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Hindustan Times
23-05-2025
- Business
- Hindustan Times
Vietnam's economy is booming, but its new leader is worried
IT IS A contrarian argument from an improbable contrarian. Vietnam's economy may be the envy of South-East Asia, having averaged 6% annual growth over the past 15 years, but it is in urgent need of radical reform. So, at any rate, asserts To Lam, who spent eight years running Vietnam's ruthless security services before becoming general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party last year. He is busy sacking civil servants and amending economic laws in pursuit of a 'revolution' to 'liberate all productive forces'. 'Time does not wait for us,' he warned his comrades soon after taking charge. Vietnam's economy has come a long way since the Vietnam war ended 50 years ago, leaving an already poor country in ruins. At first the victorious communist regime tried to 'liquidate' the private sector. Shortages, rationing and hunger followed. In the 1980s the Soviet Union's economic troubles meant less aid for Vietnam, exacerbating the malaise. Annual inflation reached 454% and half of Vietnamese were living in poverty. The death of one of Mr Lam's predecessors in 1986 paved the way for a new general secretary to legalise private enterprise and embrace market forces. Renewing the renewal Doi moi or 'renovation' has been an astonishing success. Over the past 40 years GDP per person has increased 18-fold and poverty has plummeted. Foreign investors, attracted by Vietnam's cheap labour, political stability (it is a single-party, authoritarian state), proximity to Asian suppliers and generous incentives for manufacturing, have built lots of factories assembling consumer goods for export. A trade deal with America, accession to the World Trade Organisation and, more recently, multinationals' desire to diversify away from China have provided further reasons to invest. Yet the forces that have propelled Vietnam's boom are slowing or reversing. The pool of cheap workers is dwindling and wages are rising. Instead of largely free trade with America, Donald Trump is threatening tariffs of 46%. It is getting harder to maintain good relations with both America and China, Vietnam's second-biggest trading partner. And there has been relatively little spillover from the foreign-owned factories to the rest of the economy. Vietnam risks becoming stuck as an assembly hub, adding little value to components manufactured elsewhere. Shifting onto a more promising developmental path will not be easy—and Mr Lam is staking his tenure on it. Foreign factories are the linchpins of Vietnam's recent prosperity. Annual foreign direct investment (FDI) reached $19bn in 2023. Foreign enterprises accounted for a fifth of GDP that year, up from 6% in 1995. The biggest is Samsung, whose complex in Pho Yen, a factory town near Hanoi, employs some 160,000 workers, who assemble the bulk of Samsung's smartphones. The FDI boom, in turn, has produced a surge in exports, which have risen eight-fold since 2007, to $385bn a year. Foreign firms account for just 10% of employment and 16% of investment, but 72% of exports. Samsung alone accounts for 14%. Yet Vietnamese workers are simply assembling parts made, by and large, in China or South Korea. Even as export volumes have ballooned, the average unit value has stagnated (see chart 1). Vietnam adds less value to its exports than do nearby Malaysia and Thailand. Because final assembly is labour-intensive, productivity is low. Vietnam's output per hour worked is 37% below the average for upper-middle-income countries in Asia. Over 90% of jobs in manufacturing require few or no skills. Local firms struggle to meet the standards necessary to take part in global supply chains. Multinationals in Vietnam source the lowest share of local inputs of any country in East and South-East Asia. Despite Samsung Electronics' huge presence in Vietnam, none of its core suppliers is a homegrown Vietnamese firm, noted a recent article in Guancha, a Chinese news outlet, that was widely read among the Vietnamese elite. The small number of Vietnamese firms that do supply global manufacturers mainly provide simpler materials, such as cardboard and plastics. Meanwhile, Vietnam has reached the 'Lewis turning point', at which developing economies exhaust their rural labour surpluses and wages begin to rise swiftly. Between 2014 and 2021, over 1m agricultural jobs disappeared each year despite a growing labour force; in 2022-23 the pace decelerated to 200,000. Labour costs in manufacturing are already higher than in India or Thailand and are set to climb by a further 48% by 2029, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, our sister company. Vietnam could soon end up too expensive for labour-intensive manufacturing yet too technologically unsophisticated to do much else—a classic middle-income trap. Other obstacles to growth loom. It is not just unproductive rural workers that Vietnam is running short of: the total workforce aged 15-64 will peak around 2030, according to Vu Thanh Tu Anh and Dwight Perkins, two economists. Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, which together generate over a quarter of Vietnamese output, are among the most flood-prone cities in the world. The rich farmland of the Mekong Delta, Vietnam's breadbasket, is shrinking by 500 hectares a year. Most threatening of all are Mr Trump's tariffs: Michael Kokalari of VinaCapital, an investment firm in Ho Chi Minh City, estimates that they would reduce long-run growth by 2.5 percentage points a year. Mr Lam evinces a keen understanding of these challenges. 