Latest news with #anti-Zionism
Los Angeles Times
a day ago
- Politics
- Los Angeles Times
Anti-Zionism is antisemitism — university leaders settle the question
For too long, the debate over antisemitism on college campuses has bogged down over whether anti-Zionism is antisemitism. Endless ink has been spilled over the distinction (or not) between the two. Last week, in their testimony to the House Committee on Education & Workforce, UC Berkeley Chancellor Rich Lyons, City University of New York Chancellor Félix V. Matos Rodríguez and Georgetown interim President Robert M. Groves cut through all this academic hairsplitting. 'Is denying the Jewish people their rights to self-determination … antisemitism? Yes or no?' asked Rep. Burgess Owens (R-Utah). All three university leaders replied simply and unequivocally: 'Yes.' The right to Jewish self-determination is a textbook definition of Zionism. The clarity with which the university officials pegged anti-Zionism as antisemitic is much-needed and long overdue. For years, progressives have raised consciousness about the need to recognize and repudiate bigoted dog whistles, microaggressions and misgendering. Yet many of those same progressives have been shockingly silent when it comes to decrying the macroaggressions of antisemitism that have become increasingly commonplace at anti-Israel protests. They've insisted that the now-familiar chants — 'From the river to the sea, Palestine shall be free!' 'We don't want no two states! We want all of '48!'— are not antisemitic, just anti-Zionist, with some who are Jewish concurring and providing cover. Yet just as there can be 'racism without racists' — that is, racist results without racist intents — so too can there be antisemitism without antisemites. Not all anti-Zionists are antisemites, but anti-Zionism, in its most basic form — denying to the Jewish people the right to self-determination, a right recognized as inherent to countless others, including Palestinians — is itself a form of antisemitism. Moreover, because anti-Zionism singles out the Jewish state alone for elimination — among the dozens of ethnonational or ethnoreligious states in the world, including myriad Islamic ones — that, too, makes it a form of antisemitism. Declaring anti-Zionism to be antisemitic, as the university leaders did, was an important development for the dignity of Jewish students, one that echoed and amplified a federal district court's preliminary injunction last year that said UCLA could not allow anti-Israel activists to exclude 'Jewish students … because they refused to denounce their faith,' of which Zionism was a central component, from parts of the campus, as happened during protests against the Israel-Hamas war. Zionism, at its core, is a belief in Israel's right to sovereignty as a Jewish state on part of the ancestral homeland of the Jewish people. That's a millennia-old article of faith for Judaism, as reflected, for example, in daily Jewish prayers, the Passover Seder and the ritual of breaking a glass at weddings. Those claiming the mantle of Zionism for far more aggressive or exclusionary aims don't change that core fact, nor do those treating Zionism as a uniquely malevolent expression of national liberation or nation-building. Recognizing anti-Zionism as a manifestation of antisemitism is an important step forward for combating the discrimination and ostracism that many Jewish students have experienced for expressing their support for Israel's right to exist in the face of those who call for its elimination. Such recognition, in turn, can help concentrate campus conflicts about Israel and Palestinians on what matters most: fruitful debate over Israel's actions (including its prosecution of the war in Gaza) rather than fruitless shouting matches over Israel's existence and neo-McCarthyite litmus tests ('Are you now or have you ever been a Zionist?'). As this happens, we would be well-served to cease and desist using the terms 'Zionism' and 'anti-Zionism,' except as historical artifacts. After all, 'Zionism' refers to the aspiration to create a nation that is now nearly 80 years old. And anti-Zionism thus perpetuates a fantasy that Israel's long-settled place among the family of nations is still open for debate. It isn't, any more than, say, the existence of Russia under Putin or the United States under Trump, however much we might deplore their policies, is open for debate. We owe the Berkeley, CUNY and Georgetown leaders a great debt of gratitude for helping to elevate the intractable campus conflicts about Israel and the Palestinians to a higher plane. Mark Brilliant is an associate professor of history and American studies at UC Berkeley.
