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Daily Tribune
3 days ago
- Politics
- Daily Tribune
Shura committee reviews 17 draft laws
Seventeen draft laws, including changes to Bahrain's Penal Code and a set of international agreements, have been reviewed by the Shura Council's Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security Committee. Chaired by Dr Ali bin Mohammed Al Rumaihi, the committee held 14 meetings during the third session of the sixth legislative term, covering legislation on criminal law, residency rules, traffic offences, and a range of foreign treaties. Three proposed amendments to the Penal Code were examined, including one to add a final paragraph to Article 107. The proposal came from five members: Nancy Dina Ely Khudori, Khalid Hussain Al Maskati, Redha Abdulla Faraj, Dr Abdulaziz Hassan Abul, and Dr Bassam Ismail Al Binmohammed. Other drafts sought to amend the 2017 law on alternative punishments, revise Article 56 of the 2014 Traffic Law, and add a new clause—Article 7 repeated—to the 1965 immigration and residency law. Each of these stemmed from proposals passed by the elected chamber. International agreements International agreements featured heavily on the agenda. The committee reviewed treaties with the UAE, Oman, South Korea, Kuwait, Hungary, and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. These covered tax arrangements, investment rules, and maritime cooperation. Bahrain will also join the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the 1949 Convention on Road Traffic. One item concerned the amended World Trade Organization protocol on fisheries support, which has now been added to the Marrakesh Agreement's annex. The committee gave it the green light. Still under review is a draft law to ratify the Makkah Agreement on anti-corruption cooperation among member states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. It was referred to the committee after His Majesty the King ordered the close of the session.
Mint
21-05-2025
- Politics
- Mint
India has held off the Indus Waters Treaty with due legitimacy
Following the terror attack of 22 April on civilians in Pahalgam that India traced to Pakistan, the Indian government announced that the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 would be held in 'abeyance" with immediate effect. While 'abeyance' lacks a formal status in international law, the closest corresponding legal concept is 'suspension' under Article 62 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). It recognizes a change in circumstances as a valid but narrowly constructed ground for suspending or terminating treaty obligations if: (a) the change is unforeseeable and fundamental and (b) radically transforms a party's obligations. Given these conditions, can India's actions be justified within the international law framework? Also Read: Mint Quick Edit | India can gain Indus leverage over Pakistan Fundamental change: A major point of contention is whether Pakistan's support of cross-border terrorism amounts to a fundamental change in circumstances. In the case of A. Racke GmbH & Co. vs Hauptzollamt Mainz, the European Court of Justice recognized the outbreak of hostilities as constituting a fundamental change of circumstances. The IWT's preamble acknowledges that the satisfactory utilization of the Indus river system requires continued cooperation in a spirit of goodwill and friendship. Similarly, Article VII emphasizes future cooperation and 'common interests in the optimum development of the Rivers." These provisions indicate good faith as an essential condition for the IWT's performance. Pakistan's persistent acts of support for cross-border terrorism have undermined the very foundation of cooperative engagement essential to fulfil the objective of the IWT. These acts have also critically altered the political landscape, impacting human rights, peace and security in the region and making the treaty impossible to sustain on moral grounds. The opinion of the UN Secretary-General's Study on the Legal Validity of the Undertaking Concerning Minorities, which acknowledges the relevance of moral impossibility in the context of treaties, offers a supporting precedent. Also Read: The IMF's Pakistan loan spotlights the case for voting power reform Climate change: At the time of IWT negotiations, climate change had neither joined the mainstream political debate nor the legal landscape. The IWT focused on the apportioning of water flows and management of rivers, rather than on water sharing per se. It covered dam construction for hydro-power generation, etc, but recent studies have shown how climate change severely affects hydrological circles. According to the US space agency Nasa, the Indus Basin is the world's second-most water-stressed aquifer. The IWT's failure to accommodate climate change has implications. India's climate targets include the goal of carbon neutrality by 2070; it also envisages achieving 50% of electricity generation from non-fossil fuels by 2030. The IWT restricts ambitious dam projects by India along the Indus river system, thereby impacting its ability to meet its goals. The effects of climate change could constitute a