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2 days ago
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With Bukele Emboldened, El Salvador's Authoritarian Slide Is Accelerating
Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele has never concealed his autocratic tendencies. He had already unabashedly referred to himself as the world's coolest dictator, but since enjoying the firm embrace of U.S. President Donald Trump, Bukele has grown emboldened. In recent weeks, he has intensified his crackdown on critics and accelerated his efforts to suppress dissent, turning the screws on human rights organizations, journalists and civil society at large. Bukele's acolytes have arrested one of the country's most prominent human rights activists, have enacted a 'foreign agents' law that resembles the ones used in dictatorships like Russia and Nicaragua to weaken civil society, and have made life even more threatening for independent journalists, prompting more of them to flee into exile. The millennial president, who became enormously popular by imposing draconian policing tactics that restored security to a country that had been plagued by brutal gang violence, quickly consolidated power after becoming president in 2019. He easily led his New Ideas party to full control of the legislature, secured an ironclad majority in the Supreme Court, and maneuvered to win a second term in office, even though the country's constitution clearly limits presidents to a single one. Before long, he had full control of the country, steadily dismantling democratic institutions. Through it all, Salvadorans seemed satisfied with the bargain. Security had greatly improved the quality of life in their impoverished country. Polls consistently showed his approval hovering around 80 percent. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. In the past few months, however, as El Salvador has come under greater global scrutiny stemming from Trump's deportation of migrants to prisons there, even Salvadorans are having second thoughts. A recent poll showed Bukele's approval rating sliding to 55 percent, fully 20 points lower than a year ago, with two-thirds of respondents saying they disapprove of his controversial use of Salvadoran prisons to house deportees in exchange for cash from the U.S. government. Bukele's notorious prisons stand at the center of the security policies that transformed the country and raised the alarm of human rights organizations and democratic activists. In 2022, he declared a state of emergency that remains in place to this day, allowing police to arrest and imprison individuals without any semblance of due process. The prison population has tripled, with human rights groups documenting hundreds of deaths inside and desperate families saying their relative have disappeared without a trace into the system. Thousands of innocent men have been swept up and warehoused in crowded cells without access to legal representation or communication with the outside world. Conditions in the terrorism confinement center, or CECOT—which now also houses migrants deported by the Trump administration—are labeled as torture by human rights experts. Now, after high praise from the U.S. president, a visit to Trump in the White House, and histrionic tours of the CECOT prison by administration officials like Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, Bukele is feeling no pressure from the world's most powerful country to tone down his tactics. As a result, he is becoming less patient with his critics at home. On Sunday night, May 18, police arrested Ruth Lopez, one of the best-known anti-corruption and human rights lawyers in Central America. Lopez heads Cristosal, an organization that has been looking into corruption in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. Cristosal was investigating multiple instances of potential corruption under Bukele, including the misuse of pandemic funds, the diversion of public funds to acquire Pegasus software for spying on journalists, as well as secretive negotiations between Bukele's government and Salvadoran gangs. Her organization lambasted Lopez's detention as part of a 'systematic strategy of criminalization against those who defend human rights' under Bukele. Human Rights Watch said the arrest, 'is not an isolated incident—it marks a dangerous escalation in President Bukele's effort to silence dissent.' The Bukele administration's attorney general's office accused her of collaborating 'in the theft of funds from state coffers,' linking her to the former president of the supreme electoral tribunal, Eugenio Chicas, who had been arrested earlier on charges of illicit enrichment. Chicas, who had also worked under the previous administration, denies the charges. The opposition claims his arrest is politically motivated. Chicas and Bukele have an acrimonious history. Back in 2017, when Chicas was a government minister, Bukele accused him of rape. Chicas sued for slander and won. Bukele was ordered by the court to pay Chicas $50,000. Earlier this month, two days after arresting the head of an NGO that was looking into malfeasance in Bukele's government, the legislature moved to silence just about any organization it deems threatening. By a 57 to 3 vote, the Bukele-controlled Congress passed the 'foreign agents' law. The pretext for the law was a protest by peasant families in front of Bukele's