'Do not let Vietnam become an assembly-processing base… while domestic enterprises learn nothing,' he urged in January. He wants to make local firms more innovative and productive. Earlier this month the Politburo approved a big tax break for spending on research and development. It also adopted special incentives for local firms working with foreign investors. The private sector, Mr Lam says, is 'the most important driving force of the national economy'. He wants to lift its share of output to 70%, from around 50% today. Life is not easy for Vietnam's private sector, doi moi notwithstanding. Regulations are complex, enforcement is opaque and the state dominates banking and so controls access to credit, too. All this tends to benefit big, politically connected businesses. Rigged bids for public procurement, sweetheart land deals and cut-price loans are rife. Successful businessmen, in turn, are expected to contribute to society. Moving capital outside Vietnam is frowned upon. In 2021 Nguyen Thi Phuong Thao, the billionaire founder of Vietjet, a private airline, promised Linacre College at Oxford University £155m ($215m at the time) to rename itself Thao College. The donation never materialised, presumably because the government blocked it. Pham Nhat Vuong, Vietnam's richest man, made his first fortune hawking instant noodles in Ukraine in the 1990s. He sold his restaurant business to Nestlé and invested the proceeds in Vietnam's luxury property market. His company, Vingroup, soon became the country's biggest developer. It then parlayed that business into a sprawling conglomerate, which does everything from designing smartphones to setting up schools. A subsidiary called VinFast is South-East Asia's biggest homegrown electric-vehicle maker. It sold nearly 100,000 EVs in 2024. Vietnam's politicians admire South Korea's chaebols and would like local conglomerates to evolve in a similar manner. But though the state showered chaebols with largesse, its support was time-bound and tied to success in export markets. In 1999 politicians allowed Daewoo Group, then the third-biggest chaebol, to collapse. None of Vietnam's conglomerates, in contrast, is globally competitive, in part because the state holds rivals at bay. Vietnam's EV charging network is compatible only with VinFast's cars. Yet VinFast has lost $9bn since 2021 producing EVs, many of which are sold to other businesses owned by Vingroup. The government is considering shoring up Vingroup by giving another subsidiary, VinSpeed, a $60bn contract to build a high-speed railway. As well as exposing conglomerates to more competition, Mr Lam will have to find ways to invigorate Vietnam's smaller firms. Lacking the political clout of state-owned enterprises, conglomerates and foreign investors, they have trouble getting access to land, credit and permits. Banks tend to insist on property or durable-goods inventory as collateral for loans, says Chad Ovel of Mekong Capital, a private-equity firm in Ho Chi Minh City. Few are willing to lend against projected future cashflows. Small businesses also face a shortage of talent. Partly this is because the state hoovers it up: over half of state employees have tertiary degrees, versus around 15% at foreign-invested firms and 5% at domestic firms. But the bigger reason is the education system. Attainment lags behind other countries in Asia (see chart 2). Unlike China, Singapore or South Korea, Vietnam has no world-class universities, and its best institutions rank below their counterparts in India or Malaysia. Most Vietnamese universities are state-run and the curriculum is watched closely by communist apparatchiks. Even engineering students must spend as much as a quarter of their time taking mandatory classes on Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh thought, complains a Vietnamese academic. Improving life for small businesses will also require a leaner, more capable state. This is where Mr Lam has been boldest. He has abolished five ministries and eliminated an entire layer of the bureaucracy, at the level of Vietnam's 705 districts. He is reducing the number of provinces from 63 to 34. All this is eliminating 100,000 jobs from the civil service. He has decreed that there should be a 30% reduction in red tape. At the same time Mr Lam wants to build administrative capacity. He has called for higher pay for capable civil servants. Some of his changes seek to reverse the legacy of 'blazing furnace', an anti-corruption campaign initiated by his predecessor. Over 330,000 party members were prosecuted or punished and tens of thousands resigned. The effect was to make bureaucrats drastically risk-averse. Mr Lam has instead sought to engender an atmosphere of tolerance of mistakes. Stepping back to get ahead Deeper political questions remain unanswered. For Vietnam to grow quickly, the state must become not just more efficient, but also less controlling. Take the digital economy, one of Mr Lam's highest priorities. Despite a shortage of software engineers, Vietnam has a surprisingly peppy startup scene. Yet the government censors the internet and keeps tech firms on a tight leash. The state-owned firm that dominates power generation struggles to supply reliable electricity. Construction began in April on Vietnam's first 'hyperscale' data centre. But it is not being built by a giant of the industry like Amazon or Alibaba. Instead Viettel, another state firm, is in charge. A new R&D centre for AI and semiconductors in Danang has been set up by FPT, a conglomerate that will soon be majority-owned by Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security, which Mr Lam used to lead. It is hard to imagine Vietnam becoming a digital powerhouse with the government so firmly in control of so much of the digital economy. For now, Mr Lam's position seems secure. He has elevated allies to important posts and is pushing through sweeping reforms with little discernible resistance. A party conference in January, at which he will seek to extend his tenure, may give dissenters a chance to weaken his position, however. Mr Lam has shown he understands the task ahead of him. He has yet to prove he is capable of completing it. Get 360° coverage—from daily headlines to 100 year archives.