fundamental and unforeseen change of circumstances under the IWT as well. Also Read: Hydropower: Let pump dams fill gaps in India's clean energy supply Legal efforts by the government: Although this is the first time India has announced the abeyance of the IWT, New Delhi has made consistent attempts to modify it. Citing climate change, a parliamentary standing committee in 2021 recommended re-negotiation of the IWT. After this, India sent two notifications to Islamabad to modify the IWT in line with Article XII (3). New Delhi highlighted an altered demographic profile, agricultural use, depleting groundwater and the burning need for clean energy as fundamental and unforeseen circumstances that necessitated a reassessment of the Treaty. More importantly, India also referred to continued cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir as impacting the operation of the IWT. Pakistan insisted that any discussion on it should be undertaken through the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC). In contrast, India feels that the PIC, a byproduct of the Treaty, does not have a mandate to play such a role. Article X11 (3) allows modification of the IWT only by means of a new agreement concluded between the two governments. Also Read: Nitin Pai: Operation Sindoor leaves India better placed for the next round An assessment of other treaty practices, like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, indicates that treaty bodies are entrusted with implementation, whereas treaty modification is a political decision. The last meeting of the PIC took place in May 2022, which suggests a breakdown of the IWT's institutional machinery. Hence, the post-Pahalgam-attack decision of the Indian government to hold the IWT in 'abeyance' should be viewed from the larger perspective of New Delhi's prolonged and exhaustive efforts, which can reasonably be said to have exhausted all legal remedies under the 1960 Treaty. Climate change has fundamentally altered water availability in the Indus Basin. Given Pakistan's refusal to re-negotiate the IWT in the face of climate change and its support of terrorism that has nullified the spirit of cooperation, making the Treaty's performance impossible, there is sufficient legal basis for India's invocation of changed circumstances. However, India needs to tread cautiously, considering the ecological impact of climate change and the region's interdependence. Moreover, decisions like these risk being followed by other state parties elsewhere that might be looking for a pretext to unilaterally terminate treaties and other international agreements. In addition, there is always the risk of retaliatory actions that could create complications. The author is senior associate professor at the faculty of legal studies, South Asian University.
Hans India
15-05-2025
- Politics
- Hans India
Suspension of IWT a strategic weapon against Pakistan: Defence expert
New Delhi: Brigadier Vijay Sagar Dheman (Retd), a prominent Defence expert, on Thursday stated that India holds the legitimate right to use the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) as a strategic weapon against Pakistan, asserting that no one can prevent New Delhi from doing so. Following the brutal terror attack in Pahalgam on April 22, India took a series of calculated actions against Pakistan, including the suspension of the IWT. In addition, India launched 'Operation Sindoor' targeting high-value terror hideouts in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir. On May 10, a ceasefire understanding was reached between India and Pakistan, after which Islamabad demanded the lifting of the IWT suspension. Speaking to IANS, Brigadier Dheman said, "In the CCS meeting held on April 20, one of the decisions taken was to suspend the Indus Water Treaty, and after that we would start planning how to take revenge for the Pahalgam massacre." "Due to IWT suspension, we stopped sharing of water data which was done daily earlier, plus we started filling our Baglihar Dam and Salal Dam. What happened was that the water level of Pakistan, the Indus River, went down even further and there was a possibility of some damage to their crops and along with that, the water level of their dams, Tarbela Dam or Diamer-Bhasha Dam, went down impacting electricity generation." "Then we said that we are opening all our gates for desilting. So, we did desilting of our dams in this way, and we created a flood situation for Pakistan. Due to that, when there was a flood in Pakistan's Punjab, they also suffered a lot of losses," he added. Responding to concerns that India cannot unilaterally exit an international treaty, Brigadier Dheman said, "People within India are saying that this is an international treaty, brokered by the World Bank, so how can you exit it unilaterally? We can do that under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. It is very clear in its Articles 60 and 62 that if any such incident occurs, then we can walk out unilaterally." "Who can stop us from leaving? Pakistan will suffer damage. So, I would like to say that we can use this treaty as a weapon. And we have just shown the trailer to Pakistan," the retired Army officer concluded.