residence. The president claimed they had been 'manipulated … by globalist NGOs.' Under the law, any organization that receives funding, including donations, goods or services from abroad must register as a 'foreign agent,' which triggers steep taxes, crippling government interference and potentially a stain on its reputation. The law's definition of foreign support is absurdly broad, and defines as foreign supporters 'people determined by the Foreign Agents Registry to fall under this category.' Groups that register are sharply limited in their activities and those which fail to register and are later found to qualify face destructive penalties. Most crucially, the law gives the government the ability to monitor and shut down organizations receiving foreign support. The government says the law aims to promote transparency, but Human Rights Watch says it's real aim is to 'stifle dissent.' Foreign agent laws have become a preferred tool of autocracy. When Georgia, the former Soviet republic, introduced similar legislation, the action triggered months of massive street protests by democracy advocates, who correctly feared the new law would severely handicap their democracy. There is no question that Bukele has done enormous good in El Salvador, pulling the country out of its morass of violence. But instead of using those security gains to steer El Salvador into a prosperous democratic future, he is aggressively using his successes to turn the country into a dictatorship under his rule. El Salvador didn't have to choose between security and democracy. But now, made even stronger by support from the Trump administration, Bukele seems more determined than ever to burnish his autocratic credentials. Frida Ghitis is WPR's senior columnist and a contributor to CNN and The Washington Post. Her WPR column appears every Thursday. You can follow her on Twitter and Threads at @fridaghitis. The post With Bukele Emboldened, El Salvador's Authoritarian Slide Is Accelerating appeared first on World Politics Review.
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3 days ago
- Business
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The Return of Europe's Great(ish) Powers
On May 9, French President Emmanuel Macron and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk met in the French city of Nancy to sign a Franco-Polish friendship treaty. The agreement envisions wide-ranging economic and technological cooperation, such as on civilian nuclear power, and coordination in various policy areas from migration to infrastructure and defense. The Franco-Polish rapprochement is interesting in itself, as Macron has for several years worked hard to mend France's ties with eastern Europe. But, more importantly, the two countries' cooperation is part of a more fundamental development within Europe: the return of the big European powers. Over the last few years, with Russia's war against Ukraine and the breakdown of the transatlantic relationship under U.S. President Donald Trump, the bigger European countries have multiplied their joint actions. France, Germany, the U.K. and, increasingly, Poland, are stepping up—a development which might simultaneously be a curse and blessing for the smaller European nations. In addition to the Nancy Treaty, there is the British-German Trinity House agreement on defense, signed last year, which the current governments in Berlin and London plan to extend into a full friendship treaty. In 2019, Europe's core couple, France and Germany, renewed the Elysee Treaty from 1963 with the Treaty of Aachen. Later this year, France and the U.K. are set to renew their Lancaster House treaties, and the U.K. is also in discussions with Poland to launch a new bilateral defense treaty. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. But there is more to this trend than just a rise in bilateral treaties among the main powers. In the context of the war against Ukraine, the leaders of the big European nations have played an important diplomatic role. Earlier this month, Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Tusk travelled to Kyiv for what was called the 'coalition of the willing' summit. After decades during which Europeans aimed to build up the geopolitical EU, it appears that the big European powers are back as main players in geopolitics. And as the big European countries are becoming more important, the EU as an actor diminishes. Of course, these cooperations neither explicitly nor implicitly aim to sideline the EU—there is no such plot. In fact, the Nancy treaty includes a section on cooperation within the EU, and the Treaty of Aachen notes that the cooperation between France and Germany aims to strengthen the EU. And the U.K.'s recently concluded agreement with the EU was celebrated as a reset of relations, 10 years after Brexit. Still, it is striking how much more the big powers are looking toward each other to deal with the geopolitical challenges of the moment, having largely abandoned the aim of making the EU the prime European foreign policy representative. In at least one aspect, the bilateral treaties weaken the EU – and arguably NATO. Namely, through the creation of new security guarantees. The Aachen treaty notes that France and Germany 'shall afford one another any means of assistance or aid within their power, including military force, in the event of an armed attack on their territories,' while the Nancy