Latest news with #WTO
The Star
8 minutes ago
- Business
- The Star
Bill to protect local industries from unfair trade practices tabled at Dewan Rakyat
KUALA LUMPUR: The Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties (Amendment) Bill 2025, aimed at protecting local industries from unfair trade practices and ensuring the competitiveness of local products, was tabled for first reading at the Dewan Rakyat. The bill was tabled by Investment, Trade and Industry Ministry Tengku Datuk Seri Zafrul Abdul Aziz on Wednesday (July 30). The bill contains 21 clauses that are aimed at amending the Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties Act 1993 (Act 504). The amendment seeks to enhance the legal framework and improve enforcement effectiveness in preventing unfair trade practices in the context of international trade under the World trade Organisation (WTO). According to the bill, Clause 3 proposes an amendment on Section 9(1) of the Act regarding the investigation period to align with Article 17.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, as Malaysia is a member country under the WTO. Among the other amendments, Clause 4 proposes replacing Section 12(1) of the Act, which allows the government to suspend any investigation if it receives a commitment from exporting members agreeing to eliminate or limit subsidies or agreeing to revise prices. Clause 5 aims to amend Section 12A to provide a countervailing duty imposed under Act 504 shall not exceed five years, either from the date of imposition or from the date of the most recent expiry interview. In addition, Clause 10 aims to amend Section 27(1), which will allow the government to suspend any investigation if it accepts the undertaking from any exporter to revise its prices or to cease imports into Malaysia at dumped prices. Clause 11 seeks to amend Section 27A, which stated that an anti-dumping duty shall not exceed five years, either from the date of imposition or from the date of the most recent expiry review. According to an explainer on the Investment, Trade and Industry Ministry's website, it said that anti-dumping measures refers to measures taken to offset the injury caused by dumping. Dumping occurs when a company exports a product to a foreign market at a price lower than the price it normally charges in its domestic markets, it said. On the other hand, the ministry said countervailing measures are imposed to counteract the effects of unfair subsidies provided by a foreign government to its exporters. The last time Act 504 was amended was on Dec 1, 1999.
The Sun
3 hours ago
- Business
- The Sun
China's ‘overcapacity': Facts and fiction
AS China's high-value industrial exports capture a growing share of global markets, the US and EU have pursued separate but complementary policies aimed to push back against this unprecedented threat to Western dominance in international trade and the economic order. The criticisms levelled by Washington and Brussels to counter the Chinese exports impacting their domestic producers emphasise that China's state-led and subsidised export-driven economic model has created excess manufacturing capacity, flooding their markets with cheap goods. Apart from the overcapacity charge, also commonly featured in the media pronouncements are accusations of unfair trade practices, intellectual piracy, market disruption and national security risks. These concerns have grown as Chinese products – from electric vehicles and batteries to solar panels, wind turbines, ships, electronics, steel, aluminium and a wide range of consumer goods – gain a foothold in Western markets. This popularity – driven by competitive pricing, quality and superiority over domestic and other rivals – has driven the US and EU nations into record deficits in their accounting trade figures with China. It has also given rise to demands by anti-China lobbyists for changes to the rules of international trade to ensure Western dominance. The seriousness of Western concerns is evident in the prominence of alleged Chinese overcapacity in ongoing US-China tariff talks. It also emerged as the most prominent concern of the EU delegation visiting Beijing for a one-day summit to mark the 50th anniversary of China-EU diplomatic relations. What policy changes can arise from these negotiations and meetings remain to be seen. Bane for some, boon for others The consensus amongst independent market analysts and international organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund, is that the charges levelled against China's export success have little or no basis. China's success has been hard-earned, largely driven by its vast, disciplined workforce and adherence, rather than subversion, of the market principles, norms and practices expected of WTO member countries. The WTO is the premier intergovernmental organisation regulating international trade. In existence since 1995, it has 166 members who are responsible for 98% of global trade and GDP. A majority of the member countries regard China as a responsible participant while the US, through its recent unilateralism, tariff weaponisation and flaunting of WTO rules is seen as a renegade undermining the authority and relevance of an indispensable arbitrator in the global economic system. Commentators with experience and knowledge of China's industrial and manufacturing prowess, including leaders of companies competing in the international markets, testify to the growing dynamism, economies of scale, efficiency and competitive advantages of China's industrial, manufacturing and hi-tech producers and workers. Many Western countries have conceded their inability to compete without their governments stepping in to keep out their Chinese rivals. The advances made by China in international markets can be attributed to the following factors: 1. Market-driven competitiveness and innovation - Efficiency and supply chain advantages: Analysts note that China's competitive edge, particularly in the new industrial and renewable sectors, such as EVs, solar panels and wind turbines, stems from superior innovation, economies of scale and highly integrated and efficient supply chains rather than from subsidies or any of the other negative factors cited by Western policymakers. They point out that many Western companies are simply unable to compete with their China counterparts on purely market, economic or technical variables. - Technological advancement: Studies also note that a crucial difference between recent Western and Chinese industrial development is that China has prioritised significant investments in research and development and rapid technological advancement to become key drivers of its production capabilities. 