News18
5 days ago
- Business
- News18
After Iran-Israel War, A More Unsettled Middle East
In the war's aftermath, the Middle East is more fragmented, its future more precarious The Iran-Israel war, long simmering in the shadows through proxies and intelligence skirmishes, finally erupted into a direct confrontation that not only shook the Middle East but stirred the global order. But when the smoke cleared and ceasefires took fragile shape, one was left asking: who really won, and who truly lost? Or, was there a victor at all? To examine this conflict in isolation is to miss its complex genealogy. The war did not begin in April 2025 or December 2024 when the first missiles were openly exchanged. It began decades ago, seeded in ideological conflict, regional ambition, historical grievance, and strategic calculation. Iran, with its consistent commitment to anti-Zionism, and Israel, with its existential anxiety and security doctrine of pre-emption, have long danced a deadly duet, each enabling the other's paranoia. But it was American withdrawal from regional stewardship and the collapse of the two-state illusion in Palestine that provided the vacuum into which this war was sucked. What we witnessed was not merely a regional war. It was a hybrid conflict—a mosaic of direct missile exchanges, cyberattacks, targeted assassinations, and proxy engagements in Syria, Lebanon, and even the Red Sea. Iran mobilised its axis of resistance—Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Iraq and Syria. Israel, technologically superior, retaliated with brutal precision. Cities in both nations bled. Tel Aviv's iron dome held—but not always. Tehran saw unprecedented cyber blackouts. Lebanon was devastated again. Hundreds died, thousands were displaced, and the economy of the region—already tottering—collapsed further. Oil prices soared, and global supply chains convulsed. For Iran, the war was both a demonstration of capability and a revelation of vulnerability. The Islamic Republic showcased a remarkable ability to coordinate its proxies. The war gave it a psychological edge—it proved Iran could threaten Israeli soil directly, not just through intermediaries. Internally, the war deepened fissures in Iranian society. Already fatigued by years of sanctions, economic mismanagement, and the trauma of the Mahsa Amini protests, a significant segment of the Iranian public was far from united in support of escalation. Still, the regime's narrative of resistance resonated with many, and illusions of regime change in Iran were reminiscent of past Western imperialism, apart from being premature and misjudged. Israel, for its part, won tactically perhaps, but reinforced its dubious image as the bully of the Middle East. The unstable and precarious regime of Benjamin Netanyahu can only survive by invoking the simulated nationalism of war, and the notion of 'Israel under siege'. However, it did demonstrate, backed by the fulsome supply of American weapons, its military and intelligence superiority. Iranian weapons convoys were obliterated. Key militia commanders were assassinated. Tel Aviv showed it could strike at the heart of Iranian infrastructure. But the strategic victory is less clear. For a nation that prides itself on deterrence, Israel failed to deter. Iran did retaliate. Its missiles did land. Its proxies did act. And perhaps most significantly, there is no clarity about whether its uranium enrichment programme has suffered fatal damage. Israel's domestic unity frayed. The war accelerated the cleavage between secular and religious Jews, Ashkenazi and Mizrahi populations, and reignited Palestinian resistance in the West Bank. Israel emerged militarily intact but politically shaken, increasingly dependent on the continued commitment of its American patron. Its image as a democratic fortress amid authoritarian neighbours grew threadbare under the scrutiny of war-time censorship and aggressive counterinsurgency. And what of America? Perhaps there is a diabolical method in the apparent madness of Donald Trump. He allowed Israel and Iran to batter each other, even joining Israel briefly in its attack on Iran, and then when he had left both sufficiently wounded, put pressure on them to agree to a ceasefire. India's position during the Iran-Israel war exemplified the dilemmas of an aspiring global power. Bound by its traditional ties to Iran—a vital oil supplier and a counterbalance to Pakistan's regional ambitions—India also shares a deepening strategic embrace with Israel, especially in defence, agriculture, and cyber-security. New Delhi's official stance was one of predictable neutrality. It called for de-escalation, respect for the sovereignty of both nations, and reiterated its commitment to regional peace. But underneath the platitudes was a passive diplomatic tightrope act. India could not afford to antagonise Israel—now a crucial supplier of defence technologies and a political partner against Islamic extremism. At the same time, alienating Iran would jeopardise the Chabahar port project, India's gateway to Central Asia, and push Tehran closer to China. Moreover, with over eight million Indians living and working in the Gulf, India had a strong interest in preventing the conflict from escalating into a wider regional war. Its evacuation operations were efficient, but it was clear that India still lacks the heft to shape outcomes in West Asia. It is a stakeholder, yes, but not yet a shaper. Perhaps the most haunting truth is that no one won. Iran bled, Israel endured, America equivocated, and India chose to remain a bystander. The people—civilians in Tehran, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Sana'a—were the true losers. Victory was claimed on all sides, but it was a hollow, rhetorical one. The war did not redraw borders. It did not resolve grievances. It merely exposed the unsustainable status quo. In the war's aftermath, the Middle East is more fragmented, its future more precarious. The spectre of nuclear escalation—unthinkable until recently—now hovers ominously over future skirmishes. The real challenge lies ahead—in the building of a new regional architecture that transcends sectarianism, balances power, and invests in peace. India, with its historic civilisational ties to West Asia and its growing economic and diplomatic capital, must strive to be more than a fence-sitter. The writer is a former diplomat, an author, and a politician. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views. view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: June 27, 2025, 14:52 IST News opinion Opinion | After Iran-Israel War, A More Unsettled Middle East Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