The Hindu
05-05-2025
- Politics
- The Hindu
The messaging from putting the IWT in ‘abeyance'
On April 24, India announced that it would hold the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 in abeyance until Pakistan ceased its support for cross-border terrorism. The term 'abeyance,' as used by the Government of India, suggests a temporary suspension, leaving open the possibility of reinstatement should Pakistan take credible steps to curb terrorism, particularly in light of the Pahalgam terror attack, on April 22. The meaning of 'abeyance' The term 'abeyance' finds no legal recognition under the IWT or the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 (VCLT). India is not a party to the VCLT, while Pakistan has signed it, but has not ratified it. Further, unilateral suspension of treaty obligations, as implied by 'abeyance,' lacks legitimacy under customary international law and international water law that promotes 'water cooperation' as the peremptory norm fundamental to the international legal order. Critically, in the IWT's, Articles XII(3) and (4) stipulate that modifications or termination require a mutually ratified treaty — a prospect that seems remote given the current status quo between India-Pakistan. Thus, the IWT's specific provisions preclude unilateral suspension of substantive or procedural obligations. More broadly, in the VCLT, Articles 60, 61, and 62 permit suspension of a treaty only under exceptional circumstances, such as a material breach, impossibility of performance, or a fundamental change in circumstances, respectively — none of which India has formally invoked. Therefore, India's invocation of 'abeyance' may be seen as a political signal rather than a legally enforceable action, potentially putting procedural cooperation on hold. In practical terms, by using abeyance, India can temporarily refuse to carry out all joint mechanisms necessary for the treaty's operation. India can choose not to share details on water resource development projects on western rivers and hydrological data crucial for flood forecasting and planning for irrigation, hydropower and drinking water that could jeopardise Pakistan's water interests, internal water planning and water security, temporarily if not permanently. Moreover, India could flush silt from its reservoirs (which also requires reservoirs to be filled) without issuing any prior warning to Pakistan. On January 25, 2023, New Delhi issued a notice to Pakistan through the Indus Commissioners, citing a material breach of the IWT. India argued that Pakistan's unilateral decision to approach the Permanent Court of Arbitration violated the treaty's dispute resolution mechanisms outlined in Articles VIII and IX. This time, New Delhi has invoked the Treaty as a counter-terrorism deterrent, opting for the term 'abeyance' rather than 'suspension' or 'termination'. This choice raises pertinent questions. Article 60 of the VCLT allows for the termination or suspension of a treaty in response to a material breach. Does Pakistan's alleged support for cross-border terrorism not constitute such a breach? Likewise, Article 62 permits treaty suspension or withdrawal in the event of a fundamental change in circumstances. Could the persistent threat to national security from cross-border terrorism not fulfil this condition? Yet, these arguments hinge on untested legal interpretations, as neither the IWT nor customary international law explicitly links terrorism to treaty obligations, risking escalation in an already volatile bilateral relationship. Abeyance as a two-level game The decision to use 'abeyance' likely arises from strategic and tactical considerations. First, India's Cabinet Committee on Security may have opted for abeyance as a cautious step to address public sentiment quickly and offer solace to grieving families. The limited time to fully evaluate the legal and diplomatic implications may have influenced this decision. Second, abeyance may also reflect a calculated move to relieve itself from the continuous legal objection it had witnessed vis-à-vis the construction of run-of-the-river projects planned on western rivers. India could leverage this pause to consolidate its rights to optimally use its entitled water usage allocations in western and eastern rivers, particularly through infrastructure projects that enhance its control over the Indus waters. However, this strategy risks escalating tensions, as Pakistan, heavily dependent on the Indus waters, is already viewing such actions as an 'act of war' and a direct threat to its water security. The choice of terminology is even more critical given Pakistan's current instability. With the military losing the support of the youth since Imran Khan's imprisonment and its attempts to internationalise the Kashmir issue during the U.S. Vice-President's India visit, Pakistan's political and economic instability is even more visible. This uncertainty makes it challenging for New Delhi to navigate relations with a state in turmoil. Did India fully account for this while formulating the decision announced by the Foreign Secretary? In such a context, can the abeyance of the IWT genuinely exert meaningful pressure on Pakistan? More fundamentally, will