2. Global demand perspective - Meeting global needs: China's defenders have asserted that 'overcapacity' should be viewed from a global perspective. They argue that the world, especially in the context of climate change, needs a vast amount of green technology, and China is simply meeting this growing global demand efficiently. - Temporary imbalances: Chinese economists have argued that supply-demand imbalances are a normal part of market mechanisms and are often temporary, with market forces eventually correcting them. The free market economic dogma, long cherished by the West to its own advantage, needs to be upheld rather than abandoned. Market observers critical of the Western position have also drawn attention to these considerations in the controversy: 1. Challenging definition of 'overcapacity' and 'non-market' - Lack of consensus: They point out that there is no universally agreed-upon definition of 'overcapacity' or what constitutes 'non-market' activity, making the accusations vague, subjective and hypocritical. - Criticism of Western industrial policies: Also highlighted, especially in relation to the barriers being erected against the entry of Chinese EVs into the American and EU market, is that Western countries have long employed and continue to support similar industrial policies and subsidies in every sector deemed of strategic importance, including in the automotive industry. This suggests a double standard in the criticism against China. 2. Benefits of Chinese exports - Stimulating global development ripple effects: China's industrial exports are generally acknowledged to have generated significant economic opportunities for countries around the world, especially in BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and new members such as UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and Saudi Arabia, through enhanced access to affordable goods, technology transfer, and supply chain integration. 3. Global poverty alleviation - Chinese exports are seen as providing significant benefits to global poverty alleviation by assisting less developed economies through several mechanisms, including through replication of its highly successful poverty alleviation programmes - Affordable goods and consumer access: China's large-scale production, even if in excess of its domestic demand, has led to lower unit costs globally. This translates into more affordable goods for consumers worldwide, particularly in less developed economies where purchasing power is limited. - Increased access to basic necessities: 'Overcapacity' in sectors producing essential goods like clothing, basic electronics, household appliances and agricultural products have made these items more accessible to low-income populations, improving their living standards and addressing their needs. - Enhanced quality for price: Chinese manufacturers are increasingly producing goods that offer a good balance of quality and affordability, allowing consumers in developing countries to access products that might otherwise be out of reach. Perhaps the most important outcome of China's export performance is its role in supplying critical inputs that support economic development in developing countries. Developing countries rely on imported intermediate and hi-tech inputs for their industrial sectors. China's 'overcapacity' is providing these inputs at competitive prices and is reducing production costs for local businesses and fostering more rapid industrial growth. It is also helping usher in a new industrial era, giving BRIC countries a chance to break the established hegemony of the West and its allies. Conclusion What we are seeing is that China's industrial and manufacturing exports, stemming from what the West alleges as overcapacity, is creating a complex trade-off with net negatives for developed economies and their competing manufacturers and workers. At the same time, we are seeing mixed but generally net positives for less developed economies and their nascent industries that can become more self-reliant and competitive but only if they can leverage on Chinese imports that provide superior performance to competitors from the West and elsewhere. Not to be disregarded is that global consumers are benefitting from the lower prices stemming from China's cost-efficient and value-adding industrialisation. Meanwhile China's hi-tech green revolution products are paving a faster transition to a more sustainable future and helping the world meet the climate change challenge. Lim Teck Ghee's Another Take is aimed at demystifying social orthodoxy. Comments: letters@
Time of India
4 hours ago
- Business
- Time of India
Bridging trade and gender: How the India-UK FTA advances gender equality
Live Events The India-UK Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement ( CETA ) is one of the most detailed and extensive FTAs (free-trade agreements) India has signed to date, covering many 'WTO plus issues' for the first time. Among the most notable aspects is the integration of gender considerations across multiple chapters, along with a standalone chapter on gender equality—a landmark development for India's trade policy. Given that many Indian firms have trade ties with the UK, the reduction in tariff rates is expected to boost these exports while also reinforcing the adoption of the gender-inclusive practices outlined in the one of our recent field visits to Shahi Exports, one of India's largest garment exporters, we found that a significant share of the workforce is women. In fact, about 70% of the female workforce has benefitted from the initiatives of multinational sourcing firms—many of Shahi's female