The Hill
7 days ago
- Politics
- The Hill
Columbia announces additional steps to combat antisemitism amid negotiations with Trump administration
Columbia University announced Tuesday additional steps it would take to combat campus antisemitism after months of negotiations with the Trump administration to undo cuts to its funding. Among the steps, the most controversial Columbia President Claire Shipman announced was the adoption of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) definition of antisemitism. The definition is widely used among governments and other schools but has been criticized by left-leaning groups because it considers some anti-Zionism advocacy antisemitic. 'Columbia is committed to taking all possible steps to combat antisemitism and the University remains dedicated to ensuring that complaints of discrimination and harassment of all types, including complaints based on Jewish and Israeli identity, are treated in the same manner. Formally adding the consideration of the IHRA definition into our existing anti-discrimination policies strengthens our approach to combating antisemitism,' Shipman wrote. Other actions will include appointing Title VI and Title VII coordinators, additional antisemitism training for faculty, staff and students and affirming a zero-tolerance policy for hate and antisemitism on campus. Two people familiar with the situation told The New York Times a funding deal between Columbia and the administration could come as early as this week. It could include a hefty hundred-million dollar fine and further reforms on campus. 'Our work toward an agreement with the federal government has put a harsh spotlight on many of the difficult issues regarding discrimination and harassment we've seen on our campuses. The fact that we've faced pressure from the government does not make the problems on our campuses any less real; a significant part of our community has been deeply affected in negative ways,' Shipman wrote. 'In my view, any government agreement we reach is only a starting point for change. Committing to reform on our own is a more powerful path. It will better enable us to recognize our shortcomings and create lasting change,' she added. Columbia began cooperating with the federal government after it took away over $400 million in funding for alleged inaction on antisemitism.
The Age
15-07-2025
- Politics
- The Age
What is the controversial definition of antisemitism that institutions are being told to adopt?
Antisemitism envoy Jillian Segal released a plan last week with 49 steps to tackle rising discrimination against Jewish Australians. At the core of the report is a definition of antisemitism by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, which has become a lightning rod for criticism. Segal's recommendation to embed the alliance's definition in all public institutions last week came after a host of antisemitic attacks across Australia this year, including the doors of the East Melbourne synagogue being set alight earlier this month, and children at Jewish schools in Sydney being harassed with calls of 'Heil Hitler'. However, pro-Palestinian and some human rights organisations fear the definition may stifle legitimate criticism of Israel and its government by tying antisemitism to anti-Zionism, limiting the free speech. So what is the definition? How widely used is it? And why has it become controversial? What is the IHRA, and its definition of antisemitism? The alliance was established by the Stockholm International Forum, a series of conferences held between 2000 and 2004, and convened by then-Swedish prime minister Göran Persson. The conferences were held to combat 'the growth of extreme right-wing groups' that were spreading propaganda in schools, and to address a survey of Swedish young people that found knowledge of the Holocaust 'was deficient and that a large number of teenagers were not even certain that it had taken place', according to the Swedish government. There are now 35 member states of IHRA, including Australia, Israel, the UK and the US, all of which adopted a 'non-legally binding working definition' of antisemitism in May 2016. The definition adopted by the alliance states:
Sydney Morning Herald
15-07-2025
- Politics
- Sydney Morning Herald
What is the controversial definition of antisemitism that institutions are being told to adopt?
Antisemitism envoy Jillian Segal released a plan last week with 49 steps to tackle rising discrimination against Jewish Australians. At the core of the report is a definition of antisemitism by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, which has become a lightning rod for criticism. Segal's recommendation to embed the alliance's definition in all public institutions last week came after a host of antisemitic attacks across Australia this year, including the doors of the East Melbourne synagogue being set alight earlier this month, and children at Jewish schools in Sydney being harassed with calls of 'Heil Hitler'. However, pro-Palestinian and some human rights organisations fear the definition may stifle legitimate criticism of Israel and its government by tying antisemitism to anti-Zionism, limiting the free speech. So what is the definition? How widely used is it? And why has it become controversial? What is the IHRA, and its definition of antisemitism? The alliance was established by the Stockholm International Forum, a series of conferences held between 2000 and 2004, and convened by then-Swedish prime minister Göran Persson. The conferences were held to combat 'the growth of extreme right-wing groups' that were spreading propaganda in schools, and to address a survey of Swedish young people that found knowledge of the Holocaust 'was deficient and that a large number of teenagers were not even certain that it had taken place', according to the Swedish government. There are now 35 member states of IHRA, including Australia, Israel, the UK and the US, all of which adopted a 'non-legally binding working definition' of antisemitism in May 2016. The definition adopted by the alliance states:
