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JINF Report: Is China's Senkaku Takeover Ever Closer?
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The Japan Institute for National Fundamentals (JINF), chaired by Yoshiko Sakurai, analyzed and assessed the Chinese helicopter that violated Japanese airspace on May 3 near the Senkaku Islands (Ishigaki City, Okinawa Prefecture).
JINF, a private think tank, urged the Japanese government to take action, warning that China ultimately "aims to land on the Senkakus."
Japanese experts also raised concerns that Japan is being drawn into China's cognitive warfare, a strategy to shape public opinion through disinformation. This article summarizes the key points discussed during JINF's briefing session on May 30.
At approximately 12:21 PM on May 3, a Chinese helicopter violated Japanese airspace for about 15 minutes, prompting the Japan Air Self-Defense Force to conduct an emergency scramble in response. Just minutes earlier, at 12:18 PM, the Chinese Coast Guard vessel 2303, which was carrying the helicopter, had entered Japanese territorial waters.
Around the same time, a Japanese civilian aircraft that departed from New Ishigaki Airport approached the airspace near the Senkakus. Following guidance from the Japanese Coast Guard, the plane turned around at around 12:20 PM, approximately 20 kilometers south of Uotsuri Island.
Maki Nakagawa, a researcher at the JINF, outlined the sequence of events surrounding the airspace violation. She suggested that China "may have obtained advance knowledge of the Japanese civilian aircraft's flight plan and used that information to decide when to raise the ladder by deploying the helicopter for an air patrol over the Senkakus." Nakagawa added that it appears preparations were made in advance based on that information.
If the Chinese side had indeed accessed Japan's civilian flight patterns in advance, that would be a serious concern in itself. This indicates that the airspace violation was not accidental but rather a carefully coordinated operation. A Chinese helicopter violating Japanese airspace on May 3, 2025. (Photo provided by the 11th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, Naha, Okinawa)
After the airspace violation, the China Coast Guard, along with the Chinese foreign ministry and defense ministry, released coordinated statements. They claimed that "a Japanese civilian aircraft had violated the airspace over Diaoyu Island (Chinese name for Senkakus)." The three agencies argued, "It is entirely lawful to take necessary enforcement actions, including issuing a warning to drive the aircraft away."
Nakagawa noted that China's statements seek to "assert sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and legitimize [Chinese] actions under international law." In other words, "China is engaging in a cognitive warfare campaign against Japan by trying to frame the situation as if it were Japan that provoked a violation of Chinese airspace."
Kiyofumi Iwata, a member of the JINF and former chief of staff of the Ground Self-Defense Force, also warned that Chinese cognitive warfare is beginning to influence Japanese public perception.
Some observers have raised the possibility of a simultaneous Chinese invasion of Taiwan and a landing on the Senkakus. Iwata pointed out that Admiral John Aquilino, Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, has described China's military exercises around Taiwan since 2024 as a "rehearsal" for a future invasion.
Referring to former government officials and experts who spoke to the media about China's recent airspace violation, Iwata said, "Even at this stage, there are still those who claim Japan provoked China's breach of sovereignty." To this, he added, "They have completely fallen into China's cognitive warfare trap, and it's a truly regrettable situation."
"As far as I can recall, Chinese coast guard helicopters have been approaching for some time. But they had never [violated our airspace]," said Kazuhisa Shimada, former Vice Minister of Defense and ex-secretary to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
"The fact that they did so this time suggests they may now believe Japan's response will not be strong enough to deter them. And that is deeply concerning."
Shimada's comments reveal Japan had been caught off guard.
Ten days after the airspace violation, on May 13, Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya held a press conference and stated that he had protested to China. He repeatedly called the recent incursion into Japan's territorial waters and the violation of its airspace "extremely regrettable."
However, he did not announce any new measures in response to China's unprecedented actions. As Shimada pointed out, such a lack of concrete action could very well embolden China to act even more aggressively.
There is a view that China is gradually increasing pressure through a "salami slicing tactic," steadily making incremental moves like slicing a salami. "If you ask which side the salami is on, it's Japan," warned Retired Vice Admiral Masanori Yoshida. "But the salami has already been sliced, and the next thing to be cut is our hand."
The implication is that the salami is gone, and China's next objective is to set foot on the Senkakus.
Iwata concurred, saying, "The salami slicing is over, and we must recognize that the only phase left is a landing." He emphasized the need for the government to secure effective control of the Senkakus and to strengthen the Air Self-Defense Force's response capabilities.
Iwata proposed conducting joint Japan-US training exercises on Kuba Island (private property) and Taisho Island (state property). These islands are located approximately 27 kilometers and 110 kilometers, respectively, from Uotsuri Island in the Senkakus. Iwata also recommended establishing an Air Self-Defense Force base at Shimoji Island Airport in Miyakojima City, Okinawa Prefecture.
The former chief of staff further stressed the importance of clearly demonstrating Japan's "will and ability" to defend its sovereignty over the Senkakus to China. He expressed serious concern about the response from the Ishiba administration, questioning, "Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, as head of state, has yet to make his intentions clear. Is this acceptable?"
Author: Takao Harakawa
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