treaty stipulates that 'in the event of armed aggression on their territories, the Parties shall assist each other, including by military means.' Although there is nothing wrong with these clauses per se, they raise the question of why they exist at all. After all, NATO's Article 5 and the EU's Article 42.7 already stipulate the same assurances. And while the treaties acknowledge these clauses, one is left to wonder whether the extra assurances indicate—or create—a doubt that Articles 5 and 42.7 are not sufficiently reliable after all. That Europe's great(ish) powers are becoming more relevant again feels in line with the times. Trump's vision of the world, in which big powers dominate their spheres of influence, has aptly been called a throwback to the 19th century. A return of Europe's powers fits with this new, old world. For smaller European states, this might be a curse and blessing in equal measure. On the one hand, their say within the EU will become less relevant if the EU is less of a relevant actor. On the other hand, less will be expected from them in terms of foreign policy, something many European governments might be perfectly happy with, given the more than sufficient demands of domestic politics, from the green transition to demographic changes and migration. The question is what this means for Europe's overall geopolitical power. One can lament that the EU hasn't become the unifying geopolitical actor many people hoped it would be (though one should not dismiss its role in the realm of sanctions and trade). But in the absence of a unified EU power, a working alliance of the big three, four, or five European nations could be a good alternative. Gone are the days in which France, Germany, or the U.K. can have significant geopolitical power by themselves. But together, the top European powers can still influence world politics. From this viewpoint, the recent flurry of agreements, as well as the institutionalizing of forums for further coordination prescribed in these treaties, is a positive development. Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, based in Paris. She focuses on German and European security and defense, the future of warfare and the impact of new technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence. Her bi-weekly WPR column appears every other Wednesday. The post The Return of Europe's Great(ish) Powers appeared first on World Politics Review.
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4 days ago
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Martinelli's Escape Is Testing Panama's Government—and Its Democracy
In early May, former Panamanian President Ricardo Martinelli quietly boarded a flight from Panama City to Bogota. The move ended Martinelli's 15-month stay at the Nicaraguan Embassy in Panama, where he had taken refuge to avoid serving a 10-year prison sentence for money laundering. His departure, which was sanctioned by a discreet safe-conduct granted by Panama's Foreign Ministry and transformed into territorial asylum upon his arrival in Colombia, marks more than the exit of a fugitive politician. It underscores the fragility of democratic institutions in Panama and the tactical resilience of its political elite. The entire episode, with its opaque legal maneuvers and strategic calculations, reveals a convergence of judicial evasion, partisan brinkmanship and international complicity. It forces a reckoning with how Panama's institutions function under pressure—and for whom. Martinelli's predicament stems from his conviction in 2023 in the 'New Business' case, a high-profile corruption scandal involving public funds funneled into the purchase of a media conglomerate. Martinelli initially counted on a return to the presidency and the immunity it would provide as a way out of his legal troubles, and in June 2023 he announced his candidacy for the country's presidential election, scheduled for May 2024. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. But in February 2024, after a court ordered his pre-trial detention while his appeal was decided, Martinelli sought asylum at the Nicaraguan Embassy. When his final appeal failed later that same month, resulting in him being barred from running for office, Martinelli pivoted to a new strategy, remaining in the embassy while working toward leaving Panama for political asylum abroad. Initially, the administration of President Jose Raul Mulino granted Martinelli safe-conduct to travel to Nicaragua in March 2025, but that plan collapsed amid reports of an unresolved Interpol red notice for Martinelli's arrest and Nicaragua's sudden withdrawal of landing clearance. A second safe-conduct was quietly issued in May, and only after Martinelli's arrival in Colombia was the operation made public, raising public debate about transparency and elite influence. Martinelli's maneuver was far from a retreat—it was a recalibration. Even from his refuge in the Nicaraguan Embassy, where his movements and associations were restricted under the rules of diplomatic asylum, he continued to exert political influence through social media and orchestrated visits, directing his Realizing Goals, or RM, party and pushing legislation tailored to secure his legal reprieve. Chief among these efforts was a controversial amnesty bill that would nullify his conviction along with those of other political allies. The bill has stalled in the National