Asia Times
07-05-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
Resolution 68: real reform or elite buffer in Vietnam?
The Vietnamese Communist Party's announcement of Resolution 68 has been hailed by many Vietnamese businesspeople as a major step toward protecting private property rights, ensuring fair competition and codifying legal precepts. Crucially, those legal changes include preference for civil remedies over criminal penalties, a ban on retroactive application of the law, and the presumption of innocence – all crucial to the functioning of a modern economy underpinned by the rule of law. But beneath that business optimism lies a vital question: Is this real liberation for all private enterprise or a head fake that ultimately serves the rich, powerful and Communist Party-connected? Announced earlier this month, Resolution 68 did not spring from a vacuum. In July 2023, the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council issued the 'Opinions on Promoting Development and Growth of the Private Economy.' That document was issued at a delicate moment as China's economic engines were losing steam. Business confidence had crumbled after heavy-handed crackdowns on big private tech companies like Alibaba. Recognizing that a suffocating regulatory burden and political uncertainty were choking off private-sector dynamism, the Chinese government shifted its message, emphasizing the significance of the private sector to the country's drive for modernization. China's 2023 document sought to rebuild trust and stability, and still sent the signal that the Communist Party sought to maintain a firm hold on the economy. By 2025, the economic tide had shifted in Vietnam as well. The 2024 death of leader Nguyen Phu Trong and the ascension of To Lam to Party chief marked a significant change in Vietnam's leadership hierarchy and outlook. Meanwhile, Vietnam's private sector had grown quickly but encountered longstanding obstacles, including access to resources, legal uncertainty and fragile business confidence, partly due to the crackdown on allegedly corrupt businesses and politicians. Resolution 68 borrows heavily from China's playbook, praising the private sector's importance while promising a more business-friendly environment. But Vietnam's version goes even further, promising a stronger legal shield than China's. Article 11 of China's 2023 document cautions against internal corruption and requires strict compliance regimens, criminalizing acts like embezzlement and bribery. It also highlights moves to beef up Party work in private companies, conveying the underlying assumption that businesses should police themselves in line with Party values. Vietnam's Resolution 68 also calls on private companies to promote business ethics, integrity and social responsibility. But Vietnam frames corruption as a two-way street, stressing that public officials must also stop extorting and exploiting private businesses. This dual messaging presents the state as both enforcer and partner, aiming to project itself not just as a regulator but also as an enabler of private-led growth. However, the key worrying difference between the two policies lies in how they handle legal risks. China's document promises to reduce unnecessary interference in business activities during legal investigations. It stresses 'protecting the property rights and interests of private enterprises and entrepreneurs in accordance with the law' and pledges to curb overreach like sweeping asset freezes or arbitrary enforcement. But it stops short of removing criminal prosecution from the table. Due process and proportionality are central, but when justified, criminal liability remains. Vietnam's Resolution 68 takes a bigger leap. Section 2.3 stipulates: Economic and civil violations should first be addressed through civil, economic, and administrative measures, And where the law permits both criminal and non-criminal handling, criminal measures should be strictly avoided, Even when prosecution is necessary, remediation should be prioritized and weighed heavily in legal decisions, Retroactive actions that harm businesses are prohibited, And the presumption of innocence is strongly emphasized. This is not a subtle repositioning. Vietnam's document not only endeavors to minimize legal disruption, but it in fact makes criminal penalties a last resort even in cases where legal outcomes are ambiguous. On paper, these principles align with international standards of predictability and proportionality. Prioritizing civil remedies and respecting the presumption of innocence are hallmarks of a fair legal system. But Vietnam's political-business terrain muddies the waters. Even if these reforms lead to a more level playing field for small and medium enterprises, in an environment still driven by elite capture and cronyism, these legal protections may still give priority and better protection to powerful state or state-linked conglomerates. For many businesses, the new legal shield may ultimately remain out of reach unless you are one of the major players with political connections. Additionally, overprotecting large companies creates systemic risks. Shielding such firms from full legal scrutiny fosters moral hazard – or worse. If these giants fail, the state may be forced into expensive bailouts, destabilizing the broader financial