents of SB30 point to high-profile, large verdicts as evidence of a crisis requiring legislative intervention, empirical research demonstrates that such verdicts are statistical outliers that rarely survive appellate review (Vidmar & Wolfe, 2009). According to data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the median awards in personal injury trials have remained relatively stable over time when adjusted for inflation, and only a tiny fraction of cases result in what might be termed "nuclear verdicts" (Cohen & Smith, 2004). Moreover, as demonstrated in the previous section, the Texas Supreme Court has already established effective mechanisms for reviewing and, when appropriate, reducing excessive verdicts. The focus on these exceptional cases diverts attention from the thousands of legitimate claims that would be harmed by the proposed changes. For every headline-grabbing verdict, numerous injured Texans struggle to obtain even modest compensation for genuine harms caused by corporate negligence (Baker, 2005). Who Benefits from SB30? The evidence from previous tort reform efforts suggests that SB30 would primarily benefit corporate defendants and their insurers, not ordinary Texas consumers (Black et al., 2005). By making it more difficult for injured plaintiffs to recover fair compensation, SB30 would effectively shift costs from negligent corporations to injured individuals and, ultimately, to taxpayers through increased reliance on public assistance programs (Finley, 2004). The 2003 medical malpractice reforms provide a cautionary tale. While those reforms succeeded in dramatically reducing medical malpractice claims and payouts to injured patients, the promised benefits to consumers in the form of lower healthcare costs and insurance premiums never materialized (Silver et al., 2008). Instead, the primary beneficiaries were insurance companies, which saw substantial increases in profitability without passing those savings on to consumers (Black et al., 2005). Conclusion The Texas civil justice system already possesses robust mechanisms for addressing excessive verdicts through the appellate review process. The Texas Supreme Court has consistently demonstrated its willingness and ability to reduce or reverse verdicts that are not supported by evidence or that are deemed excessive. SB30 represents an unnecessary and potentially harmful legislative intervention that would primarily benefit corporate defendants and their insurers at the expense of injured Texans seeking fair compensation. Rather than protecting consumers, the bill would shield negligent actors from accountability and shift costs to individuals and taxpayers. Based on the evidence from previous tort reform efforts and the Texas Supreme Court's established framework for reviewing damages awards, this article concludes that SB30 is an unnecessary solution to a largely fictional problem. As Justice Devine aptly noted in Chohan, "the jury system holds its own cure" for truly excessive verdicts. Rather than enacting SB30, Texas lawmakers should trust in the judiciary's demonstrated ability to address excessive verdicts through existing legal principles and appellate review. Benson Varghese is the founder and managing partner of Varghese Summersett, a Texas law firm that represents clients in significant wrongful death and injury cases. He is also the creator of Lawft, a law practice management platform built for growth, and the author of Tapped In, a soon-to-be-released book on law firm growth. He can be reached at benson@ References Baker, T. (2005). The medical malpractice myth. University of Chicago Press. Behrens, M. A., & Silverman, C. (2017). Nuclear verdicts: Trends, causes, and solutions. IADC Defense Counsel Journal, 84(3), 291-305. Black, B., Silver, C., Hyman, D. A., & Sage, W. M. (2005). Stability, not crisis: Medical malpractice claim outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2(2), 207-259. Cohen, T. H., & Smith, S. K. (2004). Civil trial cases and verdicts in large counties, 2001. Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, NCJ 202803. Finley, L. M. (2004). The hidden victims of tort reform: Women, children, and the elderly. Emory Law Journal, 53, 1263-1314. Gregory v. Chohan, 615 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. 2020). Hyman, D. A., & Silver, C. (2006). Medical malpractice litigation and tort reform: It's the incentives, stupid. Vanderbilt Law Review, 59(4), 1085-1136. Hyman, D. A., Black, B., Silver, C., & Sage, W. M. (2007). Do defendants pay what juries award? Post-verdict haircuts in Texas medical malpractice cases, 1988-2003. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 4(1), 3-68. Hyman, D. A., Silver, C., Black, B., & Paik, M. (2015). Does tort reform affect physician supply? Evidence from Texas. International Review of Law and Economics, 42, 203-218. Paik, M., Black, B., Hyman, D. A., Sage, W. M., & Silver, C. (2012). Will tort reform bend the cost curve? Evidence from Texas. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 9(2), 173-216. Silver, C., Hyman, D. A., Black, B., & Paik, M. (2008). Does tort reform affect physician supply? Evidence from Texas. Health Affairs, 27(3), 1865-1873. Vidmar, N., & Wolfe, M. W. (2009). Punitive damages. Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 5, 179-199. About Varghese Summersett Varghese Summersett is a premier personal injury, criminal defense, and family law practice dedicated to helping people through life's greatest challenges. The firm's roster is comprised of experienced, award-winning attorneys committed to providing exceptional legal services. Varghese Summersett has been named a fastest-growing law firm by Inc. 5000. It has also been named a "Best Law Firm," a "DFW Favorite," a "Best Place to Work" and a "Best Places for Working Parents," among numerous other accolades. The firm has locations in Fort Worth, Dallas, Southlake, and Houston, allowing clients throughout Texas to access top-tier legal representation. For more information, visit Media Contact Melody Lanier melody@ ### SOURCE: Varghese Summersett See release on EZ Newswire
Yahoo
16-04-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
4 Things To Know Before Co-Signing a Loan for Your Student
On the surface, it can seem like a great way to support someone important to you. Co-signing a loan for your student may be your way of giving them a financial boost. Discover Next: For You: But before you agree to do that, there are some essential things to keep in mind. If not, you may find yourself in a financial situation you never expected — and may not easily be able to fix. GOBankingRates talked to some financial and legal experts to find out four things to know before you co-sign that loan. Benson Varghese, the founder and managing partner of Varghese Summersett, said he's worked with dozens of parents and grandparents who co-signed loans, especially student loans and had no idea about the legal implications. Read Next: 'As a board-certified criminal lawyer, I've seen how financial missteps spill over into other areas, including lawsuits, garnishments and even credit-based denials that affect housing and employment,' Varghese said. 'Over the last five years, I've helped more than 150 families unwind loan situations gone sideways and what stands out most is how many never got proper legal advice before signing.' Andrew Lokenauth, money expert and owner of BeFluentInFinance, said one key thing to remember is that you're 100% on the hook for that debt. 'A lot of people don't realize this, but I've seen countless cases where parents thought they were just helping out and ended up responsible for massive payments,' he said. Lokenauth learned some of this the hard way. When his nephew lost a job in September, the lender called Lokenauth first. Speaking of lessons learned, Lokenauth pointed out how co-signing a loan for a student can hurt your own finances. 'The impact on your credit score is huge,' Lokenauth added. 'My credit took a 30-point hit just from the initial cosigning and that loan shows up on my credit report just like it's my own debt — because technically, it is. This affects everything from my debt-to-income ratio to my ability to qualify for other loans.' It may be tougher than you think to get out of that loan agreement. Many loans don't offer co-signer release. 'You may be tied to that loan until it's paid in full,' said Christopher Stroup, founder and president at Silicon Beach Financial. 'This is why it's always important to read the fine print.' Most importantly, Lokenauth said to go in to the co-signing situation with your eyes wide open. 'Make sure you can afford to take over the payments if needed, because there's a decent chance you might have to,' he said. 'My rule of thumb: Don't co-sign unless you can afford to gift that amount of money.' More From GOBankingRates 5 Luxury Cars That Will Have Massive Price Drops in Spring 2025 4 Things You Should Do if You Want To Retire Early 4 Affordable Car Brands You Won't Regret Buying in 2025 5 Types of Vehicles Retirees Should Stay Away From Buying This article originally appeared on 4 Things To Know Before Co-Signing a Loan for Your Student Sign in to access your portfolio