leveraging the IWT as a tool to compel Pakistan to end its support for cross-border terrorism prove effective at all? It is widely acknowledged that Pakistan, as a failing state, is unlikely to comply with India's demands. By invoking 'abeyance', India may buy time to pursue domestic goals, particularly advancing water infrastructure projects on the western and eastern rivers. Many of these projects, including the Kishenganga, Baglihar, and Ratle hydel projects, have faced significant delays due to Pakistan's legal interventions. This move could provide India with the leverage needed to expedite such initiatives. While the Kishenganga and Baglihar were eventually resolved, projects such as Tulbul-Navigation and Ratle remain uncertain. These long-standing tensions, along with the 2021 Parliamentary Committee's emphasis on the need for infrastructure to fully utilise India's allocated waters, mark a critical inflexion point. However, questions persist about the feasibility of such projects, especially regarding environmental clearances. In the weeks and months ahead, we could witness a complex interplay of domestic and international strategies, or a 'two-level game', between India and Pakistan. Both nations must manage domestic expectations, engage diplomatically to safeguard their interests, and justify their actions as victories. For India, invoking the IWT in 'abeyance' serves dual purposes: domestically, it demonstrates a firm stance against terrorism, aligning with public sentiment and reinforcing national security priorities. Internationally, it signals India's frustration with Pakistan's alleged support for terrorism. But could there be more to this strategy? Ramifications for India While in India, the decision has resonated emotionally with the public and garnered widespread political support, it risks overshadowing the more profound implications of such a strategy. On the global stage, unilaterally violating the IWT could lead to India facing the Permanent Court of Arbitration or the International Court of Justice, damaging its credibility as a responsible international actor. However, domestically, the strategy raises critical questions about the balance between national security and ecological prudence. The rush to fast-track water infrastructure projects, ostensibly to strengthen India's water rights, risks bypassing essential public and environmental scrutiny. Such actions could have dire consequences in the biodiversity-rich and seismically sensitive Indus basin. Weaponising water resources as a strategic tool may provide short-term leverage but could inadvertently harm India, undermining the foundational principles of democratic governance and constitutional integrity. At the same time, public sentiment demands a stronger stance against Pakistan, with some public intellectuals advocating escalated military actions akin to the surgical strikes of 2016 and 2019. While such actions might serve as immediate displays of strength, they do not address the root cause of cross-border terrorism. The challenge lies in navigating a path that satisfies national sentiment while ensuring long-term stability and security. New Delhi must carefully craft its narrative and future on-the-ground steps around the IWT abeyance, ensuring that India aligns with broader geopolitical goals and has a sound legal basis within the IWT framework. Actions taken must reflect strategic foresight, aiming to pressure Pakistan into reevaluating its stance on cross-border terrorism while avoiding harm to India's own ecological and social fabric. The focus should remain on measures that strengthen India's position as a responsible global power, leveraging its democratic values and environmental stewardship. This would uphold India's international standing, ensuring that its actions do not inadvertently harm the region that it seeks to protect. Anamika Barua is Professor, Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati; Sumit Vij is Assistant Professor, Wageningen University and Research, The Netherlands; Medha Bisht is Associate Professor, South Asian University, India; M. Shawahiq Siddiqui is an environmental lawyer in India; Neeraj Singh Manhas is Adviser for South Asia, Parley Policy Initiative, Republic of Korea
Scroll.in
05-05-2025
- Politics
- Scroll.in
Indus Water Treaty: Pakistan has few legal options against India
After New Delhi announced that it would hold the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan in abeyance in response to the terror attack in Pahalgam on April 22 that left 26 people dead, Islamabad issued a strong counter. It said that it would consider 'any attempt to stop or divert the flow of water belonging to Pakistan…as an Act of War …' Pakistan also said it was exploring legal strategies to keep the waters from India flowing. However, it's clear that Pakistan's options are limited. Detailing the legal strategies available to Pakistan, the country's Minister of State for Law and Justice Aqeel Malik told Reuters that Islamabad could raise the issue at the World Bank, which mediated the treaty. It could also move the Permanent Court of Arbitration or the International Court of Justice in The Hague claiming that India has violated