system in a 'too big to fail' scenario. Vietnam, one of the key 'China+1' destinations for global manufacturers, is already coming under investor scrutiny for its commitment to stability and predictability. Resolution 68's pro-business promises may ease concerns for domestic businesses, but foreign investors, particularly those who are aware of China's decades-long trajectory, will be closely monitoring how it's carried out. Any overt defense of elite interests could dent confidence in Vietnam's long-term legal credibility, even if short-term sentiment improves. By any measure, Resolution 68 is a bold move. It promises to slash red tape, protect property rights and update the legal regime in ways more appropriate for today's Vietnam. But Vietnam's strong tilt toward shielding private businesses from criminal penalties raises an unavoidable question: Is this the dawn of genuine legal reform or just a clever maneuver to protect the connected while appearing modern and pro-business to the outside world? Vietnam's entrepreneurs and foreign observers alike should temper optimism with caution, watching closely to see whether this latest wave of reform truly levels the playing field or merely fortifies existing powers and hierarchies. Leo Tran writes about international affairs, trade, and global strategy. His work has appeared in The Diplomat, Kyiv Post, and Modern Diplomacy. He also publishes at Vietnam Decoded.
Gulf Today
02-05-2025
- Politics
- Gulf Today
Vietnam celebrates 50th anniversary of victory over US
Vietnam celebrated the 50th anniversary of the victory of then communist North Vietnam over the United States, in which 3 million Vietnamese and 60,000 Americans had died. It was the defining war of the Cold War, which was an overt rivalry between democracies ostensibly led the United States and communism symbolised by the Ho Chi Minh-led North Vietnam. Of course, then Soviet Union, now Russia, and China had supported the communist government in North Vietnam. It was a war that the Americans did not win. It took another 15 years for communism to collapse in Russia and in Eastern Europe. But Vietnam remains defiantly communist. Like China, Vietnam does not follow the old communist-style ideology. Vietnam had embraced market economy, shook hands with old foe United States and it has prospered. Even as Vietnam staged a spectacular victory parade in Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon, in which Vietnamese, Chinese, Cambodian and Laotian soldiers participated, Vietnam Communist Party chief To Lam described the victory as a nationalist triumph of the Vietnamese nation. There is of course the irony in the fact that orthodox communists do not believe in nationalism, but both Vietnamese and Chinese leaders take immense pride in their respective nationalisms. Vietnamese Communist Party General-Secretary To Lam described the Vietnamese victory as 'a victory of faith', and cited Ho Chi Minh's motto, 'Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese people are one. Rivers may dry up, mountains may erode, but that truth will never change.' Saigon fell on April 30, 1975 to the Vietnamese communist forces. The city which served as the capital of then South Vietnam government supported by Americans, was renamed Ho Chi Minh city, the legendary Communist Party leader of Vietnam. And two parts of the country, North and South Vietnam, were united two years later. The united post-war Vietnam established diplomatic relations with the United States in 1995, and it had also become the strategic partner of the US in 2023. The trade and economic relations between the former ideological rivals had become close, and Vietnam is today one of the prosperous economies in the region and in the world. The Vietnamese have stuck to the single party rule of the Communist Party but they have opened up their economy, and they did not hesitate to forge economic ties with the United States. The reason for the resilience of the Vietnamese Communist Party is the gratitude of the people that it stood up to the might of the then superpower, the United States, and it did not allow the country to split. Vietnam could have ended up like Korea, divided into communist North Korea and generally democratic South Korea. But they remain separated. North Vietnam could have struck a deal with United States and settled for a divided Vietnam, where the communists remained in power in the north and the American-supported regime in the south. But the Vietnamese communists stuck to the principle and idea of a united Vietnam, and did not pause until they had achieved it. The victory of the Vietnamese over the Americans was seen as that of David against Goliath, the small nation against the big one. But the Vietnamese soon realised that there in no point in gloating over victory once victory was achieved. They changed tracks quickly enough and looked to the future prospects of the country. They realised that the future could be bright only with a strong and vibrant economy, and they unhesitatingly embraced the market economy and capitalism. They did not let ideological blinkers come in the way. Americans might argue that they might have lost the war, but they won the war of ideas. And the Vietnamese can justifiably claim that they preserved the unity of their country which was the most important challenge.