Assembly, but its mere proposal exposes the depths of Panama's institutional vulnerabilities and the lengths to which Martinelli's faction is willing to go to secure his political future. Complicating matters is the increasingly tense relationship between Martinelli and Mulino, who was initially Martinelli's vice presidential running mate in last year's election but became his handpicked successor when Martinelli was barred from the race. While Martinelli's support was instrumental in Mulino's electoral victory, fissures have emerged since then. Martinelli loyalists have accused Mulino of betrayal, and the legislative alliance between RM and Mulino's broader coalition is fraying. Amid the tensions, the amnesty debate has become a litmus test. Backing it signals loyalty to Martinelli. Opposing it signals a commitment to legal accountability and institutional integrity, but comes at a political cost. Disavowing the bill distances Mulino from Martinelli's legacy, allowing him to assert his independence, but it also risks alienating RM's legislative bloc and inviting retaliation from Martinelli's still-powerful network. Beyond its domestic repercussions, the circumstances surrounding Martinelli's departure have taken a toll on Panama's global standing. Observers across the region view the episode as emblematic of elite impunity. While legal under the 1954 Caracas Convention, Martinelli's transition from diplomatic to territorial asylum reads to many as a procedural workaround to avoid accountability. Territorial asylum means protection granted by a country when the individual is physically on its soil, allowing greater freedom than diplomatic asylum inside an embassy. In Colombia, Martinelli gained rights such as freedom of association, and his designation as a 'politically persecuted' individual blocks extradition efforts for now. Unsurprisingly, Colombia's role in his flight has raised eyebrows. By accepting a convicted ex-president on grounds of political persecution—a claim widely disputed by legal analysts—President Gustavo Petro's government broke with precedent and triggered criticism at home and abroad. Colombian journalist Daniel Coronell summed up the sentiment succinctly, declaring that '[t]he only winner is Martinelli.' The optics since Martinelli's arrival in Colombia have only worsened the backlash. Having previously claimed serious health issues, Martinelli appeared smiling in Bogota and even posed with Panama's ambassador, who was later reprimanded by the Mulino administration. The performative nature of Martinelli's public appearances not only contradicted his asylum narrative but also undermined the seriousness of his legal case. Rather than a fugitive in hiding, Martinelli projected the image of a seasoned operator playing the system. Martinelli's ambitions remain unchanged: a return to the presidency, but in 2029 rather than 2024. Achieving that goal hinges on either overturning his conviction or rendering it irrelevant through legislation like the amnesty bill. His continued control over RM—the second-largest party in the National Assembly—gives him considerable influence within the legislature, and by all indications he has every intention of using it. Despite his legal troubles, Martinelli remains very popular in Panama. Before he was forced to withdraw from the race, he was favored to win the 2024 presidential election. While sheltered in the Nicaraguan Embassy, he used social media prolifically and strategically, sharing political commentary alongside casual, relatable content like videos of barbecues and selfies with his dog. That kept him visible and engaged with supporters, fueling his influence even in exile. All of this sets the stage for a high-stakes political struggle in the years ahead. Should the amnesty effort succeed, Panama risks institutional backsliding and a further erosion of public trust. If it fails, Martinelli could leverage his exile as a rallying cry, positioning himself as a persecuted leader poised for a comeback. Either way, Mulino must continue to manage complex relationships among Panama's political elites, including with his predecessor. Martinelli's escape to Colombia marks not the end of his political story, but the beginning of a new chapter—one where exile is used as part of a calculated political strategy. Whether he will continue to shape Panama's political landscape through 2029 remains uncertain, largely dependent on the fragile dynamics within the National Assembly and the country's resilience in this test of its democratic institutions. The broader regional implications are, of course, sobering. The use of political asylum to protect convicted elites could further weaken judicial independence across Latin America, where corruption and impunity already test the resilience of democratic systems. Cristina Guevara is a Latin America policy analyst and writer. She previously served as a policy and legislative adviser in Panama's National Assembly. In addition to World Politics Review, she has written for Foreign Policy, The Miami Herald, Rolling Stone, Americas Quarterly and The Dallas Morning News, among other outlets. A Chevening scholar, she is currently pursuing her second master's degree focused on inequality and governance in Latin America at University College London. The post Martinelli's Escape Is Testing Panama's Government—and Its Democracy appeared first on World Politics Review.
