Latest news with #Wilayatal-Faqih
Ammon
10 hours ago
- Politics
- Ammon
How will the war end?
Benjamin Netanyahu has placed the Iranian regime, the Wilayat al-Faqih system, before a fateful challenge through a harsh pre-emptive strike. While extremely risky, the strike was not decisive enough to settle the confrontation. Netanyahu himself did not expect that an ideological-nationalist regime like Iran's would surrender and offer immediate concessions following the strike, without launching a retaliatory blow against Israel. Despite Iran's unprecedented powerful strikes on Tel Aviv, the reformist current in Iran, represented by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, has also demonstrated its continued commitment to 'the negotiating table' and to finding a way out of this war. Iran has deliberately avoided using its full missile capabilities against Israel to prevent the battle from reaching the point of no return. Current indicators suggest that this war will likely not last long, nor will it expand geographically, because the destruction costs—for both sides—are immense. For Iran, this includes damage to its oil facilities, which are the backbone of its economy, as well as the protection of what remains of its nuclear program and infrastructure. For Israel, the fact that Iran managed to breach the Iron Dome and cause major direct damage in the heart of Tel Aviv and Haifa presents a reality that Israelis cannot endure. In this light, there will likely come a tipping point at which both parties will be willing to end the conflict. The timing of that moment will be decided by the U.S. administration, which will step in to halt the military escalation. But when will this moment arrive? It will come when both sides realise that they can no longer achieve significant additional objectives, and that the cost of continuing the conflict far outweighs the cost of stopping it, especially given that a so-called "knockout blow" is impossible in such existential wars. On the Israeli side, there are two major areas of superiority: First, Israel's air force has successfully destroyed much of Iran's air defense systems, allowing it to operate freely over Tehran and strike targets at will. Second, intelligence penetration, which could lead to further surprises that may force the Iranians to retreat or make subsequent concessions. However, Israel's major vulnerability lies in its inability to withstand sustained, large-scale missile attacks, especially after a prolonged multi-front military conflict. As for Iran, it has two primary objectives in the current military confrontation: To preserve the political legitimacy of the Wilayat al-Faqih regime, which is built on religious ideology and propaganda. Failing to respond or retreating now would reflect poorly internally and could erode the regime's very source of legitimacy. To protect Iran's deterrence capacity and prevent its regional standing from deteriorating—especially after losing the bulk of its regional influence in the aftermath of 'Flood of al-Aqsa' (the Gaza war). American intervention, whether military or diplomatic, will be decisive in ending this conflict. It is evident that President Donald Trump prefers a negotiated path, aiming for political, military, and economic gains. Netanyahu, however, is betting that a major military defeat for the Iranian regime will lead not only to concessions on its nuclear program (the primary stated objective) but potentially to changing or collapsing the regime itself, thereby neutralizing it within the regional power structure. This would constitute a strategic shift in the regional security equation in Israel's favour. Direct US military involvement remains unlikely, except in two scenarios: If Israel were to request assistance after a massive and successful missile strike against its territory. If the U.S. concludes that Iran will not back down unless there is a more dramatic shift in the military balance of power that compels it to return to the negotiating table and offer substantial concessions. This equation was not the same two years ago. Back then, Iran had greater geopolitical space and extensive tools of influence in the region. However, what has occurred with the fall of Bashar al-Assad's corridor (the Syrian axis), and the diminished power of Hezbollah and Hamas, has cost Iran critical advantages in the regional balance of power. After this war, there will be significant consequences even for Iran's remaining influence in Iraq, which may become the final outpost lost by Tehran, ending a twenty-year effort (since the 2003 invasion of Iraq) to weave its intricate carpet of regional influence.
Asharq Al-Awsat
11-04-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Khamenei Fatwa Gives Iraqi Militias Room to Maneuver, Quds Force Plots Plan B
Iraqi Shiite factions and parties find themselves torn between two opposing forces — Tehran's call to preserve the 'Wilayat al-Faqih' system at all costs, and Washington's growing pressure to dismantle armed groups as a condition for engagement. The competing agendas are tightening their grip as US and Iranian officials prepare for fresh negotiations in Oman on Saturday, amid a tense regional backdrop. Both sides are testing who will blink first. Some Iraqi factions have reportedly received a religious ruling from Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, granting them leeway to ease US pressure without undermining Tehran's loyalist political network in Iraq. Iranian Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani has also left behind a small team in Baghdad to oversee political files, including a previously issued recommendation to halt attacks on US interests 'for now.' The ruling, which surfaced recently, was communicated late last year through Shiite politicians and is seen as a quiet nod toward de-escalation — or at least a tactical pause. Interviews conducted by Asharq Al-Awsat suggest the fatwa has enabled factions to avoid Israeli-American strikes and gain time to prepare a "Plan B" in case diplomacy with Washington breaks down. Within Iraq's powerful Coordination Framework — an umbrella group of Iran-aligned forces — discussions are intensifying. But rather than focusing on disarmament, they aim to preserve the influence of pro-Khamenei groups in the political system. One insider likened the strategy to 'sacrificing the fetus to save the mother,' while some influential Shiite figures in government are skeptical about 'putting all the eggs in Tehran's basket.' Sources familiar with the talks say Washington remains unconvinced by Baghdad's reassurances that Iran-aligned militias will be dismantled. A recent American message demanded disbanding armed groups and reintegrating their fighters through civilian rehabilitation programs. A senior official from one of the Shiite factions told Asharq Al-Awsat, 'It's the factions themselves that will decide the fate of their weapons. That