the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. At the diplomatic level, Pakistan could raise the issue with the United Nations Security Council too, he said. The World Bank, after negotiating the treaty on sharing the water of the Indus River System in 1960, also played a role in settling disagreements between India and Pakistan. For instance, in May 2005, after consultation with the two countries, the World Bank appointed Raymond Lafitte as a 'neutral expert' to settle differences between them over the Baglihar Dam on the Chenab river in India. In 2007, he cleared the project. The World Bank stepped in again in 2022 when a dispute arose about India's Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric power plants on the Chenab, both part of the Indus riparian system. India asked for a neutral expert to consider the matter while Pakistan requested the establishment of a Court of Arbitration. The World Bank appointed Michel Lino as a neutral expert and Sean Murphy as chairman of a Court of Arbitration. But India declined to participate in the hearings of the Court of Arbitration. It said that the World Bank's decision to constitute the court contravened the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty. India said that it could not 'be compelled to recognise or participate in illegal and parallel proceedings not envisaged by the Treaty '. So far, India has not formally told the World Bank about its decision to hold the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance. A World Bank spokesperson said that the institution was a 'signatory to the treaty for a limited set of defined tasks' and it does 'not opine on treaty-related sovereign decisions taken by its member countries '. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice depends on the consent of member-states and is not an obligation. In September 2019, India's External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar signed a declaration recognising the court's jurisdiction as 'compulsory' with 13 exceptions. Of these exceptions, point number two concerns disputes with 'any State which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth of Nations '. Pakistan is a member of the Commonwealth. Number 3 is about 'disputes in regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Republic of India'. For India, Jammu and Kashmir is an internal matter. Number 4 relates to disputes arising from hostilities, armed conflicts, self-defence, resistance to aggression, international obligations, or related actions involving India, including national security and defence measures. This would squarely cover the situation arising from the Pahalgam attack, as far India is concerned. Under number 13, India reserves the right to amend or terminate the declaration after notifying the United Nations secretary general of its decision. Another option Pakistani minister Malik mentioned is raising the matter in the United Nations Security Council. In this case, the most relevant section of the United Nations charter would be Article 35, which says that a member state 'may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly'. Article 34, says that the security council may investigate any dispute or situation that could cause friction or threaten international peace and security. In June 2020, Egypt took a dispute about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam to the security council under Article 35. The dam on the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia's Benishangul-Gumuz region has led to transboundary water disputes between Ethiopia and its lower riparian countries: Egypt and Sudan. In September 2021, the security council asked the three countries to take forward a negotiation process led by the African Union. At that time, India's deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, said New Delhi's position is that, 'as a general rule, transboundary water issues do not belong to the domain of the Security Council '. It is possible that the UN Security Council may take the water dispute between India and Pakistan more seriously because both sides are nuclear powers and the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty could trigger a fullscale war. Preventing such escalation is key for the security council. In 2022, the five permanent members of the security council had made a joint statement underscoring that they 'consider the avoidance of war between Nuclear Weapon States and the reduction of strategic risks as our foremost responsibilities '. Though lower riparian countries such as Pakistan, in this case, have a right over the shared river waters, cooperation largely depends on the water situation in the upper riparian region, the nature of bilateral relations and the power capabilities of the countries involved. It is not unknown for even unfriendly countries to cooperate on matters that are in their larger interests. The United Nations and the World Bank have played a role in sealing deals between riparian neighbours, but their role largely depends on the global political situation at the time. Though Pakistan could use diplomatic mechanisms to try to resolve India's unilateral suspension of the Indus Water Treaty, legally, Islamabad's hand is weak.