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23-05-2025
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Trump's Middle East Trip Was Quietly About Resetting U.S. Regional Policy
Last week, U.S. President Donald Trump took a four-day tour of three Gulf monarchies: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. One of those nations, Saudi Arabia, has long been a special partner, if not a formal ally, of the United States. The other two are also key U.S. economic and security partners in the region. Many noted a key Middle East country not on Trump's travel list: Israel. As Frida Ghitis remarked in her WPR column last week, 'What used to be a lovefest has turned chilly, making Israelis nervous about what's behind the change and what it presages.' Similarly, Emma Ashford observed how, despite Trump claiming that Israel would have no better friend than him, 'it seems increasingly clear from his conduct that 'America First' may not have an exception for Israel after all.' While Israel's absence from Trump's itinerary is worth noting, it was probably not an intentional snub. Israel is still among the top recipients of U.S. military aid. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was still the first leader to visit the White House after Trump returned to the presidency. And according to recent accounts, it seems that Trump still intends to go forward with a plan for the U.S. to play a role in governing and rebuilding Gaza once Israel has completed its military operations and 'conquered' the territory. Moreover, in his visits to Gulf capitals, Trump made clear his desire for them to eventually normalize relations with Israel by signing onto the Abraham Accords, arguably the signature foreign policy achievement of his first term. If the trip was not about snubbing Israel, it raises the question of why Trump would want to visit these particular countries, besides the pomp and circumstance and gifts he was showered with while there. The answer may be surprising: He wanted to reset U.S. policy toward the Muslim countries of the Middle East after years, and really decades, of failed approaches. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. Barack Obama famously tried to do just this when he first became president. Back in June 2009, he traveled to Cairo to give his 'New Beginning' address to the Muslim world, in which he called for 'a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.' The speech was an attempt to make good on a promise from his inaugural address to reset U.S. relations in the Middle East. Eight years into the war on terror and six years into the disastrous U.S. occupation of Iraq, that promise and the Cairo speech were considered so profound that they contributed to Obama being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize later that year. But the new way forward that Obama in Cairo promised didn't fully materialize during his presidency. The U.S. drew down its forces from Iraq, but didn't fully withdraw them. The U.S. military remained in Afghanistan. And while Obama secured the nuclear deal with Iran, he did so on tenuous footing given that it was not a treaty but an agreement, which could and was easily overturned by Trump when he succeeded Obama in office. Besides wanting to one-up Obama, Trump used his trip to the Gulf to level an indictment against much of the conventional thinking that dominated U.S. foreign policy in the first part of the 21st century. In an address in Riyadh, Trump pointed to what he characterized as the folly of nation-building, noting that the 'gleaming marvels of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were not created by the so-called nation builders, neocons, or liberal nonprofits like those who spent trillions and trillions of dollars failing to develop Kabul, Baghdad, and so many other cities.' This was a direct swipe at former President George W. Bush, who had sought to rebuild both Iraq and Afghanistan after first using military force to overthrow their respective governments. Of course, given that Trump seems eager for the U.S. to take over Gaza and develop it into what he called the 'Riviera of the Middle East,' some might claim that Trump isn't opposed to nation-building per se, but just building projects that do not carry his name. Much like former President Joe Biden's own Middle East tour back in 2022, this trip was also about Iran. But while Biden's trip was oriented toward bolstering a coalition against Iran, Trump's intent was consistent with his visit's overall theme: to potentially reset U.S. policy toward Washington's longstanding regional adversary. Trump directly offered an olive branch to Tehran, stating, 'I am willing to end past conflicts and forge new partnerships for a better and more stable world, even if our differences may be very profound, which obviously they are in the case of Iran.' Trump's overtures toward Iran are in line with his praise of and meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during his first term and his attempts to appease Russia early in his present term. Of course, just as his diplomatic efforts with North Korea went nowhere and his overtures toward Putin seem to have largely failed, whether Trump follows through with his offer to Iran, or whether Tehran would actually take up the olive branch if he does proffer one, warrants some healthy skepticism. But it's nevertheless worth pointing out the irony of Trump possibly realizing that Obama's more conciliatory approach to diplomacy might be preferable to his own confrontational style of maximum pressure. In his haste in 2017 to undo all that his immediate predecessor had done, Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, by which Iran had agreed to strict limits on its civil nuclear program, as well as intrusive oversight of it to make sure the program was never diverted to produce nuclear weapons. To be fair, some of Trump's 'Middle East Reset' was started under Biden. The final withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, which was set in motion by Trump during his first term, allowed the U.S. to finally end its 'forever wars' in the region. Following the fall of former dictator Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the end of that nation's long and bloody civil war, Biden also removed the $10 million bounty the U.S. had placed on the head of Ahmed al-Sharaa. Now Syria's interim president, al-Sharaa was previously the leader of a rebel group that, in addition to fighting Assad, was also designated a terror organization by the U.S. State Department. Biden's decision paved the way for Trump to not only meet with al-Sharaa during his stop in Riyadh, but also to call for the end of U.S. sanctions against Syria, to the apparent surprise of even his aides, who are now scrambling to figure out exactly how to roll the sanctions back. Overall, Trump's trip promised a lot. But will that promise turn into tangible results? The question refers not to the tech and business ventures between the U.S. and these nations that were announced during the trip, but to the goal of truly remaking U.S. policy toward the Middle East. It would be the height of irony if a president bent on the U.S. doing less in the world brought about the desirable outcome that many of his predecessors tried hard—perhaps too hard—to achieve, only to come up short. Paul Poast is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago and a nonresident fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The post Trump's Middle East Trip Was Quietly About Resetting U.S. Regional Policy appeared first on World Politics Review.