recruitment, promotion, wage-equalisation, and upskilling policies are initiated by the international brands that they supply to. The gender-related provisions laid out in the India-UK FTA will accelerate such initiatives the India-UK FTA moves beyond token acknowledgements of women's contributions to the economy. Until now, gender considerations have been conspicuously absent from India's external economic policymaking. Notably, India opted out of signing the Joint Declaration on Trade and Women's Economic Empowerment at the WTO , and gender was not mainstreamed into India's foreign policy or its existing the India-UK FTA, this is set to change. By embedding gender equality into its core, the agreement could transform the narrative of women being passive beneficiaries of trade into active participants and leaders within global value chains. Trade is a proven engine of growth, but its benefits are not gender neutral—without careful, intentional policy design and complementary domestic reforms, trade liberalisation often perpetuates existing India's first agreement with a dedicated and comprehensive chapter on Trade and Gender Equality, the India-UK CETA underscores the need for such systemic action by acknowledging both the contributions of women and the barriers they face in achieving equal participation in the workforce. The labour chapter also contains detailed provisions that promote non-discrimination and gender equality in the and equality considerations are also embedded across other chapters, such as those on trade and development cooperation, government procurement, and digital trade, to support women's inclusion in these domains. The agreement further encourages national standard-setting bodies to adopt gender-responsive standards and processes. Within the digital trade chapter, the parties commit to exchanging experiences and best practices for creating datasets and conducting gender-specific analysis related to digital such cooperative measures are undertaken on a best-endeavour basis, without there being a specific mechanism to track progress. This is simply because, for certain issues, it is difficult to establish exogenous governance mechanisms or complex law elements, since they are often deeply tied to cultural and social identities and values that go beyond general rulemaking. Therefore, more agreements in the past have stopped at a mere acknowledgement of fact and specifying the intent to address India-UK agreement adopts a distinct and stronger approach by creating a treaty body specifically dedicated to advancing trade and gender equality. Notably, this body is set up at the time of the agreement's signing, rather than being postponed for future establishment. Treaty bodies function as endogenous governance mechanisms, formed with representatives from both parties to the agreement. This contrasts with exogenous mechanisms, which involve a third party. Nonetheless, treaty bodies offer a more effective structure than agreements that merely state intentions without designating any entity to monitor this regard, a Working Group on Trade and Gender Equality is established, with government representatives from both parties to consider matters as appropriate to advance women's economic empowerment and gender equality across this Agreement. Moreover, it will also support the effective implementation and operation of this Chapter and will report to a higher joint committee, which is also established by the trade implemented effectively, these provisions could bring significant benefits. One of the most tangible ways the India-UK FTA could empower women is through significant tariff reductions and duty-free access in sectors such as textiles, apparel, leather, and footwear. These sectors, which employ a large share of women in manufacturing, are classified as 'Category A' in the UK's schedule of commitments, meaning the UK has committed to eliminating all customs duties on these items from the date the agreement takes UK imports from India in these sectors are projected to rise by 85% compared to a no-FTA scenario. These gains could especially represent thousands of new jobs and more secure livelihoods for Indian women—research by the EXIM Bank shows that in India, a 1% tariff reduction in female-intensive export sectors can increase the female labour supply by 0.36% and thereby add 0.13% to with gender and equality provisions embedded in the agreement, companies seeking to benefit from these concessions will also be expected to follow fair and inclusive hiring practices. Such FTA-aligned sourcing requirements by UK-based companies could catalyse India's export-oriented firms to introduce initiatives to reduce wage discrimination, undertake skill building, incentivise female leadership, and ensure workplace safety. This doesn't mean that this is the only way to achieve gender balance or that no other efforts are being made. However, certain gender-based disparities are so deeply rooted in our systems that they demand an extra push to effectively address and overcome should only be seen as a beginning. While it marks a promising step forward, the true impact of such mechanisms will rely on how well they are implemented, the consistency of stakeholder engagement, and the adoption of a comprehensive, goal-oriented approach. India must also augment the FTA with domestic programmes, such as trade facilitation for women-led SMEs, export-readiness training, market intelligence, and subsidised be a genuine game changer, the FTA's commitments should be woven into the broader tapestry of India's policy landscape. This could mean including gender issues in India's overall foreign trade policy, establishing a dedicated women entrepreneurship cell within the Ministry of Commerce, and cross-linking trade reforms with national goals of gender equality and India-UK FTA sets a new standard for India's FTAs and could serve as the model/base text for all future agreements. If India embraces this as a blueprint, it won't just be catching up to global best practice, but it will be setting a new standard for trade-led gender writers are Tanu M. Goyal, Senior Fellow and Shravani Prakash, Consultant with ICRIER.
