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Zawya
3 days ago
- Business
- Zawya
Why is Africa missing from map of maritime power?
At a recent high-level debate at the United Nations Security Council, global leaders gathered to confront what has become an undeniable truth. The maritime domain is no longer just a space of commerce. It is a theatre of geopolitical competition, digital infrastructure, and hybrid threats. The tone was urgent. The consensus was clear. Freedom of navigation, global supply chain stability, and maritime domain awareness were all underscored as priorities for international peace and economic resilience. Yet as statement after statement filled the chamber, some bold, some tactical, many assertive, one reality became unmistakably clear. Africa was once again peripheral in the very conversation that should have placed it at the centre. This is not a new pattern. It is a familiar and increasingly dangerous blind spot. The oceans surrounding Africa cover approximately 214 million square kilometers, and with 90 percent of our trade flowing through maritime routes, the question is no longer whether the seas matter, but whether we control some of the most strategic maritime corridors in the global order — such as the Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Guinea, Mozambique Channel, and Red Sea. These are not peripheral routes. They are critical arteries of global trade, leverage points for security, and gateways to the continent's economic future. The African Union already has a legally binding framework—the Lomé Charter, officially known as the African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa—designed to safeguard this maritime space. Yet the gap between this framework and actual enforcement remains dangerously wide. Unless Africa moves from ratification to real operational command, the Charter will remain an unfulfilled promise, while foreign actors consolidate control along our coastal zones. In global maritime debates, Africa is still framed not as a sovereign actor, but as a vulnerability to be managed. While other states unveil national maritime strategies, negotiate port access, and expand blue-water naval capacities, Africa is often discussed in terms of donor support, capacity building, and technical cooperation. This framing is no longer acceptable. It is not just inaccurate, it is strategically reckless. The most recent UNSC debate reflected a growing recognition among powerful states that the maritime space is becoming the next frontier of rivalry and realignment. From illegal fishing and shadow fleets to undersea cables and dual-use ports, the threats and opportunities at sea are multiplying. Notably, there was broad consensus around the principle that maritime security is foundational to global stability. But what went largely unspoken is that much of that stability hinges on African waters, and yet African states are neither setting the agenda nor controlling the frameworks through which their maritime zones are governed. This is not merely a diplomatic oversight. It is a structural vulnerability. Africa's maritime space is becoming a contested zone of influence, infrastructure, surveillance, and sovereignty. Foreign naval exercises are proliferating along our coasts. Deep-water ports are being constructed or retrofitted with limited transparency. Seabed exploration contracts are being signed without robust continental oversight. Intelligence and surveillance capabilities are expanding in ways that often bypass our own regulatory institutions. This is not partnership. It is strategic encroachment, masked in the language of cooperation. If Africa does not establish its own maritime doctrine, if we do not assert control over our sea lanes, ports, and maritime infrastructure, we will find ourselves locked into a future in which our sovereignty is incrementally diluted. That erosion will not come by way of invasion. It will come through quiet contracts, fragmented deals, and the absence of a unified continental response. What is required now is not rhetoric, but a recalibration of posture. The African Union must move beyond symbolic declarations and operationalize the 2050 Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy. Regional institutions must lead in coordinating legal and security frameworks into a unified continental position on port access, naval cooperation, and maritime law. A permanent continental body, independent, technocratic, and politically anchored, must be established to audit all foreign maritime infrastructure and security arrangements. We need a binding Continental Maritime Sovereignty Protocol, adopted and upheld by member states, that sets clear standards for transparency, strategic alignment, and reciprocity in all maritime engagements with non-African actors. Member states must assert their collective right to shape the rules of maritime governance, not merely comply with frameworks set elsewhere. In this context, the recent article 'From Pirates to Profits: East Africa Must Rule the Indian Ocean' published in The EastAfrican offers a timely and strategic intervention. It rightly reframes the Indian Ocean not merely as a security concern but as a zone of economic command, and calls for East African nations to lead rather than observe. The emphasis on regional naval cooperation, robust port governance, and sovereign control of the Blue Economy resonates strongly with the broader continental imperatives discussed here. These are the types of contributions that must move from editorial pages to policy rooms. Moreover, Africa must invest urgently in coastal surveillance, maritime intelligence fusion centres, and naval command capacity. Maritime security is not simply about defending waters. It is about controlling the flow of goods, data, energy, and influence. In this domain, control is strategy. Africa has every right to be a decisive maritime power. But rights unclaimed become rights unrealised. The tide is shifting in global maritime affairs. Africa can no longer afford to be cast as a passive route of extraction or a problem to be solved. We are a strategic continent. Our waters are not corridors. They are commands. It is time we start governing them as such. Abdisaid M. Ali is the chairperson of Lomé Peace and Security Forum, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and Former National Security Advisor, Somalia. © Copyright 2022 Nation Media Group. All Rights Reserved. Provided by SyndiGate Media Inc. (
