Latest news with #encryption
WIRED
21 hours ago
- WIRED
Encryption Made for Police and Military Radios May Be Easily Cracked
Aug 7, 2025 2:09 PM Researchers found that an encryption algorithm likely used by law enforcement and special forces can have weaknesses that could allow an attacker to listen in. Photo-Illustration:Two years ago, researchers in the Netherlands discovered an intentional backdoor in an encryption algorithm baked into radios used by critical infrastructure–as well as police, intelligence agencies, and military forces around the world–that made any communication secured with the algorithm vulnerable to eavesdropping. When the researchers publicly disclosed the issue in 2023, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), which developed the algorithm, advised anyone using it for sensitive communication to deploy an end-to-end encryption solution on top of the flawed algorithm to bolster the security of their communications. But now the same researchers have found that at least one implementation of the end-to-end encryption solution endorsed by ETSI has a similar issue that makes it equally vulnerable to eavesdropping. The encryption algorithm used for the device they examined starts with a 128-bit key, but this gets compressed to 56 bits before it encrypts traffic, making it easier to crack. It's not clear who is using this implementation of the end-to-end encryption algorithm, nor if anyone using devices with the end-to-end encryption is aware of the security vulnerability in them. The end-to-end encryption the researchers examined, which is expensive to deploy, is most commonly used in radios for law enforcement agencies, special forces, and covert military and intelligence teams that are involved in national security work and therefore need an extra layer of security. But ETSI's endorsement of the algorithm two years ago to mitigate flaws found in its lower-level encryption algorithm suggests it may be used more widely now than at the time. In 2023, Carlo Meijer, Wouter Bokslag, and Jos Wetzels of security firm Midnight Blue, based in the Netherlands, discovered vulnerabilities in encryption algorithms that are part of a European radio standard created by ETSI called TETRA (Terrestrial Trunked Radio), which has been baked into radio systems made by Motorola, Damm, Sepura, and others since the '90s. The flaws remained unknown publicly until their disclosure, because ETSI refused for decades to let anyone examine the proprietary algorithms. The end-to-end encryption the researchers examined recently is designed to run on top of TETRA encryption algorithms. The researchers found the issue with the end-to-end encryption (E2EE) only after extracting and reverse-engineering the E2EE algorithm used in a radio made by Sepura. The researchers plan to present their findings today at the BlackHat security conference in Las Vegas. ETSI, when contacted about the issue, noted that the end-to-end encryption used with TETRA-based radios is not part of the ETSI standard, nor was it created by the organization. Instead it was produced by The Critical Communications Association's (TCCA) security and fraud prevention group (SFPG). But ETSI and TCCA work closely with one another, and the two organizations include many of the same people. Brian Murgatroyd, former chair of the technical body at ETSI responsible for the TETRA standard as well as the TCCA group that developed the E2EE solution, wrote in an email on behalf of ETSI and the TCCA that end-to-end encryption was not included in the ETSI standard 'because at the time it was considered that E2EE would only be used by government groups where national security concerns were involved, and these groups often have special security needs. For this reason, Murgatroyd noted that purchasers of TETRA-based radios are free to deploy other solutions for end-to-end encryption on their radios, but he acknowledges that the one produced by the TCCA and endorsed by ETSI 'is widely used as far as we can tell.' Although TETRA-based radio devices are not used by police and military in the US, the majority of police forces around the world do use them. These include police forces in Belgium and Scandinavian countries, as well as East European countries like Serbia, Moldova, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, and in the Middle East in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. The Ministries of Defense in Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, and Syria also use them, as do the Polish military counterintelligence agency, the Finnish defense forces, and Lebanon and Saudi Arabia's intelligence services. It's not clear, however, how many of these also deploy end-to-end decryption with their radios. The TETRA standard includes four encryption algorithms—TEA1, TEA2, TEA3 and TEA4—that can be used by radio manufacturers in different products, depending on the intended customer and usage. The algorithms have different levels of security based on whether the radios will be sold in or outside Europe. TEA2, for example, is restricted for use in radios used by police, emergency services, military, and intelligence agencies in Europe. TEA3 is available for police and emergency services radios used outside Europe but only in countries deemed 'friendly' to the EU. Only TEA1 is available for radios used by public safety agencies, police agencies, and militaries in countries deemed not friendly to Europe, such as Iran. But it's also used in critical infrastructure in the US and other countries for machine-to-machine communication in industrial control settings such as pipelines, railways, and electric grids. All four TETRA encryption algorithms use 80-bit keys to secure communication. But the Dutch researchers revealed in 2023 that TEA1 has a feature that causes its key to get reduced to just 32 bits, which allowed the researchers to crack it in less than a minute. In the case of the E2EE, the researchers found that the implementation they examined starts with a key that is more secure than ones used in the TETRA algorithms, but it gets reduced to 56 bits, which would potentially let someone decrypt voice and data communications. They also found a second vulnerability that would let someone send fraudulent messages or replay legitimate ones to spread misinformation or confusion to personnel using the radios. The ability to inject voice traffic and replay messages affects all users of the TCCA end-to-end encryption scheme, according to the researchers. They say this is the result of flaws in the TCCA E2EE protocol design rather than a particular implementation. They also say that 'law enforcement end users' have confirmed to them that this flaw is in radios produced by vendors other than Sepura. But the researchers say only a subset of end-to-end encryption users are likely affected by the reduced-key vulnerability because it depends how the encryption was implemented in radios sold to various countries. ETSI's Murgatroyd said in 2023 that the TEA1 key was reduced to meet export controls for encryption sold to customers outside Europe. He said when the algorithm was created, a key with 32 bits of entropy was considered secure for most uses. Advances in computing power make it less secure now, so when the Dutch researchers exposed the reduced key two years ago, ETSI recommended that customers using TEA1 deploy TCCA's end-to-end encryption solution on top of it. But Murgatroyd said the end-to-end encryption algorithm designed by TCCA is different. It doesn't specify the key length the radios should use because governments using the end-to-end encryption have their own 'specific and often proprietary security rules' for the devices they use. Therefore they are able to customize the TCCA encryption algorithm in their devices by working with their radio supplier to select the 'encryption algorithm, key management and so on' that is right for them—but only to a degree. 'The choice of encryption algorithm and key is made between supplier and customer organisation, and ETSI has no input to this selection—nor knowledge of which algorithms and key lengths are in use in any system,' he said. But he added that radio manufacturers and customers 'will always have to abide by export control regulations.' The researchers say they cannot verify that the TCCA E2EE doesn't specify a key length because the TCCA documentation describing the solution is protected by non-disclosure agreement and provided only to radio vendors. But they note that the E2EE system calls out an 'algorithm identifier" number, which means it calls out the specific algorithm it's using for the end-to-end encryption. These identifiers are not vendor specific, the researchers say, which suggests the identifiers refer to different key variants produced by TCCA—meaning TCCA provides specifications for algorithms that use a 126 bit key or 56 bit key, and radio vendors can configure their devices to use either of these variants, depending on the export controls in place for the purchasing country. Whether users know their radios could have this vulnerability is unclear. The researchers found a confidential 2006 Sepura product bulletin that someone leaked online, which mentions that 'the length of the traffic key … is subject to export control regulations and hence the [encryption system in the device] will be factory configured to support 128, 64, or 56 bit key lengths.' But it's not clear what Sepura customers receive or if other manufacturers whose radios use a reduced key disclose to customers if their radios use a reduced-key algorithm. 'Some manufacturers have this in brochures; others only mention this in internal communications, and others don't mention it at all,' says Wetzels. He says they did extensive open-source research to examine vendor documentation and ' found no clear sign of weakening being communicated to end users. So while … there are 'some' mentions of the algorithm being weakened, it is not fully transparent at all.' Sepura did not respond to an inquiry from WIRED. But Murgatroyd says that because government customers who have opted to use TCCA's E2EE solution need to know the security of their devices, they are likely to be aware if their systems are using a reduced key. 'As end-to-end encryption is primarily used for government communications, we would expect that the relevant government National Security agencies are fully aware of the capabilities of their end-to-end encryption systems and can advise their users appropriately,' Murgatroyd wrote in his email. Wetzels is skeptical of this, however. 'We consider it highly unlikely non-Western governments are willing to spend literally millions of dollars if they know they're only getting 56 bits of security,' he says.
GSM Arena
3 days ago
- GSM Arena
WhatsApp is testing a new guest chats feature
Michail, 05 August 2025 WhatsApp is testing a new guest chats feature that allows users to start a chat with people who do not have a WhatsApp account. As uncovered by WABetaInfo, the feature is present in the WhatsApp beta for Android (version 2.25.22.13), and it is expected to be implemented in the regular WhatsApp Android and iOS apps in the near future. WhatsApp guest chats feature The guest chat feature allows WhatsApp users to send a chat link via text message, email or social media to people in their contacts who do not have the app or an active WhatsApp account. Once the link is opened, the non-WhatsApp user will be transferred to a platform similar to WhatsApp Web, where they can chat with WhatsApp users with end-to-end encryption. Guest chats come with several limitations as users won't be able to send media files, GIFs, voice messages or start video calls. They work on WhatsApp's own ecosystem. The new feature is likely implemented as part of the European Union's platform interoperability measures, which require different online services to communicate with each other. Source
GSM Arena
3 days ago
- GSM Arena
WhatsApp is testing a new guest chats feature
WhatsApp is testing a new guest chats feature that allows users to start a chat with people who do not have a WhatsApp account. As uncovered by WABetaInfo, the feature is present in the WhatsApp beta for Android (version 2.25.22.13), and it is expected to be implemented in the regular WhatsApp Android and iOS apps in the near future. WhatsApp guest chats feature The guest chat feature allows WhatsApp users to send a chat link via text message, email or social media to people in their contacts who do not have the app or an active WhatsApp account. Once the link is opened, the non-WhatsApp user will be transferred to a platform similar to WhatsApp Web, where they can chat with WhatsApp users with end-to-end encryption. Guest chats come with several limitations as users won't be able to send media files, GIFs, voice messages or start video calls. They work on WhatsApp's own ecosystem. The new feature is likely implemented as part of the European Union's platform interoperability measures, which require different online services to communicate with each other. Source
Tahawul Tech
31-07-2025
- Business
- Tahawul Tech
Quantum-safe networks are cornerstone of tomorrow's digital infrastructure
In a world where nearly every aspect of our lives is connected, encryption is what keeps our digital systems trustworthy. It protects everything from financial transactions to national intelligence. But that protection won't hold forever. Quantum computing, once the stuff of science fiction, is edging closer to practical reality. With it comes a new set of challenges to how we keep information secure. Here in the Gulf, where digital transformation is accelerating at breakneck speeds, the stakes are rising. Initiatives like the UAE's Digital Government Strategy and Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 have led to an explosion of digital services, cloud platforms, and cross-border data flows. But with this growth comes a stark reality: adversaries are already harvesting encrypted data today, waiting for quantum computers to break the cryptographic algorithms we rely on. Rethinking network security for the quantum age Quantum-safe networks (QSNs) are emerging as a vital part of the solution. These systems combine post-quantum cryptography (typically at application layer) with techniques like symmetric key infrastructure and / or quantum key distribution (at IP and Optical level) to build layered security frameworks across infrastructure. The goal isn't just to defend against future risks but to harden networks now, add risk mitigations measures with long term security, especially as cyberattack sophistication and frequency increase. This shift is already underway. In Europe, a live trial between Proximus and Nokia demonstrated how quantum encryption can be layered into live networks. In Asia, similar pilots with SK Broadband and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power have proven scalability. And closer to home, operators in the GCC are laying the groundwork for similar capabilities, driven by the region's urgent push toward digital sovereignty. This is happening against the backdrop of a booming data center market. The GCC's data center sector is projected to more than double in size by 2030, growing from $3.48 billion in 2024 to over $9.4 billion. As demand for AI applications, cloud infrastructure, and sovereign hosting grows, securing these environments from emerging threats becomes mission critical. Making the shift: what it really takes Getting quantum-ready is not an overnight process. It begins with mapping what you already have. Surprisingly, a large share of organisations still lack complete visibility into their cryptographic assets, a gap that becomes riskier as quantum threats move from theoretical to practical. Alongside conducting audits, organizations can begin implementing