Indian Express
10 hours ago
- Business
- Indian Express
India's FTA focus: Trade in the time of disorder
The formal signing of the India-UK Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) headlined Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the UK. Since leaving the EU, 'Global' Britain has been on a spree to conclude or join FTAs. After a period of FTA pause, India, too, is on an accelerated pursuit of trade agreements. Though neither is the other's major trading partner, the salience of CETA lies in the symbolism and substance, the future potential, the many tangible and intangible dimensions of this partnership, and the infusion of strength into a relationship that faces challenges not from customary colonial memories, but from contemporary challenges to India's security and integrity. CETA's significance also derives from its ambition. FTAs either cover areas that fall within the mandate of the WTO or go deeper in covering commitments and harmonisation on a range of national economic policy issues to facilitate stronger economic partnership among signatories. CETA embodies the latter. The two governments have hailed CETA as a landmark agreement because of the balance of openings and protections, coverage and scope and also because, from India's standpoint, it is the first comprehensive one with a major Western partner that defines the template for others, including with the EU. CETA is historic for another reason. It is an important milestone in India's — as in the world's — growing reliance on bilateralism and regionalism at a time when the multilateral trade regime is eroding as its architect, which is still the world's most powerful economy, turns its back on it. President Donald Trump has abandoned the foundational principle of the global trade regime. As in other domains, the US no longer finds the system it created useful or attractive. Trump has accelerated a longer-term trend in the US since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 towards trade hesitancy, if not hostility, and protectionism, through the successive tenures of presidents Barack Obama, Trump and Joe Biden. There is a bipartisan consensus that the US will not surrender its sovereignty to the binding rule-making role of the WTO. The current sentiments will continue to shape the US political economy. For the US and the West broadly, the problem has deeper structural roots in the consequences of the recent wave of globalisation that began in the 1970s and peaked by the time of the GFC. The first wave of globalisation from 1870 to 1914 led to the concentration of prosperity and power in the industrialising West and America's rise as a major power. By contrast, the recent phase triggered Asia's rise, China's emergence as a major power and the West's relative decline with disruptive political consequences in the advanced countries. In particular, it has resulted in China's extraordinary accumulation of industrial and technological power and dominance in key industries and supply chains in a fundamentally different political and economic system, incongruous with a transparent trade regime. The concentration risk was laid bare by the Covid pandemic. Further, the sharpening geopolitical competition has manifested in trade and technology. The war in Ukraine deepened shifts and uncertainty. Together, these factors have put globalism and its scaffolding under extreme stress. Calls for reshoring and industrial sovereignty face limitations of lost capabilities, and deeply entrenched Global Value Chains (GVCs) that various estimates put at 50-70 per cent of global trade. Trade remains essential for all nations. But as nations seek to derisk, diversify and rebalance trade relations in a world in flux, they seek long-term commitment, trust, assurance and resilience through bilateral and regional agreements. The number of such agreements, although within the WTO framework, has risen rapidly in the past two decades, with an increase in momentum after the GFC and the Covid pandemic. Trump's strategy will accelerate the trend. For one, despite his impetuosity, the legislative uncertainty of his authority and questionable enforceability of the 'deals', countries are seeking exclusive and competitive bilateral agreements with the US. At the same time, hedging strategies, against both US unpredictability and China's dominance, will trigger new bilateral or regional agreements, as well as expansion, restructuring and interlocking of existing regional agreements: The Trans Pacific Partnership was resuscitated as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) after the US's exit. India's preferred path is more manageable bilateral agreements with countries or groupings rather than participation in regional agreements. India signed a spate of agreements during the UPA era, mostly in Asia. However, not all of them were with competitors like ASEAN, but also with complementary economies like Japan and Korea. That these agreements had disappointing outcomes was as much due to their terms as to our lack of competitiveness. Their lessons are shaping the choice of partners and the terms of the agreements, and alignment with domestic policies and incentives. Nonetheless, global trends point to an enhanced need for comprehensive FTAs. With the atrophying of the predictable, non-discriminatory