South China Morning Post
01-05-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Chinese PLA soldiers make first-ever appearance at Vietnam's fall of Saigon parade
Soldiers from China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) on Wednesday made their first ever appearance at Vietnam 's 50th anniversary celebration of the fall of Saigon, marching in its biggest ever annual parade to mark the event. Advertisement Vietnam's defence ministry invited a PLA honour guard to join the military parade in Ho Chi Minh City, a display that marked the end of the civil war 50 years ago, which saw the ruling party defeat the regime that controlled southern Vietnam. The celebration came as both sides confront steep trade pressures from US-imposed tariffs, with Vietnam and China facing some of the highest tariffs imposed. Chinese state media described the PLA's appearance as symbolic of a 'brotherhood' between Hanoi and Beijing. The event commemorated the seizure of Saigon on April 30, 1975, and is celebrated as National Reunification Day in Vietnam. It marked the end of the decades-long Vietnam war, in which the communist North, backed by China and the Soviet Union, defeated the US-backed South Vietnamese regime. While the anniversary is framed domestically as a celebration of unity, it is also a moment of ideological reaffirmation. The anti-imperialist tone of the event reflected enduring war memories and the continued influence of Cold War-era alliances in Vietnam's political messaging. Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary To Lam described the day as 'one of the most glorious milestones in our history', saying the 1975 victory brought 'an end to over a century of domination by old and new colonialism' and opened a new era of 'national independence and socialism'. A Chinese PLA honour guard marches in a parade to mark the 50th anniversary of the fall of Saigon. Photo: Xinhua Speaking at Wednesday's ceremony, Lam criticised US intervention and war of aggression in Vietnam, saying the 'American imperialists sought to replace the French colonisers, divide our country, and turn the South into a neo-colony and a frontline post against communism'.
Asia Times
01-05-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
Vietnam War: reckoning with the past, not just celebrating it
The parades are over. TikTok videos of marching bands and fighter jets have made their rounds, and Vietnam has officially marked 50 years since the end of the war. In Ho Chi Minh City, crowds lined the streets in celebration. Across the country — and even in parts of the diaspora — this anniversary was met with pride, gratitude and emotion. But what comes after the applause? For all the fireworks and orchestras, a deeper story continues — quieter, harder and unresolved. The Vietnam War is no longer just a war between nations. It remains a fault line at the center of Vietnamese identity, sharpened by exile, repression and the long shadow of what came after 1975. Officially, April 30 is the day of 'liberation' and 'reunification.' In exile and across the diaspora, it is remembered instead as the 'fall' — of Saigon, and of a homeland they were forced to leave. Fifty years on, those wounds have not disappeared. They have only shifted. The question is whether they can now be addressed. Even those rifts have begun to shift. Today, many overseas Vietnamese return freely to visit their families. In both Vietnam and the United States, Vietnamese artists perform to packed audiences. The protests that once greeted official delegations have faded. National belonging, it turns out, can stretch across ideological divides. But memory cannot be honest without recognizing hard truths. The Vietnamese Communist Party — not just the United States — bears deep, if different, responsibility for the tragedy that followed. Any genuinely honest pathway to healing calls for our reckoning with those twin burdens — not so much by pressing for an ideological surrender as by insisting on a memory capacious enough to hold the full cost of being human. As a child, I heard only pieces of this story — the triumphant marches, the narrow escapes. For years, the stories appeared to be two unrelated tales. Only long after, through the fissures of memory and history, did I realize that one was the fragment of the other, both fragments of a single shattered unity: a war that destroyed the country it was meant to save. This year, on the 50th anniversary of reunification, General Secretary To Lam's commemorative article hinted at a different tone. He did not solely frame 1975 as a military victory, but spoke of reconciliation — invoking 'courage,' 'tolerance' and 'shared pain.' It is rare that a Vietnamese leader publicly acknowledged that national unity need not mean uniformity, and that the suffering caused by the war and its aftermath touched all sides, including those who fled. The Geneva Accords of 1954 temporarily divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel and called for nationwide elections within two years. The aim was reunification through a peaceful vote, supervised by an international commission. Yet even before the ink was dry, Washington and its newly installed