Quantum-Safe Cryptography (QSC), particularly at the network layer—IP and optical—where deployment is significantly faster than at the application level. This approach enables immediate risk mitigation by securing critical infrastructure early, while teams are trained to adopt crypto-agile and resilient processes and prepare for broader integration.. This transition also needs to be seamless. With the help of zero-touch encryption, automated policy management, and advanced orchestration platforms, it is possible to strengthen security without compromising performance or uptime. These tools are especially valuable in the Gulf's smart infrastructure environments, where service continuity is non-negotiable. Scaling security for the region's digital ambitions Telecom operators, hyperscalers, and data centre providers across the Middle East are already feeling the pressure to enhance their security posture. The GCC cybersecurity market is projected to skyrocket, from $4.8 billion in 2024 to nearly $15 billion by 2031. That growth isn't just driven by threat vectors. It's a direct response to the expanding digital landscape and the geopolitical importance of regional infrastructure. Modern chipsets now support encryption at speeds of 800G and deliver up to 75% energy savings over previous generations. In the Gulf's hot and high-demand environments, that's a significant advantage. At the same time, architecture must accommodate encryption across long-haul optical networks and sovereign cloud environments without adding latency. These are the very requirements regional carriers are tackling now, often in collaboration with international partners and standards bodies. A strategic opportunity to lead This isn't just a defensive play. It is a chance to lead. The global market for quantum-safe technologies is expected to grow rapidly in the years ahead. And countries like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are already investing in quantum computing R&D and advanced AI ecosystems, signaling their intent to be at the forefront of this wave. The GCC's focus on cyber resilience is also accelerating. National cybersecurity agencies, such as the UAE Cyber Security Council, are actively collaborating with private and international entities to address vulnerabilities and raise the region's security posture. A 2025 report highlighted over 223,000 vulnerable assets in the UAE alone, with many remaining exposed for years, making quantum resilience a non-negotiable pillar of future planning. Operators in the region have a unique chance to go a step further by offering quantum-safe infrastructure as a service. In doing so, they won't just be securing their own networks, they will be enabling banks, hospitals, utility providers, and governments to do the same. Resilience isn't optional, its foundational Quantum computing is no longer an abstract concept. While it promises breakthroughs in everything from medicine to logistics, it also threatens the cryptographic systems our societies rely on. In regions like the GCC, where digital growth is central to economic strategy, the consequences of inaction could be severe. By embedding quantum-safe technologies into the core of their networks, Gulf organizations can secure their most valuable data, protect their national priorities, and lay the foundation for trusted digital ecosystems. In the quantum age, it's not just about reacting to what's coming. It's about shaping it. Because when trust, privacy, and security are on the line, resilience isn't a luxury. It's the cornerstone of progress. This Op-ed is authored by Carlo Corti, Head of Optical Networks, Nokia Middle East and Africa
Forbes
31-07-2025
- Forbes
Why You Should All Be Worried About Q-Day And The Collapse Of Digital Security
Imagine waking up one morning to find that there's no such thing as privacy or secrets anymore. Suddenly, it's no longer possible to verify that any digital transmissions, from money transfers to telephone calls, are genuine. Which means they can't be made. Without the digital encryption that secures our digital world, everyone from hostile foreign states to terrorist cells can access government and military information, as well as our personal health records and bank accounts. It sounds like the premise for a disaster thriller, but the threat is very real, and according to proponents of a theory known as Q-day, it could be on us sooner than we think. Q-day is a term used in cybersecurity talk to mark the moment when quantum computers become powerful enough to easily smash through the cryptographic protection that secures every piece of sensitive information stored online. And while still hypothetical, the threat is considered to be very serious by governments, corporations and security experts, who are investing heavily in finding a solution. So, how worried should we be? Let's take a look at the evidence, what experts are saying, and what we can do to make sure we're prepared. What's So Scary About Q-Day? Encryption involves taking one piece of information and transforming it into another by following an