global trade regime, FTAs will become determinants of competitiveness. These have become essential for creating opportunities for our services sector and mobility of our professionals, and for access to critical minerals, technology, innovation and energy. Above all, there is a strong correlation between high-quality FTAs and the GVCs. Assured integration into GVCs will serve our twin objectives of rapid industrialisation and export growth at scale. It is even more critical now as various studies estimate the share of potential bottleneck products in global trade to have doubled since 2000 to around 20 per cent, with almost 66 per cent of the share of the global export value in these products now coming from East Asia-Pacific. This also means that, besides the new FTA with Australia, we must revisit the CEPA/CECA with Japan, Korea and Singapore, not just to improve their terms but also for assured access to critical inputs to fully exploit the potential of FTAs with Western partners. This will also require finding a modus vivendi with China. As India pursues its national transformation at a time of global disorder, shaping our external economic engagement strategically is both a geopolitical necessity and an economic imperative. The writer is a retired ambassador
Bangkok Post
11 hours ago
- Business
- Bangkok Post
WTO at 30 after decades of challenges
When I sat down to write an article "WTO at 10" for a commemorative book for the occasion in 2005, little did I know of the huge challenges the WTO and the multilateral trading system would have to confront in the following two decades. During its first decade in existence, the WTO basked in a mood of cautious optimism as its membership continued to expand and the process of globalisation was in full swing, also helped by the launch of the Doha Development Agenda and the joining of China in December 2001. The impact of China's WTO accession on the Chinese economy itself and on the global trading system has been unprecedented, part of which I have elaborated in my co-authored book (2002) with Mark Clifford on China and the WTO: Changing China, Changing World Trade. During its first ten years, the WTO stood the test not only arising from the Asian financial crisis (1997-98), the massive protests at the third Ministerial Conference (MC) in Seattle in 1999, but also some sensitive and high-profile dispute settlement cases. The crisis-hit countries in Asia could find their way out of the predicament, not least because the rest of the world kept its markets open and absorbed their exports. Their current accounts became more balanced, and trade has proved itself to be a powerful remedy, more so than the counterproductive conditional IMF standby support. In the meantime, the WTO's dispute settlement system has functioned as a remarkably efficient and effective mechanism for resolving trade conflicts between WTO members. Emeritus Professor Giorgio Sacerdoti, an international law professor at Bocconi University in Milan and former member of the Appellate Body offered in a book on the contribution of the dispute settlement system this comment: "The past ten years show the vitality of the dispute settlement system as had been envisaged, as well as its central position within the WTO as an element capable of ensuring respect of agreed rules." Although the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003 could not advance the Doha Agenda, it significantly marked the emergence of developing countries as active participants in the negotiation process. They have become serious demandeurs, witnessing their joint group approaches, their consistent push on Special and Differential Treatment (SD&T) proposals, support for LDC accessions, and, most importantly, the technical assistance initiatives through the Aid for Trade programme, enabling developing countries to meet international standards and access global markets. The introduction of cotton as a specific commodity for negotiation at Cancun, with my consistent support, also helped to focus on an item of major export earnings for several LDCs in Africa. Like several other negotiation issues, cotton, SD&T, and Trade-Related Intellectual Property Agreement (Trips) and its public health flexibilities would gain more traction going into the second decade of the WTO. WTO discussions on cotton took up two tracks: one on trade aspects and another on development assistance to raise productivity and enhance its value chain. Agreement was reached at the 2015 Ministerial Conference to prohibit the use of export subsidies and call for a further reduction in domestic support for cotton products. Since the launch of the SD&T negotiations in 2001, the issue continues to be discussed at several ministerial meetings, with only a ministerial declaration to be adopted at the 13th Ministerial Conference in 2024 as the first outcome ever made on agreement-specific proposals applicable to all developing countries. On Trips and public health, progress was made before the Cancun Ministerial to create flexibilities in using compulsory licensing beyond serving only domestic markets, but also allowing export of medicines to countries in need. This Trips amendment carries a humane face to WTO agreements in that countries with no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector can now do parallel importing of the necessary medicines to deal with domestic health problems. This extension was given full legal effect in 2017 and further clarified at the WTO's 12th Ministerial Conference in 2022 in order to support equitable access to Covid-19 vaccines. Although the Doha Agenda could not be brought to an end in the WTO's second decade, another significant milestone was achieved in the form of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), coming into force in 2017. This agreement facilitates the harmonisation of export and import processes, resulting in the speeding up of the movement, release, and clearance of goods, including those in transit. According to the WTO World Trade Report 2024, the implementation of the TFA has led to a substantial increase in trade, with agricultural trade among developing economies increasing by 16 to 22%. The book The WTO at Twenty: Challenges and Achievements, published in 2015, concludes that the WTO has achieved much over its first 20 years, but the success of the WTO has inevitably given rise to new challenges. Indeed, the challenges came through thick and fast in the WTO's third decade. Multilateralism has come under threat as geopolitical polarisation began to take hold while the Doha negotiations dragged on with no end in sight. As trade tension grew between the US and China, the global trading system stuttered with rising uncertainty exacerbated by a growing number of trade restriction measures. Environmental concerns also contributed to border regulations that put more restraints on normal trade flows, such as carbon taxes and border carbon adjustment measures. The Appellate Body that has been an effective mainstay of the WTO's dispute settlement system (DSS) has been disabled since December 2019 due to the US blocking the appointment of new judges. With no appeal quorum, the enforceability of WTO rules is rendered impossible. Some alternatives to the existing system have been raised, such as the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MP/A) with limited applicability. The US blocking has come with its concerns about the Appellate Body's interpretation of WTO rules, which has led to proposed reforms of the system, claiming the body's overstepping of its mandate. This US blocking is somewhat ironic, considering that the US has been the most prolific user of the DSB and gained positive rulings on a majority of complaints. When I was at the WTO, I made attempts to resort to arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. Now again we see this proposal being brought forward, recognising the possibility of applying "expeditious arbitration" under Article 25 of the DSU. As the WTO moves into its fourth decade, it needs to prepare itself to counter an extremely disruptive period in the world trading system. US President Donald Trump's 'liberation day' tariff hikes and subsequent retaliations or submissions are unprecedented and unpredictable. While the US will remain one of the world's most significant markets, its share in the world trade volume may gradually decline, while the share of South–South trade will continue to expand. But this chaotic situation should not really benefit anyone, and whether it will help to narrow the US trade deficit remains to be seen. The essential role of the WTO as the guardian of the rules-based trading system will be more needed than ever before. In the words of the late Cuban president Fidel Castro, as spoken to me when I was at the WTO: "The world needs the WTO to bring order to this chaotic world." In order to face up to this existential threat, the WTO must be able to seriously reform itself before it's too late. I fully concur with WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala in her strongly prodding the members to agree on 'deep and thorough' reform proposals for the 14th Ministerial Conference in Yaoundé, Cameroon, next year, to ensure the WTO's relevance. First and foremost are the reforms of the DSU to entice the US back into the system, which needs to be simplified and easily accessible. This could lead to subsequent WTO-backed orderly discussions and negotiations to bring back the wayward tariffs into an acceptable configuration. In the meantime, the WTO may intervene to bring relief to the low-income developing countries injured by the tariff hikes. The chair of the General Council has been conducting informal consultations with the membership to ensure the impact of tariff escalations and to thrash out some joint actions to deal with the crisis. The process can help pave the way for focusing on the key reforms at the MC 14. In view of all these ongoing efforts, I do have full respect and confidence in the management of the WTO with the pragmatic collaboration of the membership to successfully preserve and strengthen the rules-based trading system we all need. Time will tell whether the disruptive emergence of unprecedented tariff escalations will prove to be highly costly to all economies of the world and will ultimately fail to serve the corrective purposes they were intended for. Supachai Panitchpakdi is a veteran Thai politician and former director-general of the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as a former secretary-general of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