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21-05-2025
- Politics
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Europe Does Face a Threat From Within. Vance Just Misidentified It
While addressing the Munich Security Conference back in February, U.S. Vice President JD Vance declared that the biggest threat Europe faces is from within, in the form of a retreat from its core values. Though his speech shocked European leaders and the trans-Atlantic foreign policy community, Vance was onto something. But the internal threat is the opposite of what he described in Munich. Vance claimed that threat comes from dangerous 'woke' liberals who, in targeting disinformation and hate speech, purportedly restrict free speech. In fact, the internal threat is found in the public support for and normalization of the nationalist far-right movements that are back on the rise across Europe. These movements seek not just the erosion of liberal democracy in Europe, but the hollowing out and fragmentation of European integration, which has secured peace on the continent over the past 80 years. The threat they pose from within is compounded by the external threat posed by Russia as well as the risk of American abandonment and possibly even betrayal. The danger of Russia's imperial ambitions is known. Militarily, it is playing out on the ground in Ukraine. As has been amply demonstrated by the failed attempts by U.S. President Donald Trump to broker a ceasefire there, Russian President Vladimir Putin is in no mood for compromise. He believes that he can still win the war and seems to be preparing a new offensive. The fact that so far Russia has failed to fully conquer the five regions of Ukraine that it illegally annexed does not mean that Putin believes he has lost. Yes, Russia today occupies just over 18 percent of Ukraine, 14 percent of which it had conquered back in 2014. That meager additional 4 percent has been taken over the past three years at a staggering cost in human lives, including around 800,000 Russian soldiers killed and wounded. But Putin still thinks he can push forward, continuing to nibble away at Ukrainian territory over time. There may come a time when Russia will conclude that a ceasefire is in its interest. But that moment does not seem to be close at hand. Russia's military threat starts in Ukraine, but it doesn't end there. In Putin's attempt to reconstitute the Russian empire, he is pursuing a military and hybrid strategy looking north, especially at the Baltic countries and Poland. But Putin must know that there is no amount of hybrid tactics—from sabotage and cyber warfare to election meddling and disinformation—that will do the trick in these countries. Costly as military endeavors are, force would be necessary to bring them under Moscow's control. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. By contrast, looking west and south from Ukraine, from Moldova through to Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, Putin hopes to secure the allegiance of pliant governments through political interference. And the parties that Russia supports are invariably located on the nationalist and populist extremes. The election in Moldova last year and the presidential election in Romania last week are testimony to this. In both cases, Moscow very nearly succeeded in empowering pro-Russian forces by meddling with the polls. Had the strategy worked to add Moldova and Romania to the list of Russia-friendly governments already in power in Hungary and Slovakia, Putin would have achieved his political goals far more cheaply than through military force. Russia's political investments through disinformation and election meddling are set to continue, with the second round of the Polish presidential election coming up next, followed by elections in the Czech Republic in the fall. But just as the threat from Russia doesn't end in Ukraine, the external threats to Europe don't end with Russia. In the U.S., too, the MAGA right that forms the base of Trump's support has no sympathy for Europe. While the die may not be cast yet, in the best of circumstances the U.S. under Trump will likely disengage from European security, including NATO, in a coordinated and gradual way. In the worst-case scenario, the U.S. will abandon Europeans more abruptly—and perhaps even side more explicitly with Russia. The threat from Russia is clearly bigger and more tangible than that posed by the U.S., which remains hypothetical and will hopefully never materialize. But while Europeans are equipping themselves to deal militarily with Russia, they can't seem to get their heads around the U.S. turning its back on the continent's security. The European 'immune system' when it comes to seeing the U.S. as a potential threat is extremely weakened through