decision depends on regional calculations, not on unilateral demands.' Khamenei's 'Harm Prevention' Fatwa According to sources, in autumn 2024, representatives of a Shiite leader within the Coordination Framework — who also commands an armed wing — traveled to Iran to meet with Khamenei. They asked whether his earlier fatwa calling for participation in the 'support front' remained in effect after the start of the Gaza war, even amid escalating threats from the US and Israel. Khamenei reportedly responded verbally, saying: 'Preventing harm comes first.' The Iraqi delegation interpreted this as a fatwa, and the leader passed it on to faction commanders and allies. The meeting followed internal disputes among Iraqi factions over whether to continue attacks on US bases or Israeli targets. Some leaders had insisted the original fatwa supporting the "support front" remained in place. A senior Iraqi official involved in the weapons negotiations said the fatwa has become a pivotal element in shaping discussions around disarmament. These talks gained new momentum amid mounting US threats to strike Iranian assets and growing speculation in Baghdad that, with operations against Yemen's Houthis winding down, Iraqi factions could become the last remaining operational node of the so-called 'Axis of Resistance.' Faction leaders now believe they can harness Iran's two strongest traits — pragmatism and adaptability. As one official put it: 'Baghdad has become a testing ground for political trial balloons.' Qaani's Team in Baghdad A senior Shiite leader in Iraq says the priority for pro-Iran factions is to protect their political foothold within the Iraqi state, even if they are forced to disarm — a move they believe would be reversible if circumstances shift in Tehran's favor. Before concluding his March 2025 visit to Baghdad, Quds Force commander, Qaani, left behind a small Iranian team tasked with overseeing both political and field developments, according to Iraqi sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat. The team's initial objective was reportedly to help restructure Iraq's Shiite political alliances, but sources say its main focus quickly turned to managing the behavior and positioning of armed factions under rising US pressure. A trusted source told Asharq Al-Awsat the Qaani team was particularly committed to enforcing Tehran's instruction of 'zero operations' against US targets — a tactical pause aimed at avoiding escalation while high-stakes negotiations loom. Despite conflicting accounts about the team's mission, a senior figure in the Iran-aligned Coordination Framework said its dual purpose was to 'curb the factions' actions against the Americans while simultaneously mapping out political alliances ahead of elections.' The source added that the factions are under strict orders to avoid provocative moves and refrain from unilateral action, but are also expected to be ready 'to defend the Wilayat al-Faqih system if the outcome of the upcoming talks in Oman warrants it.' The Iranian team has reportedly held a series of meetings with faction leaders and party officials to ensure that contingency plans — known as 'Plan B' — are in place should nuclear negotiations collapse. 'If the nuclear talks result in a decision to disarm the factions, this team will be instrumental in managing the fallout,' the Shiite official said. Fate of Arms? Two senior officials from Shiite parties with brigades in Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) say the fate of the paramilitary umbrella group and its weaponry are closely intertwined — and ultimately in the hands of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. But they admit that shifting regional dynamics have forced a recalibration of tactics. 'There's something changing in Baghdad when it comes to the factions and their arms,' one of the officials told Asharq Al-Awsat. 'Talks have intensified recently as US military deployments grow. Some are preparing to adapt to the risks and changing landscape — but the path ahead remains uncertain.' The official noted that Iraq's Shiite factions now find themselves caught between two conflicting tracks: one led by Iran, where their loyalty is political and security-based, and another dictated by the United States, where economic and security interests are at stake. 'It will end in one of two ways — either disarmament or a return to regional escalation,' the official said. Reluctant Retreat Ahead of Elections Within the Iran-aligned Coordination Framework, divisions are emerging over how to handle potential disarmament. While some factions remain wary of US intentions and the outcome of the nuclear negotiations, others are leaning toward a pragmatic retreat, favoring survival over resistance. 'After the Houthis, Iraqi factions will be Iran's last remaining high-value asset — they won't be given up easily or without concessions,' said a senior Shiite leader. A former government official, speaking on condition of anonymity, ruled out any serious move to disarm. 'Giving up weapons would mean losing their edge over political rivals,' the official said. 'These groups won't head into the next election in a wheelchair.' In recent weeks, influential Shiite actors have begun floating trial balloons, including proposals for 'negotiated disarmament,' aimed at crafting an Iraqi model that allows the Coordination Framework to navigate shifting US-Iran dynamics. The Shiite clerical ruling known as the 'harm prevention' fatwa has helped advance those discussions. One proposed model would see weapons handed over as a conditional trust — secured but retrievable — preserving the factions' political leverage while keeping open the possibility of future resistance, should diplomacy falter. Sources told Asharq Al-Awsat in February 2025 that ongoing talks over disarmament were largely symbolic and unlikely to produce meaningful results. Maliki Holds Firm Not all Shiite leaders support the pragmatic shift. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has rejected concessions, insisting on a hardline 'Shiite strategy' regardless of how US-Iran negotiations unfold. Multiple sources say Maliki has informed various parties — including Iranian circles — that he has no intention of weakening the PMF, even if Tehran distances itself. 'We won't trust anyone... We're defending our own project,' he was quoted as saying. People close to Maliki say his calculus is shaped by deep-rooted fears: changes in Syria's power structure, Türkiye's rising regional role, and growing competition within Iraq's Shiite camp — particularly from current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who is seen as leveraging the US-Iran standoff to boost his political prospects. A senior figure from Maliki's Dawa Party said: 'He will respond to these threats by reinforcing the most powerful Shiite military institution — the Popular Mobilization Forces — no matter what Tehran decides.'