Malay Mail
25-05-2025
- Business
- Malay Mail
Securing the maritime commons: Why Asean, GCC, and China must navigate toward shared naval cooperation — Phar Kim Beng
MAY 25 — In an age of intensifying maritime rivalry and rising naval nationalism, few regions possess the geopolitical leverage, commercial reach, and diplomatic flexibility to shape a new maritime security architecture. But as the seas grow more contested, Asean, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and China are finding common cause — through trade, infrastructure, and now, maritime security. One of the most underutilised platforms for this cooperation is the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) — a 34-nation naval coalition headquartered in Bahrain. With task forces operating across the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Gulf, and parts of the Indian Ocean, the CMF's mission is deceptively simple: to guarantee the freedom of navigation and uphold maritime stability. But its real utility lies in its open-ended structure, which allows willing partners to plug in without ideological alignment. While Asean as a bloc is not a formal member, countries like Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have contributed to CMF operations as observers or auxiliary support. The GCC, meanwhile, anchors the CMF's physical infrastructure, hosting forward-operating naval bases and control centres. China, though not a participant, runs parallel maritime missions — most notably in the Gulf of Aden — positioning it as a 'functional converger,' if not a formal ally. Beyond the horizon: From strategic chokepoints to shared stakes The strategic logic is unassailable. With half of the world's oil and gas passing through Gulf and Southeast Asian sea lanes, maritime cooperation is not a luxury — it's a necessity. As piracy, trafficking, and grey-zone coercion persist, especially in the Straits of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and the South China Sea, the old binaries of U.S.-led versus China-led blocs no longer hold. What matters now is operational interoperability, timely information, and political will. This is where the CMF and future maritime cooperation arrangements could evolve toward a C4ISR framework — the digital nervous system of modern naval operations. Understanding C4ISR: The backbone of modern maritime strategy C4ISR stands for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. It integrates real-time data from satellites, drones, radar, and naval sensors to help commanders understand the battle space, respond swiftly, and coordinate effectively. In essence, C4ISR: Enhances Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), a critical need for Asean countries facing IUU fishing and territorial incursions. Enables joint operations without formal alliances, ideal for Asean and GCC states wary of entangling security commitments. Facilitates crisis coordination in grey zones and disaster-prone maritime corridors. For instance, the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) in Singapore already acts as a hub for sharing maritime intelligence with partners including CMF members. Extending this to a Gulf-Asean-China maritime C4ISR bridge would dramatically boost collective security and build confidence in overlapping patrol zones. China, for its part, has rapidly improved its C4ISR capabilities with BeiDou navigation systems, maritime drones, and AI-driven surveillance analytics. While the West views these with caution, Asean and GCC countries could benefit by standardising threat assessments, coordinating HADR (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) missions, and jointly policing shared sea lanes — without provoking hegemonic anxieties. German Navy M1061 Rottweil and Lithuanian Navy M54 Kursis minehunters attend international naval mine clearance operation "Open Spirit / EODEX 2025" at sea near Klaipeda, Lithuania May 20, 2025. — Reuters pic From soft patrols to hard coordination The possibilities for structured maritime cooperation are expanding: Joint patrols under humanitarian or environmental mandates can avoid geopolitical entrapment while building trust. Anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and Sulu-Celebes Seas could be coordinated through a modular Asean-GCC-CMF task force. Maritime cyber defense — a rising concern with the advent of autonomous vessels and port digitalisation — could see trilateral cooperation in tracking maritime malware, rogue signals, and GPS spoofing. In this, China's technical prowess, the GCC's strategic geography, and Asean's diplomatic neutrality are complementary assets, not contradictions. Challenges at sea, opportunities in strategy Yet the path to convergence is not free of squalls. Asean remains divided on issues like the South China Sea; the GCC countries still face trust deficits with Western and Eastern powers alike; and China remains wary of joining any platform it does not lead. Moreover, legal ambiguities in UNCLOS, overlapping territorial claims, and the lack of interoperability in naval platforms all hinder more robust integration. Nonetheless, the stakes demand vision. As the Red Sea chokepoint becomes increasingly unstable, and as U.S. focus shifts erratically between Europe and the Indo-Pacific, regional players must step up. Charting a shared course through the CMF and beyond The Combined Maritime Forces — if seen not as a U.S.-centric construct but as a neutral public good — can become a launchpad for strategic confidence-building between Asean, the GCC, and China. But more importantly, it could anchor a new form of modular, inclusive maritime multilateralism, one that leverages C4ISR systems not for domination, but for collective maritime resilience. In the age of climate stress, piracy resurgence, and great-power posturing, the task is clear: secure the maritime commons before they become battlegrounds. And that begins not with warships, but with data, trust, and dialogue — the real engines of 21st-century sea power. * Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of Asean Studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia and Visiting Faculty, Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya. ** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