algorithm that can later be reversed when the information needs to be decrypted. That information could be the data your computer or phone downloads from the internet, or the instructions you send to your bank when you transfer money. It's secured using a 'key' (code) that only those with the right to access the information have. But if someone else can guess it, or work it out mathematically by comparing the difference between encrypted and decrypted data, they can crack the encryption. So far this has been impossible, because the mathematics would take a classical (non-quantum) computer an impractical amount of time to solve, as in 3 trillion years impractical. In 1994, however, mathematician Peter Shor showed that eventually a powerful enough quantum computer might crack it in a matter of seconds. At the time, this was pure science fiction. Today, quantum computers are a reality, and their power is increasing by the moment. Q-day is considered to have enormous geopolitical significance. There's no way to know yet what form state-sponsored attacks against encryption could take. But theoretically, it could involve an aggressive nation deploying it militarily against a rival's banking, healthcare, telecoms or defense infrastructure. On top of this, most of the systems we rely on day-to-day to protect our privacy and security would become worthless. Everybody could be tracked through their phone signal, and bank and cryptocurrency accounts could be plundered on a whim. In reality, it's probably more likely that those systems would simply stop working, causing economies to crash and society to descend into chaos! Even shutting systems down wouldn't be enough to protect data that's already out there. Malicious actors are already engaging in 'harvest now, decrypt later' attacks, storing huge quantities of stolen encrypted data for a time when it can be decrypted. Estimates vary as to how long we have. Google thinks it could happen by 2029, while Adi Shamir—one of the cryptography experts behind the development of RSA encryption—believes it's at least 30 years away. But everyone agrees that it's coming, sooner or later, so what's being done about it? And just as importantly, what do we as individuals need to know if we want to take personal responsibility for our future safety? Quantum-Safe Cryptography With a threat of this scale, it makes sense that governments, militaries, and corporations aren't simply sitting around waiting for the apocalypse to happen. In the U.S., the problem is recognized at the top level, with former President Biden signing a national security memorandum in 2022 prioritizing the development of quantum-safe technology. Companies like Cloudflare that are responsible for security across large swathes of the internet are also adopting post-quantum cryptography. At the same time, banks and financial service companies are well aware that the threats are particularly challenging for them. HSBC, for example, recently demonstrated a quantum-safe method for trading digital assets. How exactly does quantum-safe technology work? Well, like everything quantum-related, it's a hugely technical subject that requires a PhD in physics to fully understand. But one technique, known as Quantum Key Distribution, involves sending keys as photons (light particles) that will alert the owner if anyone attempts to intercept and measure them. This is due to one of the peculiar quirks of quantum mechanics that shows simply measuring particles can change them! It's important to remember, though, that we can still play a part in ensuring the safe transfer of digital information, even if we aren't quantum scientists working directly on solving the problem. Consumer manufacturers are starting to roll out quantum-safe versions of the tools and apps we use in everyday life, such as Apple's PQ3 protocol that protects its iMessage system; as, too, are VPN service providers, which are starting to upgrade their internal security. So while it might be too late to ensure that data encrypted before the arrival of QSC and QKD never falls into the wrong hands, we can ensure the data being created today will be as safe as possible. So, Should We Be Worried? Will all of this be enough to head off the predicted cyber-apocalypse of Q-Day? Well, what we know for sure is that it's still being treated as a very real and serious threat. Technological workarounds are emerging, but in reality, there will probably be no way to know for sure how effective they will be until Q-Day arrives. Rather than worry, the best advice is to start getting prepared. This involves long-term planning and auditing your own requirements around data security, particularly around data that has to be stored for a long period of time. If you run a business and its success or survival is dependent on its ability to keep data safe (as is true for most companies), then it's a threat that can't be ignored. But individuals should also take the opportunity to reflect on how important data protection and privacy are when it comes to keeping us safe, so we're also prepared for what's on the horizon.