disuse, making the hypothetical scenario of a U.S. betrayal, small as it might be, even harder to deal with than the reality of the Russian threat. It's no coincidence that the European parties backed by the MAGA right are the same ones Russia is bolstering, not just in Eastern Europe, but in Western Europe as well, from the League in Italy and AfD in Germany to Chega in Portugal and Vox in Spain. It is here, in fact, where the external threats posed by Putin and Trump are joined at the hip: through their concerted support for the far right in Europe—the 'threat from within,' as Vance would put it, but in reverse. The far right's rise in Europe has come in waves. It began well over a decade ago, when the European Union was torn apart by the sovereign debt crisis in the early 2010s. In the South, where poverty and inequality increased to unprecedented levels, its rise was driven and amplified by the austerity policies in vogue in that period. In the 'frugal' North, which saw the ills of the profligate Southern Europeans as being of their own making, it was driven by resentment over the calls for further European integration and solidarity to shore up the suddenly vulnerable union. It rose further in 2015 during the so-called migration crisis, which added a toxic East-West divide to Europe's North-South cleavage. The double shock of the Brexit referendum and Trump's election in 2016 and the years thereafter took some wind out of the European far right's sails, by demonstrating the downsides of populism and the benefits of European integration. The wave further subsided—or at least appeared to— during the pandemic, as the value of predictability, reliability and competence were once again underscored and appreciated. However, the far right continued to trumpet its traditional themes, first and foremost migration, while also championing new ones, including the anti-climate, anti-science and anti-woke agendas. The backlash against social distancing rules and the anti-vax movement during the pandemic, followed by post-pandemic inflation and the energy crisis sparked by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, fueled a renewed far-right push. European elections since 2022, including the European Parliament elections in 2024, confirm the far right's rising appeal. While far-right parties come in different shapes and sizes, today they are either in government or provide external support to governments in seven EU member states. Those in opposition represent the second-largest party in many other countries, with their rise to power seemingly just one election away should present trajectories continue. It was feared that Trump's return to power would further galvanize the far right in Europe. However, subsequent elections in Canada and Australia—in which the populist right ended up being weakened, not strengthened, by the aggressive postures of the Trump administration—instilled new hope: Perhaps the Trump effect would lead to a political backlash against the far right in Europe as well. Unfortunately, however, the picture in Europe is not clearcut. The elections last weekend in Romania, Portugal and Poland paint a mixed picture. The pro-EU mayor of Bucharest, Nicusor Dan, ended up unexpectedly winning Romania's presidential election, despite the nationalist far-right candidate George Simion having finished with a commanding lead in the first round. The pro-EU liberal mayor of Warsaw, Rafal Trzaskowski, also scraped ahead in the first round of Poland's presidential election, but the second-round vote against far-right rival Karol Nawrocki is set to be a hard-fought contest. And while the center-right Democratic Alliance finished first in Portugal's parliamentary elections, it did not secure an outright majority, even as the far-right Chega party tied with the Socialists for the second-highest number of seats. In this new climate, other far-right parties across the EU feel increasingly emboldened, including those in government, like Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni's Brothers of Italy, as well as those in opposition, like the National Rally in France and the AfD in Germany. As Europe grapples with the threat from Russia and the risk of abandonment and even betrayal the U.S., it is far from having either tamed or contained, let alone beaten, this very real threat from within. Nathalie Tocci is director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, part-time professor at the School of Transnational Governance (European University Institute) and honorary professor at the University of Tubingen. She has been special adviser to the EU high representative. Her WPR column appears monthly. The post Europe Does Face a Threat From Within. Vance Just Misidentified It appeared first on World Politics Review.
