How will the war end?
Benjamin Netanyahu has placed the Iranian regime, the Wilayat al-Faqih system, before a fateful challenge through a harsh pre-emptive strike. While extremely risky, the strike was not decisive enough to settle the confrontation. Netanyahu himself did not expect that an ideological-nationalist regime like Iran's would surrender and offer immediate concessions following the strike, without launching a retaliatory blow against Israel.
Despite Iran's unprecedented powerful strikes on Tel Aviv, the reformist current in Iran, represented by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, has also demonstrated its continued commitment to 'the negotiating table' and to finding a way out of this war. Iran has deliberately avoided using its full missile capabilities against Israel to prevent the battle from reaching the point of no return.
Current indicators suggest that this war will likely not last long, nor will it expand geographically, because the destruction costs—for both sides—are immense. For Iran, this includes damage to its oil facilities, which are the backbone of its economy, as well as the protection of what remains of its nuclear program and infrastructure. For Israel, the fact that Iran managed to breach the Iron Dome and cause major direct damage in the heart of Tel Aviv and Haifa presents a reality that Israelis cannot endure.
In this light, there will likely come a tipping point at which both parties will be willing to end the conflict. The timing of that moment will be decided by the U.S. administration, which will step in to halt the military escalation. But when will this moment arrive? It will come when both sides realise that they can no longer achieve significant additional objectives, and that the cost of continuing the conflict far outweighs the cost of stopping it, especially given that a so-called "knockout blow" is impossible in such existential wars.
On the Israeli side, there are two major areas of superiority: First, Israel's air force has successfully destroyed much of Iran's air defense systems, allowing it to operate freely over Tehran and strike targets at will. Second, intelligence penetration, which could lead to further surprises that may force the Iranians to retreat or make subsequent concessions. However, Israel's major vulnerability lies in its inability to withstand sustained, large-scale missile attacks, especially after a prolonged multi-front military conflict.
As for Iran, it has two primary objectives in the current military confrontation: To preserve the political legitimacy of the Wilayat al-Faqih regime, which is built on religious ideology and propaganda. Failing to respond or retreating now would reflect poorly internally and could erode the regime's very source of legitimacy. To protect Iran's deterrence capacity and prevent its regional standing from deteriorating—especially after losing the bulk of its regional influence in the aftermath of 'Flood of al-Aqsa' (the Gaza war).
American intervention, whether military or diplomatic, will be decisive in ending this conflict. It is evident that President Donald Trump prefers a negotiated path, aiming for political, military, and economic gains. Netanyahu, however, is betting that a major military defeat for the Iranian regime will lead not only to concessions on its nuclear program (the primary stated objective) but potentially to changing or collapsing the regime itself, thereby neutralizing it within the regional power structure. This would constitute a strategic shift in the regional security equation in Israel's favour.
Direct US military involvement remains unlikely, except in two scenarios: If Israel were to request assistance after a massive and successful missile strike against its territory. If the U.S. concludes that Iran will not back down unless there is a more dramatic shift in the military balance of power that compels it to return to the negotiating table and offer substantial concessions.
This equation was not the same two years ago. Back then, Iran had greater geopolitical space and extensive tools of influence in the region. However, what has occurred with the fall of Bashar al-Assad's corridor (the Syrian axis), and the diminished power of Hezbollah and Hamas, has cost Iran critical advantages in the regional balance of power. After this war, there will be significant consequences even for Iran's remaining influence in Iraq, which may become the final outpost lost by Tehran, ending a twenty-year effort (since the 2003 invasion of Iraq) to weave its intricate carpet of regional influence.
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How will the war end?
Benjamin Netanyahu has placed the Iranian regime, the Wilayat al-Faqih system, before a fateful challenge through a harsh pre-emptive strike. While extremely risky, the strike was not decisive enough to settle the confrontation. Netanyahu himself did not expect that an ideological-nationalist regime like Iran's would surrender and offer immediate concessions following the strike, without launching a retaliatory blow against Israel. Despite Iran's unprecedented powerful strikes on Tel Aviv, the reformist current in Iran, represented by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, has also demonstrated its continued commitment to 'the negotiating table' and to finding a way out of this war. Iran has deliberately avoided using its full missile capabilities against Israel to prevent the battle from reaching the point of no return. Current indicators suggest that this war will likely not last long, nor will it expand geographically, because the destruction costs—for both sides—are immense. For Iran, this includes damage to its oil facilities, which are the backbone of its economy, as well as the protection of what remains of its nuclear program and infrastructure. For Israel, the fact that Iran managed to breach the Iron Dome and cause major direct damage in the heart of Tel Aviv and Haifa presents a reality that Israelis cannot endure. In this light, there will likely come a tipping point at which both parties will be willing to end the conflict. The timing of that moment will be decided by the U.S. administration, which will step in to halt the military escalation. But when will this moment arrive? It will come when both sides realise that they can no longer achieve significant additional objectives, and that the cost of continuing the conflict far outweighs the cost of stopping it, especially given that a so-called "knockout blow" is impossible in such existential wars. On the Israeli side, there are two major areas of superiority: First, Israel's air force has successfully destroyed much of Iran's air defense systems, allowing it to operate freely over Tehran and strike targets at will. Second, intelligence penetration, which could lead to further surprises that may force the Iranians to retreat or make subsequent concessions. However, Israel's major vulnerability lies in its inability to withstand sustained, large-scale missile attacks, especially after a prolonged multi-front military conflict. As for Iran, it has two primary objectives in the current military confrontation: To preserve the political legitimacy of the Wilayat al-Faqih regime, which is built on religious ideology and propaganda. Failing to respond or retreating now would reflect poorly internally and could erode the regime's very source of legitimacy. To protect Iran's deterrence capacity and prevent its regional standing from deteriorating—especially after losing the bulk of its regional influence in the aftermath of 'Flood of al-Aqsa' (the Gaza war). American intervention, whether military or diplomatic, will be decisive in ending this conflict. It is evident that President Donald Trump prefers a negotiated path, aiming for political, military, and economic gains. Netanyahu, however, is betting that a major military defeat for the Iranian regime will lead not only to concessions on its nuclear program (the primary stated objective) but potentially to changing or collapsing the regime itself, thereby neutralizing it within the regional power structure. This would constitute a strategic shift in the regional security equation in Israel's favour. Direct US military involvement remains unlikely, except in two scenarios: If Israel were to request assistance after a massive and successful missile strike against its territory. If the U.S. concludes that Iran will not back down unless there is a more dramatic shift in the military balance of power that compels it to return to the negotiating table and offer substantial concessions. This equation was not the same two years ago. Back then, Iran had greater geopolitical space and extensive tools of influence in the region. However, what has occurred with the fall of Bashar al-Assad's corridor (the Syrian axis), and the diminished power of Hezbollah and Hamas, has cost Iran critical advantages in the regional balance of power. After this war, there will be significant consequences even for Iran's remaining influence in Iraq, which may become the final outpost lost by Tehran, ending a twenty-year effort (since the 2003 invasion of Iraq) to weave its intricate carpet of regional influence.