ally in Saigon doubted they could win at the ballot box. President Dwight Eisenhower himself later admitted that as many as 80% of Vietnamese would have voted for Ho Chi Minh. Legally and politically, that burden is on the United States. The Geneva Accords of 1954 set national elections in 1956 to reunite Vietnam under a single government. The United States, which supported the South Vietnamese government it had recently helped to install, was the obstruction to that process, not least because it feared that Ho Chi Minh would indeed win. By rejecting elections and constructing an anti-communist state in the South, Washington transformed a temporary split into a permanent and militarized war. The first chance for a peaceful reunification was missed not by Hanoi, but by Washington's policy. But morally, the leadership in Hanoi has to take responsibility for what came after. Their insistence on a full-scale military effort to 'liberate' the South, and their behavior after victory in 1975 — the re-education camps, the political purges, the forced migration policies, the refugee exodus — only deepened the wounds of a nation that had already been rent asunder. The tragedy of Vietnam was not only a fight against foreign intervention; it was also a national division that tore at the fabric of society, one that the policies of postwar Vietnam made worse, not better. Authentic remembrance must engage with these emerging narratives — not to uncritically embrace them, but to test their sincerity. The heaviest responsibility for starting the war still lies with the United States; the deepest wounds after 1975 were inflicted by Vietnam's own postwar governance. If To Lam's speech signals a shift toward a broader memory, it is a start. True reconciliation does not require renouncing the Party's legitimacy, but it does demand the harder work of acknowledging past harms — especially to those once cast out — and weaving their experience into the nation's shared story. To conflate the two histories — to pretend that the communists' conduct before 1975 somehow excuses the repression that came after, or to minimize the United States' catastrophic role in the war's trajectory — is to be mired by delusion. And healing does not spring from forgetting, or from letting prosperity paper over pain. Nowadays, many among the Vietnamese diaspora — younger generations in particular — don't go back to Vietnam to protest, but for opportunities. The country is vibrant, interconnected and increasingly affluent. For many, life in Saigon may prove more accommodating than surviving on the fringes of the West. And Vietnam, for its part, seems mostly happy to accept them — as long as they don't challenge the official narrative: patriotism is good; politics is not. But comfort is not the same as reconciliation. Welcoming people back is not the same thing as being seen. Economic inclusion is not moral redress. A state that offers open arms but keeps the past sealed tight is demanding allegiance, not responsibility. And for foreign diplomats and businesspeople too, Vietnam's openness and growth can feel alluring — enough to make the past seem like someone else's problem, or a chapter long closed. The illusion of progress is actual. The Vietnam of today is no longer the place it was even a decade ago. There is more transparency, more space for cultural freedom and a burgeoning pride in national achievement. And many younger Vietnamese, both inside and outside the country, may no longer feel personally burdened by the legacy of war. But that's also exactly what makes this juncture so crucial. It is not when a society is traumatized that it is most at risk of forgetting, but when it is convinced that it feels too good, too self-possessed to remember. The threat is not that people will celebrate — it's that they will engage in self-congratulation. Reconciliation can't be quantified with ceremonies and can't be outsourced to the course of time. It must be built through acts of recognition: naming the costs of the past, listening to the stories long excluded, making space for discomfort. Vietnam's strength lies not just in having survived the war, but in whether it can now face what the war — and its aftermath — truly meant. A nation's strength is not measured by GDP or foreign direct investment. It is measured by the stories it is willing to tell — and the ones it is still willing to silence. The Vietnam War was not just a military struggle. It was a civil rupture, and its legacies still live in the silences of exile, the contradictions of official memory and the lives that history tried to forget. Fifty years later, it is time to move beyond the slogans of victory or the bitterness of loss. Courage now means facing history not with illusion, but with clarity. Vietnam has come far in softening old divides. But if it seeks true reconciliation, it must go further — not only in its ceremonies, but in how it tells its story, how it honors all its people and how it welcomes those once exiled into its future. Leo Tran writes about international affairs, trade, and global strategy. His work has appeared in The Diplomat, Kyiv Post, and Modern Diplomacy. He also publishes at Vietnam Decoded.
